Thornton v. Oliver

Filing 67

ORDER denying 66 Petitioner's Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Louisa S Porter on 12/20/11. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(lmt)(jrd)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WILLIAM CECIL THORTON,

Civil No.

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Petitioner,

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11-cv-0338-IEG (POR)

ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

v.
EUKETA OLIVER,
Respondent.

[ECF No. 66]

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On February 17, 2011, Petitioner William Cecil Thorton (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner

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proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) On December 5, 2011, Petitioner filed his fifth Motion to Appoint

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Counsel. (ECF No. 66.) Petitioner argues the appointment of counsel is necessary because his

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claims are meritorious and he is unable to afford legal counsel.

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The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to federal habeas corpus actions by

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state prisoners. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 495 (1991); Chaney v. Lewis, 801 F.2d 1191,

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1196 (9th Cir. 1986); Knaubert v. Goldsmith, 791 F.2d 722, 728 (9th Cir. 1986). However,

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financially eligible habeas petitioners seeking relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 may obtain

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representation whenever the court “determines that the interests of justice so require.” 18 U.S.C.

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§ 3006A(a)(2)(B); Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 912 F.2d 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 1990); Bashor v. Risley,

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730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984).

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In the Ninth Circuit, “[i]ndigent state prisoners applying for habeas relief are not entitled to

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11cv338-IEG (POR)

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appointed counsel unless the circumstances of a particular case indicate that appointed counsel is

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necessary to prevent due process violations.” Chaney, 801 F.2d at 1196; Knaubert, 791 F.2d at

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728-29. A due process violation may occur in the absence of counsel if the issues involved are too

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complex for the petitioner. In addition, the appointment of counsel may be necessary if the

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petitioner has such limited education that he or she is incapable of presenting his or her claims.

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Hawkins v. Bennett, 423 F.2d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1970).

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In the absence of counsel, however, “[t]he procedures employed by the federal courts are

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highly protective of a pro se petitioner’s rights,” and “[t]he district court is required to construe a pro

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se petition more liberally than it would construe a petition drafted by counsel.” Knaubert, 791 F.2d

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at 729 (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (holding pro se complaint to less stringent

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standard) (per curiam)); Bashor, 730 F.2d at 1234.

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Here, Petitioner does not present any new facts or circumstances demonstrating the

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appointment of counsel is necessary. Indeed, the instant motion is identical to Petitioner’s previous

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motion for appointment of counsel. As the Court has found on four previous occasions, Petitioner

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has adequately represented himself to date. Petitioner’s voluminous filings demonstrate an

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understanding of the law and relevant facts. On November 18, 2011, Petitioner filed a Traverse to

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Respondent’s Answer. No further briefing is required at this time. Therefore, at this stage of the

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proceedings, the Court finds that the interests of justice do not require the appointment of counsel.
Based on the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES without prejudice Petitioner’s Motion for

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Appointment of Counsel.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: December 20, 2011

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LOUISA S PORTER
United States Magistrate Judge

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cc:
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The Honorable Irma E. Gonzalez
All parties
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11cv338-IEG (POR)