Stewart v. Oceanside, City of et al

Filing 5

ORDER: (1) granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; and (2) dismissing the complaint with leave to amend. Amended Complaint due within (30) thirty days of this Order. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 7/8/14. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(cge)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL STEWART,

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Plaintiff,

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v.

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CITY OF OCEANSIDE, et al.,

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Defendants.

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Civil No.14cv1472 AJB (JLB)
ORDER:
(1) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,
(Doc. No. 2); and
(2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT
WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, (Doc.
No. 1)

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Plaintiff Michael Stewart (hereinafter “Plaintiff” of “Stewart”), a nonprisoner

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proceeding pro se, has submitted a Complaint alleging civil rights violation under 42

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U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No.1.) Plaintiff has not paid the $450 civil filing fee required to

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commence this action, but rather, has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis

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(“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in

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forma pauperis is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim, thus

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his Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

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14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

BACKGROUND

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I.

Factual Allegations 1
On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was attacked while walking at Oceanside Beach,

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City of Oceanside, California. Plaintiff states that he protected himself against his

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attackers by using a knife. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) According to Plaintiff, two weeks prior to

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the August 29, 2013 incident, Plaintiff contacted the Oceanside Police Department to

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report threats made against him. “TOLD THEM THAT THIS (sic) PEOPLE HAD BEEN

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THREATHING (sic) ME, HARRASSING (sic) ME BECAUSE I WOULD RIDE THEM

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(sic) AROUND IN MY CAR SO THEY COULD SELL DRUGS . . . .” (Id.) A dispatch

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officer instructed Plaintiff to go to the police station to make his report; he did so the

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next day. Plaintiff states that he asked an officer to “TELL THEM LEAVE ME ALONG

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(sic). (Id.)

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When officers arrived on the scene on August 29, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that his

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attackers made false statements to the officers. Moreover, one witness who spoke on

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Plaintiff’s behalf attempted to tell the officers that Plaintiff did nothing wrong, but was

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told to leave. (Id.) Plaintiff was arrested and charged with two counts of PC 245(1)

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Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chris Ruedi retained

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possession of Plaintiff’s car keys after booking him in the county jail. Plaintiff further

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states that his car was ticketed and impounded. Plaintiff alleges that such actions were

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unlawful.

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Plaintiff states that during his court case, the only “EVIDENCE THAT OCEANS-

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IDE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAD IN [his] CASE WAS THE POLICE REPORT AND

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THEY DID NOT HAVE MY CAR KEYS.” (Id.) 2 Plaintiff spent forty-four (44) days in

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jail. When he was released, Plaintiff had to pay $1,790.00 for impound fees and

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$2,011.91 to have his car re-keyed due to Officer Ruedi’s alleged unlawful actions.

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Plaintiff further alleges that his car was broken into and his personal belongings stolen.

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All factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1.)

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No further details are given with regards to Plaintiff’s state court proceedings.

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14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the City of Oceanside (Claim Number

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GC2013000147) which was denied by operation of law. (Doc. No. 1 at Ex. C.)
According to Officer Ruedi’s Report, attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, he

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received a citizen flag at the Oceanside Police Beach Lockup Facility referencing a fight

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that was occurring behind the building. (Doc. No. 1, Ex. A at 7.) Officers Ruedi was

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flagged by witnesses as he and a colleague exited the Lockup Facility. There, Officer

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Ruedi saw the suspect, Michael Stewart, holding a “large, black handled, fixed blade

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knife in his right hand.” (Id.) Officer Ruedi states that Stewart appeared to have blood

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on his clothing and face. Officer Ruedi then proceeded to draw out his firearm and

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instructed Stewart to drop the knife and to lie in the prone position. Stewart complied

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and Sgt. Stanley handcuffed Stewart without further incident. (Id.) Thereafter, multiple

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officers assisted in the investigation by locating witnesses, interviewing witnesses, and

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collecting additional evidence. While conducting a witness search, Officer Ruedi

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noticed a black male nearby appearing to be injured. The subject, later identified as

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David Williamson (“Williamson”), reported that he had been stabbed by the suspect.

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Officer Ruedi noticed a small puncture wound on Williamson’s left arm. (Id.) William-

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son stated that he had tried to help a friend who was also being assaulted by Stewart. (Id.

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at 8.)

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Based upon evidence and statements obtained on the scene, Officer Ruedi formed

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the opinion that “Stewart was in violation of two counts of PC 245(1) Assault with a

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Deadly Weapon. Multiple witnesses identified Plaintiff as using his knife to stab two

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victims. Plaintiff was transported to Tri-City Medical Center based upon a laceration he

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sustained above his eye. Plaintiff stated to Officer Ruedi that he had pulled the knife in

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self-defense. Thereafter he was booked into custody and transported to Vista Detention

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Facilities. (Id.)

