Lemons v. Camarillo
Filing
188
ORDER Granting 142 Defendant Valenzuela's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142-4) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 as to all of Plaintiff's claims against him. Signed by Judge Dana M. Sabraw on 8/15/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(aef)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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TERRELL DESHON LEMONS,
CDCR #P-83680,
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
VALENZUELA'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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Case No.: 3:14-cv-02814-DMS-DHB
A. CAMARILLO, et al.,
Defendants.
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Terrell Deshon Lemons (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner at Ironwood State Prison in Blythe,
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California, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”), is proceeding with a Second
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Amended Complaint (“SAC”) filed pursuant to the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983
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(ECF No. 60).
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I.
Procedural History
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On January 24, 2017, Defendant Valenzuela1 filed a Motion for Summary Judgment
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pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (ECF No. 142). On February 13, 2017, the Court notified
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Plaintiff of the requirements for opposing summary judgment pursuant to Klingele v.
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Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1988) and Rand v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.
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1998) (en banc), and set a briefing schedule (ECF No. 148). Plaintiff was given until June
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9, 2017, to notify the Court that he did not oppose Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion or file
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an Opposition. (Id. at 2.)
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That date has long since passed and Plaintiff has not filed an Opposition or any
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notification relating to the Motion currently before the Court. The Court has determined
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no oral argument is required, and took Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment under submission for resolution on the papers pursuant to S.D. CAL. CIVLR
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7.1.d.
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Having carefully considered the record as submitted, the Court now GRANTS
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Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
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II.
Factual Background
Plaintiff’s Claims
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A.
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On August 15, 2012, while housed at Centinela State Prison (“CEN”), Plaintiff’s cell
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was searched “during a massive search of Facility C-2 Building.” (SAC at 4.) Plaintiff
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and his cellmate were returning to their cell at approximately 3:30 p.m. and realized that a
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radio was missing that was not documented in the cell search. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff and
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his cellmate “called upon Sgt. Cortez and 3rd Watch Building Officer Liss to verify that
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Plaintiff’s radio was indeed missing.” (Id. at 5.)
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The next day, on August 16, 2012, Plaintiff approached Correctional Officer
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Camarillo and showed him that the radio had not been documented as confiscated during
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This Motion is brought by Defendant Valenzuela only. The remaining Defendants are not currently
moving for summary judgment and remain in this action.
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the cell search. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges Camarillo responded by denying that Plaintiff’s name
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or identification was on the radio.
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documentation” that showed “Sgt. D. Pollard had recently compensated Plaintiff with that
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exact radio.” (Id.) However, Defendant Camarillo “insisted ‘he was not giving [Plaintiff’s]
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radio back.’” (Id.)
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(Id.)
Plaintiff “immediately produced valid
Plaintiff then “walked about 10 feet” and spoke to an unidentified Sergeant who
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“advised [Plaintiff] to 602 (appeal).” (Id. at 6.)
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writing the appeal and later that day a radio was “placed in front of Plaintiff’s cell” by
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another inmate. (Id.)
Plaintiff returned to his cell to begin
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On August 23, 2012, Plaintiff was exiting the “chowhall” when Camarillo decided
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to search Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he complied with the search but the pat down
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search became “aggressive.” (Id.) Plaintiff asked Camarillo “why are you grabbing me
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like that?” (Id. at 5.) While receiving no response from Camarillo Plaintiff claims he “felt
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a shot of pain from his testicles to the gut of his stomach.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges he was
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unable to remain in the “spread eagle” position due to the pain but Camarillo told him to
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“put your [expletive] hands in the air and squeezed his grasp harder.” (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff
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“bucked in an attempt to free himself” but he was “taken to the ground immediately by
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Defendant Camarillo from the front and Defendants J. Butcher and D. Zamora from
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behind.” (Id.)
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Plaintiff was “subdued and restrained on the ground” by Butcher and Zamora while
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“Camarillo continued to punch Plaintiff upon the face and while applying a choke-hold.”
