Bona Fide Conglomerate, Inc. v. SourceAmerica et al

Filing 518

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part Counterdefendants' 493 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The Court grants summary judgment in favor of Counterdefendants on SourceAmerica's UCL claims, and it denies summary judgment on SourceAmerica's CIPA claims. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 5/14/2018. (mpl)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SOURCEAMERICA, Case No.: 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART COUNTERDEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT SOURCEAMERCA; PRIDE INDUSTRIES, INC.; KENT, CAMPA & KATE, INC.; SERVICESOURCE, INC.; JOB OPTIONS, INC.; GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA; LAKEVIEW CENTER, INC.; THE GINN GROUP, INC.; CORPORATE SOURCE, INC.; CW RESOURCES; NATIONAL COUNCIL OF SOURCEAMERICA EMPLOYERS; and OPPORTUNITY VILLAGE, INC., 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 Defendants. 22 23 24 25 26 27 [ECF No. 493] SOURCEAMERICA, Counterclaimant, v. BONA FIDE CONGLOMERATE, INC.; and RUBEN LOPEZ, Counterdefendants. 28 1 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 Before the Court is a motion for partial summary judgment filed by Bona Fide 2 Conglomerate, Inc., and Ruben Lopez (collectively, “Counterdefendants”). (ECF No. 3 493.) The motion seeks summary judgment on several claims asserted against them by 4 Counterclaimant SourceAmerica. The motion is fully briefed. (ECF No. 509 5 (SourceAmerica’s Opposition); ECF No. 512 (Counterdefendants’ Reply).) For the 6 reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the motion. 7 I. 8 SourceAmerica’s Counterclaims against Bona Fide and Lopez In this countersuit, SourceAmerica asserts the following allegations. 9 A. Selection Process 10 The United States operates a federal procurement program, named AbilityOne, 11 which is intended to increase employment opportunities for individuals who are blind or 12 have other severe disabilities. (Am. Counterclaims Complaint (“ACC”), ECF No. 308 at 13 ¶ 1.) In operating the AbilityOne program, the United States AbilityOne Commission 14 (the “Commission”) takes the recommendations of Central Non-Profit Agencies 15 (“CNAs”) such as SourceAmerica about which Non-Profit Agency (“NPA”) that has bid 16 for a particular project should be hired. (Id.) Bona Fide is an NPA within 17 SourceAmerica’s network; Ruben Lopez is the President and Chief Executive Officer of 18 Bona Fide. (Id. ¶ 2.) As a CNA, SourceAmerica “identifies opportunities for 19 employment for the severely disabled and works with the federal customer to develop 20 criteria for performance and the specific opportunity,” after which it posts the opportunity 21 and receives responses from NPAs interested in the project. (Id. ¶ 15.) After reviewing 22 those responses, SourceAmerica recommends one of the responding NPAs to the 23 Commissioner. (Id.) After reviewing the recommendation, the Commission votes and 24 selects a suitable NPA. (Id.) After the decision has been made, the CNA notifies any 25 responding NPA that has not been selected. After receiving such a notice, an NPA may 26 request a “debrief” with the CNA for feedback so as to help “improve future responses.” 27 (Id.) 28 // 2 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 2 3 4 B. Instances of Misconduct According to the ACC, Bona Fide has engaged in a series of misdeeds in an effort to obtain procurement projects from the Commission. (Id. ¶ 3.) First, SourceAmerica contends that Lopez made “improper loans” to Steve 5 Underhill, who was an officer of the General Services Administration (“GSA”). 6 SourceAmerica cites a complaint filed in the United States Court of Federal Claims by 7 Bona Fide, which includes an admission that Lopez—acting as President and Chief 8 Executive Office of Tried & True Corporate Cleaning, Inc., a company under contract to 9 provide janitorial services for a federal courthouse—gave two interest-free loans to 10 Underhill, who was then the GSA’s contracting officer’s technical representative. (Id. ¶¶ 11 21–22.) SourceAmerica alleges that these loans were made with an intent to influence 12 Underhill’s supervision of Lopez’s company. (Id. ¶ 22.) 