Herrera et al v. AllianceOne Receivable Management, Inc. et al

Filing 69

DISCOVERY ORDER (ECF No. 67 ). Defendant shall produce any remaining responsive documents and any privilege log on or before close of business on 4/4/2015. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 3/28/2016. (rlu)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GILVERTO HERRERA, et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.

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ALLIANCEONE RECEIVABLE
MANAGEMENT, INC., et al.,

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Defendants.

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Civil No. 14-CV-1844-BTM (WVG)
DISCOVERY ORDER
[DOC. NO. 67]

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I. INTRODUCTION

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On March 21, 2016, Plaintiffs Gilverto and Claudia Herrera (“Plaintiffs”) and

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Defendant AllianceOne Receivable Management, Inc. (“Defendant”) filed a Joint

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Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute (“Joint Motion”) related to Plaintiffs’

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Requests for Production of Documents (“RFPs”), Set Two, which were served on

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Defendant on December 11, 2015. (Doc. No. 67; Doc. No. 61 at 1-2.) Plaintiffs’ RFPs

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seek production of, among other items, Defendant’s employee training manuals and

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Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding a number of issues. Id. On January 13,

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2016, Defendant served its RFP responses. (Doc. No. 61 at 2.) On February 9, 2016,

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Defendant produced additional responsive documents.1/ Id.

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The Court has identified several problems with Plaintiffs’ requests and

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Defendant’s responses. Notably, as Defendant argues, Plaintiffs have adjusted the

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target of several RFPs in their attempt to argue their position and clarify their initial

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requests. However, neither Defendant nor the Court can make assumptions about what

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information Plaintiffs really meant to obtain through their RFPs. Plaintiffs must be

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explicit and precise about the information they seek in the actual RFP, not simply in the

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subsequent argument to compel the information.

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As for Defendant, many of its objections and responses violate the spirit and

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intent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rules”), case law, and this Court’s

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Civil Chambers Rules (“Chambers Rules”), which prohibit boilerplate objections and

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conditional responses. Judge Gallo’s Chambers Rules, Appendix B (“Waiver of

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Discovery Objections”). The Court is dismayed that Defendant’s justification for its

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objections, as asserted in the Joint Motion, was not explained in its actual responses.

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Despite stating that every request was objectionable for various reasons, Defendant did

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not even attempt to demonstrate how or why the requests were vague, ambiguous,

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overbroad, or irrelevant. This Court’s Chambers Rules unequivocally instruct against

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boilerplate objections or conditional waivers. Defendant failed to properly object

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despite the Court’s Chambers Rules, case law, and the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure.

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1/

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On February 18, 2016, the Court granted the parties’ First Joint Motion to Extend the
Deadline to Resolve Discovery Dispute, allowing the parties until February 29, 2016
to schedule a joint telephone conference with the court. (Doc. No. 60.) On March 1,
2016, the Court granted the parties’ Second Joint Motion to Extend the Deadline to
Resolve Discovery Dispute, allowing the parties until March 11, 2016 to schedule a
joint telephone conference with the court. (Doc. No. 62.) On March 14, 2016, the
parties jointly notified the Court of their continuing dispute. (Doc. No. 65.)
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After reviewing Plaintiffs’ discovery requests and Defendants’ objections, and

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considering the arguments asserted by both parties in the Joint Motion, the Court issues

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the rulings below.

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II. DISCUSSION AND RULING

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A. RFP NO. 39
Request No. 39: “Produce all of defendant’s policies and procedures
regarding the verification of a debt.”

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Response to Request No. 39: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrases “policies and procedures” and “regarding the
verification of a debt” are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further
objects to this Request on the grounds that it is overbroad and seeks
information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit,
nor proportionally tailored to the reasonable needs of the case. There is no
“debt” or “consumer debt” at issue as those terms are defined by 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f), respectively.
Defendant also objects to this Request to the extent that it seeks proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective
orders, confidentiality agreements, or statutory provisions that bar the
disclosure of that information without the consent of third parties, or
information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney
work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that
it is duplicative of other Requests previously responded to by Defendant
in this action. Subject to and without waiving the foregoing, Defendant
will produce non-privileged business records in its possession, custody or
control, responsive to this request, that are relevant to the claims and
defenses in this lawsuit and that have not previously been produced.”