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(Id.) Plaintiff claims that “after allowing this to go on for some time,” Butcher “pulled
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and/or waved” Camarillo off Plaintiff. (Id.)
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Following this incident, Camarillo allegedly told his supervisors that he “felt ‘contra-
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band’ on Plaintiff and Plaintiff resisted.”
(Id.)
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contraband was ever found on him. (Id.) He further claims that Defendants Greenwood,
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Valenzuela and Pollard “all accepted as true” that Plaintiff had contraband despite no
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evidence of any contraband. (Id. at 8.)
However, Plaintiff claims that no
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Plaintiff was escorted to the Program Office where he “immediately told” Defendant
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Pollard that Camarillo had used excessive force and that it was “in reprisal for Plaintiff’s
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complaint about his radio the week prior.” (Id.) Plaintiff also claims he told Valenzuela
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and Greenwood about the excessive force by Camarillo as well. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that
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Greenwood “declined to accept and/or investigate Plaintiff’s version of the events.” (Id.
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at 9.) Greenwood allegedly told Plaintiff that “you are a liar, you assaulted my officer . . .
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and if it’s the last thing [Greenwood] does, [Greenwood] is going to make sure that Plaintiff
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would be transferred to Pelican Bay, so that Plaintiff would never see his family again.”
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(Id.)
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A few hours later, Plaintiff was again brought to the Program Office where he would
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be transferred to Administrative Segregation (“Ad-Seg”). (Id. at 8.) However, Plaintiff
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claims he realized that his “radio was not on the inventory list/receipt and immediately
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brought it to Sgt. Pollard’s attention.” (Id.) Pollard sent Defendant Ramirez to locate
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Plaintiff’s radio and bring it to Plaintiff. (Id.) When the radio was located, Pollard “signed
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‘602’ on the inventory sheet to show she placed the radio in Plaintiff’s property upon
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departure.” (Id.) However, on September 21, 2012, Plaintiff received his “allowable
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property” while housed in Ad-Seg but there was no radio contained in the property. (Id.)
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Plaintiff appealed the issue and was again “granted a Super III G.E. radio.” (Id.)
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On October 28, 2012, while still housed in Ad-Seg, Plaintiff was permitted to receive
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“non-contact (behind the glass) visits” with his wife. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff claims that his
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wife was “ordered to a closed room by a Sgt. or Lt. Ramirez and subjected to being
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searched in further reprisal and [to] discourage Plaintiff’s wife from visiting.” (Id.)
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On April 3, 2014, Plaintiff “brought this (threat) and other situations where Plaintiff
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experienced other reprisal/retaliation” to former Warden Miller’s attention. (Id.) Plaintiff
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claims she “assured Plaintiff that this would not occur” while in the presence of
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Greenwood. (Id.) The next day, on April 4, 2014, Plaintiff submitted an “Inmate Request
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CDCR 22” form to Miller regarding the threat by Greenwood which was received by Miller
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on April 14, 2014, and forwarded to Defendant Galeana, a correctional counselor. (Id. at
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10.) Galeana then passed Plaintiff’s complaint to Defendant Angulo, also a correctional
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counselor. (Id.)
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On April 21, 2014, Angulo called Plaintiff into his office “to reiterate/reassure
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Plaintiff that he would indeed by referred by ICC to be transferred to a Level III prison,
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not a Level IV prison (Pelican Bay State Prison) as previously threatened” by Greenwood.
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(Id.) Four days later, Angulo “retracted this reassurance” on the grounds that there had
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been a “miscalculation in points.” (Id.) However, Galeana called Plaintiff into his office
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to inform him that he was “taking Plaintiff back to ICC for Level III transfer” because he
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had contacted the “Head Office in Sacramento” to review his calculations for accuracy.
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(Id.)
