Cowan v. Brown et al

Filing 23

ORDER: (1) Granting 5 Maureen Hallahan and Pennie McLaughlin's Motion to Dismiss; (2) Granting 14 the DCSS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; (3) Granting 16 Governor Brown's Motion to Dismiss; (4) Vacating Hearing Date. Plaint iff's Complaint is Dismissed with leave to amend as to all defendants. Amended complaint due by 12/19/2014. The hearing set for November 21, 2014, is Vacated. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 11/20/2014. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(srm)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

CHAD COWAN,

11

CASE NO. 3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG
Plaintiff,

12

(1) GRANTING MAUREEN
HALLAHAN AND PENNIE
MCLAUGHLIN’S MOTION TO
DISMISS;

13
14

v.

[ECF No. 5]

15

(2) GRANTING THE DCSS
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS;

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

ORDER:

[ECF No. 14]
GOVERNOR JERRY BROWN,
JUDGE MAUREEN HALLAHAN,
COMMISSIONER PENNIE
MCLAUGHLIN, SDCSS LAWYER
NATASHA ESSES, SDCSS
LAWYER DIONNE MOCHON,
SDCSS CASE MANAGER MIA-LEE
CABRERA, TRAC PHAM, SAN
DIEGO CHILD SUPPORT SERVICE,

(3) GRANTING GOVERNOR
BROWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS;
[ECF No. 16]
(4) VACATING HEARING DATE

Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are three motions to dismiss by: (1) Judge Maureen Hallahan

27 and Commissioner Pennie McLaughlin (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”); (2)
28 Mia Cabrera, Natasha Esses, Dionne Mochon, Trac Pham, and the Department of Child
-1-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 Support Services (the “DCSS”) (collectively, the “DCSS Defendants”); and (3)
2 Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (“Governor Brown”). (ECF Nos. 5, 14, 16.) Plaintiff Chad
3 Cowan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, opposes all three motions. (ECF No. 19.)
4

The parties have fully briefed the motions. (ECF Nos. 5, 14, 16, 19.) The Court

5 finds the motions suitable for disposition without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local
6 Rule 7.1(d)(1). Upon review of the moving papers, admissible evidence, and applicable
7 law, the Court GRANTS all three motions to dismiss.
8
9

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Judicial Defendants,

10 the DCSS Defendants, and Governor Brown (the “Complaint”). (ECF No. 1.) On
11 September 5, 2014, the Judicial Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 5.) On
12 September 14, 2014, the DCSS Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 14.)
13 On September 25, 2014, Governor Brown filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 16.) On
14 October 16, 2014, Plaintiff filed an opposition to all three motions to dismiss. (ECF
15 No. 19.) On October 17, 2014, the DCSS Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiff’s
16 opposition. (ECF No. 20.) On October 27, 2014, Judge Hallahan and Commissioner
17 McLaughlin filed a reply to Plaintiff’s opposition. (ECF No. 22.)
18

While Plaintiff’s complaint only specifies a “1st Cause of Action,” (see

19 Complaint, at 2:26)1, Plaintiff’s complaint appears to allege numerous claims: (1)
20 failure to defend Plaintiff’s constitutional rights in violation California Constitution,
21 article 20, section 3 by Governor Brown, Judge Hallahan, Commissioner McLaughlin,
22 Mochon, Pham, and Esses; (2) declaratory judgment invalidating a contract for child
23 support payment against; (3) violation of U.S. Constitution, article I, section 10 by
24 Commissioner McLaughlin; (4) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–242 by Commissioner
25 McLaughlin; (5) violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights by Commissioner
26 McLaughlin; (6) conspiracy to deprive Plaintiff of liberty without due process by Esses
27
28

1

References to the Complaint refer the page number in its CM/ECF document
header and the line number printed on each page.
-2-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 and Commissioner McLaughlin; (7) failure to “reserve [P]laintiff’s constitutional
2 rights” by Commissioner McLaughlin; (8) failure to investigate a conspiracy by
3 Governor Brown; (9) deprivation of liberty and constitutional rights by Esses and
4 Judge Hallahan; (10) conspiracy to “force involuntary servitude” on Plaintiff by Esses
5 and Commissioner McLaughlin; and (11) violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights2
6 by Commissioner McLaughlin, Judge Hallahan, Esses, Cabrera, and Governor Brown.
7 (Complaint.)
8

Based on the language in the Complaint, the Court construes Plaintiff’s first

9 cause of action to contain three causes of action: (1) violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2)
10 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and (3) declaratory judgment invalidating the contract
11 for child support based on fraud and duress.
12
13

III. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff’s allegations arise out of an underlying state judicial proceeding for

14 child support. (See ECF No. 1-2.) On approximately December 17, 2010, Plaintiff
15 alleges that Judge Hallahan and the DCSS conspired to force him to sign “SDCSS
16 document FL-610 contracting payment for child support” under duress. (Complaint,
17 at 2:38–40.) On approximately October 23, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that Commissioner
18 McLaughlin and Esses conspired to “order Plaintiff’s participation participation and
19 involuntary servitude to pay SDCSS without reserving Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”
20 (Id. at 2:43–47.) On approximately January 8, 2014, Plaintiff alleges that
21 Commissioner McLaughlin and Esses conspired “to again deprive plaintiff of liberty
22 without due process.” (Id. at 3:60–66.) On approximately February 10, 2014, Plaintiff
23 alleges that he informed Governor Brown of the conspiracy and that Governor Brown
24 did not respond. (Id. at 3:68–70.) On approximately March 6, 2014, Plaintiff alleges
25 Judge Hallahan and Esses “threatened plaintiff with deprivation of liberty and of
26 constitutional rights.” (Id. at 3:71–4:76.)
27
2

These include alleged violations of the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
28 Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Amendments and U.S. Constitution, article 1, sections 1 and
2.
-3-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 //
2

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

3 A. Judicial Notice
4

Generally, on a motion to dismiss, courts limit review to the contents of the

5 complaint and may only consider extrinsic evidence that is properly presented to the
6 court as part of the complaint. See Lee v. City of L.A., 250 F.3d 668, 688-89 (9th Cir.
7 2001) (court may consider documents physically attached to the complaint or
8 documents necessarily relied on by the complaint if their authenticity is not contested).
9 However, a court may take notice of undisputed “matters of public record” subject to
10 judicial notice without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
11 judgment. Id. (citing FED. R. EVID. 201; MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman, 803 F.2d 500,
12 504 (9th Cir. 1986)). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a district court may take
13 notice of facts not subject to reasonable dispute that are capable of accurate and ready
14 determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
15 FED. R. EVID. 201(b); see also Lee, 250 F.3d at 689.
16 B. Motion to Dismiss
17

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

18 sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
19 Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable
20 legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.
21 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a
22 court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a
23 complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to
24 plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.
25

While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must

26 plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
27 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
28 a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
-4-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
2 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual
3 allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
4 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual
5 content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of
6 a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
7 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
8 will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
9 judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
10

In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

11 truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light
12 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th
13 Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal
14 conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the
15 form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003);
16 W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
17
18

V. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court is mindful that pro so pleadings are to be liberally

19 construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Additionally, any 42 U.S.C. §
20 1985 cause of action requires at the outset a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation. See Caldeira
21 v. County of Kauai, 866 F.2d 1175, 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
22 A. Judicial Notice
23

The Judicial Defendants request judicial notice of eight documents from County

24 of San Diego v. Chad Cowan, San Diego Superior Court Case No. DF250584: (1) the
25 complaint, (2) the answer, (3) the May 4, 2011 minute order, (4) the October 23, 2013
26 minute order, (5) the January 8, 2014 minute order, (6) the January 8, 2014 notice of
27 objection, (7) the March 3, 2014 motion, and (8) the March 6, 2014 minute order. (ECF
28 No. 5-2.)
-5-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1

The Judicial Defendants’ eight requests for judicial notice are properly

2 noticeable. The complaint, answer, minute orders, notice of objection, and motion in
3 a state trial court case are matters of public record and are capable of accurate and
4 ready determination. Finding the eight court documents relevant, the Court takes
5 judicial notice of all eight documents.
6 B. Motions to Dismiss
7

1. Judicial Defendants

8

The Judicial Defendants argue three reasons why Plaintiff’s causes of action

9 should be dismissed: (1) judicial immunity, (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity, and
10 (3) failure to file a government tort claim. (ECF No. 5-1, at 4–6.) Plaintiff argues that
11 the Judicial Defendants are not “above the law” and that the Eleventh Amendment does
12 not bar his causes of action. (ECF No. 19, at 1–2.)
13

Judicial immunity generally affords judges immunity from suit for money

14 damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991) (per curiam). This is true even if there
15 are “allegations of bad faith or malice.” Id. at 11. There are two exceptions to judicial
16 immunity: (1) actions taken outside of the judicial capacity, and (2) judicial actions
17 “taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. at 11–12.
18

