Henderson v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc.

Filing 44

ORDER denying as moot 33 Motion to File Documents Under Seal; denying as premature 35 Motion to Certify Class; denying as moot 29 Motion to Continue; granting 30 Motion to Amend/Correct. (Final Pretrial Conference reset for 9/14/2015 11:00 AM before Judge M. James Lorenz, Mandatory Settlement Conference reset for 2/18/2015 09:30 AM before Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major, Proposed Pretrial Order now due by 9/7/2015). Signed by Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major on 9/17/2014. (sjt)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

SHYRIAA HENDERSON, on behalf of )
herself, and all others similarly situated,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
v.
)
)
)
)
UNITED STUDENT AID FUNDS, INC., )
D/B/A/ USA FUNDS,
)
)
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 13cv1845-L (BLM)
ORDER:
(1) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF’S EX PARTE MOTION TO
CONTINUE THE DATE FOR FILING
HER CLASS CERTIFICATION
MOTION [ECF No. 29];
(2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S EX
PARTE MOTION TO MODIFY THE
SCHEDULING ORDER [ECF No. 30];
(3) MODIFYING THE CASE
MANAGEMENT ORDER;
(4) DENYING AS PREMATURE
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS
CERTIFICATION [ECF No. 35]; AND
(5) DENYING AS MOOT
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO FILE
DOCUMENTS UNDER SEAL
[ECF No. 33].

25

On August 20, 2014, Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion to continue the class

26

certification deadline. ECF No. 29. On August 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a second ex parte

27

motion asking the Court to amend the scheduling order. ECF No. 30. Plaintiff did not

28

contact the Court prior to filing the ex parte motions, as required by the Court’s Chamber’s
13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

Rules. On August 21, 2014, defense counsel advised the Court that Defendant intended

2

to oppose Plaintiff’s motions. On the same day, the Court issued an expedited briefing

3

schedule for the pending motions. ECF No. 31. After Plaintiff’s counsel contacted the Court

4

to inquire whether the pending motions “tolled” the existing deadlines, the Court conducted

5

a telephonic conference with the parties on August 22, 2014, and issued an order denying

6

Plaintiff’s verbal request to “toll” the current deadlines pending a ruling on the ex parte

7

motions. ECF No. 32. On August 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed her motion for class certification.

8

ECF No. 35.

9

In accordance with the Court’s August 21, 2014 order setting briefing schedule, on

10

August 25, 2014, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiff’s ex parte applications to

11

continue the deadline for filling motions for class certification and for modification of the

12

scheduling order.

13

Defendant’s opposition to Plaintiff’s ex parte motions. ECF No. 38. Having considered all

14

of the briefing and supporting documents presented, and for the reasons set forth below,

15

Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to continue the date for the motion for class certification is

16

DENIED as moot, and Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to modify the scheduling order is

17

GRANTED.

18

See ECF Nos. 31, 36.

On August 29, 2014, Plaintiff replied to

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

19

On August 8, 2013, Plaintiff filed a class cation complaint alleging that Defendant

20

violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 227 et seq., by invading

21

Plaintiff’s privacy. ECF No. 1 at 1-2. Plaintiff alleges that beginning in 2009 through June

22

2013, she received unsolicited phone calls to her wireless phone attempting to collect a

23

debt. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that she did not provide prior express consent to be

24

contacted on her cellular telephone by Defendant or its agents, and alleges that they

25

obtained her cell phone number from a third party by “trapping” such number. Id. Plaintiff

26

further alleges that the phone calls were placed to her cellular telephone “via an ‘automatic

27

telephone dialing system,’ (‘ATDS’) as defined by the 47 U.S.C. § 227 (a)(1) and by using

28

‘an artificial or prerecorded voice’ system as prohibited by 47 U.S.C. § 227 (b)(1)(A), which

-2-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

had the capacity to produce or store numbers randomly or sequentially, and to dial such

2

numbers, to place telephone calls to Plaintiff’s cellular telephone.” Id. at 4-5; see also id. at

3

8-9. Plaintiff brought the class action on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated

4

who received phone calls from Defendant or its agents to their wireless telephones without

5

consent. See id. at 5-8.