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Plaintiff was later called back again to Galeana’s office between May 16, 2014, and
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May 22, 2014, and was told that “some guy in CSR, at Centinela, have a stick up his ass
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because nobody aggravated your offense to make you a high-risk, high security Level IV
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inmate.” (Id.) Previously in August of 2010, Plaintiff claims Valenzuela found Plaintiff
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“not guilty” of mutual combat with another inmate but “approximately 2 years later, and
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coincidentally in August of 2012, Plaintiff was re-issued the same rule violation report
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(RVR) 115 and found ‘guilty’ for fighting.” (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges there was no other
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documentation of this finding other than Valenzuela’s entry in a log book. (Id.)
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Plaintiff claims this was done to make him eligible for a Level IV placement. (Id.)
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On June 9, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Pelican Bay State Prison, a Level IV
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prison, by himself in a van. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that this was intentional so that his “radio
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would be confiscated once again, this time without compensation.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims
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he was subjected to further acts of retaliation while housed at Pelican Bay. (Id. at 11-12.)
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On August 23, 2012, following the alleged incident with Camarillo, Plaintiff claims
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Defendant Villalobos-Valenzuela “was on notice and notified of the incident” but waited
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an “hour and 30 minutes after the excruciating pain” to examine Plaintiff.” (Id. at 15.)
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Plaintiff further alleges Villalobos-Valenzuela “failed to report any and all marks, bruises
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and/or scratches upon Plaintiff’s body.” (Id. at 16.) Plaintiff claims that in the days
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following the incident, he “started to notice his vision getting blurry in his right eye, the
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eye Defendant Camarillo was punching, while being restrained.” (Id.) Plaintiff did not
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immediately assume it was serious but it later “flared up and [Plaintiff] had to be rushed to
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CTC 2-4 weeks later.” (Id.) Plaintiff claims to continue to suffer from “negative reactions
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to bright lights and blurriness.” (Id.)
Defendant’s Claims
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B.
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Defendant Valenzuela, a Correctional Lieutenant, was employed at Centinela State
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Prison (“CEN”) until October of 2013. (See Def.’s Valenzuela’s Decl., ECF No. 142-4, ¶
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1.)
As a Lieutenant, Valenzuela’s job responsibilities included “overseeing and
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supervising the general activities and the day-to-day operations of the facility.” (Id. ¶ 2.)
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In addition, Valenzuela was responsible for “ensuring that staff met all security standards,”
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as well as serving as a “senior hearing officer” who conducts disciplinary hearings and
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appeal reviews. (Id.) This also included being “responsible for collecting and preparing
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documents in response to use of force incidents.” (Id.)
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On August 23, 2012, the date of the incident with Defendant Camarillo, Valenzuela
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was in the program office when he heard “the yard alarm and the institutional radio report
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an incident” in the dining hall. (Id. ¶ 3.) Valenzuela arrived at the scene and “saw that
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Sergeant Pollard was already handling the incident and that inmate Lemons had been
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restrained.” (Id.) Valenzuela claims that prior to this incident he was “not aware of any
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purported risk that Officer Camarillo posed to Plaintiff” and that Plaintiff had never
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expressed any concerns to him about Defendant Camarillo. (Id. ¶ 4.)
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Sergeant Pollard collected reports from each of the individual officers involved in
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the incident, completed a “CDCR 837 Crime/Incident Report, Part C,” and provided this
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report to Valenzuela. (Id. ¶ 5.) It was Valenzuela’s duty to collect the report from Pollard
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and conduct his own review of the incident. (Id.) Valenzuela was responsible for
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reviewing the individual reports, preparing a “summary of the events as described by the
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officers,” and assemble an “Initial Incident Report package.” (Id.)
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On August 23, 2012, Pollard provided Valenzuela with reports from “the officers
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who participated in or witnessed the incident between Officer Camarillo and inmate
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Lemons.” (Id. ¶ 6.) Following a review of these reports, Valenzuela “prepared a summary
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of the incident, as had been reported by staff.” (Id. ¶ 8.) An administrative disciplinary
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hearing “on the Rules Violation Report concerning the August 23, 2012 incident” was
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conducted on May 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 9.) Criminal Charges were also brought against Plaintiff
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in state court for battery on a peace officer. (See Jeffrey Decl., Ex. A, ECF No. 142-3, Pl’s
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Depo. 102:18-24.) Plaintiff was convicted by a jury and sentenced to six years. (Id.) At
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his trial, Plaintiff was represented by counsel and called several fellow inmates as
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witnesses. (Id. at 102:18 - 103:18.)
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On May 24, 2012, an administrative hearing was held at CEN regarding the Rules
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Violation Report and Plaintiff was found “guilty of the charges and assessed 150 days
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forfeiture of behavioral credits and sentenced to a 12 month term in administrative
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segregation.” (Valenzuela Decl., Ex. D., ECF No. 142-4, Rules Violation Report dated
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May 2, 2014.)
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III.
Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment
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Defendant Valenzuela seeks summary judgment on the grounds that: (1) Plaintiff
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waived his Eighth Amendment claims against Valenzuela; (2) Plaintiff cannot establish an
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Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim or a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim;
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(3) his Eighth Amendment claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (4)
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Valenzuela cannot be sued in his official capacity for monetary damages; and (5)
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Valenzuela is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Def’s. Mem. of P&As in Supp. of Mot.
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for Summ. J., ECF No. 142-1, at 512-22 (hereafter “Def’s. P&As”).)
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A.
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Rule 56(a) provides that a court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
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that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
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judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Standard of Review
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Under summary judgment practice, the moving party always bears the initial
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responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
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those portions of “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
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on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
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genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)) If the moving party meets its initial responsibility, the burden then
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shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, that there is a genuine
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issue for trial. Id. at 324.
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To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving party is “required to present
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significant, probative evidence tending to support h[is] allegations,” Bias v. Moynihan, 508
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F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted), and must point to some evidence in
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the record that demonstrates “a genuine issue of material fact [which], with all reasonable
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inferences made in the plaintiff[]’s favor, could convince a reasonable jury to find for the
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plaintiff[].” Reese v. Jefferson School Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736, 738 (9th Cir. 2000)
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(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). The opposing party cannot rest solely
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on conclusory allegations of fact or law. Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457, 459 (9th Cir.
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1986).
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B.
Eighth Amendment Claim
1.
Waiver of claims
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Valenzuela moves for summary judgment of the Eighth Amendment claim brought
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against him on the ground that Plaintiff waived this claim during his deposition. (See Def’s.
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P&As at 12.) While it does appear in Plaintiff’s deposition that he intends to bring only
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due process claims against Valenzuela, his SAC is verified and remains the operative
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pleading containing an Eighth Amendment claim against Valenzuela. (See SAC at 6-12,
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27.) Therefore, the Court will not enter summary judgment as to this claim on the ground
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that Plaintiff waived these claims. However, the Court will consider summary judgment
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on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine dispute as to any material fact.
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2.
Failure to Protect Claim
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Plaintiff alleges in his SAC that Valenzuela failed to “take disciplinary or other
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actions to cure the known pattern of physical ‘verbal abuse of inmates by Defendant
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Camarillo” which “constituted ‘deliberate indifference’ to the Plaintiff and other
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prisoners[’] safety.” (SAC at 18.)
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Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials must “take reasonable measures to
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guarantee the safety of the inmates.” Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1984);
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DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989)
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(“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the
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Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his
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safety and general well-being.”). “Protecting the safety of prisoners and staff involves
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difficult choices and evades easy solutions.” Berg, 794 F.2d at 460.
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Thus, to show that a prisoner has been subject to cruel and unusual punishment by
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an officer’s failure to protect him, he must point to evidence in the record which shows that
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the alleged deprivation was objectively “sufficiently serious,” i.e., that the conditions he
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faced posed a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
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(1994). Second, because “only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates
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the Eighth Amendment,” evidence must exist to show the defendant acted with a
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“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (internal
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quotation marks, emphasis and citations omitted); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 5, 8.
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In a failure to protect case, “that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to
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inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. Prison officials display a deliberate
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indifference to an inmate’s well-being when they know of and consciously disregard an
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excessive risk of harm to that inmate’s health or safety. Id. at 837. “[T]he official must
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both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
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serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
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indifference” entails something more than mere negligence, but may be satisfied with proof
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of something less than acts or omissions “for the very purpose of causing harm,” or that a
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particular official “acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an
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inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a
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substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. at 842. “Whether a prison official had the requisite
Id.
Thus, “deliberate
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knowledge of a substantial risk” may be inferred if the prisoner produces evidence
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sufficient to show that the risk was “obvious.” Id.
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As set forth above, Plaintiff alleges in his SAC that Valenzuela, and other prison
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officials, were aware that Defendant Camarillo was both verbally and physically abusive
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to inmates. (See SAC at 18.) Plaintiff offers no other factual allegations to support his
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claim. In his Declaration, Valenzuela states “[p]rior to the August 23, 2012 incident,
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inmate Lemons had never communicated to me any safety concerns he had in regard to
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Officer Camarillo, or any of the other involved officers.”
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Valenzuela also declares that he “was not aware of any purported risk that Officer
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Camarillo posed to Plaintiff.” (Id.) In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he did not have
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“any idea” that he was going to have a confrontation with Camarillo on August 23, 2012,
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and “the whole thing came as a big surprise” to him. (Jeffery Decl., Ex. A at 118:19-25.)
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Plaintiff offers no specific factual allegations in his SAC or his deposition testimony that
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Valenzuela knew, or should have known, that Camarillo was a danger to Plaintiff.
(Valenzuela Decl. ¶ 4.)
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When the moving party meets its initial obligation demonstrating that no genuine
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issue exists, the burden shifts to the opposing party to establish that a genuine issue of
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material fact does exist. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574,
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586 (1986). Plaintiff provides no factual evidence, exhibits or admissible affidavits to
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defeat Defendant’s showing that he did not fail to protect him from harm in violation of his
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Eighth Amendment rights. Accordingly Defendant’s Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary
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Judgment as to Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims is GRANTED.
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C.
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In his SAC, Plaintiff alleges that on August 23, 2012, “Defendants Capt.
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Greenwood, Lt. Valenzuela, and Sgt. Pollard failed to follow the ‘excessive force
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procedure/protocol: secure a video interview or secure video facing chowhall.” (SAC at
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13.)
Due Process Claim
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The Due Process Clause prohibits states from “depriving any person of life, liberty,
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or property, without the due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The procedural
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guarantees of due process apply only when a constitutionally-protected liberty or property
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interest is at stake. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974). In order to
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invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause, Plaintiff must first establish the existence
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of a liberty interest. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005); Sandin v. Conner, 515
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U.S. 472 (1995). In Sandin, the Supreme Court “refocused the test for determining the
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existence of a liberty interest away from the wording of prison regulations and toward an
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examination of the hardship caused by the prison’s challenged action relative to the ‘basic
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conditions’ of life as a prisoner.” Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1996)
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(citing Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484); McQuillion v. Duncan, 306 F.3d 895, 902-03 (9th Cir.
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2002) (noting that Sandin abandons the mandatory/permissive language analysis courts
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traditionally looked to when determining whether a state prison regulation created a liberty
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interest which required due process protection).
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Thus, “[a]fter Sandin, it is clear that the touchstone of the inquiry into the existence
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of a protected, state-created liberty interest is avoiding restrictive conditions of
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confinement is not the language of regulations regarding those conditions but the nature of
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those conditions themselves ‘in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”
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Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 223 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484).
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Defendant does not argue that Plaintiff has not alleged facts relating to his
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disciplinary conviction that constitute a liberty interest. Therefore, the Court will presume
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that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a liberty interest. When a liberty interest has been
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implicated as the result of a disciplinary charge, the Fourteenth Amendment requires prison
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officials to provide the prisoner with: (1) written notice of the charges at least 24-hours
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before the hearing; (2) the opportunity to appear in person at the hearing, to call witnesses,
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and to present rebuttal evidence; and (3) a written statement by the factfinders of the
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evidence relied on for their decision and the reasons for the action taken by the committee.
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Wolff, 418 U.S. at 564-66; Neal, 131 F.3d at 830; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 952 (“Although
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prisoners are entitled to be free from arbitrary action and conduct of prison officials, the
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protections against arbitrary action ‘are the procedural due process requirements as set
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forth in Wolff v. McDonnell.’”).
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Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that he received written notice or that he was
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deprived of the right to call witnesses. Instead, Plaintiff argues that he was denied access
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to evidence to rebut the charges. The only allegation that Plaintiff clearly sets forth as to
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Defendant Valenzuela is his alleged failure to videotape an interview with Plaintiff
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following the August 23, 2012 incident. In his deposition testimony, Plaintiff maintains
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that Valenzuela did not follow protocol and as a result, he could not rebut Defendants
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assertion that Plaintiff failed to report the alleged excessive force by Camarillo. (Jeffery
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Decl., Ex. A at 22, 119:20-120:22.) Plaintiff further maintains that Valenzuela denied his
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due process rights by failing to investigate his claims that Camarillo used excessive force
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against him. (See id. at 23, 121:4-13.)
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Even if Plaintiff believes that Valenzuela’s investigation was inadequate, that
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argument alone is insufficient to support a due process claims against Valenzuela. See
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Gomez v. Whitney, 757 F.2d 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (“[W]e can find no
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instance where the courts have recognized inadequate investigation as sufficient to state a
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civil rights claim unless there was another recognized constitutional right involved.”)
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Defendant argues that the disciplinary hearing came after Plaintiff’s criminal trial at
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which time he had counsel and witnesses that testified on his behalf. (See Def.’s Ps & As
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at 20.) Moreover, it is not at all clear how the lack of a videotaped interview with Plaintiff
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would have made any difference in the outcome of Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing. As
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Defendant also notes, Plaintiff was able to tell his version of the events that occurred on
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August 23, 2012 as he testified at both his criminal trial and his disciplinary hearing. (Id.)
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Plaintiff provides no evidence, nor does he point to any evidence in the record, to rebut
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Defendant’s showing that he was provided with the procedural protections guaranteed by
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Wolff.
For all these reasons, Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment based
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on due process violations is GRANTED.
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D.
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Defendant also seeks summary judgment to the extent Plaintiff seeks money
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damages against him based on actions taken in his “official” capacity. The Eleventh
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Amendment bars a prisoner’s § 1983 claims against state actors sued in their official
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capacities, Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989). Consequently,
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the Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion for Summary Judgment on Eleventh
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Amendment grounds.
Eleventh Amendment
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E.
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Finally, Defendant argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity. Because the
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Court has found no triable issue of fact exists to show Plaintiff’s constitutional rights were
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violated by Defendant Valenzuela, it need not reach any issues regarding qualified
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immunity. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no constitutional right would
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have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further
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inquiries concerning qualified immunity.”); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833,
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841 n.5 (1998) (“[The better approach to resolving cases in which the defense of qualified
16
immunity is raised is to determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of
17
a constitutional right at all.”).
18
IV.
Qualified Immunity
Conclusion and Order
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For all the reasons explained, the Court GRANTS Defendant Valenzuela’s Motion
20
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 142-4) pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 as to all of
21
Plaintiff’s claims against him.
22
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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Dated: August 15, 2017
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3:14-cv-02814-DMS-DHB
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