Medicinova, Inc. v. Genzyme Corporation
Filing
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ORDER (1) Denying 158 Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 and (2) Granting in Part and Denying in Part 159 Defendant's Bill of Costs. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 7/20/2021. (tcf)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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MEDICINOVA, INC.,
a Delaware Corporation,
Case No.: 14-CV-2513 JLS (KSC)
ORDER (1) DENYING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
ATTORNEYS’ FEES UNDER 35
U.S.C. § 285 AND (2) GRANTING IN
PART AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANT’S BILL OF COSTS
Plaintiff,
v.
GENZYME CORPORATION,
a Massachusetts Corporation,
Defendant.
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(ECF Nos. 158–159)
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Presently before the Court are Defendant Genzyme Corporation’s Motion for
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Attorneys’ Fees Under 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“Mot.,” ECF No. 158-1) and Bill of Costs (“Bill,”
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ECF No. 159). Plaintiff Medicinova, Inc. filed a Response in Opposition to (“Fees Opp’n,”
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ECF No. 162) the Motion, and Defendant filed a Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No.
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163) the Motion. Plaintiff also filed an Opposition in Part to Defendant’s Bill of Costs
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(“Costs Opp’n,” ECF No. 161). The Court took the matter under submission without oral
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argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 164. After considering the
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Parties’ arguments and the law, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motion and GRANTS IN
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PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Bill of Costs, as set forth below.
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///
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BACKGROUND
I.
Factual Background
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A.
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Through gene therapy, physicians aim “to treat disease by infecting a patient’s body
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with genetic material designed to produce therapeutic material that treats the disease.”
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Declaration of M. Curt Lambert in Support of Defendant’s Brief (“Lambert Decl.”), Ex. K
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at 504.1. 1 There are various ways to introduce this therapeutic genetic material, sometimes
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referred to as a “heterologous gene,” see Lambert Decl., Ex. A (“’237 patent”) at 9:3–20,
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into a patient’s body, one of which involves the use of recombinant viruses. Id. at 2:1–7.
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A recombinant virus is “a virus that has been genetically altered, e.g., by the addition or
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insertion of a heterologous nucleic acid construct into the particle.” Id. at 8:12–14.
U.S. Patent No. 6,376,237 (the “’237 Patent”)
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One means of viral-mediated gene delivery is the use of adeno-associated virus
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(“AAV”) vectors. Id. at 2:7–9, 15–16. There are various benefits to using AAV as
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compared to other viruses. Id. at 2:17–18. For example, AAV can “infect a wide range of
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host cells, including non-dividing cells”; can “infect cells from different species”; “has not
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been associated with any human or animal disease[;] and does not appear to alter the
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biological properties of the host cell upon integration.” Id. at 2:18–23. Further, AAV is
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“stable at a wide range of physical and chemical conditions.” Id. at 2:26–27.
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AAV contains a single-stranded deoxyribonucleic acid (“DNA”) molecule. Id. at
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2:28–29. The AAV genome comprises an internal, non-repeating genome that is flanked
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on either end by inverted terminal repeats (“ITRs”). Id. at 2:29–31. The non-repeating
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genome is itself comprised of AAV replication (“rep”) and capsid (“cap”) genes, which
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code for viral proteins, allowing the virus to replicate and package, respectively, its viral
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genome into a virion. Id. at 2:36–40. AAV may be engineered to deliver a therapeutic
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heterologous gene by deleting the internal, non-repeating portion of the AAV genome, i.e.,
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In citing to Defendant’s supporting materials, except for deposition transcripts and patents, the Court
cites to the consecutive pagination provided by Defendant and stamped at the bottom of each page.
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the rep and cap genes, and inserting the heterologous gene between the two ITRs. Id. at
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2:59–62. This is referred to as an AAV vector. See id. at 6:64–7:10.
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To produce an infectious recombinant AAV (“rAAV”) containing the heterologous
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gene, the AAV vector and two other components must be introduced to a suitable host cell.
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See id. at 3:1–10. One of these additional components is a vector, called the “AAV helper
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construct,” see id. at 7:22–40, which contains the AAV rep and cap genes that were
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replaced in the AAV vector with the heterologous gene. See id. at 3:3–7. The other
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necessary component is a vector containing accessory function genes. See id. at 3:7–10.
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Accessory functions are “non-AAV derived viral and/or cellular functions upon which
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AAV is dependent for its replication,” id. at 7:41–43, and the vector containing those
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accessory function genes is an “accessory function vector.” Id. at 8:1–3.
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Once these three vectors have been introduced to the host cell, the heterologous gene
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is replicated and packaged into a recombinant virion. Id. at 3:11–13. The rAAV virions
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can then be used to treat a patient by infecting the patient’s cells. Id. at 3:13–14. The
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heterologous gene enters and is expressed by the patient’s cells but, because the patient’s
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cells lack the AAV rep and cap genes and helper virus accessory function genes necessary
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for the rAAV to replicate and package its genome, the rAAV do not further replicate within
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the patient’s cells. Id. at 3:15–19. The absence of AAV rep and cap genes in the patient’s
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cells also means that the patient’s cells will not produce unwanted wild-type or pseudo-
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wild-type AAV. Id. at 3:19–21.
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Methods of producing rAAV as of the ’237 patent’s filing, however, presented
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significant problems, including that they produced too few rAAV to be therapeutically
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useful and resulted in the production of replication-competent pseudo-wild-type AAV. See
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id. at 3:22–29. Although many attempts had been made to address the formation of pseudo-
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wild-type AAV, none had succeeded. See id. at 3:36–37. Indeed, the stocks resulting from
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U.S. Patent No. 5,753, 500 (the “’500 patent”), filed on April 3, 1995 by Thomas E. Shenk
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et al., yielded between 0.01 and 10% wild-type AAV, a level of contamination that would
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be unacceptable for human trials. See id. at 3:38–47.