13 Second, SourceAmerica claims that Lopez misled U.S. District Judge Lloyd 14 George, a federal judge sitting in the District of Nevada, into recommending Bona Fide’s 15 services to SourceAmerica’s Regional Director David Dubinsky. (Id. ¶¶ 23–24.) Third, 16 SourceAmerica claims that in 2010 and 2012 Lopez threatened Joe Diaz, a 17 SourceAmerica employee, by stating that Lopez would leave Diaz alone if Lopez got a 18 project “in each region,” and that Diaz did not “understand what’s coming” if Lopez was 19 not awarded a project. (Id. ¶¶ 25–27.) 20 Fourth, SourceAmerica contends that Lopez surreptitiously recorded a 21 conversation between him and Dubinsky, as well as 21 conversations between Lopez and 22 Jean Robinson, SourceAmerica’s General Counsel and Chief Compliance Officer from 23 2011 to 2014. (Id. ¶¶ 28, 32.) According to the ACC, neither Robinson nor Dubinsky 24 consented to Lopez recording those conversations. (Id. ¶¶ 30, 32.) At least one of the 25 instances of Lopez recording Robinson occurred while Lopez was in California, and the 26 recorded conversation between Lopez and Dubinsky occurred while both were in 27 California. (Id. ¶ 32.) Lopez later disseminated these recordings to other “litigious 28 NPAs, including PORTCO and National Telecommuting Inc. (“NTI”), various 3 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 government agencies, the media, and the press.” (Id. ¶ 33.) 2 Fifth, SourceAmerica alleges that Lopez engaged in witness tampering by 3 contacting Denise Ransom, a SourceAmerica Senior Project Manager planning to leave 4 her position. (Id. ¶ 34.) Lopez suggested to Ransom that he could provide a helpful 5 recommendation with another company, “and presumably in exchange for his 6 recommendation, he wanted [Ransom] to contact the Inspector General investigators at 7 GSA to change her testimony regarding” an AbilityOne project opportunity. (Id. ¶¶ 35– 8 36.) When Ransom refused, Lopez implied that he would impede her efforts to find new 9 employment. (Id. ¶ 37.) Sixth, SourceAmerica alleges that Counterdefendants have used “serial litigation” 10 11 to delay AbilityOne projects. These alleged tactics include pursuing appeals of project 12 denials and filing litigation in federal courts. (Id. ¶¶ 38–41, 44.) Counterdefendants also 13 allegedly conspired with PORTCO and NTI to file “baseless lawsuits against 14 SourceAmerica and regarding the AbilityOne Program.” (Id. ¶¶ 42–43.) 15 Last, SourceAmerica alleges that Bona Fide’s attorney, Daniel Cragg, 16 commissioned transcriptions of the conversations recorded by Lopez, and that those 17 transcriptions were posted, along with the audio recordings, on the website WikiLeaks. 18 (Id. ¶¶ 46–51.) C. SourceAmerica’s Claims 19 20 Based on the allegations above, SourceAmerica asserts against both 21 Counterdefendants claims of (1) violation of the California Invasion of Privacy Act 22 (“CIPA”), California Penal Code § 632; and (2) unfair, unlawful, and/or fraudulent 23 business practices in violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), 24 California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq.1 25 26 27 28 1 The ACC also alleged breach of contract against Bona Fide, but SourceAmerica has since indicated to Counterdefendants that SourceAmerica intends to withdraw that claim. (See ECF No. 493-3, Ex. E (letter from SourceAmerica’s counsel to Counterdefendants’ counsel giving “formal notice that 4 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 2 II. Legal Standard Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any 3 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 56(a). “An issue of material fact is genuine if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable 5 jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Reed v. Lieurance, 863 F.3d 1196, 6 1204 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046, 1050 (9th Cir. 2015)). “The 7 deciding court must view the evidence, including all reasonable inferences, in favor of 8 the non-moving party.” Id. 9 To obtain summary judgment, Counterdefendants can “either produce evidence 10 negating an essential element of [SourceAmerica’s] claim . . . or show that 11 [SourceAmerica] does not have enough evidence of an essential element to carry [its] 12 ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.” Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Fritz Cos., 13 Inc., 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000). If Counterdefendants succeed in that effort, 14 SourceAmerica “must produce evidence to support [its] claim” sufficient to demonstrate 15 a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 1103. If SourceAmerica “fails to produce 16 enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact, [Counterdefendants] win[] the 17 motion for summary judgment. But if [SourceAmerica] produces enough evidence to 18 create a genuine issue of material fact, [it] defeats the motion.” Id. (citation omitted). 19 20 21 22 23 III. Discussion Counterdefendants seek summary judgment in their favor with respect to (1) the CIPA claims based on Lopez’s conversations with Robinson, and (2) all UCL claims. A. CIPA Claims Relating to Lopez’s Conversations with Robinson Counterdefendants seek summary judgment in their favor on SourceAmerica’s 24 CIPA claims relating to Lopez’s conversations with Robinson. According to a 25 declaration signed by Lopez and offered by Counterdefendants, Lopez recorded 21 26 27 28 SourceAmerica will no longer be pursuing its counterclaim for breach of contract”).) No formal notice of withdrawal, however, has yet been filed with the Court. 5 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 conversations between him and Robinson: three were in person and occurred outside of 2 California, and the remaining 18 occurred over the phone when Lopez was in California. 3 (ECF No. 493-4 at ¶¶ 3–7.) In support of their motion for summary judgment on the 4 CIPA claims relating to these conversations, Counterdefendants offer three arguments: 5 (1) Robinson consented to the recordings, (2) Virginia’s consent law—which permits a 6 participant of an oral communication to record the communication—should apply to the 7 18 recorded telephone conversations, and (3) CIPA does not apply to the three in-person 8 conversations that occurred outside of California. (ECF No. 493-1 at 5–9.) The first and 9 third grounds can be dealt with easily. With respect to the first—that Robinson 10 consented to the recordings—Counterdefendants concede in their reply memorandum 11 that there is a genuine issue of fact as to whether Robinson consented to the recording of 12 these conversations. (ECF No. 512 at 2.) Summary judgment on that ground is therefore 13 inappropriate. As to the third ground—that CIPA does not apply to the three in-person 14 conversations that occurred outside of California—SourceAmerica has clarified that its 15 CIPA claims are not based on those three conversations. (ECF No. 509 at 15.) 16 The remaining issue pertaining to the CIPA claims is the second ground noted 17 above: whether California or Virginia privacy law should apply to the claims that Lopez 18 unlawfully recorded 18 telephone conversations he had with Robinson. 19 Counterdefendants contend that during those 18 telephone conversations, Lopez was in 20 California and Robinson was in Virginia. In support of that assertion, Counterdefendants 21 offer Lopez’s declaration, which states in relevant part: “I recorded Robinson eighteen 22 (18) times over the telephone. During each of these telephone conversation recordings, I 23 was in California. I was under the impression that Robinson was in Virginia during each 24 of these conversations.” (ECF No. 493-4 at ¶ 7.) Because Robinson was in Virginia 25 during those conversations, Counterdefendants argue that the applicable choice-of-law 26 analysis produces the conclusion that Virginia law, not CIPA, should apply to these 27 claims. (ECF No. 493-1 at 6–9.) Virginia’s privacy law permits a recording of a 28 conversation if the person making the recording “is a party to the communication.” Va. 6 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 Code. Ann. § 19.2-62(B)(2). Thus, if Virginia law applies to SourceAmerica’s privacy 2 claims based on Lopez’s recording of his telephone conversations with Robinson, those 3 claims fail as a matter of law. 4 SourceAmerica offers two arguments in response, one evidentiary and the other 5 legal. First, SourceAmerica argues that Lopez’s statement that he was “under the 6 impression” that Robinson was in Virginia during the phone conversations is 7 inadmissible speculation. Second, SourceAmerica argues that the applicable conflict-of- 8 law analysis produces the conclusion that California law, not Virginia law, applies. 