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Plaintiffs’ Argument2/

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Defendant’s objections are baseless. The parties have signed a Protective
Order. (Doc. 24 and 26.) Further, this Request deals with the policies and procedures
to verify or validate the identity of the debtor and other information regarding the debt.
In this matter, all three traffic tickets were issued to drivers with completely different
name. The owner of the cars was Gilberto Gamino Herrera, who has a different name,
address, date of birth, height, and weight than plaintiff. If Defendant has any policies
and procedure to validate the identity of the debtor, then Plaintiff need to examine it.
If there are no policies and procedures, then Defendant must state it.

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2/

All of the parties’ arguments are copied verbatim from their Joint Motion.
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Defendant’s Argument

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As Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s objection that this

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Request is vague and ambiguous is well-taken. Plaintiffs initially requested information

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regarding “verification of the debt.” Now, however, they explain that they seek

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information “to verify or validate the identity of the debtor.” This is not what the

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request sought, which was information regarding “a debt.” In any event, Defendant has

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produced responsive documents. See AO 1-34, 64-67, 68-71, 81-84, 271-275, 357-361,

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516-528, 529-543 and 544-556. There is no basis to compel production.

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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 39

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Defendant’s objection is SUSTAINED on the basis of Defendant’s specific

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objection that, “[t]here is no ‘debt’ or ‘consumer debt’ at issue as those terms are

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defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f), respectively.”

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Logically, if there is no debt as defined by the statutes, then there are no documents to

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produce.

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It does appear, as Defendant contends, that Plaintiffs have readjusted the focus

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of this RFP in their argument to the Court. Although RFP No. 39 explicitly seeks

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Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding the verification of a debt, Plaintiffs now

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argue that they seek policies and procedures to validate the identity of the debtor. The

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Court will not compel Defendant to produce documents related to the identity of the

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debtor in response to this RFP, as this is not what Plaintiffs initially requested.

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Plaintiffs must be precise about what information they seek when crafting their RFPs.

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Defendant is not expected to be clairvoyant.

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While Defendant’s objection to RFP No. 39 is sustained on the sole basis

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explained above, the remainder of Defendant’s objections to this RFP are OVER-

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RULED. Defendant has provided a catalogue of boilerplate objections, including

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noting that this request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, duplicative, and seeks

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irrelevant information, but has failed to provide any explanation for its objections.

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Where the responding party provides a boilerplate or generalized objection, the
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“objections are inadequate and tantamount to not making any objection at all.” Walker

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v. Lakewood Condominium Owners Associations, 186 F.R.D. 584, 587 (C.D.Cal.

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1999); see Ritacca v. Abbott Laboratories, 203 F.R.D. 332, 335 n.4 (N.D.Ill. 2001)

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(“As courts have repeatedly pointed out, blanket objections are patently im-

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proper,...[and] we treat [the] general objections as if they were never made.”). The

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responding party must clarify, explain, and support its objections. Anderson v. Hansen,

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2012 WL 4049979, at 8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012). “The grounds for objecting to a

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request must be stated...and as with other forms of discovery, it is well established that

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boilerplate objections do not suffice.” Id. (discussing boilerplate objections asserted in

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response to requests for admission).

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Further, Defendant has included a conditional response in its objection, which

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leaves Plaintiffs and the Court guessing as to whether all responsive documents will be

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produced. Conditional responses and/or the purported reservation of rights by a

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responding party are improper and ultimately have the effect of waiving the objections

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to the discovery requests. Sprint Communications Co. v. Comcast Cable Communica-

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tions, LLC, 2014 WL 545544 at *2 (D. KS 2014)(“Sprint I”), modified 2014 WL

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569963 (D. KS 2014)(“Sprint II”). The responses are confusing and misleading

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because, for example, when a party responds to an interrogatory that is “subject to” and

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“without waiving its objections,” the propounder of the interrogatory is “left guessing

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as to whether the responding party has fully or only partially responded to the

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interrogatory.” Estridge v. Target Corp., 2012 WL 527051 at *1-2 (S.D. FL 2012).

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Conditional responses to discovery requests violate Rule 26.