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Plaintiff alleges Officer Ruedi and the City of Oceanside maliciously violated his

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rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu-

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tion. Plaintiff contends that as a result of the Officer’s action, his application for low3

14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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income housing was denied due to his lengthy history of serious crimes. (Id. at 2; Ex. D

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Letter Denying Housing Application.) Plaintiff seeks $12 million in punitive and

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compensatory damages for mental, emotional and monetary loss. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also

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requests the Court to instate a temporary restraining order against Officer Ruedi because

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he is “going through legal means to settle this matter.” (Doc. No. 2.)
DISCUSSION

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I.

Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a court may authorize the commencement of a

suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement

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of all his assets, showing he is unable to pay filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

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However, even if a court finds the plaintiff has submitted adequate documentation

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detailing his inability to pay, before granting IFP status, the court must conduct a sua

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sponte review of the complaint to determine if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails

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to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

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defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254

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F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not

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limited to prisoners.”).

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Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit to show his inability to pay the filing fees

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in this matter. (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff is not currently employed though he does receive

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an unspecified amount of money from Social Security, disability, or other welfare. (Id. at

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2.) Plaintiff has a checking account and has listed the present balance as $ -79.00.3

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Plaintiff owns an automobile with a total of $6,900 still owed. Plaintiff has also listed a

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number of other debts owed and indicates he has no other assets. (Id. at 3.)

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Though Plaintiff’s affidavit fails to specify the amount he receives from Social
Security, disability, or other welfare, the Court, in its discretion, finds that Plaintiff has

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It appears that Plaintiff’s affidavit states that the present balance of his checking account is a
negative number.

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14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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satisfied the necessary showing to proceed in forma pauperis. See Weller v. Dickson,

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314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963) (agreeing with the statement that “the privilege of

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proceeding in forma pauperis is a matter within the discretion of the trial court . . . .”).

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Based on the numerous debt obligations listed compared to assets, the Court finds that

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Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fees for his suit to proceed.
After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss the case if the

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complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000)

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(en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to

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sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). The Court

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must now review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether it states a claim for which

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relief may be granted.

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II.

Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

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A.

Legal Standards

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After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the complaint “fails to

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state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. §

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1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc)

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(noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte

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dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). In order to properly

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state a claim for relief, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as

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true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

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662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A complaint must contain more than “labels and

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conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must

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contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative

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level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). “ ‘The

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pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates

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a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’ ” Id.

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A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.”

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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989) (superseded on other

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grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir.2000)). Where a

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complaint fails to state “any constitutional or statutory right that was violated, nor asserts

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any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,” there is no “arguable basis in law”

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under Neitzke, and the court on its own initiative may decline to permit the plaintiff to

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proceed and dismiss the complaint under Section 1915. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d

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1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1995).

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The Court takes note that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and recognizes its duty to

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ensure that the pro se litigant is afforded a review of his pleadings under a more lenient

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standard than if drafted by lawyers. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th

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Cir. 1986); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Pleadings drafted by

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laymen, proceeding in propria persona, are to be interpreted by the application of less

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rigid standards than those applicable to formal documents prepared by lawyers.”).

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However, it is also the duty of the district court to examine any application for leave to

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proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if

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it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion

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seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir.

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1965). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983

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based upon Officer Ruedi’s conduct. Essentially, Plaintiff argues that Officer Ruedi

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falsely arrested him on August 29, 2013. Plaintiff’s primary claim for damages stems

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from the fact that he was forced to pay impounding fees for his vehicle as well as costs

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for re-keying his car when the Oceanside Police Department allegedly lost his keys.

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B.

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Section 1983 Claims
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show: (1) a

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person acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the

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conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the

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Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. County of Los

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Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 claims must also conform to

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Rule 8's pleading standards. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8. A complaint must contain more

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than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

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conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 is designed to provide defen-

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dants with fair notice of the claims and the factual allegations supporting those claims.

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See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991).

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The United States Supreme Court has explained that any § 1983 claim must begin
by isolating “the precise constitutional violation with which the defendant is charged.”
Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).

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1.

Claims Against Officer Ruedi

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“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the

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Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justifica-

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tion.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001).4

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Thus, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he

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was arrested without probable cause. “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have

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knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reason-

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able caution to believe that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the

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person being arrested.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007).

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Probable cause is an objective inquiry. Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 590

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F.3d 936, 954 (9th Cir. 2010).

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Where probable cause for arrest exists under the circumstances for arrest, civil

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rights are not violated by an arrest even though innocence may subsequently be establis-

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hed. Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1966). By Plaintiff’s own

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admissions, he was in possession of a knife when officers arrived at the scene. (Doc. No.