6

On December 20, 2013, the Court issued a Case Management Order (“CMC Order”)

7

setting February 14, 2014, as the deadline to amend the pleadings and requiring Plaintiff

8

to file her motion for class certification by June 20, 2014. ECF No. 22 at 1. On January 27,

9

2014, Plaintiff served Defendant with her First Set of Requests for Production of Documents

10

and First Set of Interrogatories, and on March 28, 2014, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s

11

discovery requests. ECF No. 29-1, Exhs. A-B; see also ECF No. 29-1, Declaration of Alexis

12

M. Wood (“Wood Decl. I”) at 2-3; ECF No. 30-1, Declaration of Alexis M. Wood (“Wood

13

Decl. II”) at 2. On June 10, 2014, the parties moved the Court to continue the class

14

certification motion deadline and the Mandatory Settlement Conference date by sixty days.1

15

ECF No. 27 at 2. The Court granted the parties’ motion, extended the filing deadline for

16

Plaintiff’s motion for class certification until August 22, 2014, and extended all remaining

17

dates in its CMC Order. ECF No. 28.

18

LEGAL STANDARD

19

Once a Rule 16 scheduling order is issued, dates set forth therein may be modified

20

only “for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4); see also ECF

21

No. 22 at 7 (stating that the dates set forth in the CMC Order regulating discovery and

22

other pretrial proceedings “will not be modified except for good cause shown”). The Rule

23

16 good cause standard focuses on the “reasonable diligence” of the moving party. Noyes

24

v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n.6 (9th Cir. 2007); Coleman v. Quaker Oats Co., 232

25
26
27
28

1

In support, the parties stated that “Defendant has advised Plaintiff that several of the categories of
documents sought by Plaintiff in Plaintiff’s Requests for Production of Documents would be in the custody of
third parties such as the servicer of Plaintiff’s loans and collection agencies retained by the servicer, which
Defendant is unable to obtain itself, necessitating the need for Plaintiff to issue subpoenas.” ECF No. 27 at 2.
Consequently, the parties claimed that Plaintiff required additional time to seek discovery from the third parties
to “adequately prepare” her class certification motion. Id.

-3-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

F.3d 1271, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating Rule 16(b) scheduling order may be modified

2

for “good cause” based primarily on diligence of moving party). Essentially, “the focus of

3

the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons for seeking modification.” Johnson v.

4

Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). However, a court also may

5

consider the “existence or degree of prejudice to the party opposing the modification . . . .”

6

Id.

7

In addition to being required to establish good cause, a party moving to amend a

8

pleading after a scheduling order deadline has passed must demonstrate excusable neglect.

9

Mireles v. Paragon Sys., Inc., 2014 WL 575713, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2014) (citing Weil

10

v. Carecore Nat'l, LLC, 2011 WL 1938196, at *2 (D. Colo. May 19, 2011)); see also Fed. R.

11

Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (stating “the court may, for good cause, extend the time on motion made

12

after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”). The

13

following factors are considered in determining whether there has been excusable neglect:

14

the danger of prejudice to the non-moving party; the length of the delay and its potential

15

impact on judicial proceedings; the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the

16

reasonable control of the movant; and whether the moving party’s conduct was in good

17

faith. Pioneer Inv. Serv. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993).

18

DISCUSSION

19

A. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion to Continue the Date for Filing her Class

20

Certification Motion

21

After filing an ex parte motion requesting the continuance of the class certification

22

motion deadline on August 20, 2014, and participating in a telephonic conference with the

23

Court and the opposing counsel on August 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed her motion for class

24

certification. ECF No. 35. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to

25

continue the date for filing her class certification motion as moot.

