Brown v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company as Trustee
Filing
6
ORDER granting plaintiff's 2 Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis solely for purposes of screening. The Court dismisses with prejudice this action sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of federal subject matter juri sdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). In light of the Court's finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the Court denies as moot Plaintiff's ex parte motion for a temporary restraining order 1 and request for issuance of writ of execution 5 . The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this case. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 3/27/15. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(kas)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
12
Plaintiff, ORDER:
13
14
15
16
CASE NO. 15-cv-655-MMA (BLM)
DIANNE BROWN
vs.
DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL
TRUST COMPANY as Trustee for
Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I Inc.,
Trust 2007-NC4, ,
17
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION
FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS SOLELY FOR
PURPOSES OF SCREENING
[Doc. No. 2]
Defendant. SUA SPONTE DISMISSING ACTION
FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION
18
19
[Doc. No. 1]
20
21
22
On March 3, 2015, Dianne Brown, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of removal
23
from the State of California, Superior Court for the County of San Diego and
24
concurrently filed a motion to proceed informa pauperis (“IFP”). See Civil Case No.
25
15cv474-MMA (BLM)1 Doc. Nos. 1, 2. In the state court complaint, Plaintiff
26
Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Morgan Stanley ABS Capital
27
1
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(c)(1), the Court sua sponte takes
judicial notice of the related action Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Brown, Case No.
28
15cv474-MMA (BLM) and the documents filed therein.
-1-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
I Inc. (“Deutsche”) alleges a single claim against Ms. Brown and Does 1 to 5 for
2
unlawful detainer for possession under $10,000. See Doc. No. 1. According to the
3
state court complaint, Deutsche is the owner of the real property located at 1767
4
Fernwood Road, Chula Vista, California 91913 (“the subject property”), which it
5
purchased at a trustee’s sale on or about August 26, 2010. Deutsche further seeks
6
immediate possession of the subject property, which Ms. Brown has purportedly
7
occupied without Deutsche’s consent, title to, and/or right to possess since the
8
trustee’s sale. In the documents accompanying Ms. Brown’s notice of removal, Ms.
9
Brown indicates that the state court entered default judgment against her on or about
10
February 5 or 6, 2015, and Ms. Brown requests that this Court set aside what she
11
claims is an “erroneous default judgment” because she did not receive proper service.
12
See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Brown, Case No. 15cv474-MMA (BLM),
13
Doc. No. 1-3 at 3–5, 9–10.
14
After carefully reviewing the notice of removal and the accompanying
15
documents, the Court found that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
16
action. Specifically, the Court found that although Ms. Brown indicated on the civil
17
cover sheet upon removal that jurisdiction was based on a federal question, the Court
18
found that because the state court complaint presented no question “arising under”
19
federal law, it did not have federal question jurisdiction. The state court complaint set
20
forth a single cause of action for unlawful detainer—a claim that arises exclusively
21
under state law. Further, although Ms. Brown asserted various constitutional claims
22
and federal statutes, the Court noted that her anticipated defenses or counterclaims
23
could not establish federal jurisdiction. See Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765
24
F.2d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding a defendant’s counterclaim presenting a federal
25
question does not make a case removable). The Court also found that it did not have
26
subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that
27
even if the parties are citizens of different states as Ms. Brown indicated on the civil
28
cover sheet, the state court complaint states that the amount demanded is under
-2-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
$10,000, which clearly does not exceed the $75,000 amount in controversy
2
requirement. Because the Court had neither federal question nor diversity jurisdiction,
3
it concluded that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction over the complaint and
4
remanded the action to state court.
5
On May 24, 2015, Ms. Brown initiated the instant action by filing a document
6
entitled “Emergency Ex Parte Application for TRO, Order to Show Cause Why
7
Preliminary Injunction Should Not Issue.” See Doc. No. 1. Ms. Brown concurrently
8
filed a motion to proceed IFP. See Doc. No. 2. Ms. Brown now seeks to enjoin
9
Deutsche from all attempts to take possession of the subject property. Although it is
10
not clear from the complaint and other filings,2 Ms. Brown appears to allege that she
11
has acquired title to the subject property through adverse possession. Ms. Brown also
12
appears to allege that Deustche’s attempts to take possession of the subject property
13
violate the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) and California’s
14
Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
MOTION TO PROCEED IFP
15
16
All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of
17
the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing
18
fee of $350.3 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff’s
19
failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to
20
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999).
