Stewart v. Oceanside, City of et al

Filing 5

ORDER: (1) granting 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis; and (2) dismissing the complaint with leave to amend. Amended Complaint due within (30) thirty days of this Order. Signed by Judge Anthony J. Battaglia on 7/8/14. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(cge)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 MICHAEL STEWART, 13 Plaintiff, 14 v. 15 CITY OF OCEANSIDE, et al., 16 Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil No.14cv1472 AJB (JLB) ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS, (Doc. No. 2); and (2) DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, (Doc. No. 1) 17 18 19 Plaintiff Michael Stewart (hereinafter “Plaintiff” of “Stewart”), a nonprisoner 20 proceeding pro se, has submitted a Complaint alleging civil rights violation under 42 21 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. No.1.) Plaintiff has not paid the $450 civil filing fee required to 22 commence this action, but rather, has filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis 23 (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in 24 forma pauperis is GRANTED. However, Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim, thus 25 his Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend. 26 27 28 1 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) BACKGROUND 1 2 3 I. Factual Allegations 1 On August 29, 2013, Plaintiff was attacked while walking at Oceanside Beach, 4 City of Oceanside, California. Plaintiff states that he protected himself against his 5 attackers by using a knife. (Doc. No. 1 at 1.) According to Plaintiff, two weeks prior to 6 the August 29, 2013 incident, Plaintiff contacted the Oceanside Police Department to 7 report threats made against him. “TOLD THEM THAT THIS (sic) PEOPLE HAD BEEN 8 THREATHING (sic) ME, HARRASSING (sic) ME BECAUSE I WOULD RIDE THEM 9 (sic) AROUND IN MY CAR SO THEY COULD SELL DRUGS . . . .” (Id.) A dispatch 10 officer instructed Plaintiff to go to the police station to make his report; he did so the 11 next day. Plaintiff states that he asked an officer to “TELL THEM LEAVE ME ALONG 12 (sic). (Id.) 13 When officers arrived on the scene on August 29, 2013, Plaintiff alleges that his 14 attackers made false statements to the officers. Moreover, one witness who spoke on 15 Plaintiff’s behalf attempted to tell the officers that Plaintiff did nothing wrong, but was 16 told to leave. (Id.) Plaintiff was arrested and charged with two counts of PC 245(1) 17 Assault with a Deadly Weapon. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Chris Ruedi retained 18 possession of Plaintiff’s car keys after booking him in the county jail. Plaintiff further 19 states that his car was ticketed and impounded. Plaintiff alleges that such actions were 20 unlawful. 21 Plaintiff states that during his court case, the only “EVIDENCE THAT OCEANS- 22 IDE POLICE DEPARTMENT HAD IN [his] CASE WAS THE POLICE REPORT AND 23 THEY DID NOT HAVE MY CAR KEYS.” (Id.) 2 Plaintiff spent forty-four (44) days in 24 jail. When he was released, Plaintiff had to pay $1,790.00 for impound fees and 25 $2,011.91 to have his car re-keyed due to Officer Ruedi’s alleged unlawful actions. 26 Plaintiff further alleges that his car was broken into and his personal belongings stolen. 27 1 All factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. No. 1.) 2 No further details are given with regards to Plaintiff’s state court proceedings. 28 2 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 Plaintiff filed a claim for damages with the City of Oceanside (Claim Number 2 GC2013000147) which was denied by operation of law. (Doc. No. 1 at Ex. C.) According to Officer Ruedi’s Report, attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint, he 3 4 received a citizen flag at the Oceanside Police Beach Lockup Facility referencing a fight 5 that was occurring behind the building. (Doc. No. 1, Ex. A at 7.) Officers Ruedi was 6 flagged by witnesses as he and a colleague exited the Lockup Facility. There, Officer 7 Ruedi saw the suspect, Michael Stewart, holding a “large, black handled, fixed blade 8 knife in his right hand.” (Id.) Officer Ruedi states that Stewart appeared to have blood 9 on his clothing and face. Officer Ruedi then proceeded to draw out his firearm and 10 instructed Stewart to drop the knife and to lie in the prone position. Stewart complied 11 and Sgt. Stanley handcuffed Stewart without further incident. (Id.) Thereafter, multiple 12 officers assisted in the investigation by locating witnesses, interviewing witnesses, and 13 collecting additional evidence. While conducting a witness search, Officer Ruedi 14 noticed a black male nearby appearing to be injured. The subject, later identified as 15 David Williamson (“Williamson”), reported that he had been stabbed by the suspect. 16 Officer Ruedi noticed a small puncture wound on Williamson’s left arm. (Id.) William- 17 son stated that he had tried to help a friend who was also being assaulted by Stewart. (Id. 18 at 8.) 19 Based upon evidence and statements obtained on the scene, Officer Ruedi formed 20 the opinion that “Stewart was in violation of two counts of PC 245(1) Assault with a 21 Deadly Weapon. Multiple witnesses identified Plaintiff as using his knife to stab two 22 victims. Plaintiff was transported to Tri-City Medical Center based upon a laceration he 23 sustained above his eye. Plaintiff stated to Officer Ruedi that he had pulled the knife in 24 self-defense. Thereafter he was booked into custody and transported to Vista Detention 25 Facilities. (Id.) 26 Plaintiff alleges Officer Ruedi and the City of Oceanside maliciously violated his 27 rights under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitu- 28 tion. Plaintiff contends that as a result of the Officer’s action, his application for low3 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 income housing was denied due to his lengthy history of serious crimes. (Id. at 2; Ex. D 2 Letter Denying Housing Application.) Plaintiff seeks $12 million in punitive and 3 compensatory damages for mental, emotional and monetary loss. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also 4 requests the Court to instate a temporary restraining order against Officer Ruedi because 5 he is “going through legal means to settle this matter.” (Doc. No. 2.) DISCUSSION 6 7 8 9 I. Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), a court may authorize the commencement of a suit without prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement 10 of all his assets, showing he is unable to pay filing fees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 11 However, even if a court finds the plaintiff has submitted adequate documentation 12 detailing his inability to pay, before granting IFP status, the court must conduct a sua 13 sponte review of the complaint to determine if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails 14 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a 15 defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 16 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not 17 limited to prisoners.”). 18 Here, Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit to show his inability to pay the filing fees 19 in this matter. (Doc. No. 2.) Plaintiff is not currently employed though he does receive 20 an unspecified amount of money from Social Security, disability, or other welfare. (Id. at 21 2.) Plaintiff has a checking account and has listed the present balance as $ -79.00.3 22 Plaintiff owns an automobile with a total of $6,900 still owed. Plaintiff has also listed a 23 number of other debts owed and indicates he has no other assets. (Id. at 3.) 24 25 Though Plaintiff’s affidavit fails to specify the amount he receives from Social Security, disability, or other welfare, the Court, in its discretion, finds that Plaintiff has 26 27 28 3 It appears that Plaintiff’s affidavit states that the present balance of his checking account is a negative number. 4 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 satisfied the necessary showing to proceed in forma pauperis. See Weller v. Dickson, 2 314 F.2d 598, 600 (9th Cir. 1963) (agreeing with the statement that “the privilege of 3 proceeding in forma pauperis is a matter within the discretion of the trial court . . . .”). 4 Based on the numerous debt obligations listed compared to assets, the Court finds that 5 Plaintiff is unable to pay the filing fees for his suit to proceed. After granting in forma pauperis status, the Court must dismiss the case if the 6 7 complaint “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28 8 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) 9 (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to 10 sua sponte dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). The Court 11 must now review Plaintiff’s Complaint to determine whether it states a claim for which 12 relief may be granted. 13 II. Initial Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) 14 A. Legal Standards 15 After granting IFP status, the Court must dismiss the case if the complaint “fails to 16 state a claim on which relief may be granted” or is “frivolous.” 28 U.S.C. § 17 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir.2000) (en banc) 18 (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) “not only permits but requires” the court to sua sponte 19 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim). In order to properly 20 state a claim for relief, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as 21 true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). A complaint must contain more than “labels and 23 conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must 24 contain factual allegations sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative 25 level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (2007). “ ‘The 26 pleading must contain something more ... than ... a statement of facts that merely creates 27 a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action.’ ” Id. 28 5 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) A complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” 1 2 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (1989) (superseded on other 3 grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir.2000)). Where a 4 complaint fails to state “any constitutional or statutory right that was violated, nor asserts 5 any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction,” there is no “arguable basis in law” 6 under Neitzke, and the court on its own initiative may decline to permit the plaintiff to 7 proceed and dismiss the complaint under Section 1915. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 8 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1995). 9 The Court takes note that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and recognizes its duty to 10 ensure that the pro se litigant is afforded a review of his pleadings under a more lenient 11 standard than if drafted by lawyers. See Jacobsen v. Filler, 790 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th 12 Cir. 1986); Hansen v. May, 502 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (“Pleadings drafted by 13 laymen, proceeding in propria persona, are to be interpreted by the application of less 14 rigid standards than those applicable to formal documents prepared by lawyers.”). 