26

B. Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Motion to Modify the Scheduling Order

27

Plaintiff moves the Court to modify its December 20, 2013, Case Management

28

Conference (“CMC”) Order. ECF No. 30 at 2. Plaintiff seeks to continue the already-passed

-4-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

February 14, 2014, deadline to amend the pleadings in order to file an amended complaint

2

adding new defendants “brought to light” after her review of the documents produced

3

during discovery, and to extend all other deadlines in the CMC Order by ninety days. Id.;

4

see also Wood Decl. I at 2, 6-7 (containing Plaintiff’s counsel’s statement that Plaintiff “has

5

recently learned that several third party debt collection agencies are responsible for placing

6

phone calls on behalf of Defendant,” and that she needs additional time to obtain discovery

7

from such third parties). Plaintiff asserts that she has established the good cause required

8

to modify the CMC Order because she assisted the Court in crafting the Order, learned

9

about the involvement of Navient Solutions, Inc. (“Navient”) and several third-party

10

collection agencies after the deadline to amend the pleadings had passed, and was diligent

11

in seeking a CMC Order modification. ECF No. 30 at 5-6. Plaintiff also argues that she has

12

established the excusable neglect requirement for the CMC Order modification because

13

Defendant will not be prejudiced by her “narrow” request for leave to file a motion to

14

amend, the requested extension will have little impact on the duration of the judicial

15

proceedings, the reason for the delay was not within her reasonable control, and she has

16

not acted in bad faith. Id. at 6-7.

17

Defendant opposes the motion by asserting that Plaintiff has known the third parties’

18

identities since March 28, 2014, when Defendant disclosed them in its interrogatory

19

responses, and that Plaintiff did not make “any discovery attempts . . .

20

[c]ollection [a]gencies” and “waited until the eve of the class certification deadline to raise

21

her purported need for more discovery from Navient.” ECF No. 36 at 3. Defendant argues

22

that Plaintiff was not diligent in conducting discovery, and that Plaintiff thus fails to

23

establish the good cause required to further modify the scheduling order. Id. Defendant

24

also asserts that because Plaintiff filed a class certification motion and simultaneously

25

requested a 90-day extension of all CMC Order deadlines, in order to add Navient and third-

26

party collection agencies as defendants to this lawsuit, Defendant is placed in the

27

“untenable position of having to oppose a motion for class certification while the pleadings

28

and parties remain uncertain.” Id. Defendant therefore maintains that it will be prejudiced

-5-

as to the

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

if Plaintiff’s motion to modify the CMC Order is granted and asks the Court to deny the

2

motion. Id. at 3, 9.

3

Plaintiff responds that Defendant caused a significant delay by waiting nearly eight

4

months to advise Plaintiff of its defense that “it d[id] not make collection calls” and that it

5

had no documents or evidence relative to Plaintiff’s complaint. ECF No. 38 at 8-9; see also

6

id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that given Defendant’s “new” defense, and publically-available

7

information calling into question the accuracy of Defendant’s assertion that it did not make

8

collection calls, she was required to further investigate her claims before serving subpoenas

9

on third-party entities and seeking to amend her complaint. See id. at 7; see also ECF

10

No. 29-1, Exh. D. Plaintiff also challenges Defendant’s claim of prejudice resulting from

11

having to oppose her motion for class certification while the pleadings and parties remain

12

uncertain, by asserting that Defendant could have avoided the situation by agreeing to

13

stipulate to an extension of the motion for class certification deadline. ECF No. 38 at 6.

14

1.

15

While the Court believes that Plaintiff should have pursued the third-party discovery

16

in a more timely manner after receiving Defendant’s March 28, 2014, discovery responses,

17

the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has not been “reasonably diligent” in investigating and

18

prosecuting her case. Initially, a review of the parties’ joint discovery plan lodged on

19

December 9, 2013, reveals that Plaintiff proposed May 30, 2014, as the deadline to amend

20

the pleadings and indicated that she “may move to amend her complaint by, among other

21

things . . . amending to include additional defendants.” ECF No. 30-1 at 8. As such,

22

Plaintiff did request a longer period of time for the deadline to move to amend, and thus

23

was diligent in creating a workable scheduling order under Rule 16. See Hood v. Hartford

24

Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 567 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1224 (E.D. Cal. 2008); Becerra v. Nat’l

25

Recovery Solutions, LLC, 2014 WL 3700210, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 24, 2014).

