Schutza v. Courtesy Chevrolet Center et al

Filing 17

ORDER granting Defendant's 13 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Court dismisses this action with prejudice. Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 4/15/2015. (jah)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SCOTT SCHUTZA,
Plaintiff,

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Case No. 14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)
ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO
DISMISS
[ECF 13]

v.
COURTESY CHEVROLET
CENTER, a California corporation,
and DOES 1–10,
Defendants.

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Plaintiff Scott Schutza is a paraplegic individual who uses a wheelchair for

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mobility. On October 29, 2014, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant

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Courtesy Chevrolet Center, seeking injunctive relief under Title III of the

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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.,

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and additional relief under related state laws. See ECF 1. Plaintiff amended his

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complaint on February 20, 2015. ECF 12. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s

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Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 13. For

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the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion.
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14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)

BACKGROUND1

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This action arises out of Plaintiff Scott Schutza’s attempts to test drive cars

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at Defendant Courtesy Chevrolet’s dealership. Plaintiff is a paraplegic and cannot

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walk. In June 2014, Plaintiff visited the dealership. Plaintiff wanted to test drive a

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vehicle prior to purchase. Dealership representatives advised Plaintiff that vehicles

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with hand controls are not available. Thus, Plaintiff was not able to test drive a

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vehicle.

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Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings causes of action against

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Defendant for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42

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U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §

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51-53, and the California Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 54-54.8.

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Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF 13.
LEGAL STANDARD

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A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil

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Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. Fed.

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R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 731 (9th Cir. 2001). The court

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must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true and must

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construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the

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nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.

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1996). To avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a complaint need not contain detailed

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factual allegations, rather, it must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that

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is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A

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claim has “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

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the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

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misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly,

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Because this is a motion to dismiss, the Court defers to Plaintiff’s factual
allegations. See Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
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14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)

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550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’

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a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility

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of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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557).

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“[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to

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relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the

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elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting

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Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)) (alteration in original). A court need

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not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite the

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deference the court must pay to the plaintiff’s allegations, it is not proper for the

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court to assume that “the [plaintiff] can prove facts that [he or she] has not alleged

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or that defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.”

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Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459

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U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

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Generally, courts may not consider material outside the complaint when

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ruling on a motion to dismiss. Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co.,

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896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990). However, documents specifically

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identified in the complaint whose authenticity is not questioned by parties may also

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be considered. Fecht v. Price Co., 70 F.3d 1078, 1080 n.1 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(superceded by statutes on other grounds).

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As a general rule, a court freely grants leave to amend a complaint which has

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been dismissed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend may be denied

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when “the court determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the

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challenged pleading could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co.

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v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986).

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DISCUSSION

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Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, arguing that a car dealership

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is not required by either the ADA or attendant regulations to install hand controls
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14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)

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to permit disabled patrons to test drive its vehicles. Defendant is correct.

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Title III of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), requires places of

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public accommodation to “remov[e] physical barriers that have the result of

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excluding persons with disabilities from fully enjoying goods, services, privileges,

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or advantages.” Plaintiff cites 28 C.F.R. § 36.304(b)(21), which lists “installing

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vehicle hand controls” as an example of “steps to remove barriers.”

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However, while regulations require a business to remove “architectural

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barriers . . . that are structural in nature[,]” they do not require businesses to “alter

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its inventory to include accessible or special goods that are designed for, or

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facilitate use by, individuals with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. § 36.307(a). Here,

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Defendant’s vehicles are its inventory, not an architectural barrier arising from the

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structure of its public accommodations. Courts have regularly distinguished

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between access to goods and the goods themselves, finding that only access to the

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goods is required by the ADA. See Doe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d

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557, 560 (7th Cir. 1999). Furthermore, courts have found on identical legal

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circumstances that the ADA does not require dealerships to provide hand controls

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for test drives. Schutza v. FRN of San Diego, LLC, 3:14-cv-2628 JM (RBB), 2015

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WL 574673 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 11, 2015); Karczewski v. K. Motors, Inc., 3:14-cv-

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02701-MMA (WVG) (S.D. Cal. March 21, 2015). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s ADA

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cause of action is based on an incorrect statutory interpretation and fails to state a

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claim. Because his state claims are predicated on the viability of his ADA claim,

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they also fail as a matter of law.

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Plaintiff’s legal theory is barred by the ADA’s statutory schema, and

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therefore he cannot possibly cure the defects in his complaint. Further, Plaintiff has

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already amended his complaint and failed to remedy its defects. “Because any

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amendment would be futile, there [is] no need to prolong the litigation by

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permitting further amendment.” Lipton v. Pathogenesis Corp., 284 F.3d 1027,

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1039 (9th Cir. 2002).
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14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)

CONCLUSION

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Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss
and DISMISSES this action WITH PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 15, 2015

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14-cv-2576 BAS (DHB)