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The invention claimed by the ’237 patent was intended to correct these deficiencies
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by “provid[ing] AAV helper functions for rAAV production that do not result in the
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formation of pseudo-wild-type AAV” and “that allow high efficiency production of
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rAAV.” See id. at 3:48–56. “The rAAV virions produced using the present invention may
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be used to introduce genetic material into animals, including humans, or isolated animal
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cells for a variety of research and therapeutic uses.” Id. at 4:42–45. “For example, rAAV
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virions produced using the methods of the present invention may be used to express a
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protein in animals to gather preclinical data or to screen for potential drug candidates.” Id.
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at 4:45–48. “Alternatively, the rAAV virions may be used to transfer genetic material into
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a human to cure a genetic defect or to effect a desired treatment.” Id. at 4:48–51.
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Dr. Peter Colosi filed Application No. 09/450,083 on November 29, 1999, which
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issued as the ’237 patent on April 23, 2002. See generally ’237 patent. The ’237 patent
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was itself a continuation of Application No. 09/143,270, filed on August 28, 1998, which
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issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,001,650 (the “’650 patent”), itself a continuation of Application
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No. 09/107,708, filed on June 30, 1998, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 6,027,931 (the
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“’931 patent”), itself a continuation of Application No. 08/688,648, filed on July 29, 1996,
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and subsequently abandoned, itself a continuation of Application No. 08/510,790, filed on
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August 3, 1995, which issued as U.S. Patent No. 5,622,856. See ’237 patent at 1:1–13.
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The ’237 patent, titled “High-Efficiency Wild-Type-Free AAV Helper Functions,”
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contains seventeen claims, four of which are independent. See generally id. at 23:10–
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24:65. Each of the seventeen claims begins with the phrase “[a] stock of recombinant
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adeno-associated virus.” See generally id.
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B.
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In 2005, Defendant entered into a written Assignment Agreement (the “Agreement”)
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with Avigen, Inc. (“Avigen”). First Am. Compl. (“FAC,” ECF No. 13) ¶ 6. Under the
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Agreement, Defendant “acquired from Avigen certain gene therapy intellectual property
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and gene therapy research and developmental programs.
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The Assignment Agreement
Avigen, in turn, received
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consideration upfront and was eligible for specified milestone payments should certain
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events and/or conditions be met in the future.” Id. ¶ 7.
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The technology acquired by Defendant per the Agreement included the ’237 patent.
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Id. ¶ 13. Defendant owes a milestone payment to Plaintiff under the Agreement “when the
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first patient is dosed or treated in a Phase I clinical study with a product that is covered by
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a claim of one of the Gene Therapy Patents [i.e., the ’237 patent] issued in certain major
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markets,” such as the United States. Id. ¶ 10.
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In 2009, Avigen merged with Plaintiff and Plaintiff assumed all rights under the
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Agreement, including rights to milestone payments. Id. ¶ 11. In March 2014, Defendant
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informed Plaintiff that Defendant was “currently conducting a Phase 1 clinical trial of a
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gene therapy product for age-related macular degeneration named AAV-sFLT.
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[Defendant] explained that all patients in the clinical trial had already been dosed with
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AAV-sFLT.” Id. ¶ 12.
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Plaintiff alleges that Defendant owes it the $1,000,000 milestone payment because
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AAV-sFLT is covered by the Agreement. Id. ¶ 16. As a result, Plaintiff alleges Defendant
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breached the Agreement by not paying Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant, on the other hand,
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contends that AAV-sFLT is not covered by the ’237 patent and, consequently, no milestone
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payment is owed. See, e.g., Mot. at 2 n.1.
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II.
Procedural History
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On October 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant alleging two
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causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Although nominally a breach of contract
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action, Plaintiff conceded in its Complaint that its “right to relief depends on resolution of
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a substantial question of federal patent law.” Id. ¶ 1.
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Defendant moved to dismiss, see generally ECF No. 3, a request that the Honorable
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M. James Lorenz granted with leave to amend. See generally ECF No. 9. Plaintiff filed
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the operative First Amended Complaint on September 4, 2015. See generally ECF No. 13.
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After Defendant filed its answer on September 28, 2015, see generally ECF No. 17, the
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Parties engaged in an Early Neutral Evaluation conference, see ECF No. 23, and proceeded
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to discovery. See, e.g., ECF Nos. 25, 35.
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On August 9, 2017, the case was reassigned to this Court. See generally ECF No.
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55. On November 20, 2017, Defendant moved for summary judgment as to both of
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Plaintiff’s causes of action. See generally ECF Nos. 70, 96. Because Defendant sought
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claim construction of the patent term “a stock of recombinant adeno-associated virus” as
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part of its motion for summary judgment, the Court set a status conference for April 19,
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2018, to discuss the necessity of a claim construction hearing. See generally ECF No. 89.
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Following the hearing, the Court ordered the Parties to file a joint claim construction chart,
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see ECF No. 90, which they filed on May 3, 2018. See generally ECF No. 93.
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In the initial joint claim construction chart, Plaintiff proposed that the disputed term
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“has a plain and ordinary meaning to one of ordinary skill in the art and no construction is
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necessary.” Id. at 1. Defendant, on the other hand, proposed that the disputed term either
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(1) “excludes recombinant adeno-associated virus made using accessory functions derived
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from the herpes simplex type-1 (HSV-1) virus,” or (2) means “[a] stock of recombinant
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adeno-associated virus virions,” to which the ’237 patent’s express definitions for a
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“recombinant AAV virion” and “accessory functions” would apply. See id. at 1–3.