21
“To proceed in forma pauperis is a privilege not a right.” Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d
22
114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965).
23
A party need not be completely destitute to proceed in forma pauperis. Adkins
24
2
The Court notes that Ms. Brown’s filings are unclear and at times nonsensical.
However, because Ms. Brown is proceeding pro se, the Court construes her filings and
26 allegations liberally, affording her the benefit of any doubt. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d
338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010).
25
27
3
All parties filing civil actions on or after May 1, 2013, must pay an additional
administrative fee of $50. However, the $50 administrative fee is waived if the plaintiff
28
is granted leave to proceed IFP.
-3-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 (1948). But “the same
2
even-handed care must be employed to assure that federal funds are not squandered to
3
underwrite, at public expense, either frivolous claims or the remonstrances of a suitor
4
who is financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his own oar.” Temple v.
5
Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984).
Based on the information provided by Plaintiff in her IFP motion, pursuant to
6
7
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP motion solely for the purpose
8
of screening the pro se complaint and adjudicating the motions currently before the
9
Court.
10
11
SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (E)(2)(B)
When a plaintiff proceeds IFP, the complaint is subject to mandatory screening
12
and the Court must order the sua sponte dismissal of any case it finds “frivolous,
13
malicious, failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeking
14
monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §
15
1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions
16
of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”). Federal Rule of Civil
17
Procedure 12(h)(3) permits a district court to dismiss a complaint sua sponte for lack
18
of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
19
“[S]ubject-matter jurisdiction concerns the courts’ statutory or constitutional
20
power to adjudicate cases.” Leeson v. Transamerica Disability Income Plan, 671 F.3d
21
969, 975 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523
22
U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (internal quotations omitted)). Thus, without subject-matter
23
jurisdiction, a federal court is without “power” to hear or adjudicate a claim. See Steel
24
Co., 523 U.S. at 89; Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
25
(1994). For this reason, “[w]hen a federal court concludes that it lacks subject-matter
26
jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the complaint in its entirety.” Arbaugh v. Y&H
27
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
28
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction without general subject matter
-4-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
jurisdiction.” Li v. Chertoff, 482 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1174-75 (S.D. Cal. 2007) (citing
2
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Thus,
3
federal courts “possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.”
4
Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. For example, federal courts have original subject-matter
5
jurisdiction over cases that present a federal question pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or
6
that involve citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000
7
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Because of the federal court’s limited jurisdiction, a
8
federal court is presumed to lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the contrary is
9
affirmatively established. See Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
10
Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The party asserting jurisdiction,
11
here Ms. Brown, has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Kokkonen,
12
511 U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted).
13
Ms. Brown indicates on the civil cover sheet that jurisdiction in this Court is
14
based on diversity jurisdiction. See Doc. No. 1-1. However, Ms. Brown does not
15
allege any amount in controversy, and therefore does not meet her burden of
16
satisfying the amount-in-controversy requirement. Moreover, although she claims
17
that the parties are citizens of different states, she simultaneously indicates that she is
18
a resident of San Diego County, and Deutsche is a resident of Orange County,
19
specifically of Irvine, California. See id. Thus, Ms. Brown’s own allegations
20
establish that both she and Deutsche are citizens of California, and therefore there is
21
no diversity of citizenship. See Morris v. Princess Cruises, Inc., 236 F.3d 1061, 1067
22
(9th Cir. 2001) (“Section 1332 requires complete diversity of citizenship; each of the
23
plaintiffs must be a citizen of a different state than each of the defendants.”).
24
Accordingly, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity
25
jurisdiction.
26
This leaves federal question as the only available basis of jurisdiction in this
27
Court. Ms. Brown appears to bring a claim for violations of the FDCPA, which as a
28
federal statute would ordinarily provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction.