Rule 26

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(g)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) requires responders to discovery requests to certify that the discovery

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responses are consistent with the Rules, “not imposed for any improper purpose,” and

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are “neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome.” Moreover, the 1983 Committee

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comments to Rule 26(g) state that “Rule 26 imposes an affirmative duty to engage in

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pretrial discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent with the spirit and purposes

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of Rule 26 through 37.” Providing conditional responses to discovery requests is
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improper, the objections are deemed waived, and the response to the discovery request

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stands. Sprint II, 2014 WL 1569963 at *3; see also Estridge, 2012 WL 527051 at *2;

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citing Tardif v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 2011 WL 1627165 at *2

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(M.D. FL 2011); Pepperwood of Naples Condominium Assn. v. Nationwide Mutual

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Fire Ins. Co., 2011 WL 4382104 at *4-5 (M.D. FL 2011); Consumer Elecs. Assn. v.

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Compras And Buys Magazine, Inc., 2008 WL 4327253 at *3 (S.D. FL 2008) (“subject

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to” and “without waiving objections” “preserve... nothing and serve... only to waste the

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time and resources of both the Parties and the Court. Further, such practice leaves the

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requesting Party uncertain as to whether the question has actually been fully answered

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or

whether

only

a

portion

of

the

question

has

been

answered.”)

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Defendant also objects to this RFP to the extent that it seeks proprietary

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information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders, confidentiality

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agreements, or statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that information without

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the consent of third parties. Like Plaintiffs, the Court is confused that Defendant asserts

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an objection to producing information subject to a protective order, when a protective

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order was executed in this case more than one year ago, on February 5, 2015. (Doc.

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No. 26.)

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The Court observes that many of Defendant’s responses to Plaintiff’s

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discovery requests assert that the requested information is protected by the attor-

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ney-client privilege and/or, work product doctrine. If Defendant cannot reasonably

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determine what Plaintiffs are requesting, the Court is befuddled as to how Defendant

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can state in good faith that the attorney-client privilege or work product doctrine is

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implicated. Further, Defendant has not indicated whether a privilege log has been

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produced. To the extent that the response invokes a privilege or work product,

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Defendant is required to provide Plaintiffs with a privilege log that lists each document

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withheld from production. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5)(A)(i)-(ii). A proper assertion of

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privilege or work product must contain the following for each document, communica-

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tion, or information withheld:
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(1) Date of the creation of the document;

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(2) Author;

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(3) Primary addressee(s) [and the relationship of that person(s) to the client

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and/or author of the document];

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4) Secondary addressee(s), persons who received copies of the document and the

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recipient [and the relationship of that person(s) to the client and/or author of the

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document];

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(5) Type of document;

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(6) Client (party asserting the privilege)

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(7) Attorneys (with an indication of who the attorney represents);

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(8) Subject matter of the document or privileged communication;

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(9) Purpose of the document or privileged communication (basis for the legal

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claim of privilege, work product or objection to production);

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(10) Whether the document, communication, or objection is attorney-client

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privilege, work product, or some other basis;

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(11) Identify each document by number.3/

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Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 302 (C.D. Cal. 1992); Martin v. Evans, 2012 WL

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1894219 at *5 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Del Campo v. American Corrective Counseling

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Services, 2007 WL 4287335 at *4 (N.D. Cal. 2007).

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3/

No. 11 was added by this Court.
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B. RFP NO. 43

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Request No. 43: “Produce all of defendant’s policies and procedures
regarding methods used to collect a debt.”
Response to Request No. 43: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrases “policies and procedures” and “methods used”
are vague and ambiguous. Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that it is overbroad and seeks information which is neither
relevant to the subject matter of this action, nor proportionally tailored to
the reasonable needs of the case. Defendant also objects to this Request
to the extent that is seeks proprietary information, trade secrets, or
information subject to protective orders, confidentiality agreement, or
statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that information without the
consent of third parties, or information protected by the attorney-client
privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine. There is no “debt” or
“consumer debt” at issue as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. §
1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f), respectively. Defendant
objects to this Request to the extent that it is duplicative of other Requests
previously responded to by Defendant in this action.”