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The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528,
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14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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1 at 1.) According to Officer Ruedi’s report, a witness told him a suspect in possession

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of a knife was nearby Lockup Facility. Officer Ruedi also heard witnesses stating a male

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subject attempted to stab someone. (Id. at Ex. A, Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest

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Report.) Thereafter, Officer Ruedi saw Plaintiff with a fixed blade knife in his right

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hand and blood on his clothing and face quickly walking towards the officer. Multiple

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witnesses at the scene, including the two victims, identified Plaintiff as the attacker. (See

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Reports of Officer Ruedi, Officer Jose Lopez, and Officer James Ridenour, Doc. No. 1,

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Ex. A.) Moreover, Officer Ruedi personally saw the injuries on Williamson. Officer

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Ruedi’s declaration of probable cause for warrantless arrest also details the circum-

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stances of arrest. (Id.) Based upon the information known to Officer Ruedi at the time

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of arrest, he placed Plaintiff under arrest for two counts of violation of PC 245(a)(1)

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Assault with Deadly Weapon. Even taking Plaintiff’s allegation as true, that he was

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acting in self defense, Officer Ruedi acted with probable cause based on the objective

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circumstances surrounding the time of arrest. The defense of good faith and probable

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cause, available to police officers in a common law tort action, is also available in an

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action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).

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Accordingly, this Court finds that based on Plaintiff’s own allegations and the

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records attached to his Complaint, Officer Ruedi had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff

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for Assault with Deadly Weapon.

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Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations when Officer Ruedi seized Plain-

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tiff’s car keys after he was booked into county jail. However, once an accused has been

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lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention

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that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may lawfully be searched and

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seized. U.S. v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1974). Therefore, Plaintiff has no claim

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against Officer Ruedi for Fourth Amendment violation when the Officer seized Plain-

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tiff’s car keys.5

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Plaintiff further alleges violations of his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment,

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prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Involuntary

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servitude “occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by improper or

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wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person to believe

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that he or she has no alternative but to perform labor.” Brogan v. San Mateo Cnty., 901

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F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint, even under the

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most liberal of readings and by any stretch of the imagination, is woefully deficient in

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stating a claim of Thirteenth Amendment violation against Officer Ruedi. There are

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absolutely no allegations made that would support a showing that Plaintiff was subjected

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to involuntary servitude. Based upon the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and the

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Officer Reports attached as exhibits to the Complaint, the Court fails to see how any of

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Officer Ruedi’s conduct during the August 29, 2013 could amount to a violation of the

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Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude

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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Ruedi are DISMISSED for failure
to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

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4.

Claims against Defendant City of Oceanside

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Plaintiff names as a defendant, the City of Oceanside. (Id. at 1.) However, a local

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governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employee under a

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respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New

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York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2019 (1978). Instead, liability under § 1983 can only

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be established where the alleged constitutional violation results from an official policy or

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If Plaintiff meant to plead that his car keys were unlawfully retained and/or lost by the police
department, those allegations should be brought under a claim of relief under the California Tort Claims
Act. However, the Court reminds Plaintiff that a claim for conversion against a state agency does not
create a basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, even if the Court could exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the conversion claim, it has the discretion to decline to hear such a claim if all federal
claims have been dismissed.

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custom. Id. The Ninth Circuit has articulated three ways a plaintiff may establish

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vicarious liability against a local government entity. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal.,

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47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). First, a plaintiff may show liability “by proving that

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a city employee committed the alleged violations pursuant to the city’s official policy or

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custom.” Id. Second, a plaintiff may show “that, rather than being the product of

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general official policy, on a given occasion the conduct was the result of a ‘deliberate

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choice... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for

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establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’” Id. (citing

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Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). Third, a plaintiff could

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demonstrate that “an official policymaker either delegated policymaking authority to a

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subordinate or ratified a subordinate’s decision, approving the ‘decision and the basis for

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it.’” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126-27 (1988)).
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead such bare facts. Moreover, this Court has

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already found Officer Ruedi’s arrest of Plaintiff justified by probable cause, thus there

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can be no liability under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the City of Oceanside based on

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Officer Ruedi’s conduct as alleged. As to any Thirteenth Amendment violations brought

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against the City of Oceanside, even if Plaintiff intended to plead that he was subjected to

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involuntary servitude when he was required to work in accordance with prison rules

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during his forty-four day incarceration, such a claim is without merit. See Berry v.

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Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1957 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment does not

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apply where prisoners are required to work in accordance with prison rules.”)
As it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that these deficiencies cannot

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be cured by amendment, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint against the City of

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Oceanside for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted.

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//

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//

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//

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CONCLUSION

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The Court finds that, at this time, Plaintiff has failed to state claim for which relief

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may be granted. A plaintiff should be granted leave to amend when the deficiencies in

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the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th

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Cir. 2000). In this case, it is unclear whether Plaintiff can allege facts supporting his

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claims of civil rights violation. As the four page Complaint stands now, there are no

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factual allegations that could support a claim for civil rights violations. However,

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recognizing the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the “rule favoring liberality in amend-

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ments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant.” Id. (quoting Noll v.

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Carlson, 809 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint is

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DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint

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within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Failure to file the amended com-

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plaint in a timely manner will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice.

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DATED: July 8, 2014

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Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia
U.S. District Judge

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