Cowan v. Brown et al

Filing 95

ORDER: (1) Granting 67 the DCSS Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; (2) Granting 73 Governor Brown's Motion to Dismiss; (3) Granting 74 Maureen Hallahan and Pennie Mclaughlin's Motion to Dismiss; (4) Denying 70 Plaintiff's Motion for Entry of Default; (5) Denying as Moot 93 Plaintiff's Application For an Order Shortening Time. Plaintiff's second amended complaint is Dismissed with prejudice. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 6/24/2015. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (srm)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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CHAD COWAN,

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CASE NO. 3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG
Plaintiff,

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ORDER:

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(1) GRANTING THE DCSS
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
DISMISS;

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[ECF No. 67]

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(2) GRANTING GOVERNOR
BROWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS;

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v.

[ECF No. 73]

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(3) GRANTING MAUREEN
HALLAHAN AND PENNIE
MCLAUGHLIN’S MOTION TO
DISMISS;

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[ECF No. 74]

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GOVERNOR JERRY BROWN,
JUDGE MAUREEN HALLAHAN,
COMMISSIONER PENNIE
MCLAUGHLIN, SDCSS LAWYER
NATASHA ESSES, SDCSS
LAWYER DIONNE MOCHON,
SDCSS CASE MANAGER MIA-LEE
CABRERA, TRAC PHAM, SAN
DIEGO CHILD SUPPORT SERVICE,

(4) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF
DEFAULT;
[ECF No. 70]
(5) DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
APPLICATION FOR AN ORDER
SHORTENING TIME
[ECF No. 93]

Defendants.

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3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

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I. INTRODUCTION
Before the Court are three motions to dismiss by: (1) Judge Maureen Hallahan

3 and Commissioner Pennie McLaughlin (collectively, the “Judicial Defendants”); (2)
4 Mia Cabrera, Natasha Esses, Dionne Mochon, Trac Pham, and the Department of Child
5 Support Services (the “DCSS”) (collectively, the “DCSS Defendants”); and (3)
6 Edmund G. Brown, Jr. (“Governor Brown”). (ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Plaintiff Chad
7 Cowan (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, opposes all three motions. (ECF No. 81.) Also
8 before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default. (ECF No. 70.)
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The parties have fully briefed the motions. (ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74, 80, 81, 82, 83,

10 85, 86, 87, 89.) The Court finds the motions suitable for disposition without oral
11 argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Upon review of the moving papers,
12 admissible evidence, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS all three motions to
13 dismiss and DENIES Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default.
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On August 12, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Judicial Defendants,

16 the DCSS Defendants, and Governor Brown. (ECF No. 1.) After the first round of
17 motions to dismiss, which Plaintiff opposed, Plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed
18 without prejudice. (ECF No. 23.) On December 19, 2014, Plaintiff filed a first amended
19 complaint. (ECF No. 25.) After the second round of motions to dismiss, which Plaintiff
20 failed to oppose, Plaintiff’s first amended complaint was again dismissed without
21 prejudice. (ECF No. 57.) On April 3, 2015, Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint.
22 (ECF No. 65.) Defendants have now filed a third round of motions to dismiss. (ECF
23 Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Plaintiff’s allegations remain similar to those in his original
24 complaint, though with additional details. (See ECF No. 23, at 3; ECF No. 65.)
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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint alleges three causes of action: (1) a

26 declaratory judgment invalidating his alleged contract to pay child support due to fraud
27 and duress, (2) violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and (3) violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
28 241–242. (ECF No. 65.)
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IV. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the

3 sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001).
4 Dismissal is warranted under Rule12(b)(6) where the complaint lacks a cognizable
5 legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.
6 1984); see Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989) (“Rule12(b)(6) authorizes a
7 court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.”). Alternatively, a
8 complaint may be dismissed where it presents a cognizable legal theory yet fails to
9 plead essential facts under that theory. Robertson, 749 F.2d at 534.
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While a plaintiff need not give “detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must

11 plead sufficient facts that, if true, “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”
12 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
13 a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
14 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
15 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547). A claim is facially plausible when the factual
16 allegations permit “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
17 liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In other words, “the non-conclusory ‘factual
18 content,’ and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of
19 a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
20 (9th Cir. 2009). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief
21 will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
22 judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume the