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On June 6, 2018, the Court requested additional briefing from Plaintiff concerning
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Defendant’s argument that “[p]rior art cited in the patent demonstrates that the invention
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is directed to rAAV virions,” see ECF No. 97, in response to which Plaintiff filed a
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supplemental brief. See generally ECF No. 100. On June 11, 2018, the Court invited the
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Parties to provide a tutorial or preliminary statement concerning the ’237 patent and
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underlying technical issues. See generally ECF No. 98.
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The Court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and the
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related claim construction issue on August 6, 2018. See generally ECF No. 111. At the
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end of the hearing, after months of briefing and hours of oral argument, see generally ECF
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Nos. 70, 86, 87, 93, 100, 113, Plaintiff’s counsel contended that it had “not fully briefed
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claim construction” and requested “the opportunity to have additional briefing on this
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subject.” ECF No. 113 (“Aug. 6, 2018 Tr.”) at 91:14–25. Consequently, the Court found
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that “it d[id] not have adequate information to engage in a sufficient claim construction
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analysis,” denied without prejudice Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, see ECF
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No. 112 at 1, and set a second claim construction hearing. See ECF No. 115.
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In January 2019, Plaintiff and Defendant filed opening claim construction briefs, see
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generally ECF Nos. 126, 123, and they subsequently filed their corresponding responses
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to one other’s claim construction briefs. See generally ECF Nos. 134–35. Plaintiff also
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filed a motion to strike portions of Defendant’s opening claim construction brief, see
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generally ECF No. 130, to which Defendant filed an opposition, see generally ECF No.
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132. Specifically, Plaintiff complained that it was unable to address Defendant’s new
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exhibits and novel arguments contained in the opening claim construction brief. ECF No.
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130 at 8. Defendant countered by noting that the “new” exhibits were part of the
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prosecution history of the ’237 patent. ECF 132 at 6–10.
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Regarding Plaintiff’s motion to strike, the Court held that Plaintiff had not met its
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burden of showing that exclusion was warranted because Plaintiff had had the 239-page
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prosecution history of the ’237 patent for over two years. ECF 148 at 9–10. Accordingly,
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the Court denied Plaintiff’s motion. Id. at 9. Regarding claim construction, the Court
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adopted Defendant’s proposed construction. Id. at 42.
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On September 17, 2019, the Parties entered a joint motion for judgment in favor of
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Defendant so that Plaintiff could appeal the decision. See generally ECF 150. Plaintiff
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then appealed to the Federal Circuit, seeking reversal of the Court’s claim construction.
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See generally Medicinova, Inc. v. Genzyme Corp., No. 20-1064 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 21, 2019).
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The appellate court, however, affirmed the Court’s decision. Medicinova, Inc. v. Genzyme
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Corp., 831 F. App’x 506, 506 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (per curiam).
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On February 19, 2021, Defendant filed the instant Motion for Attorneys’ Fees Under
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35 U.S.C. § 285, alleging that Plaintiff’s litigation conduct rendered the case exceptional,
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thus supporting an award of attorneys’ fees to Defendant as the prevailing party. See
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generally Mot. Defendant also filed a Bill of Costs. See generally Bill. In response,
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Plaintiff filed both a Response in Opposition to the Motion, see generally Fees Opp’n, and
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an Opposition in Part to Defendant’s Bill of Costs. See generally Costs Opp’n. Defendant
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filed a Reply in Support of the Motion. See generally Reply.
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MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES
I.
Legal Standard
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Under 35 U.S.C. § 285, the court “in exceptional cases may award reasonable
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attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party” in a patent infringement lawsuit. The Supreme
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Court construed this language in Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572
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U.S. 545 (2014). Specifically, the Octane Fitness Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s then-
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prevailing interpretation of the “exceptional case” language as “rigid and mechanical.” Id.
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at 553. The Court held that the prior method “impermissibly encumber[ed] the statutory
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grant of discretion to district courts.” Id. Octane Fitness instead established a flexible
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approach: “[A] district court may award fees in the rare case in which a party’s
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unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanctionable—is nonetheless
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so ‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of fees.” Id. at 555.
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Under Octane Fitness, a case may warrant a fee award if the litigation is objectively
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baseless or is brought in subjective bad faith. Id. In particular, a case is “exceptional”
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when it “stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s
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litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the
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unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Id. at 554. Courts may look to pre-
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Octane Fitness case law for guidance on whether a case was litigated in an unreasonable
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manner. SFA Sys., LLC v. Newegg Inc., 793 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015). District
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courts “may determine whether a case is ‘exceptional’ in the case-by-case exercise of their
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discretion, considering the totality of the circumstances.” Octane Fitness, 572 U.S. at 554.
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Additionally, Octane Fitness rejected the former requirement that patent litigants establish
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their entitlement to attorneys’ fees by “clear and convincing evidence” in favor of a lower
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“preponderance of the evidence” standard. Id. at 557–58.
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To guide its discretion, a court may consider a nonexclusive list of factors, including:
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“frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal
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components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations
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of compensation and deterrence.” Id. at 554 n.6. To be found frivolous, an argument must
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be shown to be at least objectively unreasonable at the time it was made. Highmark, Inc.
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v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., 687 F.3d 1300, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d on other
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grounds, 572 U.S. 559 (2014). The purpose of section 285 is remedial, and it aims to
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compensate the winning party for the other side’s litigation misconduct. Id. at 1324 n1.