Here, the Complaint refers to the Judicial Defendants by their judicial titles of

19 “judge” and “commissioner” and refers to actions taken during the course of the family
20 court case. (See Complaint.) Moreover, the actions in the Complaint allegedly taken by
21 the Judicial Defendants were all done in the context of the family court proceedings
22 against Plaintiff. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s causes of action against the Judicial
23 Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice.
24

2. DCSS Defendants

25

The DCSS Defendants argue four reasons why Plaintiff’s causes of action should

26 be dismissed: (1) statute of limitations, (2) failure to state a claim, (3) Rooker-Feldman
27 Doctrine, and (4) Younger Abstention. (ECF No. 14-1, at 2–7.)
28

The Complaint alleges that defendants Pham and Mochon “are lawyers
-6-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 representing” DCSS and are “required by oath of affirmation, to support and defend
2 Plaintiffs Constitutional rights when or where they claim to have jurisdiction over or
3 official duties with the plaintiff,” but does not allege any specific actions taken by
4 them. (See Complaint, at 2:32–37.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s causes of action against
5 defendants Pham and Mochon are DISMISSED without prejudice.
6

The Complaint alleges that defendant Cabrera “conspired together and with

7 others unknown to Plaintiff to deprive him of his constitutional rights,” but does not
8 allege any specific actions taken by Cabrera other than this conclusory statement. (See
9 Complaint, at 4:96–97.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s causes of action against defendant
10 Cabrera are DISMISSED without prejudice.
11

The Complaint alleges that defendant Esses: (1) “conspired to deprive plaintiff

12 of liberty and without due process,” (Complaint, at 2:43); (2) “ordered plaintiff to
13 disclose private information and ordered plaintiffs participation and involuntary
14 servitude to pay SDCSS without reserving plaintiffs constitutional rights,” (id. at 2:45);
15 (3) “threatened plaintiff with deprivation of liberty and of constitutional Rights,” (id.
16 at 3:71); (4) “conspired to force involuntary servitude on defendant,”(id. at 4:75); and
17 (5) “conspired . . . to deprive [Plaintiff] of his constitutional rights,” (id. at 4:96–98).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a remedy for “deprivation of rights established elsewhere.”
19 City of Okla. City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985); 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. §
20 1985 creates a cause of action for conspiracy to deprive such rights. Caldeira, 866 F.2d
21 at 1182. While the Complaint alleges that Esses “conspired” to deprive Plaintiff’s
22 constitutional rights, it fails to allege what specific actions were taken that did violate
23 Plaintiff’s rights. The Complaint alleges that Plaintiff was forced “to disclose private
24 information” but does not allege any specific private information that Plaintiff was
25 allegedly forced to disclose. Moreover, being required to make child support payments
26 is not a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment’s prohibition on involuntary servitude.
27 See Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz), 950 P.2d 59, 66–73 (Cal. 1998). Accordingly,
28 Plaintiff’s causes of action against defendant Esses are DISMISSED without prejudice.
-7-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1

The Complaint alleges that on approximately December 17, 2010, DCSS “forced

2 plaintiff to complete and sign SDCSS document FL-610” “through duress involuntary
3 servitude and cruel and unusual punishment.” (See Complaint, at 2:38–40.) For 42
4 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1985 causes of action in California, the statute of
5 limitations is two years. See Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 954–55 (9th Cir.
6 2004); McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1991); CAL. CODE
7 CIV. P. § 335.1. Insofar as this portion of the Complaint refers to Plaintiff’s § 1983 and
8 § 1985 causes of action, Plaintiff’s § 1983 and § 1985 causes of action for events that
9 occurred in December 2010 are DISMISSED without prejudice. Additionally, as
10 Plaintiff’s causes of action against the DCSS employees have been dismissed and
11 Plaintiff alleges no independent basis upon which DCSS would be liable, Plaintiff’s
12 causes of action against DCSS are also DISMISSED without prejudice.
13

3. Governor Brown

14

Governor Brown argues five reasons why Plaintiff’s causes of action should be

15 dismissed: (1) failure to state a claim, (2) Eleventh Amendment immunity, (3) the
16 “Domestic Relations Exception,” (4) Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, and (5) Younger
17 Abstention. (ECF No. 16-1, at 3–9.) Plaintiff argues that the Eleventh Amendment does
18 not bar his cause of action. (ECF No. 19, at 1–2.)
19

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits against state officials in their official