9 Because the Court agrees with SourceAmerica’s first argument, it need not reach the 10 11 choice-of-law issue. The only relevant evidence offered by either party on this issue is the portion of 12 Lopez’s declaration that states: “I recorded Robinson eighteen (18) times over the 13 telephone. . . . I was under the impression that Robinson was in Virginia during each of 14 these conversations.” (ECF No. 493-4 at ¶ 7.) SourceAmerica disputes this assertion and 15 objects to the admissibility of this evidence because “Lopez provide[s] no foundation for 16 his ‘impression’ or any other evidence that Ms. Robinson was in Virginia or another one- 17 party consent state for any of the 18 telephone conversations with Ms. Robinson that he 18 secretly recorded.” (ECF No. 509 at 11–12; see also ECF No. 509-4 at ¶ 4 (“Mr. Lopez 19 provides no facts or evidence to support the basis for his ‘impression.’”).) The Court 20 agrees with SourceAmerica that Lopez’s assertion of his impression is inadmissible to 21 prove that Robinson was in fact in Virginia at the time of the conversations. Testimony 22 regarding a person’s impression of a fact, without additional foundation evidence 23 supporting that impression, is inadmissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may 24 testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the 25 witness has personal knowledge of the matter.” (emphasis added)); Dove v. Bayer 26 Healthcare LLC, No. C 05-2873 JSW, 2006 WL 1663845, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 27 2006) (finding two individuals’ testimonies about another individual’s qualifications 28 inadmissible because “they were made without sufficient foundation”). In their motion, 7 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 Counterdefendants did not offer any evidence supporting Lopez’s impression that 2 Robinson was in Virginia during the phone calls at issue. As the summary judgment 3 record stands, then, Lopez’s impression is based on nothing. As a result, his 4 “impression” lacks foundation and is inadmissible under Rule 602. 5 Having found Lopez’s speculative statement inadmissible, the Court is left with no 6 evidence offered or identified by Counterdefendants in their motion establishing that 7 Robinson was in Virginia at the time of the recorded phone calls. Applying California’s 8 presumption that its own law applies to claims made in California, see Marsh v. Burrell, 9 805 F. Supp. 1493, 1496 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (“[California’s] choice-of-law analysis 10 embodies the presumption that California law applies unless the proponent of foreign law 11 can show otherwise.”), the Court must conclude that Counterdefendants’ motion fails to 12 demonstrate that Virginia law applies to these claims. 13 In their reply memorandum, Counterdefendants offer a new basis for the Court to 14 conclude that Virginia law applies to SourceAmerica’s CIPA claims relating to the phone 15 conversations between Lopez and Robinson: a settlement agreement that calls for the 16 application of Virginia law to claims stemming from the subject matter of the settlement 17 agreement. (ECF No. 512 at 3–5.) The Court does not consider substantive arguments 18 offered for the first time in a reply memorandum. Keating v. Jastremski, No. 3:15-cv-57- 19 L-JMA, 2016 WL 5338072, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2016) (declining to consider a 20 new argument raised in a reply memorandum in support of a summary judgment motion 21 because considering the argument “would deprive [the opposing party] of an opportunity 22 to respond”). This rule is not just a matter of convenience. By offering new substantive 23 argument in reply, Counterdefendants prevent SourceAmerica from offering any 24 meaningful response. It would be unfair for the Court to enter summary judgment 25 against SourceAmerica on the basis of Counterdefendants’ new argument without hearing 26 a responsive argument from SourceAmerica. 27 28 At the time they filed their motion, Counterdefendants had access to the contents of the settlement agreement referenced in their reply memorandum. There is no reason to 8 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 believe they could not have offered this argument in the initial memorandum in support 2 of their motion. The Court declines to consider this newly raised argument. 