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Plaintiffs’ Argument

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Defendant’s employees testified that Defendant uses several methods to

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collect, i.e., sending correspondence to the debtor, telephone calls, referral to tax

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authorities, and notifying credit bureaus. Plaintiffs have requested to examine those

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policies and procedures to determine whether its employees followed them. It is not

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clear from the Defendant’s records or deposition testimonies if Defendant sent any

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letters to the drivers, to the owner of the cars, or to the Plaintiffs. In addition,

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Defendant’s employees testified about sending a letter first and after a certain period

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of time would start the collection calls. Defendant has not produced any collection

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letters.

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Defendant’s Argument

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Although Plaintiffs’ originally requested a wide range of documents

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concerning how AllianceOne attempts to collect unpaid financial obligations, it is now

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clear from their explanation above that Plaintiffs are now seeking documents they did

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not request, namely “collection letters.” Regardless, Defendant has produced

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documents reflecting its policies and procedures for collecting outstanding financial

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obligations. See AO 1-34, 35-42, 43, 61-63, 78-80, 236-238, 239-270, 271-275,
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276-316, 317-324, 338, 340-341, 342-346, 357-361, 370-375, 381-515, 516-556,

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557-570, 571-582, 583-598, 599-614, 615-618, 619-622, 730-734. There is no basis to

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compel production.

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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 43

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Defendant’s objection is SUSTAINED on the basis of Defendant’s specific

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objection that, “[t]here is no ‘debt’ or ‘consumer debt’ at issue as those terms are

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defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f), respectively.”

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Logically, if there is no debt as defined by the statutes, then there are no documents to

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produce.

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It does appear, as Defendant argues, that Plaintiffs have readjusted the focus

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of their request in their argument to the Court. Although RFP No. 43 explicitly seeks

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Defendant’s policies and procedures regarding methods used to collect a debt, Plaintiffs

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now argue that they seek collection letters. The Court will not compel Defendant to

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produce any collection letters, as this is not what Plaintiffs initially requested. Further,

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Defendant states that it produced documents reflecting its policies and procedures for

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collecting outstanding financial obligations.

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While Defendant’s objection to RFP No. 43 is sustained on the sole basis

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explained above, the remainder of Defendant’s objections to this RFP are OVER-

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RULED. Once again, Defendant has provided a catalogue of boilerplate objections,

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noting that this request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, duplicative, and seeks

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irrelevant information. Defendant also objects to this request to the extent that it seeks

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proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders, but

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as already stated, there is a protective order in place in this case. (Doc. No. 26.)

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Finally, Defendant objects that Plaintiffs have requested information protected

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by the attorney-client privilege and/or, work product doctrine, but has failed to indicate

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whether a privilege log has been produced. To the extent that the responses invoke a

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privilege or work product, Defendant is required to provide Plaintiffs with a privilege

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log that lists each document withheld from production. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(5)(A)(i)-(ii).
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C. RFP NO. 46

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Request No. 46: “Produce all of defendant’s policies and procedures to
conduct skip trace.”

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Response to Request No. 46: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrase “conduct skip trace” is vague and ambiguous.
Defendant further objects to this Request on the grounds that it seeks
information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of the action, nor
proportionally tailored to the reasonable needs of the case. Defendant also
objects to this Request to the extent that it seeks proprietary information,
trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders, confidentiality
agreements, or statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that
information without the consent of third parties, or information protected
by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine.
Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that it is duplicative of
other Requests previously responded to by Defendant in this action.”

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Plaintiffs’ Argument

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Plaintiffs are requesting information regarding Defendant’s policies and
procedure to conduct investigation to determine the identity of the proper debtor,
debtor’s address, telephone number, and date of birth. In this case, all three traffic
tickets were issued to completely different individuals. Apparently, Defendant’s
employees conducted investigation and skip trace to find Plaintiff’s telephone numbers,
date of birth, addresses, and social security number.
Defendant’s Argument

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As Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s objection that this
Request is vague and ambiguous is well-taken. Plaintiffs now explain that they seek
information regarding how Defendant determines “the identity of the proper debtor,
debtor’s address, telephone number, and date of birth.” Regardless, Defendant has
produced responsive documents. See AO 1-34, 35-42, 64-67, 68-7, 239-270, 271-275,
365-369, 377-380, 544-556, 583-598, 599-614, 615-618, 619-622, 623-626, 735-736,
737-744. There is no basis to compel production.
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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 46
Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED.