Good Cause

26

Second, the Court finds that “matters which could not have been reasonably

27

foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference” prevented

28

Plaintiff’s compliance with the deadline. See Hood, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1224. On January

-6-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

27, 2014, five weeks after the Court’s CMC Order, Plaintiff served Defendant with her first

2

set of discovery requests. See ECF No. 22; Wood Decl. I at 2; Wood Decl. II at 2. On

3

March 28, 2014, two months after Plaintiff served her discovery requests and six weeks

4

after the February 14, 2014 deadline to amend the pleadings, Defendant responded to

5

Plaintiff’s interrogatories by stating that it did not place collection calls to Plaintiff, that

6

“Sallie Mae, Inc. was the servicer of Plaintiff’s loans for which Defendant was the

7

guarantor,” and that “there were several collection agencies who may have handled

8

Plaintiff’s loans, including Pioneer Credit Recovery, GC Services, General Revenue

9

Corporation, National Enterprise Systems, and NCO Group.” See ECF No. 22 at 1; ECF No.

10

29-1, Exh. A at 23; Wood Decl. II at 2; see also ECF No. 29-1, Exh. A (responses to Int. 4-

11

10, 12, 15-18, 20). As a result of the parties’ meet and confer efforts,2 by the end of May

12

2014, Plaintiff had learned that Defendant purchased the claims to Plaintiff’s loans on

13

September 24, 2010 and October 22, 2010, that Navient was the servicer for Plaintiff’s

14

loans, and that Navient hired third parties to make debt collection calls. See ECF No. 29-1,

15

Exh. E; Wood Decl. I at 3-4; Wood Decl. II at 2-3.

16

Although the Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff should have conducted the

17

third party discovery in a more timely manner and should have filed her motion to amend

18

the complaint sooner, the Court finds that Plaintiff was not unreasonable in her decision to

19

delay the third-party discovery while she conducted additional investigation into Defendant’s

20

claims. Defendant’s March 2014, discovery responses did not clearly state whether the

21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

2

On May 6, 2014, Plaintiff sent a letter to Defendant requesting supplemental discovery responses.
ECF No. 29-1, Exh. C. On May 15, 2014, the parties held a telephonic meet and confer, during which
Defendant asserted that it did not make collection calls and that it produced the documents in its possession
concerning Plaintiff. See ECF No. 29-1, Exh. E at 122; Wood Decl. I at 3. On May 19, 2014, Plaintiff sent a
second letter to Defendant restating her belief that Defendant “ma[de] collection calls, either internally or via
third party vendors acting on [its] behalf,” cited various publically-available sources of information supporting
her position, and asked Defendant to advise Plaintiff if her “interpretation of the . . . evidence [was] incorrect.”
See ECF No. 29-1, Exh. D. On May 27, 2014, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff, in which it reasserted that
it did not make collection calls, stated that “Sallie Mae, Inc.” was known at the time as “Navient Solutions, Inc.,”
clarified its relationship with several third-party entities, and alleged that it purchased the claims to Plaintiff’s
loans on September 25, 2010 and October 22, 2010, and that Navient was the servicer of Plaintiff’s loans. ECF
No. 29-1, Exh E.

-7-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

identified third-party agencies actually made the collection calls at issue in this case and

2

whether the list of the third-party agencies was complete. See ECF No. 29-1, Exh. A at 23

3

(stating that Pioneer Credit Recovery, GC Services, General Revenue Corporation, National

4

Enterprise Systems, and NCO Group “may have handled Plaintiff’s loans.”) (emphasis

5

added).

6

information which called into question Defendant’s assertion of not making collection calls,

7

Plaintiff reasonably wanted to ascertain “the exact identity of each collection agency” that

8

allegedly made phone calls on behalf of Naveint and Defendant, and avoid “conducting a

9

fishing expedition, sending subpoenas to all debt collectors requesting if they collected on

10

Plaintiff’s loan.” See ECF No. 38 at 7-8 (citing Klein v. NW Mut. Life Ins. Co., 806 F. Supp.