15 However, it is also the duty of the district court to examine any application for leave to 16 proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if 17 it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion 18 seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 19 1965). Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 20 based upon Officer Ruedi’s conduct. Essentially, Plaintiff argues that Officer Ruedi 21 falsely arrested him on August 29, 2013. Plaintiff’s primary claim for damages stems 22 from the fact that he was forced to pay impounding fees for his vehicle as well as costs 23 for re-keying his car when the Oceanside Police Department allegedly lost his keys. 24 B. 25 Section 1983 Claims To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show: (1) a 26 person acting “under color of state law” committed the conduct at issue, and (2) the 27 conduct deprived the plaintiff of some right, privilege, or immunity protected by the 28 6 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 Constitution or laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Shah v. County of Los 2 Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 746 (9th Cir. 1986). Section 1983 claims must also conform to 3 Rule 8's pleading standards. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 8. A complaint must contain more 4 than “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 5 conclusory statements.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rule 8 is designed to provide defen- 6 dants with fair notice of the claims and the factual allegations supporting those claims. 7 See McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 9 10 The United States Supreme Court has explained that any § 1983 claim must begin by isolating “the precise constitutional violation with which the defendant is charged.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979). 11 1. Claims Against Officer Ruedi 12 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the 13 Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justifica- 14 tion.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001).4 15 Thus, to succeed on a Fourth Amendment claim, Plaintiff must first demonstrate that he 16 was arrested without probable cause. “Probable cause to arrest exists when officers have 17 knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to lead a person of reason- 18 able caution to believe that an offense has been committed or is being committed by the 19 person being arrested.” United States v. Lopez, 482 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2007). 20 Probable cause is an objective inquiry. Edgerly v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 590 21 F.3d 936, 954 (9th Cir. 2010). 22 Where probable cause for arrest exists under the circumstances for arrest, civil 23 rights are not violated by an arrest even though innocence may subsequently be establis- 24 hed. Beauregard v. Wingard, 362 F.2d 901, 903 (9th Cir. 1966). By Plaintiff’s own 25 admissions, he was in possession of a knife when officers arrived at the scene. (Doc. No. 26 The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 28 87 S. Ct. 1727 (1967). 27 4 7 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 1 at 1.) According to Officer Ruedi’s report, a witness told him a suspect in possession 2 of a knife was nearby Lockup Facility. Officer Ruedi also heard witnesses stating a male 3 subject attempted to stab someone. (Id. at Ex. A, Probable Cause for Warrantless Arrest 4 Report.) Thereafter, Officer Ruedi saw Plaintiff with a fixed blade knife in his right 5 hand and blood on his clothing and face quickly walking towards the officer. Multiple 6 witnesses at the scene, including the two victims, identified Plaintiff as the attacker. (See 7 Reports of Officer Ruedi, Officer Jose Lopez, and Officer James Ridenour, Doc. No. 1, 8 Ex. A.) Moreover, Officer Ruedi personally saw the injuries on Williamson. Officer 9 Ruedi’s declaration of probable cause for warrantless arrest also details the circum- 10 stances of arrest. (Id.) Based upon the information known to Officer Ruedi at the time 11 of arrest, he placed Plaintiff under arrest for two counts of violation of PC 245(a)(1) 12 Assault with Deadly Weapon. Even taking Plaintiff’s allegation as true, that he was 13 acting in self defense, Officer Ruedi acted with probable cause based on the objective 14 circumstances surrounding the time of arrest. The defense of good faith and probable 15 cause, available to police officers in a common law tort action, is also available in an 16 action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). 17 Accordingly, this Court finds that based on Plaintiff’s own allegations and the 18 records attached to his Complaint, Officer Ruedi had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff 19 for Assault with Deadly Weapon. 20 Plaintiff alleges Fourth Amendment violations when Officer Ruedi seized Plain- 21 tiff’s car keys after he was booked into county jail. However, once an accused has been 22 lawfully arrested and is in custody, the effects in his possession at the place of detention 23 that were subject to search at the time and place of arrest may lawfully be searched and 24 seized. U.S. v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1974). Therefore, Plaintiff has no claim 25 26 27 28 8 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 against Officer Ruedi for Fourth Amendment violation when the Officer seized Plain- 2 tiff’s car keys.5 3 Plaintiff further alleges violations of his rights under the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude. (Doc. No. 1 at 2.) Involuntary 5 servitude “occurs when an individual coerces another into his service by improper or 6 wrongful conduct that is intended to cause, and