Greenspan v. Cate

Filing 17

ORDER: 1) Overruling Petitioner's Objections 16 ; Adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge 15 ; Denying Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 11 ; Denying Request for Evidentiary Hearing 1 ; Denying Certificate of Appealability. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 1/16/14.(cge)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 13 KYLE BLAKE GREENSPAN, v. Petitioner, 14 15 MATTHEW CATE, Secretary, 16 Respondent. 17 18 19 20 21 22 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Case No. 12-cv-2402-AJB (BGS) ORDER: 1) OVERRULING PETITIONER’S OBJECTIONS (Doc. No. 16); 2) ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE (Doc. No. 15); 3) DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (Doc. No. 1); 4) DENYING REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING (Doc. No. 1); and 5) DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 23 24 25 On October 3, 2012, Kyle Blake Greenspan (“Petitioner”), a state prisoner, 26 proceeding with the assistance of counsel, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 27 (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner seeks relief from his July 29, 2008 convictions of forcible rape 28 and sexual battery in San Diego County Superior Court Case No. SCD210048. Peti1 12cv2402 1 tioner served a three year prison sentence and is currently on a five year parole imposed 2 by the Superior Court. As a result of his conviction, Petitioner is required to register as a 3 sex offender pursuant California law. On April 17, 2013, Respondent filed an answer. 4 (Doc. No. 10.) On June 21, 2013, Petitioner filed his Traverse. (Doc. No. 14.) On 5 September 4, 2013, Magistrate Judge Skomal issued a Report and Recommendation 6 (“R&R”) recommending that the Petition be denied in its entirety. (Doc. No. 15.) On 7 September 24, 2013, Petitioner timely filed his objections to the R&R. (Doc. No. 16.) 8 For the reasons stated below, the Court ADOPTS Magistrate Judge Skomal’s well- 9 reasoned R&R and DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 10 I. BACKGROUND 11 A. Factual Background 12 The following facts are taken from the unpublished California Court of Appeal 13 (“Court of Appeal”) Opinion in People v. Greenspan, case no. D054840 (Cal. Ct. App. 14 Mar. 9, 2011.) Petitioner does not dispute the accuracy of the court’s factual summary. 15 The Court presumes these factual determinations are correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 16 2254(e)(1). See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (finding factual 17 determinations by state courts are presumed correct absent clear and convincing evi- 18 dence to the contrary). 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 R.A. was 23 years old at the time of trial and testified that she had known Greenspan from grade school, but in the years afterwards they had only brief, sporadic interactions, including once in 2004, when they kissed in a friend’s college dormitory. In June 2007, they renewed contact and exchanged text messages and phone calls. In the early morning of July 7, 2007, he accepted her invitation to her apartment to watch a movie with her and her friends. He seemed drunk when he arrived and he drank beer there. After the movie ended they went upstairs to her bedroom and sat on her bed reminiscing about grade school. At one point he playfully pushed her chest such that she lay on the bed, but she immediately came back up. He tried to kiss her but she turned her head. While he was still fully clothed, he pushed her on the bed, pressed his weight on her, hooked one of his arms around her shoulder and, with his other forearm, pushed down on her lower stomach while he kept trying to kiss her. He raped her. He ejaculated on her shirt. She ran to the bathroom, changed her shirt and ran downstairs crying. At the time of the incident she was five feet three inches tall and weighed 130 pounds. 28 2 12cv2402 R.A.’s crying woke up one of her roommates at approximately 3:30 a.m., and R.A. told her Greenspan had raped her, and he was asleep on her bed. The roommate told her to stay in the laundry room while she asked him to leave the house. The roommate testified that he was lying of R.A.’s bed wearing only his boxer shorts. She woke him up and repeatedly told him he needed to get dressed and leave. He kept asking “What did I do?” She reiterated that he had to leave. She walked him to the front porch and he asked her if R.A. thought he had raped her. The roommate responded, “Okay, good. So you do know what you did. You need to leave.” 1 2 3 4 5 At approximately 4:00 a.m., while R.A. was still in the laundry room, she telephoned a girlfriend–who did not answer–so she telephoned that friend’s boyfriend. He testified that R.A. was crying and sounded shaken up. His girlfriend spoke to R.A. and they immediately went to R.A.’s apartment, where she was crying and appeared “traumatized.” They took her to the hospital, where she cried during an interview with a police officer. In a sexual assault response team (SART) exam, a forensic nurse examined her and determined that she had vaginal redness that was consistent with either consensual or nonconsensual sexual intercourse. The parties stipulated that tests done on R.A.’s shirt by the San Diego Police Department’s Forensic Unit showed that sperm from the shirt matched Greenspan’s DNA. 6 7 8 9 10 11 Greenspan was five feet eleven inches tall and weighed approximately 195 pounds at the time of the incident. He testified at trial that after the movie he and R.A. talked in her bedroom. According to Greenspan, his sex with R.A. was consensual, he was not wearing a condom and ejaculated on her chest. She wiped herself with her shirt. He was shocked that night when R.A.’s roommate woke him and told him he had to leave. He asked the roommate whether R.A. thought he had raped her, denied doing so, and asked to speak to R.A. The roommate refused that request. He felt sad that he was blamed for making R.A. cry, and he telephoned her as he was walking from her residence, but she did not answer. 12 13 14 15 16 17 The parties stipulated that approximately one week after the incident, a detective helped R.A. make a pretext telephone call to Greenspan. The jury heard a recording of the call, in which Greenspan repeatedly apologized to R.A., at one point stating, “I am so sorry, I know that you don’t think that’s good enough or I guess I took it the wrong way and I didn’t know.” R.A. told him he had raped her and he replied that he did not feel she had pushed him away. R.A. told him she needed to hear him say why he was sorry and he replied, “Because I guess I took advantage of you and I am sorry and I didn’t mean to hurt you in any way in that way because, you know, I would never hurt you.” He continued, “I have two older sisters, I would never ever do that.” 18 19 20 21 22 23 (Lodg. No. 7, at 2-4.) 