-5-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
However, her FDCPA claim against Deutsche is not cognizable because Deutsche is
2
not a debt collector within the meaning of the FDCPA. See, e.g., Hidalgo v. Aurora
3
Loan Servs. LLC, No. 13-CV-1341-H JMA, 2013 WL 4647550, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug.
4
29, 2013) (“However, an unlawful detainer action regarding holdover occupants after
5
foreclosure does not qualify as the collection of a debt within the meaning of the
6
FDCPA.”); Duenas v. Freitas, No. 13cv0836 SBA, 2013 WL 3298249, at *4 (N.D.
7
Cal. June 28, 2013) (“Moreover, a FDCPA claim cannot be predicated on actions
8
relating to the filing and prosecution of an unlawful detainer action.”); Brambila v.
9
Reo Bay Area, LP, No. 11cv03202 SI, 2011 WL 4031142, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 8,
10
2011) (holding the defendants did not fit the definition of “debt collector” under the
11
FDCPA where “they simply commenced—and successfully litigated—an unlawful
12
detainer action against plaintiffs with respect to possession of the premises”). All of
13
Ms. Brown’s remaining claims, including her purported right to possess the property
14
based on adverse possession, arise exclusively under state law. Accordingly, the
15
Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction on the basis of federal
16
question.
17
Finally, even where federal courts otherwise have subject matter jurisdiction,
18
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts “from exercising subject matter
19
jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.”
20
Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Bianchi v.
21
Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003)); see also Maldonado v. Harris, 370
22
F.3d 945, 949 (9th Cir. 2004). The rationale underlying this doctrine is that the
23
United States Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear an
24
appeal from a state court judgment. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139; see also
25
Maldonado, 370 F.3d at 949 (“Rooker–Feldman recognizes the implicit statutory
26
structure established by Congress, which has determined that the United States
27
Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdiction to hear appeals from state
28
courts.”). In applying this doctrine, the Ninth Circuit has noted that the “clearest case
-6-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
for dismissal based on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine occurs when a federal plaintiff
2
asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks
3
relief from a state court judgment based on that decision.” Reusser v. Wachovia Bank,
4
525 F.3d 855, 859 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citation omitted). The doctrine also
5
applies “where the parties do not directly contest the merits of a state court decision,”
6
but the federal suit necessarily functions as a “de facto appeal from a state court
7
judgment.” Reusser, 525 F.3d at 859 (citing Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1139).
8
Here, even if the Court otherwise had subject matter jurisdiction based on
9
diversity or federal-question, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this Court from
10
exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this matter because it is a de facto appeal
11
from the state court’s default judgment entered against Ms. Brown. Ms. Brown
12
removed the related case Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Brown, Case No.
13
15cv474-MMA (BLM) shortly after the state court entered default judgment against
14
her on or around February 5, 2015. Ms. Brown concurrently filed a document entitled
15
“Notice Automatic Stay of Execution of Judgement” in which she requests that this
16
Court set aside what she claims is an “an erroneous default judgment” entered against
17
her based on alleged improper service. See Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v.
18
Brown, Case No. 15cv474-MMA (BLM), Doc. No. 1-3 at 2, 5. In the instant case,
19
Ms. Brown similarly seeks to have this Court determine that is she entitled to
20
possession of the subject property and to enjoin Deutsche from enforcing its right to
21
possess the property, which would necessarily require this Court to reverse and/ or
22
vacate the state court’s judgment. Accordingly, this action is a de facto appeal of a
23
state court judgment, and the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter.
24
CONCLUSION
25
For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds that it lacks subject matter
26
jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS as follows:
27
1.
The Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP [Doc. No. 2]
28
2.
The Court DISMISSES with prejudice this action sua sponte under 28
-7-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
1
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
2
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3).
3.
3
In light of the Court’s finding that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
4
Court DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for a temporary restraining
5
order [Doc. No. 1] and request for issuance of writ of execution [Doc. No. 5].
4.
6
7
8
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this
case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
9
10
DATED: March 27, 2015
11
12
13
Hon. Michael M. Anello
United States District Judge
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
-8-
15cv655-MMA (BLM)
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?