Once again, Defendant has

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provided a catalogue of boilerplate objections, including noting that this request is

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vague, ambiguous, overbroad, duplicative, and seeks irrelevant information. The

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phrase “conduct skip trace” is not vague and ambiguous, as Defendant argues. Even

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though Defendant was not collecting a debt, but a judgment, there is a similarity in the

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methods and procedures in attempting to collect either. “Skip trace” is a common term

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in the debt collection services industry and has a common meaning of which Defendant

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undoubtedly is knowledgeable.

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Further, Defendant once again objects to this request to the extent that it seeks

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proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders, but

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there is a protective order in place. (Doc. No. 26.) Defendant also objects that

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Plaintiffs have requested information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or,

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work product doctrine, but has failed to indicate whether a privilege log has been

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produced.

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D. RFP NO. 52
Request No. 52: “Produce all of defendant’s employee training manuals
regarding the investigation of a debt.”
Response to Request No. 52: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrase “the investigation of a debt” is vague and
ambiguous. Defendant objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
overbroad and seeks information that is neither relevant to the subject
matter of this lawsuit, nor proportionally tailored to the reasonable needs
of the case. There is no “debt” or “consumer debt” at issue as that term is
defined by 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f),
respectively. Defendant also objects to this Request to the extent that it
seeks proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to
protective orders, confidentiality agreements, or statutory provisions that
bar the disclosure of that information without the consent of third parties,
or information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney
work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that
it is duplicative of other Requests previously responded to by Defendant
in this action.”
Plaintiffs’ Argument
Plaintiffs are asking for any training employee have received on how to
conduct investigation to find the proper name, address, date of birth, and telephone
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numbers of a person. Defendant uses several data bases and companies to conduct

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investigation. Further, Defendant has contracts with credit reporting agencies so

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Defendant could search credit bureaus’ computer systems.

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Defendant’s Argument

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As Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s objection that this

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Request is vague and ambiguous is well-taken. Plaintiffs initially requested information

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regarding “the investigation of a debt.” Now, however, they explain that they seek

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information regarding how Defendant investigates the “name, address, date of birth,

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and telephone numbers of a person.” Regardless, Defendant has produced responsive

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documents. See AO 1-34, 64-67, 68-71, 81-84, 271-275, 357-361, 516-528, 529-543

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and 544-556. There is no basis to compel production.

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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 52

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Defendant’s objection is SUSTAINED on the basis that Defendant objects

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that “[t]here is no ‘debt’ or ‘consumer debt’ at issue as that term is defined by 15 U.S.C.

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§ 1692a(5) and California Civil Code §1788.2(f), respectively. It does appear, as

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Defendant argues, that Plaintiffs have readjusted the focus of their request in their

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argument to the Court. Although RFP No. 52 explicitly seeks Defendant’s employee

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training manuals regarding the investigation of a debt, Plaintiffs now argue that they

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seek information related to any training that employees have received on how to

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conduct an investigation to find names, addresses, dates of birth, and telephone

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numbers. The Court will not compel Defendant to produce the information, as this is

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not what Plaintiffs initially requested.

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While Defendant’s objection to RFP No. 52 is sustained on the sole basis

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explained above, the remainder of Defendant’s objections to this RFP are OVER-

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RULED. Once again, Defendant has provided a list of boilerplate objections, noting

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that this request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, duplicative, and seeks irrelevant

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information.

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proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders,

Defendant also objects to this request to the extent that it seeks

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despite there being a protective order in place. (Doc. No. 26.) Defendant objects that

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Plaintiffs have requested information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or,

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work product doctrine, but has failed to indicate whether a privilege log has been

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produced.

