Guerrero Villegas v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage et al
Filing
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ORDER granting defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s 3 Motion to Dismiss; the instant complaint is dismissed without prejudice. Signed by Judge John A. Houston on 7/30/15. (kas)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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SERGIO GUERRERO VILLEGAS,
v.
Plaintiff,
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE,
A DIVISION OF WELLS FARGO;
TICOR TITLE COMPANY OF
CALIFORNIA, NBS DEFAULT
SERVICES, LLC; AND DOES 1
THROUGH 10, INCLUSIVE,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 15cv0637 JAH(DHB)
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT
MOTION TO DISMISS [Doc. # 5]
INTRODUCTION
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Pending before the Court is the motion to dismiss [Doc. #5] filed by Defendant
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., successor by merger to Wells Fargo Bank Southwest, N.A., f/k/a
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Wachovia Mortgage, FSB f/k/a World Savings Bank, FSB (“Defendant”). After a careful
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review of the parties’ submissions, and for the reasons set forth below, this Court
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GRANTS Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
BACKGROUND
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1.
Factual Background
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The instant complaint, filed by Sergio Guerrero Villegas (“Plaintiff”), stems from
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a secured loan made by World Savings Bank, FSB to third party Maria Guadalupe
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Valenzuela to finance her purchase of a home located at 511 Montera Court, Chula Vista,
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California 91910. Maria Guadalupe Valenzuela transferred all rights to title and interest
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in the property to Plaintiff, who eventually defaulted on the loan. As a result of Plaintiff’s
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default, Defendant initiated foreclosure proceedings by recording a Notice of Default on
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September 23, 2014. On February 6, 2015 a Notice of Trustee’s Sale was recorded.
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2.
Procedural Background
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On February 19, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action in the San Diego County
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Superior Court. The case was removed to this Court on March 20, 2015. See Doc. #1.
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Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss on March 26, 2015. See Doc. #3. Plaintiff
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filed an opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss on April 28, 2015. See Doc. #4.
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Defendant filed a reply on May 4, 2015. Doc. #5. This Court subsequently took the
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motion under submission without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1(d.1).
DISCUSSION
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Defendant moves to dismiss on the grounds that the complaint fails to state a claim
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upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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Instead of opposing the merits of Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiff contends in
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opposition that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, which this Court construes as
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a motion to remand.
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1.
Motion to Remand
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a.
Legal Standard
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The Federal Court is one of limited jurisdiction. See Gould v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.
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v. New York, 790 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1986). As such, it cannot reach the merits of
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any dispute until it confirms it’s own subject matter jurisdiction. Steel Co. v. Citizens for
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a Better Environ., 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998). District courts must construe the removal
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statutes strictly against removal and resolve any uncertainty as to removability in favor of
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remanding the case to state court. Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988) .
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Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C § 1441 et seq. A state court action can only
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be removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. V.
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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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Here, Plaintiff’s complaint was removed on diversity grounds. To establish diversity
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jurisdiction, there must be: (1) complete diversity among opposing parties; and (2) an
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amount in controversy exceeding $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The burden is on the
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party invoking the federal removal statue to demonstrate federal subject matter
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jurisdiction over the case. See Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir.
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1988)
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b.
Analysis
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Plaintiff contends that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over his claims
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because “1) There is No Complete Diversity such that this Court can exercise diversity
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jurisdiction, since co-Defendant TICOR TITLE COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA and NBS
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DEFAULT SERVICES, LLC are California residents, and 2) There is NO Federal Question
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and the Amount in Controversy DOES NOT exceed $75,00.00.” Doc. # 4 at 2 (emphasis
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in original). However, Plaintiff provides no argument or evidence supporting his
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contention, nor does he rebut Defendant’s attestations presented in the Notice of Removal
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filed in support of jurisdiction. See Doc. #1 at 2.1 Based on the record, this Court finds
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Defendant has met its burden of demonstrating that subject matter jurisdiction exists, and
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Plaintiff has failed to rebut that showing. Thus, the Court is now faced with an unopposed
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motion to dismiss.
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2.
Motion to Dismiss
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a. Legal Standard
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The Ninth Circuit has held that a district court may properly grant a motion to
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dismiss as unopposed pursuant to a local rule where the local rule permits, but does not
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require the granting of a motion for failure to respond. See generally, Ghazali v. Moran,
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46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal for failure to timely file
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opposition papers). The Southern District of California’s Civil Local Rule 7.1(f.3.c)
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expressly provides that “[i]f an opposing party fails to file the papers in the manner
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The only case cited by Plaintiff in support of his jurisdictional arguments is not
analogous to the instant case. See Doc. # 4 at 2 n.1 (citing Althie v. Wells Fargo civil case
No.3:15-cv-00417-CAB-BGS.)
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required by Local Rule 7.1(e.2), that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of
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that motion or other request for ruling by the court.” Prior to dismissal of an unopposed
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motion, the court must weigh the following factors: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious
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resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage it’s docket; (3) the risk of prejudice
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to the Defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and
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(5) the availability of less drastic sanctions.” Ghazali, 46 F.3d at 53 (quoting Henderson
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v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1986)). The Ninth Circuit has recognized that
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the first and fourth factors cut in opposite directions. See Yourish v. California Amplifier,
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1991 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999) (first factor always weighs in favor of dismissal);
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Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 401 (9th Cir. 1998) (fourth factor counsels
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against dismissal). Thus, this Court will address the second, third and fifth factors in
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determining whether it should grant Defendant’s unopposed motion.
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b. Analysis
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After a review of the record, this Court finds that the second factor weighs in favor
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of dismissal. As the court noted in Yourish, the routine noncompliance of litigants should
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not prevent the court from managing its docket. Yourish, 191 F. 3d 990. Plaintiff has
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failed to comply with one of the most basic requirements of litigation, and to date has
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offered no excuse for failing to respond to Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The fact that
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Plaintiff has yet to make any attempt to address the motion to dismiss also supports a
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finding of prejudice towards Plaintiff, and weighs in favor of dismissal. Finally, with
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respect to whether less drastic measures have been considered, in the interest of lessening
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the sanction imposed on Plaintiff, the Court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss
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without prejudice.
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15cv0637
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant Wells Fargo
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Bank, N.A.,’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the instant complaint is DISMISSED
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WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
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Dated: July 30, 2015
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JOHN A. HOUSTON
United States District Judge
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