24 25 26 27 28 The defense theory at trial was that the sexual encounter between Greenspan and R.A. was consensual. (See Lodg. No. 2, Reporter’s Transcript (“RT”) vol. 2 at 289-335.) B. Procedural Background Petitioner was charged with rape (Cal. Penal Code § 261(a)(2)) and sexual battery (Cal. Penal Code § 243.4(a)). The trial began on July 23, 2008. Both sides rested after a 3 12cv2402 1 little over two days of trial. The jury deliberated for approximately two hours before 2 finding Petitioner guilty of both charges. (Lodg. No. 1, Clerk’s Transcript (“CT”) at 3 0001-0002; 0283-0296.) Defense counsel moved to dismiss, or in the alternative for a 4 continuance of the sentencing to permit additional forensic investigation into potential 5 grounds for a new trial. The court denied the dismissal motion but granted a 60-day 6 continuance. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 3 at 650-658.) 7 On November 20, 2008 the court reconvened and acknowledged a pending motion 8 for new trial. By this time, Petitioner had replaced his trial counsel, Bradley C. Patton, 9 with substitute retained counsel Catherine Denevi. (Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 265.) New 10 counsel moved to compel disclosure of juror identification information in order to 11 investigate alleged misconduct. That motion was denied. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 4 at 660- 12 661.) On February 25, 2009, the court held a hearing for the motion for new trial which 13 alleged instances of legal error, juror misconduct, and evidentiary challenges to the 14 verdict. (Lodg. No. 1, CT vol. 2 at 174-219.) The court accepted as true all the affidavit 15 representations of defense counsel’s experts and private investigators as well as coun- 16 sel’s representations about what other witnesses would say. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 17 670-682.) The court denied the motion after addressing each of the motion’s grounds 18 presented, assessed the significance or insignificance of each item of evidence, and 19 evaluated the credibility of the witnesses and strength of the trial evidence. The judge 20 concluded “while I think this is a very sad case, I don’t think it is a miscarriage of 21 justice.” (Id. at 682, 685: “I agree with probation, I probably would have put him on 22 probation if that had been an option in this case.”) The court imposed the lower term of 23 three years on count one and the lower term of two years on count two, with the latter 24 sentence stayed, for a total prison term of three years, plus payment of restitution, 25 followed by a period of parole. (Id. at 685-687.) The court further ordered that after his 26 release, Petitioner would be required to register as a sex offender pursuant to Cal. Penal 27 Code § 290. (Id. at 687.) 28 4 12cv2402 1 Petitioner appealed his conviction, alleging trial error related to the court’s 2 handling of a juror’s note, potential juror misconduct, and the giving of one jury 3 instruction. (Lodge. No. 4 (Cal. Ct. App. Case No. D054840).) In February 2010, while 4 his direct appeal remained pending, Petitioner also filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas 5 Corpus in the California Court of Appeal. (Lodg. Nos. 12, 13, Case No. D056822.) “In 6 that petition, Greenspan alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failure to 7 accurately convey a pre-trial offer, failure to investigate and present impeachment 8 evidence in the form of R.A.’s post-incident conduct as depicted on a videotape, and 9 failure to present character witnesses favorable to him.” The court, at Petitioner’s 10 request, consolidated the habeas petition with the direct appeal. (Lodg. No. 13.) The 11 Court of Appeal issued an order to show cause returnable in Superior Court in this matter 12 and directed the Superior Court to hear and determine the matter. (Id.) 13 On October 18, 2010, the Superior Court denied Petitioner’s Habeas petition and 14 rejected on the merits each of the three ineffective assistance of trial counsel alleged. 15 (Lodg. No. 16 at 2 (Cal. Superior Court, Case No. HC20063).) On March 9, 2011, the 16 appellate court decided Greenspan’s direct appeal on the merits, affirming the judgment 17 and denying him relief on any of his alleged trial errors. (Lodg. No. 7, slip op.) On 18 April 19, 2011, Petitioner filed a Petition for Review to the California Supreme Court. 19 In his Petition for Review, Petitioner presented only one issue: “Whether the Court of 20 Appeal erred in affirming the exclusion under Evidence Code §§ 352 and 782, [of] 21 photos of the complainant in a rape prosecution posted on her Facebook page showing 22 her partying in Las Vegas days after she claimed she had been raped?” (Lodg. No. 9 23 (Cal. Supreme Ct., Case No. S192405).) The California Supreme Court denied the 24 petition. (Lodg. No. 18.) 25 On October 3, 2012, Petitioner filed a federal Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 26 challenging his state conviction on two grounds. Ground One alleges Petitioner was 27 denied his right to confront and cross-examine the complaining witness, in violation of 28 the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, by the trial court 5 12cv2402 1 “excluding certain Facebook photos from the victim’s Law Vegas trip a few days after 2 the incident. Ground Two alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 3 Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment for three alleged deficiencies: (1) trial counsel’s 4 failure to convey to Petitioner the prosecution’s potential pre-trial offer to allow him to 5 plead guilty to a reducible felony that did not require registration as a sex offender; (2) 6 trial counsel’s failure to investigate and present evidence of the complainant’s conduct 7 subsequent to the incident that contradicted her testimony at trial; and (3) trial counsel’s 8 failure to interview witness and present character witnesses on behalf of Petitioner. (Doc. 9 No. 1.) 10 On April 17, 2013, Respondent filed an answer. (Doc. No. 10.) Petitioner filed his 11 Traverse on June 21, 2013. (Doc. No. 14.) Magistrate Judge Skomal issued the R&R on 12 September 4, 2013, recommending this Court deny the Petition in its entirety. (Doc. No. 13 15.) Petitioner filed timely objections to the R&R on September 24, 2013, challenging 14 only the R&R’s conclusion as to Ground One and part one of Ground Two. (Doc. No. 15 16.) 