11

2d 1120, 1126 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (“Discovery [] cannot be unlimited and plaintiffs have no

12

right to engage in extensive fishing expeditions.”)). Because Plaintiff’s failure to comply

13

with the February 14, 2014 deadline was at least partially attributable to Defendant’s

14

production of the requested information after the deadline to amend the pleadings, it could

15

not have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference.

16

See Hood, 567 F. Supp. 2d at 1224 (Plaintiff’s “noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline

17

occurred . . . notwithstanding [his or her] diligent efforts to comply, because of the

18

development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at

19

the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference”) (quoting Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186

20

F.R.D. 605, 608) (E.D. Cal. 1999); Mireles, 2014 WL 575713, at *2 (discovery produced

21

after the deadline to amend the pleadings “ma[de] compliance with the . . . deadline a

22

temporal impossibility that was unforeseen at the time the scheduling order was issued”);

23

Becerra, 2014 WL 3700210, at *4 (“Plaintiff’s noncompliance with the Scheduling Order’s

24

. . . deadline resulted, despite [Plaintiff’s] diligent efforts, from the development of matters

25

which could not have been reasonably anticipated at the time of the Case Management

26

Conference.”); Valles v. Gen-X Echo B, Inc., 2013 WL 5832782, at *3 (D. Colo. Sept. 27,

27

2103) (“In some cases, a party may learn new information after the amendment of

28

pleadings deadline has passed and, in such an instance, the newly-acquired information

Further, because Plaintiff’s independent research revealed publicly-available

-8-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

satisfies Rule 16's good cause requirement.”) (citation omitted).

2

Furthermore, the Court finds that while not ideally diligent, Plaintiff was reasonably

3

diligent in seeking the amendment of the CMC Order once it became apparent that she

4

could not comply with it. Plaintiff received Defendant’s discovery responses on March 28,

5

2014, and one month later began a series of meet and confer efforts, including written

6

correspondence and telephonic conferences with opposing counsel, during which she

7

sought clarification and supplementation of the produced information. See ECF No. 29-1,

8

Exhs. A-E; Wood Decl. I at 3-4; Wood Decl. II at 2-3. After Defendant advised Plaintiff that

9

several of the categories of documents sought by Plaintiff were in the custody of third

10

parties, such as the servicer of Plaintiff’s loans and collection agencies retained by the

11

servicer, Plaintiff obtained an extension from this Court to the CMC Order deadlines and

12

served third-party Navient with a subpoena for documents. See ECF No. 28; ECF No. 29-1,

13

Exh. F. When Plaintiff determined that the produced documents did not clearly reveal

14

which third-party vendors placed collection calls to Plaintiff, she scheduled the deposition

15

of a Navient corporate representative in order to “understand the records produced by

16

Navient and determine the entities making the calls.” ECF No. 38 at 4-5; see also ECF No.

17

38-1, Declaration of Alexis M. Wood (“Wood Decl. III”) at 3.

18

Although Plaintiff could have conducted discovery in a more accelerated manner, the

19

pace with which it proceeded was not unreasonable. See Mireles, 2014 WL 575713, at *3.

20

Plaintiff reasonably decided to investigate her claims prior to serving subpoenas on third-

21

party entities that “may or may not have taken part in the collection of her account” and

22

prior to seeking leave to amend her complaint in order to add new defendants. See

23

Becerra, 2014 WL 3700210, at *5 (Plaintiff was “entitled to pursue confirmatory discovery

24

. . . before moving to amend”). Furthermore, Plaintiff attempted to obtain a stipulation

25

from Defendant as to the proposed amendment of the CMC Order. See ECF No. 38 at 6;

26

Wood Decl. I at 2; Wood Decl. III at 3. As such, Plaintiff was reasonably diligent in seeking

27

to amend the CMC Order once it became apparent that she could not comply with the

28

Order. See Becerra, 2014 WL 3700210, at *5 (finding that Plaintiff was diligent in seeking

-9-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

amendment of the Scheduling Order after conducting confirmatory discovery and

2

attempting to obtain a stipulation from Defendant); see also Mireles, 2014 WL 575713, at

3

*3 (finding good cause to allow Plaintiffs to move to amend complaint based on their

4

“representation that they were in the process of preparing an amendment to the FAC . . .

