Gonzalez-Alvarez v. USA
Filing
2
ORDER denying Motion to Vacate Sentence under 28 USC 2255, and dismissing without prejudice. If Gonzalez-Alvarez believes he can amend his petition to adequately plead this claim, he may do so by filing an amended petition by no later than August 30, 2014. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 7/31/14.(kas)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
FELIPE GONZALEZ-ALVAREZ,
12
13
14
CASE NO. 13-CV-2432
11-CR-3677
Petitioner,
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
VACATE SENTENCE
vs.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
15
16
17
Gonzalez-Alvarez pleaded guilty to one count of attempted entry into the United
18
States following deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. §1326(a)-(b), and on December 1, 2011
19
the Court sentenced him to 60 months in custody and 3 years of supervised release. (Doc.
20
No. 32.) Gonzalez-Alvarez appealed the sentence and the Ninth Circuit affirmed it in an
21
unpublished opinion. See United States v. Gonzalez-Alvarez, 487 F. Appx 372 (9th Cir.
22
2012). On October 8, 2013, Gonzalez-Alvarez filed a motion to vacate the sentence
23
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The United States has opposed the motion and Gonzalez-
24
Alvarez has filed a reply.
25
I. Factual Background
26
As part of his plea agreement, Gonzalez-Alvarez waived the right to appeal or
27
collaterally attack his sentence, with two exceptions. (Doc. No. 17). First, if the Court
28
sentenced him above the high end of the guideline range recommended by the United
-1-
13-CV-2432; 11-CR-3677
1
States, he could appeal or collaterally attack that sentence. (Id. at 10:1-3.) Second, he was
2
free to bring a post-conviction collateral attack challenging the effectiveness of his counsel.
3
(Id. at 9:27-28.)
4
At sentencing, the United States recommended a range of 21 to 27 months in
5
custody. (Doc. No. 24.) However, the Court believed an upward variance was necessary and
6
sentenced Gonzalez-Alvarez to 60 months in prison, thereby allowing an appeal or collateral
7
attack of the sentence pursuant to the plea agreement. (Doc. No. 32.) Gonzalez-Alvarez
8
appealed to the Ninth Circuit. (Doc. No. 33.)
9
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It made two distinct findings. First, it noted that “[t]he judge
10
adequately explained and did not abuse his discretion by imposing an above Guidelines
11
sentence.” Gonzalez-Alvarez, 487 Fed.Appx. at 372. Second, addressing his objection to
12
3 years of supervised release, the Ninth Circuit found that “[c]ontrary to Gonzalez-Alvarez’s
13
assertion, this finding was not a Kimbrough-style rejection of a Guidelines sentencing policy;
14
rather, it was consistent with [U.S.S.G. § 5D1.1] and its accompanying commentary.” Id.
15
(referencing Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007)).
16
II. Petition to Vacate Sentence Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2255
17
Section 2255 states that a prisoner in custody “may move the court which imposed
18
the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. “The statute
19
states four grounds upon which such relief may be claimed: (1) ‘that the sentence was
20
imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,’ (2) ‘that the court was
21
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence,’ (3) ‘that the sentence was in excess of the
22
maximum authorized by law,’ and (4) that the sentence ‘is otherwise subject to collateral
23
attack.’” Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962).
24
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that the purpose of a § 2255 motion isn’t
25
to allow defendants to pursue a second appeal. See United States v. Berry, 624 F.3d 1031,
26
1038 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 (1979)).
27
Therefore, “[w]hen a defendant has raised a claim and has been given a full and fair
28
//
-2-
13-CV-2432; 11-CR-3677
1
opportunity to litigate it on direct appeal, that claim may not be used as basis for a
2
subsequent § 2255 petition.” United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000).
3
Gonzalez-Alvarez makes four claims in his petition: (1) the Court erred in adopting an
4
“overbroad interpretation of [Kimbrough] that would allow it to categorically reject the
5
Guidelines [for any reason];” (2) the Court “expressly mistook the purpose of the
6
[amendments to the supervised release Guidelines] as recommending that the district courts
7
‘give’ defendants ‘more time up front’ to compensate for the lack of supervised release;” (3)
8
the Court did not sufficiently explain its variance from the sentencing Guidelines; and
9
(4) ineffective assistance of counsel. (Pet. at 26, 27, 51.)
10
III. Discussion
11
With the exception of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Gonzalez-Alvarez’s
12
claims are copied verbatim from the opening brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit on appeal.
13
(Compare Gonzalez-Alvarez, 487 Fed.Appx. 372 (Ex. A), with Pet. at 14-51.) Because the
14
Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments on direct appeal, Gonzalez-Alvarez is foreclosed from
15
relitigating them now in a § 2255 motion. See United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 1132, 1139
16
(9th Cir. 2000) (“When a defendant has raised a claim and has been given a full and fair
17
opportunity to litigate it on direct appeal, that claim may not be used as basis for a
18
subsequent § 2255 petition.”). Therefore the Court will not address the claims presented on
19
pages 26 through 51 of the Petition. This leaves only his ineffective assistance of counsel
20
claim.
21
Gonzalez-Alvarez claims ineffective assistance of counsel on “five grounds.” (Pet. at
22
51.)
The problem is that these “five grounds” amount to nothing more than general
23
grievances stated in a conclusory manner. (Id.) He supports his claims with statements such
24
as “[c]ounsel representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and “trial
25
counsel’s performance was so deficient it prejudiced his defense.” (Id. at 51.) Although these
26
claims are not baseless on their face, they are certainly inadequately pleaded. See Shah v.
27
United States, 878 F.2d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir.1989) (conclusory allegations are insufficient
28
to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel). To state a claim for ineffective
-3-
13-CV-2432; 11-CR-3677
1
assistance of counsel, Gonzalez-Alvarez would have to first “show that counsel's
2
performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that
3
counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
4
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced
5
the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the
6
defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
7
668, 687 (1984) Also, there is a strong presumption that his counsel's performance was not
8
deficient. Id. at 689.
9
IV. Conclusion
10
Of Gonzalez-Alvarez’s four claims, three are DENIED because he brought them on
11
direct appeal and lost. Gonzalez-Alvarez’s last claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was
12
not waived in his plea agreement and is not plainly baseless, but it is inadequately pleaded.
13
It is therefore DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. If Gonzalez-Alvarez believes he can
14
amend his petition to adequately plead this claim, he may do so by filing an amended
15
petition by no later than August 30, 2014.
16
17
18
19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 31, 2014
20
21
HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS
United States District Judge
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-4-
13-CV-2432; 11-CR-3677
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?