16 II. LEGAL STANDARDS 17 A. Review of the Report and Recommendation 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) provide district 19 judges’ duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district 20 court judge should “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report to 21 which the objection is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the 22 finding or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); 23 see also United States v. Remsing, 874 F.2d 614, 617 (9th Cir. 1989). However, in the 24 absence of timely objection(s), the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no clear 25 error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes (1983); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 27 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). 28 6 12cv2402 1 2 B. Habeas Corpus Relief A federal court “shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf 3 of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground he is 4 in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 5 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 6 (“AEDPA”) controls review of this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). 7 Under AEDPA, a habeas petition will not be granted with respect to any claim adjudi- 8 cated on the merits by the state court unless that adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision 9 that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established 10 federal law; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determina- 11 tion of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the state court proceeding. 28 12 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1-2); Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). In deciding a state 13 prisoner’s habeas petition, a federal court is not called upon to decide whether it agrees 14 with the state court’s determination; rather, the court applies an extraordinarily deferen- 15 tial review, inquiring only whether the state court’s decision was objectively unreason- 16 able. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 4 (2003); Medina v. Hornung, 386 F.3d 872, 17 877 (9th Cir. 2004). 18 A federal habeas court may grant relief under the “contrary to” clause if the state 19 court applied a rule different from the governing law set forth in United States Supreme 20 Court cases, or if it decided a case differently than the Supreme Court on a set of 21 materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). A federal 22 court may grant relief under the “unreasonable application” clause if the state court 23 correctly identified the governing legal principle from Supreme Court decisions, but 24 unreasonably applied those decisions to the facts of a particular case. Id. Additionally, 25 the “unreasonable application” clause requires that the state court decision be more than 26 incorrect or erroneous; to warrant habeas relief, the state court’s application of clearly 27 established federal law must be “objectively unreasonable.” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 28 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). 7 12cv2402 1 “Clearly established federal law” means the law as determined by the United 2 States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). “Circuit precedent may provide ‘persua- 3 sive authority’ for purposes of determining whether a state court decision is an ‘unreason- 4 able application’ of Supreme Court precedent,” but “only Supreme Court holdings are 5 binding on state courts, and ‘only those holdings need be reasonably applied.’” Rodgers 6 v. Marshall, 678 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Campbell v. 7 Rice, 408 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). “[W]hen a Supreme Court decision does not 8 ‘squarely address[] the issue . . . it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly 9 established’ Supreme Court precedent addressing the issue,” and the federal court “must 10 defer to the state court’s decision.” Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742, 754 (9th Cir. 2009); 11 see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 77 (2006) (the lack of holdings from the 12 Supreme Court on the issue presented precludes relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)). In applying 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal habeas courts must defer to reasonable 13 14 factual determinations made by the state courts, to which a statutory presumption of 15 correctness attaches. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 16 473- 74 (2007). To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the 17 Court “looks through” to the last reasoned state court decision as the basis for its 18 analysis. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 801-8-3 (1991). If the dispositive state 19 court order does not “furnish a basis for its reasoning,” federal courts must conduct an 20 independent review of the record to determine whether the state court’s decision is 21 contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law. 22 See Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by 23 Andrade, 538 U.S. at 75- 76; accord Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 24 2003). 25 III. 26 DISCUSSION Petitioner makes two specific objections to the R&R. First, Petitioner objects to 27 the finding of the R&R that the California Court of Appeal’s decision rejecting his claim 28 that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser based on the 8 12cv2402 1 exclusion of the accuser’s Facebook photos, was not contrary to, or an unreasonable 2 application of, clearly established federal law as interpreted by the United States 3 Supreme Court. Second, he objects to the failure of the R&R to apply a de novo standard 4 of review to his claim he was denied effective assistance of counsel because of the state 5 court’s refusal to follow its own procedure and conduct an evidentiary hearing where the 6 petitioner alleged facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. (Doc. No. 16 at 1-2.) 7 Petitioner does not object to the R&R’s recommendation to deny relief based on the 8 second and third parts of the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (Id. at 2.) The 9 Court makes a de novo review of those portions of the R&R Petitioner objects to. 10 A. Ground One: Evidentiary Ruling Excluding Las Vegas Photographs 11 Petitioner disputes, under the “objectively unreasonable” standard of review used 12 by the R&R, that he is not entitled to relief on Ground One of his Petition. Specifically, 13 Petitioner contends that the AEDPA does not require deference to a state court decision 14 that identified the correct legal rule but unreasonably applied it to the facts at hand. 15 According to Petitioner, the Court of Appeal unreasonably applied the law to the facts 16 because the Facebook photos related directly to the complainant’s credibility as well as 17 that of her roommates and friends who testified for the prosecution. 