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Hard-fought and contentious litigation does not automatically result in vexatious or bad
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faith conduct. See LG Display Co. v. AU Optronics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 2d 466, 474 (D.
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Del. 2010).
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An important consideration in determining whether a case is exceptional is whether
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the fee-seeking party provided early notice of its belief that it was being subjected to
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exceptional litigation behavior. ThermoLife Int’l LLC v. GNC Corp., 922 F.3d 1347, 1357
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(Fed. Cir. 2019). However, notice is not required for a case to be found exceptional. Id.
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at 1357–58. Determining a pattern of misconduct is not tied to a set of discrete facts, but
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rather to a specific type of litigation misconduct. Id. at 1362. District courts should also
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examine whether finding a case exceptional would further goals of compensation and
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deterrence. Id.
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Octane Fitness does not mandate a fee award in all exceptional cases; even if a court
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determines that a case is “exceptional,” the court still has discretion to deny attorneys’ fees.
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See ICON Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 576 F. App’x 1002, 1005 (Fed.
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Cir. 2014) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in Octane did not, however, revoke the
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discretion of a district court to deny fee awards even in exceptional cases.”); see also S.C.
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Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 781 F.2d 198, 201 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“Even an
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exceptional case does not require in all circumstances the award of attorney fees.”).
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II.
Analysis
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The parties do not dispute that Defendant is a prevailing party as required by section
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285. Therefore, whether to award attorneys’ fees turns on whether Defendant has carried
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its burden to establish that this case is exceptional.
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Defendant provides a litany of examples of allegedly “exceptional behavior” by
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Plaintiff to show that attorneys’ fees should be awarded. See generally Mot. at 1–9. The
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Court finds that many of the examples provided are common litigation practices or honest
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mistakes and do not rise to the level of extraordinary conduct. 2 However, some of
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Plaintiff’s behavior is worth addressing in more detail.
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A.
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Plaintiff’s Request that Defendant’s Technical Expert Travel to Attend a
Deposition Was Not Objectively Unreasonable
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Defendant argues that Plaintiff unreasonably demanded that Dr. Barry Byrne,
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Defendant’s technical expert, travel across the state of Florida to attend his deposition in
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Jacksonville. Mot. at 3. Defendant also maintains that Plaintiff planned to seek fees and
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costs associated with Dr. Byrne’s failure to appear at the location noticed for the deposition,
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which was situated about 70 miles from Dr. Byrne’s clinic in Gainesville. Id. at 3–4.
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Defendant further alleges that Plaintiff “saw an edge in trying to force Dr. Byrne to go to
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Jacksonville (perhaps [Plaintiff] was hoping that [Defendant] would have to retain a
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substitute expert because Dr. Byrne was unable to leave his patients).” Reply at 8.
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Defendant also infers from Plaintiff’s behavior that Plaintiff did not care that “Dr. Byrne
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was busy saving lives in Gainesville.” Id. In response, Plaintiff notes that the deposition
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location was well within “100 miles of where the person resides, is employed, or regularly
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transacts business in person,” as mandated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45(c)(1)(A).
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Fees Opp’n at 19. Plaintiff further notes that it later changed its mind and acquiesced to
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Dr. Byrne’s preference to be deposed in Gainesville. Id. at 20.
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For example, the filing of an amended complaint is hardly a “harbinger” of extraordinary behavior to
come. See Mot. at 1. Indeed, in this Court’s own experience, the majority of plaintiffs file amended
complaints.
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Defendant’s argument—that Plaintiff’s request that Dr. Byrne travel 70 miles was
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objectively unreasonable—is unpersuasive. Although there is a general presumption that
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a defendant’s deposition will be held in the district of his residence, the presumption is not
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a strong one. Zurich Ins. Corp. v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., No. 90 Civ. 2263, 1991 WL
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12133, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1991). The presumption operates primarily when other
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factors do not favor a particular site. Id. In addition, although Defendant maintains that
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Dr. Byrne could not leave Gainesville for his deposition because he was “busy saving
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lives,” his patients were apparently stable enough for Dr. Byrne to have time to be deposed
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locally. 3 See Reply at 8. As argued by Plaintiff, the travel distance was well within the
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100 miles permitted by Rule 45 and is therefore presumptively reasonable. See Fed. R.
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Civ. P. 45; Fees Opp’n at 19; see also Wierzbowski v. Dec, No. 2:13-CV-0076-JAD-NJK,
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2017 WL 11309545, at *1 (D. Nev. June 28, 2017) (noting that Rule 45(c) sets the
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“presumptively-reasonable location” for depositions).
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unreasonable for Plaintiff to request that Dr. Byrne travel for his deposition.
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B.
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Thus, it was not objectively
Plaintiff’s Improper Conference with Its Witness Was Objectively
Unreasonable
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Defendant alleges that Plaintiff improperly conferred with its expert witness, Dr.
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Scott Burger, during a break in testimony during his deposition, resulting in Dr. Burger
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changing his testimony. Mot. at 4. Upon questioning by Defendant’s counsel, Dr. Burger
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made a concession that a stock of rAAV plasmids could not contain either wild-type or
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pseudo-wild-type AAV virions. Id. After a break, however, Dr. Burger changed his
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testimony. Id. Dr. Burger admitted that he and Plaintiff’s counsel discussed the substance
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of questioning and that he was asked to not discuss the substance of the discussion. Id. at
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4–5. Defendant notes that previous cases have affirmed the principle that counsel may not
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coach the witness on a specific response, citing New Age Imports, Inc. v. VD Importers,
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Also, presumably, Dr. Byrne sometimes takes time off to go on vacation or because he is ill, and he must
have some protocol in place to take care of his patients in his absence.