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E. RFP NO. 63
Request No. 63: “Please produce any and all DOCUMENTS YOU
reviewed, referred to, or relied upon when preparing YOUR Rule 26
Disclosures.”
Response to Request No. 63: “Defendant objects to this request on the
grounds that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad, and overly burdensome. Defendant further objects to this Request on the grounds that it
seeks information that is neither relevant to the subject matter of the
action, nor proportionally tailored to the reasonable needs of the case.
Defendant also objects to this Request to the extent that it seeks proprietary information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective
orders, confidentiality agreements, or statutory provisions that bar the
disclosure of that information without the consent of third parties, or
information protected by the attorney-client privilege or attorney
work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this Request to the extent that
it is duplicative of other Requests previously responded to by Defendant
in this action.”
Plaintiffs’ Argument
On November 6, 2014, Defendant served its Initial Disclosure pursuant to
FRCP Rule 26(a)(1). However, Defendant did NOT produce any documents. Defendant
stated, The following categories of documents are in the possession, custody or control
of Defendant and may be used by Defendant to support its case:
(1) Document relating to the accounts at issue,
(2) Documents relating to Defendant’s attempts to collect the accounts at issue,
(3) Documents related to Defendant’s communications with plaintiffs,
(4) Documents relating to the Underlying Actions,
(5) Documents relating to Defendant’s policies and procedures,
(6) Documents supporting Defendant’s affirmative defenses,
(7) Plaintiffs’ federal and state income tax returns,
(8) Plaintiffs’ credit reports, and
(9) All documents identified and produced by Plaintiffs.
On November 6, 2014, Defendant asserted that it had in its possession and
control Plaintiffs’ federal and state income tax returns, and Plaintiffs’ credit reports.
Plaintiffs want to see these documents and how Defendant obtained those documents
before any discovery was done in this case. Additionally, Defendant claimed to have
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documents relating to this account and its attempts to collect the accounts. Defendant

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has not produced any collection letters it sent to the drivers, owner of the cars, and

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plaintiffs. Defendant has not produced the dialor-log (log of the every call, date, time,

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and telephone numbers) of all collection telephone calls it has made to the drivers, the

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owner of the cars, and to the Plaintiffs. Clearly Defendant has these documents, but it

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has failed to produce them.

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Defendant’s Argument

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Once again, Plaintiffs deviate from the language of their request in the

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explanation they offer as to why production should be compelled.4/ Defendant was only

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required to identify information it “may use to support its . . .defenses.” Plaintiffs now

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focus on Defendant’s reference to their “federal and state income tax returns” and their

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“credit reports,” and “want to see . . . how Defendant obtained those documents before

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any discovery was done in this case.” Plaintiffs’ desire to learn how Defendant may

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have obtained documents is not the proper subject of a document request. The statement

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that Plaintiffs’ tax returns were within Defendant’s possession, custody, or control was

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a mistake. Defendant did not then possess such documents, but rather anticipated that

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it might rely on such documents to defend itself. Regarding Defendant’s reference to

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Plaintiffs’ credit reports, however, certain such documents were in its possession when

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it served its Initial Disclosures, because Plaintiffs mailed copies of their credit reports

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to Defendant on or about November 19, 2012, almost a year before they filed their

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complaint, on November 5, 2013. In any event, Defendant has produced all of the

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documents it identified in its Initial Disclosures. See AO 1-747. There is no basis to

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compel production.

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As a threshold matter, Defendant was not obligated to produce documents when it
served its Initial Disclosures. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). (Doc. No. 67 at 8, n.
1.)
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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 63

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Defendant’s objection is SUSTAINED. While still crowded with boilerplate

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language, Defendant’s objection to RFP No. 63 differs from the other disputed

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responses in that Defendant claims this request is also overly burdensome. The Court

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agrees that RFP No. 63 is unduly burdensome. While preparing its initial disclosures,

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Defendant may have reviewed, referred to, or relied upon a voluminous amount of

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documents that turned out to be irrelevant to this case. Defendant now represents that

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it has produced all documents listed in its initial disclosures, and that it erroneously

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stated in its initial disclosures that it possessed copies of Plaintiffs’ tax returns.

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Moreover, Plaintiffs appear to alter their request in their subsequent argument to the

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Court, stating that they want to know how Defendant obtained copies of Plaintiffs’ tax

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returns and credit reports prior to discovery. This RFP does not ask for documents that

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demonstrate how Defendant obtained the documents listed in its initial disclosures.

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While the Court finds Defendant’s objection on overly burdensome grounds

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to be valid, it is disturbed by Defendant’s failure to provide proper justification for its

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objections in its RFP response. If Defendant had simply justified its objections in its

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RFP response, it is likely that this dispute could have been avoided.

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Defendant also objects to this request to the extent that it seeks information

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subject to a protective order and attorney-client privilege and/or, work product doctrine

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information. As explained in detail above, these objections are not valid.