does cause, the other person to believe 7 that he or she has no alternative but to perform labor.” Brogan v. San Mateo Cnty., 901 8 F.2d 762, 764 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). Plaintiff’s Complaint, even under the 9 most liberal of readings and by any stretch of the imagination, is woefully deficient in 10 stating a claim of Thirteenth Amendment violation against Officer Ruedi. There are 11 absolutely no allegations made that would support a showing that Plaintiff was subjected 12 to involuntary servitude. Based upon the Court’s review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and the 13 Officer Reports attached as exhibits to the Complaint, the Court fails to see how any of 14 Officer Ruedi’s conduct during the August 29, 2013 could amount to a violation of the 15 Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition against slavery and involuntary servitude 16 17 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Ruedi are DISMISSED for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 18 4. Claims against Defendant City of Oceanside 19 Plaintiff names as a defendant, the City of Oceanside. (Id. at 1.) However, a local 20 governmental unit may not be held responsible for the acts of its employee under a 21 respondeat superior theory of liability. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New 22 York, 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2019 (1978). Instead, liability under § 1983 can only 23 be established where the alleged constitutional violation results from an official policy or 24 25 26 27 28 5 If Plaintiff meant to plead that his car keys were unlawfully retained and/or lost by the police department, those allegations should be brought under a claim of relief under the California Tort Claims Act. However, the Court reminds Plaintiff that a claim for conversion against a state agency does not create a basis for federal jurisdiction. Moreover, even if the Court could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the conversion claim, it has the discretion to decline to hear such a claim if all federal claims have been dismissed. 9 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) 1 custom. Id. The Ninth Circuit has articulated three ways a plaintiff may establish 2 vicarious liability against a local government entity. See Fuller v. City of Oakland, Cal., 3 47 F.3d 1522, 1534 (9th Cir. 1995). First, a plaintiff may show liability “by proving that 4 a city employee committed the alleged violations pursuant to the city’s official policy or 5 custom.” Id. Second, a plaintiff may show “that, rather than being the product of 6 general official policy, on a given occasion the conduct was the result of a ‘deliberate 7 choice... made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for 8 establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question.’” Id. (citing 9 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 483-84 (1986)). Third, a plaintiff could 10 demonstrate that “an official policymaker either delegated policymaking authority to a 11 subordinate or ratified a subordinate’s decision, approving the ‘decision and the basis for 12 it.’” Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 126-27 (1988)). Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to plead such bare facts. Moreover, this Court has 13 14 already found Officer Ruedi’s arrest of Plaintiff justified by probable cause, thus there 15 can be no liability under the Fourteenth Amendment as to the City of Oceanside based on 16 Officer Ruedi’s conduct as alleged. As to any Thirteenth Amendment violations brought 17 against the City of Oceanside, even if Plaintiff intended to plead that he was subjected to 18 involuntary servitude when he was required to work in accordance with prison rules 19 during his forty-four day incarceration, such a claim is without merit. See Berry v. 20 Bunnell, 39 F.3d 1056, 1957 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he Thirteenth Amendment does not 21 apply where prisoners are required to work in accordance with prison rules.”) As it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that these deficiencies cannot 22 23 be cured by amendment, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint against the City of 24 Oceanside for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted. 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 10 14cv1472 AJB (JLB) CONCLUSION 1 2 The Court finds that, at this time, Plaintiff has failed to state claim for which relief 3 may be granted. A plaintiff should be granted leave to amend when the deficiencies in 4 the complaint can be cured by amendment. Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th 5 Cir. 2000). In this case, it is unclear whether Plaintiff can allege facts supporting his 6 claims of civil rights violation. As the four page Complaint stands now, there are no 7 factual allegations that could support a claim for civil rights violations. However, 8 recognizing the Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the “rule favoring liberality in amend- 9 ments to pleadings is particularly important for the pro se litigant.” Id. (quoting Noll v. 10 Carlson, 809 F.2d 1146, 1148 (9th Cir. 1987). As such, Plaintiff’s Complaint is 11 DISMISSED with leave to amend. Plaintiff must file a First Amended Complaint 12 within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order. Failure to file the amended com- 13 plaint in a timely manner will result in the dismissal of this case without prejudice. 14 15 DATED: July 8, 2014 16 17 Hon. Anthony J. Battaglia U.S. District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 11 14cv1472 AJB (JLB)

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