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Inc., No. CV 18-4857, 2019 WL 1427468 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2019). Mot. at 19. New Age
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Imports holds that a sharp contrast between responses before and after a break in testimony
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can support an inference that the witness was improperly coached. 2019 WL 1427468, at
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*4. Plaintiff responds that New Age Imports notes that there is no binding precedent in the
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Ninth Circuit that requires a court to prohibit witnesses from conferring with their counsel
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during a deposition. See id.; Fees Opp’n at 21. Plaintiff also maintains that improperly
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conferring with a witness is not sufficient to render a case extraordinary and that the
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authorities cited by Defendant include improper conference among a host of other improper
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litigation tactics. Fees Opp’n at 21–22 (citations omitted).
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While it is true that there is no binding Ninth Circuit precedent holding that counsel
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are prohibited from conferring with their witnesses, that does not mean that the Court
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cannot find Plaintiff’s counsel’s behavior unacceptable. A plaintiff’s improper conference
13
with an expert witness, resulting in the witness changing his answer, is litigation
14
misconduct. See ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Diamond Innovations, Inc., No. 08-CV-325
15
PATENT CASE, 2010 BL 427587, *8–9 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2010); see also In re Cathode
16
Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. 14-CV-2058-SC, 2015 WL 12942210, at *3 (N.D.
17
Cal. May 29, 2015) (“[D]epositions are to be conducted as if the witness were testifying at
18
trial. Courts have ruled that once a deposition begins, counsel should not confer with the
19
witness except to determine whether a privilege should be asserted.”) (citations omitted),
20
report and recommendation adopted, No. C-07-5944-SC, 2015 WL 13653876 (N.D. Cal.
21
Sept. 11, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. C-07-5944-SC, 2015 WL
22
13653877 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2015). If, as Plaintiff contends, Dr. Burger misspoke during
23
his deposition, a proper way for Plaintiff to remedy the issue would have been for Plaintiff’s
24
counsel to question Dr. Burger at the conclusion of the deposition. See Barajas v. Abbott
25
Labs., Inc., No. 18-cv-00839, 2018 WL 6248550, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2018). Instead,
26
Plaintiff chose to assert attorney-client privilege rather than clear up the record. See Reply
27
at 9. The Court finds that such behavior was objectively unreasonable.
28
///
12
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1
Further, Plaintiff’s argument that this incident alone does not render the case
2
exceptional misses the mark; the entire purpose of Defendant’s Motion is to determine
3
whether the entire litigation was exceptional. Defendant does not contend that this incident
4
alone renders the case exceptional; rather, Defendant argues that this incident, in
5
conjunction with Plaintiff’s other litigation tactics, make this an exceptional case. See id.
6
at 9–10.
7
C.
8
Plaintiff’s Insufficient Notice to Witnesses for Their Appearances Was Not
Objectively Unreasonable
9
Defendant alleges that Plaintiff untimely served subpoenas on third-party witnesses,
10
sometimes with only three business-days’ notice, resulting in the Court quashing the
11
subpoenas. Reply at 7; Mot. at 2–3. Defendant cites to Lucas v. Breg, Inc., No. 15-CV-
12
00258, 2015 WL 8328696, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2015), where the court noted that it was
13
unreasonable to give only ten business-days’ notice for a subpoena near the discovery cut-
14
off for an exceedingly complex case. Reply at 7. In that case, even seven business-days’
15
notice was determined to be unreasonable. Id. (citing Lucas, 2015 WL 8328696, at *2).
16
Plaintiff, however, notes that the magistrate judge’s order quashing the subpoenas in this
17
cas was ultimately overturned, because this Court found that the order was not sufficiently
18
reasoned. Fees Opp’n at 18 (citing ECF No. 56). Both Parties had agreed that Defendant
19
could take depositions past the discovery deadline, but Defendant did not allow Plaintiff
20
the same courtesy to cure any alleged deficiencies in the timing of notice. Id. (citation
21
omitted).
22
While three business-days’ notice is certainly inconsiderate, and perhaps
23
unprofessional, the Court concludes that this behavior does not render the case
24
extraordinary in this instance. At the time, the discovery deadline was fast approaching,
25
and the Parties had already agreed that Defendant could depose its witnesses after the
26
discovery deadline. Id. Parties often scramble to complete discovery in civil matters in
27
the eleventh hour. Plaintiff reasonably could have believed that Defendant had advised its
28
deponents that the deposition deadline was quickly approaching and that the deponents
13
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1
could expect subpoenas at any moment. The fact that the Court found the magistrate
2
judge’s reasoning insufficient to sustain quashing the subpoenas also supports the
3
conclusion that the notice was not objectively unreasonable. Id. For these reasons, the
4
Court finds that Plaintiff’s late notice, while poorly planned, was not objectively
5
unreasonable.
6
D.
7
8
9
Plaintiff’s Behavior
Construction
1.
Regarding
Summary
Judgment
and
Claim
Plaintiff’s Lack of Preparation for the Summary Judgment Hearing
Was Not Objectively Unreasonable
10
Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s behavior regarding the summary judgment hearing
11
was unreasonable. Plaintiff arrived at the hearing without being prepared to discuss claim
12
construction. Mot. at 6. Defendant also claims that Plaintiff must have been aware that
13
claim construction was necessary because the Joint Discovery Plan stated that claim
14
construction was a central issue. Id. In addition, the Court admonished Plaintiff’s response
15
that a separate Markman process was necessary. Id. at 16. The Court noted that claim
16
construction can come up in the context of summary judgment and that the Court
17
specifically had requested a claim construction chart. Id. Plaintiff, in turn, maintains that
18
it did not think claim construction was necessary and did not unilaterally prevent the
19
process from occurring. Fees Opp’n at 13. Plaintiff also asserts that the magistrate judge
20
could have ordered a separate Markman hearing or that Defendant could have contacted
21
this Court and requested a change in the way the claim construction was handled. Id. at
22
13–14. Finally, Plaintiff notes that the Court found the claim construction process more
23
effective at the second hearing. Id. at 14–15.