5

and communicating with Defendant to achieve a stipulation to the proposed amendment

6

before the class certification deadline”). As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff has

7

established good cause to modify the Court’s CMC Order to permit her to seek leave to file

8

a First Amended Complaint.

9

2.

Excusable Neglect

10

The Court has considered the four factors identified by the U.S. Supreme Court to

11

determine whether there was excusable neglect justifying the late request to file a motion

12

to amend the complaint. See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395. The Court finds that Plaintiff has

13

established excusable neglect for not complying with the February 14, 2014 deadline.

14

Despite Defendant’s contrary assertions, the Court does not find that an order

15

permitting Plaintiff to file a motion to amend will cause any significant prejudice to

16

Defendant. See ECF No. 36 at 3. Plaintiff’s anticipated amendment relates to the same set

17

of facts that were at issue in the original complaint, and thus will not require voluminous

18

discovery. See ECF No. 36 at 5, 7; Wood Decl. I at 6-7; Wood Decl. II at 3-4. Moreover,

19

this order extends the deadlines to file and oppose the class certification motion, thereby

20

eliminating Defendant’s concerns associated with having to oppose a motion for class

21

certification while the pleadings and parties remain uncertain. ECF No. 36 at 3. This factor

22

therefore weighs in favor of finding excusable neglect.

23

The remaining three factors also weigh in favor of the Court’s finding.

24

authorized delay is not lengthy and it will have little impact on the length of the judicial

25

proceedings since no trial date has been set and discovery is still open. See ECF No. 28.

26

Similarly, as discussed above, Plaintiff was not able to comply with the deadline to amend

27

the pleadings at least in part because Defendant produced the information identifying the

28

third-party collection agencies after the deadline to amend. Finally, the evidentiary record

-10-

The

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

in this case indicates that Plaintiff acted in good faith.

2

Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established good cause and excusable

3

neglect justifying her late request and GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to modify the

4

CMC order.
CONCLUSION

5

For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s ex parte motion and

6
7

modifies the CMC Order as follows:

8
9

Current Date

New Date

10

Deadline to File Motion to Amend

February 14, 2014

October 10, 2014

11

Deadline to File New Motion for
Class Certification

August 22, 2014

December 12, 2014

Exchange of Expert Reports

October 31, 2014

January 30, 2015

Rebuttal Expert Reports

November 29, 2014

February 27, 2015

Discovery Cutoff

January 23, 2015

April 10, 2015

Pretrial Motions Filing Deadline

February 23, 2015

May 11, 2015

17

Mandatory Settlement Conference
(“MSC”)

November 5, 2014
at 9:30 a.m.

February 18, 2015
at 9:30 a.m.

18

MSC Briefs Due Date

October 29, 2014

February 11, 2015

19

Compliance with FRCP 26(a)(3)

June 1, 2015

August 17, 2015

20

Meet and Confer

June 8, 2015

August 24, 2015

21

Proposed Pretrial Conference Order

June 22, 2015

September 7, 2015

22

Pretrial Conference Date

June 29, 2015
at 11:00 a.m.

September 14, 2015
at 11:00 a.m.

12
13
14
15
16

23
24

All other dates, guidelines and requirements remain as previously set. See ECF No. 22.

25

///

26

///

27

///

28

///

-11-

13cv1845-L (BLM)

1

In light of this order granting Plaintiff’s motion to modify the CMC Order and

2

providing Plaintiff with additional time to file a motion to amend the complaint, the Court

3

also finds it necessary to delay resolution of the class certification issue. Accordingly, the

4

Court DENIES as premature Plaintiff’s currently-pending motion for class certification [ECF

5

No. 35] and DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s motion to file documents under seal [ECF No. 33].

6

IT IS SO ORDERED.

7
8

DATED: September 17, 2014

9
10
11

BARBARA L. MAJOR
United States Magistrate Judge

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

-12-

13cv1845-L (BLM)