Rivas-Medina v. USA
Filing
2
ORDER Granting Petition to Vacate under 28 USC 2255. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 6/5/2013. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service.) (mdc)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
11
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
CRIM CASE NO. 12cr276WQH
CIVIL CASE NO. 13cv107WQH
ORDER
12
WALTER RIVAS-MEDINA,
Defendant.
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
HAYES, Judge:
The matters before the court are: 1) Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by a person in federal custody (ECF No. 32)
and 2) Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct
sentence by a person in federal custody (ECF No. 36).
Defendant moves the court to set aside his sentence on the grounds of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Defendant contends that his counsel failed to review the
Presentence Report with him prior to sentencing and failed to correct false information
in the Presentence Report stating that he used a firearm in a prior attempted robbery
conviction. Defendant asserts that he was charged with use of a baseball bat and did
not use a firearm in the prior conviction. Defendant asserts in the second motion that
he cannot be housed in a minimum security facility or a Community Correctional
Center because of his deportation status.
The Government agrees that the Presentence Report incorrectly stated that the
Defendant used a firearm in the 1993 attempted robbery conviction. The Government
-1-
1
contends that the Defendant cannot establish that the sentence would have been
2
different in this case because Defendant used a deadly weapon to commit the attempted
3
robbery. The Government contends that defense counsel informed the Court at the
4
sentencing that he had reviewed the Presentence Report with the Defendant and the
5
Defendant did not state differently when given an opportunity to address the Court.
6
BACKGROUND FACTS
7
On January 24, 2102, Defendant waived indictment and agreed to allow the
8
United States to file an Information charging him with one count of attempted reentry
9
after deportation, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b).
10
11
On February 23, 2012, Defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant to a Plea
Agreement pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
12
On April 30, 2012, the Presentence Report was prepared and submitted to the
13
Court. The Presentence Report found that the total offense level was 19 and the
14
Criminal History Category was VI resulting in a advisory guideline range was 63 to
15
78 months and recommended a sentence of 63 months. The Presentence Report
16
concluded that the Defendant had seventeen criminal history points. The report
17
detailed the Defendant’s criminal history including a conviction in 1993 for Attempted
18
Robbery resulting from an armed attempted car jacking.
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
On May 29, 2012, the Government filed a Sentencing Summary Chart
recommending a sentence of 63 months.
On July 24, 2012, Counsel for the Defendant filed a Motion for Downward
Departure and a Sentencing Memorandum requesting a downward departure.
On July 31, 2012, the Court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced the
Defendant to a term of 63 months.
APPLICABLE LAW
26
28 U.S.C. §2255 provides that “A prisoner under sentence of a court established
27
by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence
28
was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the
-2-
1
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in
2
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack,
3
may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the
4
sentence.”
RULING OF THE COURT
5
6
In this case, the record conclusively shows that the Defendant has waived his
7
right to bring a § 2255 motion “except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a
8
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 17 at 9).
9
Government’s concessions in the plea agreement, the Defendant waived “to the full
10
extent of the law, any right to appeal or to collaterally attack the conviction and
11
sentence, except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective
12
assistance of counsel, unless the Court imposes a custodial sentence above the high end
13
of the guideline range recommended by the Government pursuant to this agreement at
14
the time of sentencing.” Id. This waiver is clear, express and unequivocal. Plea
15
agreements are contractual in nature, and their plain language will generally be
16
enforced if the agreement is clear and unambiguous on its face. United States v.
17
Jeronimo, 298 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2005).
In exchange for the
18
At the time of sentencing, the Government recommended an adjusted offense
19
level of 19 and a resulting guideline range of 63-78 months. (ECF No. 23). The
20
Government recommended a sentence of 63 months. Id. The Court imposed a sentence
21
of 63 months. (ECF No. 31 at 2). Pursuant to the terms of the plea agreement, the
22
Defendant waived his right to collaterally attack the sentence imposed “except a post-
23
conviction collateral attack based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.”
24
(ECF No. 17 at 9).
25
An express waiver of the right to appeal in a negotiated plea agreement is valid
26
if knowingly and voluntarily made. See United States v. Watson, 582 F.3d 974, 986
27
(9th Cir. 2009) (“A defendant’s waiver of appellate rights is enforceable if the
28
language of the waiver encompasses his right to appeal on the grounds raised, and if
-3-
1
the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made.”). In this case, the record of the plea
2
colloquy and the sentencing hearing show that waiver was knowing and voluntary.
3
Defendant entered into a written Plea Agreement with the advice of counsel and
4
represented that the plea was knowingly and voluntarily made, that he understood the
5
Plea Agreement and that he was satisfied with the representation of his counsel. (ECF
6
No. 17). Defendant initialed each page of the Plea Agreement and signed the last page
7
of the Plea Agreement under penalty of perjury. Id. at 11.1 At the plea colloquy, the
8
Magistrate Judge thoroughly reviewed the Plea Agreement in all aspects. The
9
Magistrate Judge specifically advised Defendant that he was giving up his right to
10
appeal or collaterally attack his conviction and sentence. Defendant indicated on the
11
record that he understood the rights that he was giving up. The Magistrate Judge found
12
that the guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. (ECF No. 45-8). Defendant filed no
13
objections to the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and this Court accepted the
14
guilty plea. (ECF No. 20). At sentencing, this Court confirmed with defense counsel
15
that Petitioner had waived his right to appeal his sentence.” (ECF No. 47-14). The
16
waiver of collateral attack is enforceable and Defendant waived his right to collaterally
17
attack the sentence imposed “except a post-conviction collateral attack based on a
18
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” (ECF No. 17 at 9).
