Murillo v. Parkinson et al

Filing 26

ORDER Denying 19 Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal on 4/3/12. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(ecs)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RAMON MURILLO,

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vs.

CASE NO. 11cv1687-BEN(BGS)
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL

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P. FLOURNOY; T GOFF; VILLAROMAN;
DENNIS MORRIS; CHARLES MARSH; D/
PARAMO; DOES 1-5;,

[Doc. No. 19]

Defendants.

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On March 16, 2012, Plaintiff Ramon Murillo, a prisoner proceeding pro se and In

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Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action, filed a motion to appoint counsel. (Doc. No.
19.)
Plaintiff requests appointment of counsel for the following reasons: (1) he is proceeding
IFP; (2) he is confined to administrative segregation, therefore, his access to the law library
is limited; (3) he is a mental health patient; (4) he is not equipped to conduct discovery; (5) he
is not sufficiently trained in legal matters; (6) the case involves Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation employees; and (7) the case is complex. (Doc. No. 19.)
“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.” Rand v.
Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman, 654 F.2d 1349,
1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360,

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11cv1687-BEN

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1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation

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omitted). Thus, federal courts do not have the authority “to make coercive appointments of

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counsel.” Mallard v. United States District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United

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States v. $292,888.04 in U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).

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Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), to

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“request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of “exceptional

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circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390 F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir.

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2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff

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seeking assistance requires at least an evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on

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the merits and an evaluation of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the

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complexity of the legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v.

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Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

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1017 (9th Cir. 1991).

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The Court denies Plaintiff’s request without prejudice, as neither the interests of justice

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nor exceptional circumstances warrant appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere v. Risley,

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827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Plaintiff has thus far been able

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to articulate his claims, as the Court found that Plaintiff’s complaint contains allegations

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sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required by 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2) and

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1915A(b). (See Doc. No. 8 at 3.)

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Furthermore, it does not appear that the legal issues involved are so complex that

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counsel is warranted at this stage of the proceedings. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.3d

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1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that, “If all that was required to establish successfully the

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complexity of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need for development of further

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facts, practically all cases would involve complex legal issues.”).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 3, 2012
Hon. Bernard G. Skomal
U.S. Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
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11cv1687-BEN