24
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s unpreparedness to present a claim construction at the
25
summary judgment hearing was not objectively unreasonable. Plaintiff was following
26
direction from the magistrate judge, who declined to schedule a separate Markman hearing.
27
See id. at 13–14. Defendant should have contacted the Court if it thought that a Markman
28
hearing was required. See id. at 13 (citing ECF No. 113 at 93). Given these facts and the
14
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1
confusion about the proper procedure under the magistrate judge’s order, it was not
2
objectively unreasonable that Plaintiff was not prepared to discuss claim construction at
3
the summary judgment hearing.
4
5
2.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Exclude the Prosecution History from the Second
Claim Construction Hearing Was Objectively Unreasonable
6
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s motion to strike the prosecution history of the ’237
7
patent from the second claim construction proceedings was unreasonable. Mot. at 7.
8
Defendant notes that it already had listed the prosecution history of the ’237 patent in the
9
Joint Claim Construction Chart. Id. Also, in denying the motion to strike, the Court noted
10
that nothing from the prosecution history could conceivably be new four years into
11
litigation. Id. (citing ECF No. 148 at 9–10). Plaintiff responds that, during a hearing,
12
Defendant relied on a portion of the prosecution history not included in Defendant’s claim
13
construction chart. Fees Opp’n at 24. Plaintiff would have addressed these portions of the
14
prosecution history in its own claim construction brief had it known that Defendant would
15
rely on them. Id. Plaintiff also maintains that it was prejudiced by the failure to comply
16
with the Patent Local Rules. Id.
17
The question of whether moving to exclude a patent’s prosecution history from a
18
claim construction hearing would render a case exceptional appears to be an issue of first
19
impression. However, it is well-settled law that the prosecution history informs the
20
meaning of the claim language. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
21
2005). A court should also consider the patent’s prosecution history if it is in evidence.
22
Id. The prosecution history provides evidence of how the Patent and Trademark Office
23
and the inventor understood the patent and thus serves as an important component of the
24
claim construction process. See id. Accordingly, moving to exclude portions of the
25
prosecution history would be objectively unreasonable on the first day of a patent litigation
26
action, let alone in the litigation’s fourth year. Thus, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s
27
motion to exclude portions of the prosecution history from a claim construction hearing
28
was objectively unreasonable.
15
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1
2
3.
Plaintiff’s Flip-Flopping on Whether the Local Patent Rules Applied
Was Objectively Unreasonable
3
Defendant claims that Plaintiff’s position that the Patent Local Rules did not apply
4
makes the case exceptional. See Reply at 6. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff initially fought
5
the application of the Patent Local Rules to avoid claim construction and confidential
6
document production. Id. Later, Plaintiff changed its mind, claiming that the Patent Local
7
Rules indeed did apply, and argued that Defendant’s claim construction arguments were
8
barred as untimely under the Patent Local Rules. Id. Defendant points out that this
9
argument is especially unfair because Defendant had been trying to initiate claim
10
construction proceedings from the beginning of the litigation. See Mot. at 15. Finally,
11
Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s appeal to the Federal Circuit, arguing that the case was
12
functionally a patent-infringement action, was outrageous given Plaintiff’s previous
13
assertion that the Patent Local Rules did not apply. Reply at 6. In response, Plaintiff notes
14
that the magistrate judge agreed that the Patent Local Rules would not apply. Fees Opp’n
15
at 7. Plaintiff claims that its belief that the central dispute of the suit would relate to a
16
contract or the allegedly infringing product, rather than “the meaning of the ’237 Patent,”
17
was why the Patent Local Rules did not apply. Id. at 12.
18
What makes Plaintiff’s behavior exceptional is not that it changed its mind that the
19
Patent Local Rules applied, but rather that it weaponized its change-of-mind against
20
Defendant. Plaintiff’s belief that the suit was primarily a contract or product dispute,
21
especially given the magistrate judge’s agreement that the Local Patent Rules did not apply,
22
was not objectively unreasonable. In addition, Plaintiff’s appeal mentioning that this was
23
primarily a patent infringement case was reasonable, because at that point in the case, all
24
Parties, and the Court, agreed that this was a patent case and that the Patent Local Rules
25
applied. However, Plaintiff’s attempt to use the Patent Local Rules against Defendant,
26
when Defendant had tried to apply the Patent Local Rules to this case throughout the
27
litigation, was objectively unreasonable and likely in bad faith. In addition, Plaintiff did
28
not even apply the Patent Local Rules correctly, stating that claim construction was
16
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1
untimely at the summary judgment stage when it was not. Mot. at 5. Thus, it was
2
objectively unreasonable for Plaintiff to attempt to use the Local Patent Rules to bar claim
3
construction.
4
E.
5
Determining a pattern of misconduct is not tied to a set of discrete facts, but rather
6
to a specific type of litigation misconduct. ThermoLife Int’l, 922 F.3d at 1632. Isolated
7
behavior, though objectively unreasonable, is not sufficient for a finding of litigation
8
misconduct. See id. An unsuccessful litigation strategy does not in and of itself mean that
9
the party’s conduct was exceptional. See LG Display, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 474; see also W.