18 The photographs at issue were pictures posted on R.A.’s Facebook page on July 19 18, 2007, showing a trip she had made to Las Vegas shortly after the incident. The 20 pictures included comments such as “[if] [R.A.] and I only knew that this picture 21 embodied the rest of the night . . .”; “[d]amn, hike your skirt up a little more, slut,” and 22 “THIS IS A THANK YOU TO [R.A.] FOR MAKING ME UNDERWEAR!!!!!” (Lodg. 23 1, CT vol. 2.) Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to exclude these photos, along with 24 other photos posted prior to July 7, 2007, pursuant to California Evidence Code §§ 782 25 and 1103. The trial court excluded evidence of three photos depicting R.A.’s trip to Las 26 Vegas. Defense argued that these photos were relevant to rebut claims R.A. made to 27 Petitioner, in the pretext call of July 12, 2007, that she was devastated by the incident. 28 The Court allowed photographs before the incident, finding that they related to a period 9 12cv2402 1 of time when R.A. and Petitioner were reconnecting and admitted them as relevant to 2 reveal their relationship, including inferences going to Petitioner’s consent theory 3 defense. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 13-14.) However, as to the photographs of R.A.’s 4 Las Vegas trip, the trial court found little relevance value expressing doubt on whether 5 the defense could attack her credibility in the pretext call. (Id. at 14-16.) This issue 6 resurfaced twice during trial and the trial court reaffirmed its decision both times. (Id. at 7 269, 477.) 8 9 The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s exclusion, finding the pictures were of suggestive poses and therefore sexual conduct within the meaning of California 10 Evidence Code §§ 782 and 1103. (Lodg. No. 7 at 9-10.) The Court of Appeal also found 11 the photos and comments were “minimal” on the issue of R.A.’s credibility and mislead- 12 ing or confusing by focusing on her conduct, therefore the trial court’s exclusion under 13 California Evidence Code § 352 was not an abuse of exclusion: 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 The pictures were taken and posted after the rape incident, and therefore were not relevant on the issue of whether R.A. consented to sexual intercourse with Greenspan. Whatever claimed probative value the photos had specifically regarding Greenspan’s claim that they undermined R.A’s credibility because they contradicted her demeanor at trial - was minimal, and outweighed by the prejudice they would have caused in terms of confusing the issues for the jurors, and misleading them into focusing on R.A.’s conduct after the incident in Las Vegas. (Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 9-10) Moreover, their exclusion did not deny Petitioner the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment. A state court decision may be overturned and a writ issued only when the state court decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of an authoritative decision of the Supreme Court. See Baylor v. Estelle, 94 F.3d 1321, 1325 (9th Cir. 1996). A decision involves an “unreasonable application” of federal law if it either (1) correctly identifies the governing rule but then applies it to a new set of facts in a way that is objectively unreasonable, or (2) extends or fails to extend a clearly established legal principle to a new context in a way that is objectively unreasonable. Hernandez v. Small, 282 F.3d 1132, 1142 (9th Cir. 2002). 28 10 12cv2402 1 Petitioner objects to the R&R’s affirmation of the Court of Appeal’s conclusion, 2 specifically that the photographs were of limited relevance which “unreasonably 3 narrowed the effect of the posting.” (Doc. No. 16 at 20.) Petitioner contends that the 4 photographs were “unequivocal evidence that R.A. was anything [but] traumatized . . . 5 would have been critical evidence to show her claim she was traumatized was an act, and 6 from that, that her claim of rape was also false.” (Id.) Moreover, Petitioner argues that 7 this evidence was necessary to call into question R.A.’s credibility, which played a 8 crucial factor in the prosecution of this case. (Id. at 21.) Finally, Petitioner claims that 9 R.A. “cried rape because she did not want to jeopardize her on again/off again relation- 10 ship with her boyfriend Gabe,” and the R&R incorrectly minimized this claim. Thus 11 exclusion amounted to a Confrontation Clause violation and the Court of Appeal’s 12 decision was objectively unreasonable as the court “unreasonably applied the law to the 13 facts.” (Id. at 2.) 14 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an 15 accused in a criminal prosecution “to be confronted with the witness against him.” See 16 Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678, 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986). Exposing a 17 witness’ motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitution- 18 ally protected right of cross-examination. Id. (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316- 19 317, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974). In determining whether a defendant’s Confrontation Clause 20 right was violated, a court looks to three factors: (1) whether the excluded evidence was 21 relevant; (2) whether there were other legitimate interests outweighing the defendant’s 22 interest in presenting the evidence; and (3) whether the exclusion of evidence left the 23 jury with sufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness. U.S. v. Larson, 24 495 F.3d 1094, 1103 (9th Cir. 2007). Trial judges are afforded wide latitude insofar as 25 the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose limits on cross-examination based on 26 concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the 27 witness’ safety or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Van 28 Arsdall, 475 U.S 678-79. 11 12cv2402 1 After considering these factors and the record before it, the Court is unable to 2 declare a violation of Petitioner’s right to confront or cross-examine the witness based on 3 the exclusion of the Las Vegas photographs. 4 First, a review of the record shows the primary purpose for seeking their inclusion 5 was to use that evidence to undermine the complainant’s testimony on the “tangential 6 issue of the purported severity of her post-incident trauma.” (See Doc. No. 15 at 21.) 