24 truth of all factual allegations and must construe all inferences from them in the light
25 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th
26 Cir. 2002); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Legal
27 conclusions, however, need not be taken as true merely because they are cast in the
28 form of factual allegations. Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2003);
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3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 W. Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981).
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V. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court is mindful that pro se pleadings are to be liberally

4 construed. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Plaintiff’s filings in this case
5 reflect that Plaintiff believes that, even though he was born and lives in the United
6 States, he is not a citizen of the United States. (See, e.g., ECF No. 65, at 12–15 (“There
7 are two classes of citizens, citizens of the UNITED STEATES [sic] and a citizen of the
8 state.”.).) “This belief is the hallmark of the sovereign citizen movement.” Gravatt v.
9 United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 279, 282 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2011).
10 A. Motion for Entry of Default
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Default is appropriate against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise

12 defend.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Plaintiff argues that Defendants have failed to respond
13 within the requisite time period and thus default is appropriate. (ECF No. 70.)
14 However, Defendants have appeared in this lawsuit and taken actions to defend
15 themselves such as by filing motions to dismiss.(See ECF Nos. 67, 73, 74.) Thus
16 default is inappropriate. See Direct Mail Specs. v. Eclat Computerized Tech., 840 F.2d
17 685, 689 (9th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for entry of default, (ECF No.
18 70), is DENIED. Additionally, Plaintiff’s motion for an application for order
19 shortening time to enter judgment, (ECF No. 93), is DENIED as moot.
20 B. Motions to Dismiss
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Plaintiff’s primary contention appears to be that the legal methods by which the

22 State of California enforces child support obligations do not apply to him and thus their
23 use against him constituted duress. (ECF No. 81, at 3.) Plaintiff further appears to
24 believe that the answer that he signed in his child support proceedings is a “contract.”
25 (Id.) Plaintiff is wrong on both counts. And despite his protestations to the contrary,
26 the laws of the United States and the State of California apply to him.
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First, the alleged “contract,” form FL-610, is not a contract at all, but a form

28 answer to a complaint seeking to establish parental obligations, including the payment
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3:14-cv-1886-GPC-WVG

1 of child support, that Plaintiff signed. (See ECF No. 65, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff was not
2 agreeing to contract with the DCSS or any other party, but rather he was agreeing to
3 pay a judgment. (Id.) Second, as Plaintiff admits that the child support enforcement
4 laws are valid, (ECF No. 81, at 3 (“These tactics approved by federal law . . . .”)), and
5 has not made any credible argument as to why they do not apply to him, he has failed
6 to adequately allege duress. Under California law, duress requires that there be a
7 “wrongful act.” Sheehan v. Atlanta Int’l Ins. Co., 812 F.2d 465, 469 (9th Cir. 1987).
8 But because the laws of the United States and the State of California apply to Plaintiff,
9 the child support enforcement methods were not wrongful acts, but in fact legally
10 authorized ones. As Plaintiff has failed to allege both a contract and fraud or duress,
11 Plaintiff’s first cause of action for a declaratory judgment is DISMISSED with
12 prejudice.
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Additionally, these same events serve as the basis for Plaintiff’s civil rights

2 causes of action. (ECF No. 65, at 6–12.) Plaintiff essentially argues that being required
3 to adhere to the laws that he is subject to has violated his rights. As discussed above,
4 Plaintiff has advanced no credible argument as to why he is not subject to the laws of
5 the United States or the laws of the State of California As there was neither duress nor
6 fraud, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any constitutional violations and
7 thus Plaintiff’s second and third causes of action are also DISMISSED with prejudice
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VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

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The DCSS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 67) is GRANTED;

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Governor Brown’s Motion to Dismiss , (ECF No. 73), is GRANTED;

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Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, (ECF No. 74), is GRANTED;

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Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, (ECF No. 65), is DISMISSED

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with prejudice;

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Plaintiff’s Motion for Default, (ECF No. 70), is DENIED; and

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Plaintiff’s Application for Order Shortening Time, (ECF No. 93), is

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DENIED as moot.

18 DATED: June 24, 2015
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HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL
United States District Judge

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