10
Plastics, Inc. v. Dubose Strapping, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-294-D, 2020 WL 5752095, at *3
11
(E.D.N.C. Sept. 24, 2020) (“[Defendant]’s strategy had its risks. That [Defendant] chose
12
to roll the dice does not mean [Defendant] was destined to lose.”). District courts should
13
also examine whether finding a case exceptional would further the goals of compensation
14
and deterrence. ThermoLife Int’l, 922 F.3d at 1632.
Plaintiff’s Overall Conduct Was Not Unreasonable
15
Although some of Plaintiff’s behavior regarding claim construction was objectively
16
unreasonable, see supra Section II.D §§ 2–3, as was Plaintiff’s improper conference with
17
its expert during a deposition, see supra Section II.B, these incidents, even in the aggregate,
18
are not sufficient to find a pattern of misconduct. See ThermoLife Int’l, 922 F.3d at 1632.
19
The Court finds that Plaintiff’s litigation conduct is consistent with avoiding an
20
unfavorable claim construction. In addition, the Court finds no compelling reason for
21
compensation or deterrence. Indeed, the Court hesitates to award attorneys’ fees against a
22
party that followed a magistrate judge’s orders. See Fees Opp’n at 13–14. As previously
23
noted, the proper way to handle this fundamental disagreement would have been for
24
Defendant to escalate the issue to this Court and request a separate Markman hearing. ECF
25
No. 113 at 93.
26
In sum, while Plaintiff acted unreasonably in some aspects of this litigation, most
27
notably regarding claim construction, the Court does not find these actions rise to an overall
28
level of unreasonableness or bad faith warranting an exceptional case finding.
17
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1
BILL OF COSTS
2
Under the Civil Local Rules, the winning party is entitled as of right to certain costs
3
from the losing party. See generally S.D. Cal. CivLR 54.1. There is a presumption in favor
4
of awarding costs to the prevailing party, but the district court may refuse to award costs
5
within its discretion. Champion Produce, Inc. v. Ruby Robinson Co., 342 F.3d 1016, 1022
6
(9th Cir. 2003). Here, as the prevailing party, Defendant has submitted a bill seeking a
7
total of $24,217.45 in costs, see generally Bill; see also Declaration of Francis DiGiovanni
8
in Support (“DiGiovanni Decl.,” ECF No. 159-2) Ex. A (“Itemized Bill”), which Plaintiff
9
partially opposes, see generally Costs Opp’n. The Court will address each of Defendant’s
10
requests, and any arguments by Plaintiff in opposition thereto, in turn.
11
First, pursuant to Civil Local Rule 54.1(b)(6)(a), Defendant seeks costs of $16.48
12
for copying papers for the Early Neutral Evaluation conference, see Bill at 5; Itemized Bill
13
at 8, which costs Plaintiff does not contest, see Costs Opp’n at 2. Accordingly, the Court
14
awards $16.48 in costs for copying.
15
However, Defendant and Plaintiff disagree about the acceptableness of the costs
16
Defendant seeks for exemplification of patent file-wrappers. Defendant seeks costs of
17
$955 for patent file-wrappers pursuant to Civil Local Rule 54.1(b)(6)(a). See Bill at 5;
18
Itemized Bill at 8–9. Plaintiff contests these costs because, under Rule 54.1(b)(6)(a), the
19
cost of patent file-wrappers is taxable at the rate charged by the Patent and Trademark
20
Office. Costs Opp’n at 3. By statute, this cost is $60 per file wrapper, 37 C.F.R.
21
§ 54.1(b)(6)(a), which, for five file-wrappers, results in a total of $300. Costs Opp’n at 3.
22
The Court agrees with Plaintiff and awards Defendant the reduced sum of $300 in costs for
23
the exemplification of patent file-wrappers.
24
Defendant and Plaintiff also disagree about the acceptableness of the costs
25
Defendant seeks for deposition transcripts.
26
transcripts and reporter fees are allowed as costs to the prevailing party. S.D. Cal. CivLR
27
54.1(b)(3). However, Rule 54.1(b)(3) does not allow for taxation of costs incurred for
28
expedited processing. Zopatti v. Rancho Dorado Homeowners Ass’n, No. 10CV1091,
Per the Civil Local Rules, deposition
18
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1
2012 WL 92338, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2012). Defendant seeks costs for transcript
2
and/or court-reporter expenses relating to depositions totaling $7,614.05. See Bill at 3–5;
3
Itemized Bill at 8. Plaintiff agrees that Defendant generally is entitled to these costs, except
4
for a 2017 expedited deposition transcript for Dr. Burger. Costs Opp’n at 2. As Defendant
5
did not specify the cost of an expedited deposition transcript in comparison to a standard
6
one, see generally Bill, Plaintiff suggests that the cost be taxed at a 25% reduction. Costs
7
Opp’n at 2. This is roughly the reduction in price between an expedited and ordinary
8
transcript in the Federal Court Reporting Program. See id. (citing Fed. Ct. Reporting
9
Program, https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/federal-court-reporting-program). The
10
Court agrees with Plaintiff’s assessment as to the reasonable cost of the deposition
11
transcript for Dr. Burger and awards reduced deposition costs in the amount of $7,236.93.
12
Defendant and Plaintiff also disagree as to what costs for visual aids Defendant may
13
recover. Preparation of visual aids is taxable as costs if the visual aids are reasonably
14
necessary to assist the jury or the court in understanding issues. S.D. Cal. CivLR
15
54.1(b)(7)(a). Costs may be awarded for the physical preparation and duplication of
16
documents, but not the intellectual effort involved in their preparation. Romero v. City of
17
Pomona, 883 F.2d 1418, 1428 (9th Cir. 1989). Document review is intellectual effort,
18
rather than physical preparation, and thus such costs are not awarded as part of the
19
preparation of visual aids. See Jardin v. DATAllegro, Inc., No. 08-CV-1462, 2011 WL
20
4835742, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2011). Moreover, courts have found that using a more
21
engaging method of conveying information does not make that method necessary. See,
22
e.g., Affymetrix, Inc. v. Multilyte Ltd., No. C 03-03779, 2005 WL 2072113, at *4 (N.D.