7 The photographs were never used to establish R.A.’s motive to lie about the forcible 8 nature of the encounter. In admitting some photographs from R.A.’s social media sites 9 posted before the incident, the trial court distinguished the relevance of those photo- 10 graphs from the excluded ones. The trial court found that the admitted photographs 11 related to a period of time when R.A. and Petitioner were reconnecting and thus admitted 12 them as relevant to reveal their relationship and any inferences going to Petitioner’s 13 theory of consent. However, as to the probative value of the Las Vegas pictures, the trial 14 court found it “not enormous.” (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 13-14.) The Court of Appeals 15 agreed finding that the pictures were taken and posted after the incident, thus not 16 relevant on the issue of consent. ((Lodg. No. 7, slip op. at 9-10). 17 Second, the trial court found the Las Vegas photographs to be “character evi- 18 dence.” (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 1 at 19-21.) The trial court reasonably feared that the Las 19 Vegas photographs of R.A. partying could be interpreted as character evidence. Thus 20 excluded the pictures based on the finding that they had no probative value on the issue 21 of consent and only speculative value to show R.A. was not traumatized by her encoun- 22 ter with Petitioner and therefore it must have been consensual rather than forcible. The 23 Court of Appeal concurred with the trial court’s ruling. 24 Third, the exclusion of the Las Vegas photographs did not leave the jury with 25 insufficient information to assess the credibility of the witness. As noted above, the trial 26 court admitted some photographs that tended to show the development of Petitioner’s 27 relationship with R.A., thus allowing the jury to consider the theory of consent. Defense 28 counsel vigorously cross-examined R.A., suggested potentially impeaching interpreta12 12cv2402 1 tions of her conduct with Petitioner, their interactions in the days leading up to the 2 incident, and her prior statements. Though the Court is sympathetic to Petitioner’s 3 position and indeed agrees with the trial court’s characterization that this was a sad case, 4 the Court does not find that exclusion of the Las Vegas photographs rose to the level of a 5 constitutional violation. 6 Petitioner’s Objection primarily relies on Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227 (1988) 7 to argue that the California courts and the R&R were incorrect in holding the photo- 8 graphs were erroneously excluded. (Id. at 20.) Olden involved the prosecution of a black 9 defendant for rape, kidnaping, and sodomy. Olden, 488 U.S. at 228. The petitioner had 10 asserted a defense of consent and asserted, all throughout trial, the alleged victim 11 concocted the rape story to protect her relationship with her then live-in boyfriend. The 12 defendant argued it was crucial he be allowed to introduce evidence of their cohabitation 13 to show the alleged victim’s motive to lie. Id. at 229-30. However, the trial court 14 excluded all evidence of the victim’s living arrangement, even when she testified on 15 direct examination that she was living with her mother. Id. at 230. In reversing, the 16 Supreme Court found that the trial court’ refusal to permit the defendant from cross- 17 examining the complainant regarding her cohabitation violated the defendant’s Sixth 18 Amendment right to confront the witness, as such evidence was relevant to defendant’s 19 claim that he and complainant engaged in consensual sexual acts. The Olden Court 20 identified complainant’s motive to lie and found the excluded evidence had impeach- 21 ment value to support her motive to lie. Id. at 232. 22 The Court agrees with the R&R that Olden is distinguishable from the case at 23 hand. (See Doc. No. 15 at 20.) In Olden, the petitioner consistently asserted that he and 24 the complainant engaged in consensual sexual acts and therefore lied about being raped 25 out of fear of jeopardizing her relationship with her live-in boyfriend. Thus, denying the 26 petitioner the opportunity to cross-examine her about her cohabitation when she testified 27 she lived with her mother amounted to a Confrontation Clause violation as a “reasonable 28 jury might have received a significantly different impression of [the witness’] credibility 13 12cv2402 1 had [defense counsel] been permitted to pursue his proposed line of cross examination. 2 Olden, 488 U.S. 232. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s characterization that R.A.’s motive 3 4 to lie, and any inference and probative value that may be revealed by the Las Vegas 5 photographs are “vastly more tenuous” than in Olden.” (Doc. No. 15 at 21.) Notably, as 6 stated above, trial counsel’s primary purpose in seeking inclusion of the photographs was 7 to counter R.A.’s testimony on the severity of her post-incident trauma. Though 8 Petitioner presents a plausible theory that the photographs show R.A. was not trauma- 9 tized, therefore she lied when she testified to the contrary, and thus the entirety of her 10 testimony is not credible, such an inferential link is too attenuated for this Court to 11 disturb the findings of the trial judge, who directly presided over the case and had 12 firsthand knowledge of all the relevant facts and evidence. Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and ADOPTS the 13 14 R&R’s findings and conclusion for Ground One. 15 B. 16 Ground Two: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Petitioner seeks relief from the California Courts failure to hold an evidentiary 17 hearing on whether Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel because he was 18 not told of a potential plea offer. The R&R recommended the Court deny Petitioner’s 19 claim after finding Petitioner failed to show the state court reached an unreasonable 20 result under the deferential exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2). Petitioner 21 objects to the R&R’s failure to use a de novo standard in reviewing the state court 22 decision on the matter. 23 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a “defendant must show both 24 deficient performance by counsel and prejudice.” Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 739 25 (2011) (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121, 129 S. Ct. 1411, 1419 26 (2009)). The Supreme Court, in explaining the standard and its relationship to the 27 AEDPA, writes 28 To establish deficient performance, a person challenging a conviction must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of 14 12cv2402 1 2 3 4 reasonableness.’ Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a strong presumption’ that counsel's representation was within the wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689. The challenger's burden is to show that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Id. 5 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 787 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 “Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 7 356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 8 The factual allegations concerning this issue are as follows. Petitioner’s trial 9 attorney, Mr. Patton, told Petitioner the prosecution would move to dismiss the charge of 10 rape in exchange for a plea of guilty to a felony charge of false imprisonment with a 11 recommendation of no prison or jail time, but he would be required to register as a sex 12 offender. (Lodg. 17, Ex. E.) Petitioner refused the offer because he was told he would 13 have to register as a sex offender. (Id.) After trial and during a February 25, 2009 14 sentencing hearing, the prosecutor made the following statement in open court: 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 MS. CANO: Your honor, I think this was a sad case for all parties and I think that is why Mr. Patton who is an excellent attorney tried to persuade me to accept an offer 236, 237 which would have been a felony. Could have been reduced to a misdemeanor and would have had no 290 or sex offender registration for the rest of his life. Reluctantly I agreed to that. Within five minutes Mr. Patton called me back after speaking to the family and it was the arrogance of the family that now ties the court’s hand. It is the family that decided, no, we are going forward. And I think . . . the only option for this court is to give him the three years that is mandated by law. (Lodg. No. 2, RT vol. 5 at 683.) According to Petitioner, he and his family were shocked to hear this because they 22 had been told the plea for false imprisonment would require lifetime sex offender 23 registration. (Doc. No. 16 at 23.) Petitioner and family members spoke to Ms. Denevi, 24 his counsel during sentencing, that no such pre-trial offer, without a PC 290 registration, 25 had been communicated to them. (Id.) 26 Petitioner presented the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to 27 convey the pre-trial offer in his Superior Court Petition. (Lodg. No. 16 at 2.) That court 28 considered the merits and evidence presented by Petitioner and the prosecution, includ15 12cv2402 1 ing signed declarations submitted by Mr. Patton and Deputy District Attorney Cano. The 2 court found, contrary to Petitioner’s claim, an offer that did not include lifetime registra- 3 tion as a sex offender was never made. Mr. Patton’s declaration, signed under penalty of 4 perjury, stated “[m]y suggested resolution was for Kyle to plead guilty to a reducible 5 felony (PC 237) with no PC 290 registration. At no time did the District Attorney’s 6 office extend an offer of settlement of PC 26/237 with no PC 290 registration require- 7 ment. Ms. Cano never indicated to me that her office would agree to this resolution. 8 Nor did Kyle or his family give me authority to make that specific offer of settlement in 9 this case.” (Patton Declaration, page 4:9-13) (Lodg. No. 16 at 3.) 10 Ms. Cano’s Declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, confirmed Mr. Patton’s 11 account by stating: “I went back to my office with the intention of discussing the counter 12 offer with [my supervisor] but, stopped in my office before going into her office. Within 13 minutes of reaching my office, Mr. Patton called me and told me not to bother running 14 the offer by my supervisor because Mr. Greenspan was not interested in pleading guilty 15 to any charge. I never discussed Mr. Patton’s counter offer with my supervisor because I 16 considered it withdrawn.” (Cano Declaration, page 3:20-24) (Lodge. No. 16 at 3.) 17 The state court noted that “[t]he problem in this case is not with the above 18 quotations that clearly indicates no offer was made and thus, there can be no claim or 19 failure to convey an offer that did not exist. Rather, Deputy Cano readily admits she 20 made an ‘off the cuff’ reference during the sentencing hearing . . . [She] failed to be more 21 precise about the fact that [she] agreed to discuss it with [her] supervisor. But, [she] was 22 intercepted by Mr. Patton before [she] had a chance to do so. [She] never agreed to any 23 offer made by Mr. Patton.” (Id. at 3-4.) Additionally, the Superior Court was presented 24 with declarations submitted by Petitioner, family members, as well as Petitioner’s post- 25 trial defense counsel. (See Lodg. No. 15; see also Lodg. No. 17.) The court concluded 26 that the evidence presented does not justify the conclusion that the prosecution made the 27 offer but Mr. Patton failed to present the offer to Petitioner. (Id. at 4.) The R&R found 28 16 12cv2402 1 the state court, “relying on competent evidence in the record, thus resolved this claim in 2 an objectively reasonable manner.” 3 Petitioner disputes the R&R’s finding that “this case does not fall under the ambit 4 of Missouri v. Frye, __ U.S. __, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012)” and argues the R&R overlooks 5 Petitioner’s claim that the California Courts failed to follow their own habeas procedure 6 as set forth by People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995). (Doc. No. 16 at 26.) 7 Petitioner contends that the error alleged, the failure to convey a potential pre-trial offer, 8 was a critical error thus amounting to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim under 9 Frye and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985), which requires effective assistance 10 “both prior to trial during plea negotiations as well as performance during trial.” (Doc 11 No. 16 at 26.) Petitioner objects to the R&R’s narrow reading of Frye. (Id.) 12 The R&R found that Petitioner’s characterization of trial counsel’s allegedly 13 deficient performance rested on the failure to convey a possible or potential offer he 14 would have accepted. However, Frye only establishes the duty to communicate a formal 15 offer, therefore his claim for relief and request for an evidentiary hearing should be 16 denied. (Doc. No. 15 at 27) (citing Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408-09). 17 There is no doubt that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 18 counsel extends to the negotiation of a plea bargain, as it is a critical stage for 19 ineffective-assistance purposes. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372, 130 S. Ct. 20 1473 (2010) (noting that it has been 25 years since the Supreme Court first applied 21 Strickland to claims of ineffective assistance at the plea stage). Ineffective assistance 22 has been found where counsel failed to correctly convey plea offer terms, Nunes v. 23 Mueller, 350 F.3d 1045, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003), and where counsel failed to inform 24 defendant the government had made a plea offer, see U.S. v. Blaylock, 20 F.3d 1458, 25 1466 (9th Cir. 1994). However, Petitioner has not cited, and the Court has not found, 26 any precedent finding an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on counsel’s 27 failure to inform defendant of a potential plea offer. 28 17 12cv2402 1 Instead, Petitioner asks the Court should look to the rationale of Frye in the instant 2 case, which holds that the Sixth Amendment effective assistance requirement applies to 3 plea negotiations. (See Doc. No. 16 at 26.) Even considering the rationale of Frye, the 4 Court is unable to declare Mr. Patton’s failure constitutes deficient performance under 5 Strickland standards. See Frye, 132. S.Ct. at 1402 (“Stickland’s two part test governs 6 ineffective assistance claims in the plea bargain context.”). The Court cannot conclude 7 that it was “objectively unreasonable” for counsel to not communicate a potential offer 8 that has not been finalized or approved. Such inaction may be due to a variety of 9 reasons. Some examples include, not wishing to raise the hopes and expectations of a 10 defendant and family members when formalization of an offer is tenuous or when a 11 potential offer still requires the approval of supervising attorneys which may take some 12 time. Petitioner argues that the error alleged, a failure to communicate the potential pre- 13 trial offer, “was a critical error that derailed any later plea negotiations.” However, such 14 a contention is much too speculative for this Court to disturb the findings of the State 15 Courts. 16 The Frye Court’s explanation of why negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical 17 stage rested on the reality that plea bargains are central to the administration of the 18 criminal justice system, and thus defense counsel have responsibilities during the 19 bargaining process as well. Id. at 1407. Benefits of plea bargaining include conserva- 20 tion of valuable prosecutorial resources and for defendants to receive more favorable 21 terms. Id. However, in order for these benefits to be realized, criminal defendants 22 require effective counsel during plea negotiation. Id. at 1408. In the instant case, these 23 benefits would not have been realized as there was never a formal offer on the table. 24 Without established precedent suggesting otherwise, the Court does not find Mr. Patton 25 to have breached any duty or responsibility simply for failing to convey a possible offer 26 that was being negotiated on. Therefore, the Superior Court’s finding was not contrary 27 to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, nor an unreasonable determination of the 28 facts from the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 18 12cv2402 Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and ADOPTS the 1 2 R&R’s recommendation to deny Petitioner’s relief based upon the ineffective assistance 3 of counsel claim. 4 C. 5 Request for an Evidentiary Hearing In determining whether a petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under 6 AEDPA, a court must determine whether a factual basis exists in the record to support 7 the petitioner’s claim. If it does not, and an evidentiary hearing might be appropriate, the 8 court’s first task in determining whether to grant an evidentiary hearing is to ascertain 9 whether the petitioner has failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court. If 10 the applicant has not failed to develop the facts in state court, the district court may 11 proceed to consider whether a hearing is appropriate or required under Townsend v. Sain, 12 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745 (1963) (overruled on other grounds). Earp v. Ornoski, 431 13 F.3d 1158, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 14 Under Townsend, there are six circumstances that may entitle a petitioner to an 15 evidentiary hearing: (1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state 16 hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a 17 whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to 18 afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly discovered 19 evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; 20 or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas 21 applicant a full and fair hearing. 22 Petitioner objects to the R&R for its failure to apply a de novo standard in 23 reviewing the state court decision denying an evidentiary hearing. (Doc. No. 16 at 26.) 24 However, a federal court may not independently review the merits of a state court 25 decision without first applying the AEDPA standards. In other words, a federal court 26 may not grant an evidentiary hearing without first determining whether the state court’s 27 decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts. Earp, 431 F.3d at 1166-67 28 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S. Ct. 1166 (2003)); see Schriro v. 19 12cv2402 1 Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007) (“Because the deferential stan- 2 dards prescribed by § 2254 control whether to grant habeas relief, a federal court must 3 take into account those standards in deciding whether an evidentiary hearing is appropri- 4 ate.”). However, if a defendant can establish any one of the Townsend circumstances, 5 then a federal court may reasonable conclude the state court’s decision was based on an 6 unreasonable determination of the facts and independently review the merits of that 7 decision by conducting an evidentiary hearing. Earp, 431 F.3d at 1167. 8 Petitioner argues that the state court record is insufficient to decide the claim of 9 ineffective assistance of counsel as the Superior Court’s finding was made without the 10 benefit of an evidentiary hearing. (Traverse, Doc. No. 14 at 34-35) Moreover, Petitioner 11 argues an evidentiary hearing is warranted by the failure of the California Courts to 12 follow their own procedures, therefore justifying this Court to afford no deference to the 13 state court ruling on the issue. (Doc. No. 16 at 26.) 