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F. RFP NO. 65
Request No. 65: Please produce all credit reports YOU have obtained
from Credit Reporting Companies regarding plaintiffs.
Response to Request No. 65: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that it is overbroad and burdensome. Defendant objects to this
Request on the grounds that the phrase “credit report” and “credit
reporting companies” are vague and ambiguous. Defendant further objects
to this Request on the grounds that it seeks information that is neither
relevant to the subject matter of the action, nor proportionally tailored to
the reasonable needs of the case. Defendant also objects to this Request
to the extent that it seeks proprietary information, trade secrets, or
information subject to protective orders, confidentiality agreements, or
statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that information without the
consent of third parties, or information protected by the attorney-client
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privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this
Request to the extent that it is duplicative of other Requests previously
responded to by Defendant in this action. Subject to and without waiving
the foregoing, Defendant responds as flows: Defendant did not obtain any
credit reports regarding Plaintiffs, as it understand the phrase “credit
reports.”

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Plaintiffs’ Argument

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Defendant in its Initial Disclosure stated that it has credit reports in its

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possession, custody, and control. Additionally, Defendant has produced contracts with

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Experian and TransUnion which allow Defendant to access these credit bureaus’ data

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bases and search credit information about debtors. Defendant obtained Plaintiffs’ social

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security number, telephones numbers, address, and work information. Defendant used

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the social security number to refer the matter to California Franchise Tax Board and as

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a result, Plaintiffs’ federal income tax refund was seized.

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Defendant’s Argument

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As Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s objection that this

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Request is vague and ambiguous, as to the phrase “credit report,” is well-taken.

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Plaintiffs now appear to seek information reflecting that Defendant “obtained Plaintiffs’

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social security number, telephone numbers, address [sic], and [undefined] work

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information” from the credit reporting agencies. But this is not a “credit report” within

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the meaning prescribed by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)

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(“The term ‘consumer report’ means any written, oral, or other communication of any

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information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness,

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credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics,

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or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part

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for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility for”

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credit or other enumerated purposes). The fact that Defendant contracts with credit

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reporting agencies to obtain “information about debtors” does not prove Defendant

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obtained either Plaintiff’s credit report, nor is there any evidence that Defendant pulled

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the credit report of either of the Plaintiffs, as defined under the Act. As noted above,
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the credit reports in Defendant’s possession when it served its Initial Disclosures were

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provided to Defendant by Plaintiffs. Defendant clearly stated in its response that it did

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not obtain any credit reports concerning Plaintiffs from the credit reporting agencies.

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There is no basis to compel production.

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Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 65

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Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED. Defendant shall produce all credit

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reports that it has received from the credit reporting companies, as explicitly requested

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in RFP No. 65. If Defendant did not obtain any of Plaintiffs’ credit reports from the

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credit reporting agencies, it shall clearly state that in its RFP response.

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Defendant’s objection that the use of the phrases “credit report” and “credit

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reporting agencies” are vague and ambiguous is not well-taken by the Court.

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Defendant used the exact phrase, “credit reports,” in itemizing its initial disclosures.

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Certainly Defendant did not believe that its own use of the phrase “credit report” was

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vague or ambiguous because it would not have used it if it had. In its argument for RFP

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No. 63 in the Joint Motion, Defendant states, “Regarding Defendant’s reference to

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Plaintiffs’ credit reports, however, certain such documents were in its possession when

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it served its Initial Disclosures, because Plaintiffs mailed copies of their credit reports

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to Defendant on or about November 19, 2012, almost a year before they filed their

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complaint, on November 5, 2013.” (Doc. No. 67 at 9.) The Court is at a loss to

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understand how Defendant could use the disputed phrases in its own initial disclosures

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and Joint Motion argument, yet make a good faith objection that the same phrases are

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vague and ambiguous when used by Plaintiffs. Defendant is simply playing games by

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asserting this objection, and its response violates the spirit of Rule 26.

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G. RFP NO. 66

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Request No. 66: “Please produce all skip-trace done in this matter.”

