Lara v. Aurora Loan Services LLC et al

Filing 17

ORDER denying 10 Application for a Temporary Restraining Order. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 5/10/12. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(kaj)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GEORGE LARA,

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CASE NO. 12cv904-LAB (POR)
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING APPLICATION
FOR A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER

vs.
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AURORA LOAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff George Lara is a distressed homeowner who faces imminent eviction from

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his home following a non-judicial foreclosure. Now before the Court is his ex parte motion

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for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) to halt that eviction while this case is pending.

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TROs are for emergencies only. The high hurdle plaintiffs must clear to obtain them

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“reflect[s] the fact that our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action

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taken before reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides

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of a dispute.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438 (1974).

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The TRO standard is the same as the preliminary injunction standard, with the additional

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requirement that the applicant show immediate relief is necessary. See, e.g., Hunt v. Nat’l

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Broad. Co., Inc., 872 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1989). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b)(1)(A)

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(movant must “show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the

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movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition”). “A plaintiff seeking a

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preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is

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likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of

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12cv0904

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equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural

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Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 129 S.Ct. 365, 374 (2008).

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The Court has carefully reviewed Lara’s original complaint (Dkt. No. 1), Aurora Loan

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Services’ motion to dismiss the complaint (Dkt. No. 6), and Lara’s memo in support of a TRO

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(Dkt. No. 10). It finds that Lara has failed to establish that his claims are likely to succeed

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on the merits, and his motion for a TRO is accordingly DENIED. His complaint, as Aurora

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Loan Services points out, is a nearly incomprehensible jumble of misplaced statements and

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conclusory legal claims. His TRO isn’t much better. It lacks structure and a clear narrative.

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It lacks meaningful factual content. It lacks concise argument with reference to the legal

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standard for issuance of a TRO. It is full of conclusory legal claims regarding the fraud and

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ill intentions of the Defendants. It goes to great lengths to reference other cases in which

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banks have been accused of wrongdoing to somehow suggest that Lara’s own claims are

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righteous. Most problematic, it references a November 18, 2011 order of the San Diego

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Superior Court affirming the very eviction that Lara now asks this Court to enjoin. (The order

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granted summary judgment to an unlawful detainer action brought by Aurora Loan Services.)

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That makes this case, and, the TRO that Lara seeks, effectively an appeal from a state court

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judgment—which is plainly prohibited by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.1 See Gomez v. San

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Diego Family Court, 388 Fed.Appx. 685 at *1 (9th Cir. 2010).

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In light of the above, Lara’s motion for a TRO is DENIED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: May 10, 2012

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HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS
United States District Judge

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If the case is ongoing, of course, abstention doctrine rather than Rooker-Feldman

applies.
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12cv0904