Brown v. Gore et al
Filing
218
ORDER Denying: (1) Reconsideration of Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Discovery; and (2) Reconsideration of Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Quash (Docs. 191 , 193 ). Signed by Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal on 10/3/2014. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (srm)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
ROBERT MARK BROWN, II,
Civil
No.
12
Plaintiff,
13
ORDER DENYING:
14
(1) RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER ON
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
COMPEL DISCOVERY; and
v.
15
16
17
DEPUTY #1, Deputy Sheriff; et al.,
18
12-cv-1938-GPC (BGS)
(2) RECONSIDERATION OF
ORDER ON
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
QUASH
Defendants.
19
[ECF Nos. 191, 193.]
20
21
22
I. INTRODUCTION
This case comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motions for reconsideration of: (1)
23
the Court’s March 5, 2014 Order Granting In Part and Denying In Part Plaintiff’s Motion to
24
Compel [ECF No. 191]; and (2) the Court’s March 4, 2014 Order Granting In Part and
25
Denying In Part Defendant’s Motion to Quash [ECF No. 193]. After careful consideration
26
of Plaintiff’s arguments, the motions for reconsideration are DENIED for failure to present
27
newly discovered evidence or a change in controlling law that would support of
28
reconsideration.
1
12cv1938-GPC
1
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
2
Generally, under the “law of the case” doctrine, a court is precluded from
3
reconsidering an issue which has already been decided by the same court. United States v.
4
Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). However, motions for reconsideration may,
5
under the discretion of the court, be heard in circumstances where there has been a change
6
in the controlling law or facts. Id., Midgard Tempering, Inc. v. Seals Corp. of America, 902
7
F.3d 703, 715 (9th Cir. 1990). In the absence of such a circumstance, a court lacks discretion
8
to stray from the “law of the case” doctrine. Alexander, 106 F.3d at 876 (citing Thomas v.
9
Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir.1993)). Motions for reconsideration are not to be used to
10
simply “rehash” arguments and facts previously considered by the court in making its ruling.
11
See Costello v. U.S. Government, 765 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 1991); Taylor v.
12
Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 1989). Therefore, without “new or different facts,” the
13
“law of the case” doctrine will preclude reconsideration of a court’s decision. Alexander,
14
106 F.3d at 876 (citing Thomas v. Bible, 983 F.2d 152, 155 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also School
15
Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Oregon v. ACandS, Inc. 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993)
16
(“Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered
17
evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if
18
there is an intervening change in controlling law.”)
19
III. DISCUSSION AND ORDER THEREON
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its ruling on Defendant’s motion to quash
Plaintiff’s subpoena requests which found:
(1) Plaintiff’s subpoena Request No. 1 imposed an “undue burden”. The Court
explained: “Weighing the burden on Defendants against the needs of Plaintiff - who
has already received use-of-force reports specific to his three incidents ... Plaintiff
requests records for all use of force reports that evidence, mention, or refer to any and
all use of force incidents at all San Diego County Jails within the last 10 years. This
request is overbroad on its face and exceeds the bounds of discovery designed to lead
to relevant evidence by seeking: (1) information over a ten-year period despite the fact
that Plaintiff’s incident took place in 2012; (2) information regarding all use of force
of reports, not just those pertaining to the defendants named in this case; and (3)
information regarding use of force incidents at all San Diego County Jails, not just
use-of-force incidents occurring at the jail where Plaintiff is housed.”
(2)
Plaintiff’s subpoena Request No. 5 was duplicative and irrelevant. The Court
2
12cv1938-GPC
1
2
3
4
5
stated: “Plaintiff’s entire medical file has been produced .... the court cannot require
Defendants to produce additional documents that do not exist. Manning, 247 F.R.D.
at 652. Nevertheless, the parties should be aware that they are all are under a
continuing obligation to supplement responses if additional, relevant information is
discovered. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e). As for the part of Plaintiff’s Subpoena Request No.
5 that seeks documents concerning all the felonies of which Plaintiff has ever been
convicted .... all documents concerning the three incidents at issue in this action have
already been produced.... Plaintiff has not shown how a listing of his past criminal
history is relevant or likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence concerning
the events of April 21, 2012 and April 23, 2012 and May 2, 2012.”
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
[ECF No. 176.]
Plaintiff also moves the Court to reconsider its ruling on his motion to compel
which held:
(1) Defendants’ production of use-of-force policies and rules was responsive to
RFP No. 1 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production seeking policies on
staff supervision of inmates. The Court noted Defendants produced: the “Manual
of Policies and Procedures No. I-89 (Use of Force); 0.3 (Inmate Rules and
Regulations); San Diego County Sheriff’s Department Procedure Section 2.49 and
6.48; Addendum Section F (Use of Force Guidelines); SDSD Detention Services
Bureau - George Bailey Detention Facility Green Sheet I.89.G (Use of Force) and
0.3.G (Facility Specific Inmate Rules and Regulations.” The Court’s ruling further
advised the parties that each is under a continuing obligation to supplement
responses to requests for production of documents if either discovers or obtains
additional, relevant information.
(2) Plaintiff’s RFP No. 3 of Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production, which
sought all of Plaintiff’s detention center file, was unduly overbroad because
documents for all periods of Plaintiff’s various incarcerations were not calculated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as to the three incidents at issue in
the present case which occurred in 2012. Moreover, Defendants had produced
booking records for Plaintiff’s November 3, 2011 arrest, prison grievances from
November 2011 to the present, incident reports for all three events that are the
subject of Plaintiff’s complaint, photographs of Plaintiff from May 2, 2012 and all
of Plaintiff’s medical records that could be located.
(3) Plaintiff’s RFP Nos. 1, 2,3 4, 5, and 6 of Plaintiff’s Second Set of Requests for
Production, which sought all documents referring to racial prejudice, dishonesty,
fabrication, morally lax character, unnecessary acts of aggressive behavior, acts of
violence, discriminatory actions against homosexuals, any acts of excessive force
for all deputy sheriffs at George Bailey Detention Facility within the last 10 years,
were unduly overbroad because of their unlimited scope and time-period.
24
25
26
[ECF No. 177.]
Plaintiff does not base his request for reconsideration on facts newly discovered or
27
new law as is required, but instead attempts to re-argue or clarify points made in his
28
original motion to compel and opposition to Defendants’ motion to quash. A motion for
3
12cv1938-GPC
1
reconsideration, however, is not the proper vehicle for reiterating arguments that have
2
already been raised or for presenting positions that could have been raised at the time the
3
motions at issue were brought. See School Dist. No. 1J Multnomah County v. AcandS,
4
Inc., F. 3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th
5
Cir. 2003) (explaining that “a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent
6
highly unusual circumstances”; [it is an] “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in
7
the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.”) Plaintiff’s motions for
8
reconsideration fail to identify any newly discovered facts, changes in controlling law or
9
manifest injustice.1 2 Therefore, both motions are DENIED.
10
11
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: October 3, 2014
12
Hon. Bernard G. Skomal
U.S. Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
1
On March 4, 2014, the Court ordered Defendants to provide a copy of the video for the
April 23, 2012 incident and the May 2, 2012 incident to Plaintiff. [ECF No. 176.]
2
27
28
After an extensive in camera review of performance evaluation reports and excessive
force-related Internal Affairs files for Defendants Villareal, Henton, Weber, Pierson and Garcia,
the Court ordered Defendants on May 5, 2014, to produce Performance Report Nos. p00001p00003; p00020-p00065; p00066-p00076; p00077-152; p00153-211; and Internal Affairs File
Nos. p000216-p000223. [ECF No. 203.]
4
12cv1938-GPC
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?