14 Petitioner contends the California Courts failed to follow “its own habeas corpus 15 procedures, as set forth in People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 (1995),” there by denying 16 him Due Process of law. (Doc. No. 16 at 26.) Petitioner states that there was a clear 17 factual dispute as to what was or was not conveyed to him, however the Superior Court 18 made a credibility decision based on the declarations of Ms. Cano and Mr. Patton, even 19 where they were directly contradicted by the declaration of Petitioner’s family members 20 as to what was conveyed to him as a potential offer. (Id.) Under California law, “[a]n 21 appellate court receiving such a [habeas] petitioner evaluates it by asking whether, 22 assuming the petitioner’s factual allegations are true, the petitioner would be entitled to 23 relief.” If the court “finds the factual allegations, taken as true, establish a prima facie 24 case for relief, the court will issue an OSC.”1 Duvall, 9 Cal.4th at 474-75. Issuance of 25 an OSC indicates the issuing court’s preliminary assessment that the petitioner would be 26 entitled to relief if his factual allegations are proved. Id. at 475. 27 28 1 Order to show cause. 20 12cv2402 1 A review of the record finds that the state proceedings did indeed follow the 2 procedure as established in Duvall. In February 2010, while his direct appeal remained 3 pending, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the California Court of 4 Appeal. That petition included the instant claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 That petition was consolidated with the pending appeal. (Lodg. No.13.) The appellate 6 court then issued an order to show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not 7 be granted and instructed, in pertinent part, that “the order to show cause is made 8 returnable before the superior court” and directed the Superior Court to “hear and 9 determine the matter.” (Lodg. No. 13, Docket in Case No. D056822 at 1.) The Superior 10 Court’s order denying Petitioner’s habeas relief reached and rejected the merits of the 11 ineffective assistance of counsel claim after a careful review of declarations submitted 12 from both parties, and therefore denied Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing as 13 unnecessary. (Lodg. No. 16.) 14 After reviewing the record before it, the Court finds that Petitioner has not shown 15 the need for an evidentiary hearing under Townsend. Petitioner’s allegations can be 16 construed as an attempt to establish the second Townsend circumstance, where a state 17 factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole or the sixth 18 circumstance, where it appears the state court did not afford a full and fair hearing. 19 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 313 (overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo- 20 Reyes, 503 U.S. 1., 112 S. Ct. 1715 (1992)). However, the Superior Court’s determina- 21 tion of the issue was grounded upon a review of declarations submitted, signed under 22 penalty of perjury, by both the Deputy District Attorney and Petitioner’s trial counsel. 23 Both attested that there had been talks of a potential plea that did not include lifetime 24 registration as a sex offender, however, no formal offer was made. Therefore, the 25 Superior Court’s factual finding, that no specific offer containing terms that included 26 avoidance of sex offender registration, rested on competent evidence in the record and 27 was fairly supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, as the state court reached 28 the merits of Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim and because Petitioner 21 12cv2402 1 has failed to show the state court decision was an unreasonable determination of the 2 facts, the R&R was correct in applying the “highly deferential” standard rather than a de 3 novo review. Coupled with the Court’s previous finding, that a failure to convey a 4 potential offer does not amount to ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court agrees that 5 an evidentiary hearing is neither warranted nor permissible under the AEDPA. The Court thus OVERRULES Petitioner’s objections and ADOPTS the R&R’s 6 7 recommendation to DENY Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing. 8 D. Remaining Grounds for Relief Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim includes two other basis 9 10 seeking relief: (1) counsel failed to investigate and present video of the victim’s post- 11 incident conduct and (2) counsel failed to interview and call character witnesses. (Doc. 12 No. 1 at 11-14.) The R&R recommended this Court deny relief based on these two 13 additional claims. (Doc. No. 15 at 28-33.) Petitioner makes no objection to this 14 recommendation. (Doc. No. 16 at 2.) 15 In the absence of objections, the Court “need only satisfy itself that there is no 16 clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. 17 Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes (1983); see also United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 18 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). Having reviewed the R&R, the Court finds the 19 report is thorough, well-reasoned, and contains no clear error. Accordingly, the Court 20 ADOPTS the R&R’s analysis and conclusion with regards to these aspects of Peti- 21 tioner’s claim. 22 D. Certificate of Appealability 23 When a district court enters a final order adverse to the applicant in a habeas 24 proceeding, it must either issue or deny a certificate of appealability, which is required to 25 appeal a final order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A certificate of 26 appealability is appropriate only where the petitioner makes “a substantial showing of 27 the denial of a constitutional right.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.322, 336 (2003). 28 Under this standard, the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists could debate 22 12cv2402 1 whether the petitioner should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues 2 presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further. 28 U.S.C. § 2253; 3 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 474 (2000). In the instant case, the Court finds that 4 reasonable jurists could not debate whether the petition should have been resolved 5 differently. 6 IV. CONCLUSION 7 This was a difficult case to resolve and the Court reiterates its sympathy to all 8 parties involved. However, given the record before it, the Court is unable to provide 9 federal habeas relief. For the foregoing reason, the Court hereby: 10 (1) OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection; 11 (2) ADOPTS the well-reasoned R&R in its entirety; 12 (3) DENIES the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus; 13 (4) DENIES Petitioner’s request for an evidentiary hearing; and 14 (5) DECLINES to issue a Certificate of Appealability. 15 IT IS SO ORDERED. 16 17 18 19 DATED: January 16, 2014 Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia U.S. District Judge 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 23 12cv2402

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