23
Cal. Aug. 26, 2005) (“While using animated PowerPoint presentations was admittedly a
24
more engaging method of conveying information, it was not necessary. Poster boards
25
would have sufficed.”). Thus, costs for visual aids are taxable if (1) they constitute physical
26
preparation, but not intellectual effort; and (2) the visual aids are reasonably necessary to
27
assist the Court in understanding the case’s issues.
28
///
19
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1
Defendant seeks to recover $13,487.50 in costs paid to TrialGraphix to physically
2
prepare visual aids. See Bill at 6–7; Itemized Bill at 9. Plaintiff raises several objections
3
to this sum. First, Plaintiff argues that certain costs, totaling $3,225.00, concern the review
4
and discussion of the visual aids rather than their preparation and therefore are not
5
recoverable. Costs Opp’n at 3–5 (citing DiGiovanni Decl. Ex. J (“TrialGraphix Invoices”)
6
at 31–33). The Court agrees with Plaintiff that visual-aid planning and review are
7
intellectual efforts and thus should not be taxed as costs. See Jardin, 2011 WL 4835742,
8
at *9. Accordingly, the Court will not tax the $3,225.00 in costs identified by Plaintiff.
9
Second, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant’s use of animated slides was not reasonably
10
necessary to help the Court understand the issues of the case, and thus the remaining costs
11
of $10,262.50 should be reduced by half. Costs Opp’n at 4–5. In support, Plaintiff cites
12
Affymetrix, where the court held that it was not reasonably necessary for the plaintiff to use
13
engaging PowerPoint presentations. Id. (citing 2005 WL 2072113, at *4). In Affymetrix,
14
the court awarded costs for creating poster boards but not for creating a PowerPoint
15
presentation. 2005 WL 2072113, at *4. However, the present case is distinguishable from
16
Affymetrix. Here, Defendant did not use poster boards at all, but PowerPoint presentations
17
alone, whereas in Affymetrix the plaintiff used both poster boards and a PowerPoint
18
presentation. See id. The Court finds that Defendant’s use of slides was reasonably
19
necessary given the complexity of the case. At any rate, the Court is not persuaded by
20
Plaintiff’s method of removing the allegedly “unnecessary” costs. Plaintiff’s proposal
21
simply to divide the costs by two is rough and unreasoned. See Costs Opp’n at 5. Given
22
the presumption that costs are awarded to the winning party, see Champion Produce, 342
23
F.3d at 1022, and the lack of a reasoned method for eliminating the allegedly unnecessary
24
costs incurred in making the PowerPoint slides “engaging,” the Court declines to divide
25
the remainder of the costs by a factor of two and instead awards costs in the amount of
26
$10,262.50 for Defendant’s visual aids.
27
Finally, the Parties have different opinions as to the amount of costs to be awarded
28
for Plaintiff’s appeal. Appellate costs are awardable as allowed by the Federal Rules of
20
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1
Appellate Procedure. See S.D. Cal. CivLR 54.1(b)(12). Under Federal Rule of Appellate
2
Procedure 39(e), costs are allowed for: “(1) the preparation and transmission of the record;
3
(2) the reporter’s transcript, if needed to determine the appeal; (3) premiums paid for a
4
bond or other security to preserve rights pending appeal; and (4) the fee for filing the notice
5
of appeal.” In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) lists “[f]ees for exemplification and the costs
6
of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the
7
case” as costs recoverable under Rule 39(e).
8
Plaintiff claims that Defendant’s costs for printing documents filed for the appeal
9
are not encompassed by Rule 39(e). Costs Opp’n at 5. Plaintiff further avers that
10
Defendant’s costs for filing an appendix should not be recoverable, as only the appellant
11
(in this case, Plaintiff) is required to file an appendix, whereas the appellee (in this case,
12
Defendant) has the discretion to file an appendix. Id. at 7. Finally, Plaintiff contends that,
13
even if these costs are taxable, Defendant’s costs should be limited to paper copies at the
14
rate of reimbursement of $0.08 per page and $2.00 for a cover, and limited to six copies of
15
each document. Fed. Cir. R. 25(c)(3); Fed. Cir. Form 24; Id. at 5–6. The Court will address
16
each of Plaintiff’s arguments regarding appellate fees in turn.
17
First, Plaintiff’s argument that printing documents filed for an appeal should not be
18
taxed is unpersuasive. See Costs Opp’n at 5. These costs are covered under section 1920(4)
19
as “the costs of making copies of any materials where the copies are necessarily obtained
20
for use in the case,” which would include paperwork filed for the appeal. Second,
21
Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant should not be awarded costs for filing an appendix is also
22
unpersuasive. See id. at 6. Although the appellant is required to file an appendix, the
23
appellee may do so as well, Fed. R. App. Proc. 30(a), 30(b), and Plaintiff fails to give any
24
convincing reason why these costs should not be awarded to Defendant as the prevailing
25
party. Finally, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the awardable printing costs should be
26
limited to those mandated by Federal Circuit Rule 25(c)(3) and Federal Circuit Form 24.
27
See Costs Opp’n at 5–6. Thus, the Court awards Defendant a total of $481.44 in costs
28
relating to the appeal, calculated as follows:
21
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