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Response to Request No. 66: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrase “skip-trace” is vague and ambiguous. Defendant
objects to this Request on the grounds that it is overbroad. Defendant
further objects to this Request on the grounds that it seeks information that
is neither relevant to the subject matter of the action, nor proportionally
tailored to the reasonable needs of the case. Defendant also objects to this

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Request to the extent that it seeks proprietary information, trade secrets,
or information subject to protective orders, confidentiality agreements, or
statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that information without the
consent of third parties, or information protected by the attorney-client
privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this
Request to the extent that it is duplicative of other Requests previously
responded to by Defendant in this action. Subject to and without waiving
the foregoing, Defendant will produce non-privileged business records in
its possession, custody or control, responsive to this Request, that are
relevant to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit and that have not
previously been produced.”
Plaintiffs’ Argument
For the reason stated above, if Defendant has done any investigation to find
the information about the drivers, owner of the cars, or Plaintiffs, then those documents
should be produced. Plaintiffs are asking for all the investigations done and the results
of those investigations.
Defendant’s Argument
Once again, as Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s
objection that this Request is vague and ambiguous is well-taken. Plaintiffs nebulously
asked Defendant to produce “all skip-trace.” Now, however, they seek “the investigations done and the results of those investigations.” Regardless, Defendant has produced
responsive documents. See AO 85-99. There is no basis to compel production.
Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 66
Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED.

Once again, Defendant has

provided a litany of boilerplate objections, noting that this request is vague, ambiguous,
overbroad, duplicative, and seeks irrelevant information. As already discussed in this
Order, the phrase “skip trace” is not vague and ambiguous. “Skip trace” is a common
phrase in the debt collection services industry, and Plaintiffs are asking for all skiptrace done in this matter only.
Defendant also objects to this request to the extent that it seeks proprietary
information, trade secrets, or information subject to protective orders, or protected by
the attorney-client privilege and/or, work product doctrine, but has failed to indicate
whether a privilege log has been produced.
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Finally, Defendant has included a conditional response in its objection, which

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leaves Plaintiffs and the Court guessing as to whether all responsive documents will be

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produced. Conditional responses and/or the purported reservation of rights by a

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responding party are improper.

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H. RFP NO. 67
Request No. 67: Please produce all skip-trace done regarding traffic
tickets 78781HT, 84807KQ, and 18717JH.”
Response to Request No. 67: “Defendant objects to this Request on the
grounds that the phrase “skip-trace” is vague and ambiguous. Defendant
objects to this Request on the grounds that it is overbroad. Defendant
further objects to this Request on the grounds that it seeks information that
is neither relevant to the subject matter of the action, nor proportionally
tailored to the reasonable needs of the case. Defendant also objects to this
Request to the extent that it seeks proprietary information, trade secrets,
or information subject to protective orders, confidentiality agreements, or
statutory provisions that bar the disclosure of that information without the
consent of third parties, or information protected by the attorney-client
privilege or the attorney work-product doctrine. Defendant objects to this
Request to the extent that it is duplicative of other Requests previously
responded to by Defendant in this action. Subject to and without waiving
the foregoing, Defendant will produce non-privileged business records in
its possession, custody or control, responsive to this Request, that are
relevant to the claims and defenses in this lawsuit and that have not
previously been produced.”
Plaintiffs’ Argument
Please see the reason to Request No. 66.
Defendant’s Argument
Once again, as Plaintiffs’ explanation above makes clear, Defendant’s
objection that this Request is vague and ambiguous is well-taken. Plaintiffs nebulously
asked Defendant to produce “all skip-trace.” Now, however, they seek “the investigations done and the results of those investigations.” Regardless, Defendant has produced
responsive documents. See AO 85-99. There is no basis to compel production.
Court’s Ruling on RFP No. 67
Defendant’s objection is OVERRULED. Defendant has provided nothing but
boilerplate objections, noting that this request is vague, ambiguous, overbroad,
duplicative, and seeks irrelevant information. The phrase “skip trace” is not vague and
ambiguous, but rather, is a common phrase in the debt collection services industry.
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Defendant argues that “Plaintiffs nebulously asked Defendant to produce ‘all skip-

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trace.’” Plaintiffs clearly asked for all skip-trace done regarding the three traffic tickets

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at issue in this litigation.

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Defendant’s objections related to the protective order, privileges, and its

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conditional responses, are unsupported and improper.

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III. CONCLUSION

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Defendant shall produce any remaining responsive documents and any

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privilege log on or before close of business on April 4, 2015.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: March 28, 2016

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Hon. William V. Gallo
U.S. Magistrate Judge

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