3 4 B. UCL Claims Counterdefendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment on at least 5 a portion of SourceAmerica’s UCL claims because (1) SourceAmerica’s allegations do 6 not support a claim for any available relief, (2) SourceAmerica may not assert any claim 7 based on conduct that occurred on or before the date of the settlement agreement 8 discussed above, and (3) California’s UCL does not reach claims by non-California 9 plaintiffs over conduct that occurred outside of California. Because the Court agrees with 10 Counterdefendants’ first argument, it need not reach the others. 11 Counterdefendants assert that SourceAmerica’s UCL claims fail because no 12 available relief will remedy the harm alleged in the counterclaim complaint. “[O]nly two 13 remedies are available to redress violations of the UCL: injunctive relief and restitution.” 14 Feitelberg v. Credit Suisse First Boston, LLC, 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 592, 601 (Ct. App. 2005); 15 see also Fresno Motors, LLC v. Mercedes Benz USA, LLC, 771 F.3d 1119, 1135 (9th Cir. 16 2014) (“[T]he remedy for a UCL violation is either injunctive relief or restitution.”). In 17 its response to Counterdefendants’ motion, SourceAmerica makes clear that it seeks only 18 injunctive relief as a result of Counterdefendants’ alleged UCL violations. (See ECF No. 19 509-4 at 5 ¶¶ 9–10 (SourceAmerica responding to Counterdefendants’ statement of 20 undisputed facts by asserting: “SourceAmerica is not seeking restitutionary relief for its 21 UCL Counterclaim”).) Thus, the Court need only determine whether, under the evidence 22 in the summary judgment record, injunctive relief is appropriate. 23 According to Counterdefendants, SourceAmerica has offered no evidence that the 24 alleged misconduct will occur again. Without such evidence, Counterdefendants argue, 25 SourceAmerica cannot obtain an injunction. The Court agrees. Claims for injunctive 26 relief against UCL violations are governed by California Business and Professions Code 27 § 17203. “Injunctive relief under section[] 17203 . . . cannot be used . . . to enjoin an 28 event which has already transpired; a showing of threatened future harm or continuing 9 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 violation is required. Injunctive relief has no application to wrongs which have been 2 completed absent a showing that past violations will probably recur.” People v. Toomey, 3 203 Cal. Rptr. 642, 654–55 (Ct. App. 1984). In other words, “[i]njunctive relief is 4 appropriate only when there is a threat of continuing misconduct.” Madrid v. Perot Sys. 5 Corp., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 227 (Ct. App. 2005); see also id. at 229 (“We conclude the 6 current UCL has not altered the nature of injunctive relief, which requires a threat that the 7 misconduct to be enjoined is likely to be repeated in the future.”). 8 9 In responding to this argument, SourceAmerica points to no evidence. Rather, SourceAmerica argues only that Counterdefendants are attempting to “reverse the burden 10 of production on summary judgment.” (ECF No. 509 at 16.) According to 11 SourceAmerica, to show that injunctive relief is unavailable under the circumstances of 12 this case, Counterdefendants must first offer evidence that they have voluntarily ceased 13 the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Id. at 16–17.) This argument misconstrues California 14 law. SourceAmerica cites Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., for the proposition 15 that “it is Counterdefendants’ burden on summary judgment to come forward with 16 evidence to support their motion on this issue.” (Id. at 17.) But in Sun Microsystems, the 17 court said the opposite. There, the court held that the district court erroneously “placed 18 the burden on Microsoft [against whom the injunction was entered] to prove that its 19 conduct would not recur.” 188 F.3d 1115, 1123 (9th Cir. 1999) abrogated on other 20 grounds by eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). Under California 21 law, the panel explained, “a plaintiff cannot receive an injunction for past conduct unless 22 he shows that the conduct will probably recur.” Id. (emphasis added). 23 The burden-shifting framework discussed in Academy of Motion Picture Arts & 24 Scis. v., Inc., CV 10-03738-AB (CWx), 2015 WL 12684340, at *11 (C.D. 25 Cal. Apr. 10, 2015), upon which SourceAmerica relies, does not apply. That framework 26 applies when there is evidence suggesting that future misconduct will occur, but the party 27 opposing the injunction offers evidence that it has voluntarily ceased the allegedly 28 wrongful conduct. When that occurs, “the burden shifts to the plaintiff to ‘show[] that 10 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 the conduct will probably recur.’” Id. (quoting Sun Microsystems, 188 F.3d at 1123). 2 But that framework operates outside of the default evidentiary burden under the UCL, 3 that is, that “[a] claim for injunctive relief under California’s UCL ‘requires a threat that 4 the misconduct to be enjoined is likely to be repeated in the future.’” Id. (quoting 5 Madrid, 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229). 6 Indeed, a default rule under California law that would not require a plaintiff 7 seeking injunctive relief to offer evidence of future unlawful activity would squarely 8 conflict with this Court’s Article III constraints. Those constraints prohibit the Court 9 from issuing injunctive relief unless the requesting party shows a sufficiently impending 10 threat of future harm. See, e.g., Bruton v. Gerber Prods. Co., No. 12-cv-2412-LHK, 11 2018 WL 1009257, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2018) (“To establish standing for 12 prospective injunctive relief, [the party seeking such relief] must demonstrate that she has 13 suffered or is threatened with a concrete and particularized legal harm . . . coupled with a 14 sufficient likelihood that she will again be wronged in a similar way.” (internal quotation 15 marks and alterations omitted)). 16 “When the party opposing summary judgment has the burden of proof at trial, the 17 party moving for summary judgment need only point out that there is an absence of 18 evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. If the moving party meets its initial 19 burden, the nonmoving party must set forth, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Rule 20 56, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Datta v. Asset Recovery 21 Sols., LLC, 191 F. Supp. 3d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (internal quotations marks and 22 citation omitted) (emphasis added). As just explained, SourceAmerica holds the burden 23 of demonstrating that the unlawful conduct will occur in the future in order to obtain 24 injunctive relief. In their motion summary judgment, Counterdefendants have pointed to 25 the fact that there is no evidence that the wrongdoing alleged in SourceAmerica’s 26 complaint will occur in the future. To resist that motion, SourceAmerica was obligated to 27 offer and cite evidence demonstrating that a genuine issue exists as to whether the alleged 28 wrongdoing will occur in the future. Instead, SourceAmerica points to no evidence at all. 11 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS 1 Under these circumstances, summary judgment must be granted in favor of 2 Counterdefendants as to SourceAmerica’s request for injunctive relief under the UCL. 3 Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he district court [need not] 4 scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact. We rely on the nonmoving 5 party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary 6 judgment.”). 7 Because injunctive relief is the only remedy SourceAmerica seeks as a result of its 8 UCL claims, its UCL claims fail as a matter of law. See, e.g., Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble, 9 Inc., No. SACV 12-812-JLS (RNBx), 2015 WL 12766130, at *9 (C.D. Cal. June 16, 10 2015) (dismissing UCL claims because plaintiff failed “to establish his entitlement to 11 either restitution or injunctive relief under the UCL”). 12 13 IV. Conclusion For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part 14 the motion for summary judgment. The Courts grants summary judgment in favor of 15 Counterdefendants on SourceAmerica’s UCL claims, and it denies summary judgment on 16 SourceAmerica’s CIPA claims. 17 18 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: May 14, 2018 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 12 3:14-cv-00751-GPC-AGS

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?