19
Ineffective assistance of counsel
20
Petitioner alleges that his counsel was ineffective on the grounds that counsel
21
did not review the Presentence Report with him and that he failed to object to
22
inaccuracies in the Presentence Report which resulted in an erroneous sentence. The
23
Government contends the Defendant cannot show that the error in the Presentence
24
Report resulted in prejudice.
25
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must
26
show that representation of counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,
27
1
The last page indicated that the agreement was translated for the Defendant on February 22,
28
2012.
-4-
1
and that any deficiencies in counsel’s performance were prejudicial. See Strickland
2
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 690 (1984). Both deficient performance and prejudice
3
are required before it can be said that a conviction or sentence resulted from a
4
breakdown in the adversary process that rendered the result of the proceeding
5
unreliable and thus in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See United States v. Thomas,
6
417 F.3d 1053, 1056 (9th Cir. 2005).
7
In order to show that counsel’s representations fell below an objective standard
8
of reasonableness, Defendant must identify “material, specific errors and omissions
9
that fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” United States
10
v. Molina, 934 F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). The inquiry is
11
“whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
12
in criminal cases.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 879 (9th Cir 2002) (internal
13
quotations omitted). In making this determination, the court applies a “strong
14
presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
15
professional assistance....” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A deficient performance
16
requires showing that “counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning
17
as ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. To prevail on the
18
prejudice prong of a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must
19
show that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
20
errors, the results of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable
21
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
22
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
23
Objective standard of reasonableness
24
In this case, Counsel on behalf of the Defendant did not object to any facts in
25
the Presentence Report. At the sentencing hearing, the Court asked defense counsel
26
whether he “had an opportunity to review and discuss the Presentence Report with [his]
27
client?’ And defense counsel answered “Yes, you honor.” (ECF No. 45-14 at 2). The
28
Court asked “Is it correct to say that there were no objections filed to the presentence
-5-
1
report?” and defense counsel answered “Correct, your honor.” Id.
2
The facts in the record show that there was a significant factual error in the
3
Presentence Report. In the description of the Defendant’s 1993 conviction for
4
Attempted Robbery w/Use of a Firearm, the Presentence Report detailed an armed
5
attempted car jacking incident. The Presentence Report stated that the Defendant
6
holding a rifle and pointing it at the victim accompanied by several other individuals
7
holding baseball bats, demanded that the victim get out of the car. The Presentence
8
Report stated that the victim positively identified the Defendant as the person who
9
approached his vehicle holding a rifle.
10
The Government’s investigation of the facts now shows that the Defendant was
11
charged with “using a baseball bat” and was not the person who approached the
12
victim’s vehicle holding a rifle. Upon investigation, Counsel for the Government
13
discovered that the charging documents in the case indicates that it was another
14
defendant Felix Galvan who used the firearm and that this Defendant Walter Antonio
15
Medina used a baseball bat. No objection was made. The existence of this material
16
error lends credibility to Defendant’s assertion that defense counsel failed to reviewed
17
the Presentence Report with the Defendant prior to the sentencing hearing. The Court
18
concludes that the Defendant has identified a material and specific error in
19
representation that falls outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance.
20
Prejudice
21
At the time that the Court imposed sentence, the Court stated in part:
22
The defendant also has a significant criminal history. He has one
conviction from1992 that does not score, a ... taking of a motor vehicle
for which he received 365 days in custody and probation in 1992 when
he was 18. The attempted robbery with use of firearm, the facts of that
case are somewhat aggravated in that the victim advised that he was
approached by somebody – by men with bats and a gun and that the
victim did positively identify the defendant as the person who approached
his vehicle holding a rifle.
23
24
25
26
27
28
(ECF No. 45-14 at 6). The Court concluded that a sentence of 63 months is the
minimum sentence necessary under the facts of the case.
While the use of baseball bat in the prior offense is an aggravating circumstance,
-6-
1
the Court concludes that facts in the record raise a probability sufficient to undermine
2
confidence in the outcome that the sentence imposed would have been different had
3
the factual error in the Presentence Report been brought to the attention of the Court.
4
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 69. (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
5
undermine confidence in the outcome.”).
CONCLUSION
6
7
The Court concludes that defense counsel’s deficient representation entitles the
8
Defendant to resentencing. See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th
9
Cir. 2005).
10
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
11
to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence by a person in federal custody (ECF No. 32)
12
is granted and Defendant’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or
13
correct sentence by a person in federal custody (ECF No. 36) is denied.
14
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED as follows:
15
1) the Judgment entered on July 31, 2012 is vacated and the Government shall
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
writ the Defendant back to this district;
2) the Probation Office shall prepare and file a new presentence report by July
31, 2013 and any objections shall be filed by August 14, 2013;
3) the Court appoints Martin Molina as new counsel for the Defendant under the
Criminal Justice Act;
4) resentencing is set for August 26, 2013 at 9am.
DATED: June 5, 2013
WILLIAM Q. HAYES
United States District Judge
25
26
27
28
-7-
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?