20 capacity for money damages. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71
21 (1989); cf. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The Complaint does not state whether
22 Governor Brown is sued in his official capacity, personal capacity, or both. However,
23 the cause of action against Governor Brown refers to him as “governor,” is for
24 “[m]oney [d]amages,” and alleges that Plaintiff asked Governor Brown for “protection
25 from said conspiracy” and Governor Brown “failed to reply to plaintiffs request or
26 investigate said conspiracy.” (See Complaint, at 1, 3.) Thus the Complaint appears to
27 allege a cause of action for damages against Governor Brown in his official capacity
28 which is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Will, 491 U.S. at 71. Plaintiff’s
-8-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 citation to Warnock v. Pecos County, Tex., 88 F.3d 341 (5th Cir. 1996), is unavailing
2 as Warnock merely stands for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does not
3 bar claims for prospective relief. See 88 F.3d at 343. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s causes of
4 action against Governor Brown are DISMISSED without prejudice.
5 C. Remaining Defenses
6

1. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

7

Defendants argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction in this case.

8 The Court disagrees. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction “only when the
9 federal plaintiff both asserts as her injury legal error or errors by the state court and
10 seeks as her remedy relief from the state court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc.,
11 359 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 2004). The Complaint does not allege legal errors by the
12 state court judges; rather the Complaint alleges that his constitutional rights were
13 violated by wrongful acts of the defendants. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
14 Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar jurisdiction in this case. See Kougasian, 359
15 F.3d at 1140–42.
16

2. Younger Abstention

17

Defendants argue that the Court should apply Younger abstention to this case.

18 However, the Younger only applies where there is an ongoing state judicial proceeding.
19 Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc); see also Younger
20 v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). The only evidence supplied by defendants showing that
21 the state judicial proceeding is ongoing are the arguments of counsel and over six
22 month old documents from that proceeding. These do not show that the state judicial
23 proceeding is ongoing and thus the Court finds that Younger abstention is not
24 applicable.
25

3. Domestic Relations Exception

26

Governor Brown argues that the “domestic relations exception” to federal

27 jurisdiction applies to this case. However, the domestic relations exception only applies
28 where a federal court would become “deeply involve[d]” in adjudicating matters
-9-

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 relating to “divorce, alimony, and child custody.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
2 689, 703 (1992); Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986). Here,
3 the Complaint alleges fraudulent contract formation and constitutional violations by
4 defendants and does not ask the Court to adjudicate the merits of his child support
5 obligations. Accordingly, the Court finds that this case does not require it to become
6 “deeply involved” in child support issues and thus the domestic relations exception is
7 inapplicable.
8

4. Government Tort Claim

9

The Judicial Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to file a tort claim as is

10 required by California Government Code §§ 810.2, 900 et seq. However, as the
11 Complaint appears to allege violations of § 1983 and § 1095, the Court finds that the
12 requirement to file a tort claim is not implicated by the Complaint.
13

5. Rule 8

14

Governor Brown argues that the Complaint fails to meet Federal Rule of Civil

15 Procedure 8’s requirement that the complaint contain a “short and plain statement of
16 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
17 However, a pro se complaint can only be dismissed “if it appears beyond doubt that the
18 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to
19 relief.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly,
20 the Court finds that Rule 8(a)(2)’s requirements do not serve as a basis for dismissing
21 the Complaint.
22 D. Leave to Amend
23

“Dismissal with prejudice is warranted only when the court determines that the

24 allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading could not possibly cure
25 the deficiency.” Univera, Inc. v. Terhune, No. C09-5227-RBL, 2010 WL 3489932, at
26 *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2010) (citation omitted); see Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. As it
27 is possible for Plaintiff to allege facts that support his causes of action, the Court finds
28 it appropriate to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. However, any renewed
- 10 -

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 complaint by Plaintiff must at least address any statute of limitations, Eleventh
2 Amendment, and judicial immunity issues as well as allege what specific acts were
3 taken by each defendant and which specific causes of action are alleged against each
4 defendant.
5

VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

6

For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

7

1.

The Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 5) is GRANTED;

8

2.

The DCSS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 14), is GRANTED;

9

3.

Governor Brown’s Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 16), is GRANTED;

10

4.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend as to all

11
12

defendants;
5.

13
14

If Plaintiff wishes to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies
noted herein, he may do so on or before December 19, 2014; and

6.

The hearing set for November 21, 2014, is VACATED.

15 DATED: November 20, 2014
16
17
18

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL
United States District Judge

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
- 11 -

3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG