Larson v. Paramo et al

Filing 22

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's 21 Motion to Appoint Counsel. Signed by Magistrate Judge Bernard G. Skomal on 7/7/2015. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(rlu) .

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JON WARREN LARSON, CDCR
#AD-2009

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vs.

15-CV-308 BTM (BGS)
ORDER DENYING
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO
APPOINT COUNSEL

Plaintiff,

[ECF No. 21. ]

WARDEN D. PARAMO; CMO
WALKER; DR. J. CHAU; DR.
NEWTON; DR. S. ROBERTS; R.N.
GIL; R.N. T. PAULE; R.N. WINZEL;
DR. KRISTEN DEAN,
Defendants.

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On July 2, 2015, Plaintiff Jon Warren Larson, a prisoner proceeding pro se

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and In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) in this civil rights action, filed a motion to appoint

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counsel. (ECF No. 21.) He requests appointment of counsel because: (1) he cannot

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afford to hire a lawyer; (2) the case involves complex legal issues; (3) his access to

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the law library is limited; (4) he is not sufficiently trained in legal matters and (5)

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lawyers that he has contacted have not responded. Id. at pp. 1-2.

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“There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel in a § 1983 action.”

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Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Storseth v. Spellman,

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654 F.2d 1349, 1353 (9th Cir. 1981)); see also Hedges v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In

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re Hedges), 32 F.3d 1360, 1363 (9th Cir. 1994) (“[T]here is no absolute right to

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counsel in civil proceedings.”) (citation omitted). Federal courts do not have the
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15cv308 BTM (BGS)

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authority “to make coercive appointments of counsel.” Mallard v. United States

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District Court, 490 U.S. 296, 310 (1989); see also United States v. $292,888.04 in

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U.S. Currency, 54 F.3d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1995).
Districts courts have discretion, however, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),

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to “request” that an attorney represent indigent civil litigants upon a showing of

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“exceptional circumstances.” See Agyeman v. Corrections Corp. of America, 390

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F.3d 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. “A finding of the

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exceptional circumstances of the plaintiff seeking assistance requires at least an

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evaluation of the likelihood of the plaintiff’s success on the merits and an evaluation

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of the plaintiff’s ability to articulate his claims ‘in light of the complexity of the

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legal issues involved.’” Agyeman, 390 F.3d at 1103 (quoting Wilborn v. Escalderon,

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789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015,

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1017 (9th Cir. 1991).
The Court denies Plaintiff’s request, as neither the interests of justice nor

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exceptional circumstances warrant the appointment of counsel at this time. LaMere

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v. Risley, 827 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1987); Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Plaintiff has

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thus far been able to articulate his claims, as the Court found that Plaintiff’s

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complaint contains allegations sufficient to survive the sua sponte screening required

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by 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). (See ECF No. 3 .) Moreover, it does not

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appear that the legal issues involved are so complex that counsel is warranted at this

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stage of the proceedings. See Wilborn v. Escalderon, 789 F.3d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir.

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1986) (noting that, “If all that was required to establish successfully the complexity

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of the relevant issues was a demonstration of the need

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15cv308 BTM (BGS)

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for development of further facts, practically all cases would involve complex legal

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issues.”).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: July 7, 2015
Hon. Bernard G. Skomal
U.S. Magistrate Judge
United States District Court

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-3-

15cv308 BTM (BGS)