Villa v. Cate et al

Filing 9

SCREENING ORDER Dismissing Claims Against Defendants Steadman and Gonzales for Failure to State a Claim; ORDER, CASE TRANSFERRED to Southern District of California signed by Magistrate Judge Sheila K. Oberto on 10/17/2011. (Flores, E)[Transferred from California Eastern on 10/18/2011.]

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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ROBERT VILLA,

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Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 1:11-cv-00876-SKO PC
SCREENING ORDER DISMISSING CLAIMS
AGAINST DEFENDANTS STEADMAN AND
GONZALES FOR FAILURE TO STATE A
CLAIM, AND TRANSFERRING ACTION TO
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

v.
MATTHEW CATE, et al.,

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Defendants.

(Doc. 1)
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I.

Screening Requirement and Standard

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Plaintiff Robert Villa, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil

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rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 31, 2011. The Court is required to screen

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complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or

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employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or

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portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to

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state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who

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is immune from such relief. 28U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader

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is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but

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“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

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do not suffice,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell

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Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007)), and courts “are not required

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to indulge unwarranted inferences,” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir.
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2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While factual allegations are accepted as true,

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legal conclusions are not. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.

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Under section 1983, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each defendant personally participated

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in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th

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Cir. 2002). This requires the presentation of factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim

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for relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir.

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2009). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Iqbal,

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129 S.Ct. at 1949-50; Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

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II.

Discussion

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Plaintiff’s claims arise out of his validation as a gang associate, allegedly in retaliation

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against him for filing a grievance and for assisting other inmates with filing grievances. Plaintiff was

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incarcerated at Centinela State Prison during the operative events. Following Plaintiff’s validation

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and the assessment of a Security Housing Unit (SHU) term, he was transferred to the California

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Correctional Institution (CCI) on May 21, 2010, where he remains incarcerated.

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To the extent that Plaintiff has stated any cognizable claims for relief arising out of his gang

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validation, the events occurred almost exclusively at Centinela State Prison. Venue for claims

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arising out of events at Centinela State Prison is proper in the United States District Court for the

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Southern District of California. While venue for claims which accrued at CCI is proper in this

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division, only two defendants named in the complaint worked at CCI, and Plaintiff has not alleged

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facts sufficient to give rise to a plausible claim for relief against either of those defendants.

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Defendant Steadman, who is or was a Chief Deputy Warden at CCI, allegedly violated

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Plaintiff’s right to due process on June 24, 2010. Defendant Steadman was the chairperson of the

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committee conducting Plaintiff’s initial SHU review hearing following his transfer to CCI. Plaintiff

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complained to the committee that he had been wrongfully validated and he was being retained

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without a 114-D form. Defendant said he was aware of the issue but to “602 it.” (Comp., ¶73.)

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These facts do not support a plausible claim for relief under section 1983, Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-

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50; see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (2005) (to state a due process

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claim, the plaintiff must first identify the existence of a protected liberty interest); Bruce v. Ylst, 351
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F.3d 1283, 1287 (9th Cir. 2003) (regarding gang validation issues, prisoners are entitled to the

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minimal procedural protections of adequate notice, an opportunity to be heard, and periodic review),

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and to the extent that Plaintiff believes staff at CCI violated his constitutional rights separately

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following his transfer to CCI, those claims are not properly joined with the claims arising out of his

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validation at Centinela State Prison, Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), 20(a)(2); Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950,

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952 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff may file a

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separate suit challenging his current conditions of confinement at CCI, but he may not litigate

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unrelated claims against unrelated parties in this suit.

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Regarding Defendant Gonzales, who was the Warden at CCI, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant

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was involved in transferring Plaintiff to CCI in retaliation against him for filing a grievance.1 There

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are no factual allegations supporting Plaintiff’s bare assertion that Defendant Gonzales was

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personally involved in transferring him from Centinela State Prison to CCI for retaliatory reasons.

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Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949-50. Given that Plaintiff was validated, assessed a SHU term, and transferred

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from Centinela State Prison, allegedly in retaliation for a grievance he filed while at Centinela, it is

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unclear how the warden of the receiving institution hundreds of miles away could have been

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personally involved in those actions, but assuming that Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts

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sufficient to state a claim against Defendant Gonzales, a substantial part of the events nonetheless

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occurred at Centinela State Prison.

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“For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may

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transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.” 28

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U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Davis v. Mason County, 927 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1991) (courts have

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broad discretion regarding severance); Costlow v. Weeks, 790 F.2d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (court

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may raise defective venue sua sponte). Retaining the action in a division in which one defendant was

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located at one time and against whom a claim does not currently lie is not convenient for the other

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The current Acting W arden of CCI is Michael Stainer. The Court is unaware if or where Defendant
Gonzales is currently employed

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defendants or the potential witnesses and it is not in the interest of justice.2 This action should have

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been filed in the Southern District of California, where the operative events occurred, and the Court

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shall therefore order it transferred.

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III.

Order

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For the reasons set forth above, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

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Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Steadman and Gonzales are dismissed, without
prejudice, for failure to state a claim under section 1983; and

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2.

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This action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of California.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated:
ie14hj

October 17, 2011

/s/ Sheila K. Oberto
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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Given that Plaintiff had been validated and assessed a SHU term prior to his transfer to CCI, the Court can
discern no grounds for a viable due process claim against Defendant Steadman, W ilkinson, 545 U.S. at 221; Bruce,
351 F.3d at 1287, leaving only Defendant Gonzales against whom a claim might be stated, although even that is
speculative at best at this juncture, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Doe I, 572 F.3d at 681.

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