Lincoln Property Company et al v. Haro et al

Filing 4

ORDER Sua Sponte Remanding Action to State Court; Denying as Moot Defendants' Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis 3 . Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 4/7/2015.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(vam)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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LINCOLN PROPERTY
COMPANY,

CASE NO. 15cv711-MMA (KSC)
Plaintiff,

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vs.

ORDER SUA SPONTE
REMANDING ACTION TO
STATE COURT;

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DENYING AS MOOT
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
LEAVE TO PROCEED IN
FORMA PAUPERIS

MARTHA CASTILLO and
ARMANDO HARO,
Defendants.

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[Doc. No. 3]

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On April 1, 2015, Defendants Martha Castillo and Armando Hara filed a Notice

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of Removal from the State of California, Superior Court for the County of San Diego.

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The state court complaint alleges a claim against Defendants for unlawful detainer.

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Having reviewed Defendants’ Notice of Removal, the Court finds it does not have

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subject matter jurisdiction over this action and that the removal is procedurally

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defective. The Court therefore sua sponte REMANDS this action to San Diego

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County Superior Court.

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DISCUSSION

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The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l

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Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). It possesses only that power authorized by
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15cv711

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the Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S.

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534, 541, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 89 L. Ed. 2d 501 (1986). It is constitutionally required to

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raise issues related to federal subject matter jurisdiction, and may do so sua sponte.

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Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Indus.

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Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1990). Removal

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jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A state court action can only be

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removed if it could have originally been brought in federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v.

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, (1987); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.

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1996). Thus, for an action to be removed on the basis of federal question jurisdiction,

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the complaint must establish either that federal law creates the cause of action or that

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the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of substantial

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questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal. v. Construction Laborers

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Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1983). Additionally, a federal

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court also has jurisdiction over an action involving citizens of different states when

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the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

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“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal,

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and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Nishimoto

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v. Federman-Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990). “Federal

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jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first

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instance.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). Whether federal

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jurisdiction exists is governed by the well-pleaded complaint rule. Caterpillar, 482

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U.S. at 392. The well-pleaded complaint rule is a “powerful doctrine [that] severely

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limits the number of cases in which state law ‘creates the cause of action’ that may be

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initiated in or removed to federal district court . . . .” Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at

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9-10. Under this rule, the federal question must be “presented on the face of the

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plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Id.; accord Wayne v. DHL Worldwide

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Express, 294 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2002).

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Here, Defendants indicate in their removal papers that jurisdiction in this Court
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is based on a federal question. However, the state court complaint does not allege any

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claim “arising under” federal law. Instead, in the state court action, Plaintiff sets forth

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a single cause of action for unlawful detainer – a claim that arises exclusively under

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state law. Defendants state that “[f]ederal question exists because Defendant’s

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Demurrer, a pleading depend [sic] on the determination of Defendant’s rights and

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Plaintiff’s duties under federal law.” See Notice ¶ 10. However, any anticipated

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defenses or counterclaims raised in Defendants’ state court demurrer cannot establish

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federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Takeda v. Nw. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 822

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(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that a defendant’s counterclaim presenting a federal question

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does not make a case removable). Therefore, this Court does not have subject matter

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jurisdiction on the basis of federal question.
This leaves diversity of citizenship as the only available basis of jurisdiction in

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this Court. As noted above, a federal court has jurisdiction over an action involving

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citizens of different states when the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28

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U.S.C. § 1332. The amount in controversy is determined at the time of removal and is

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to be decided based on the allegations in the operative pleading. Lowdermilk, 479

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F.3d at 994. In deciding the issue, the Court treats claims for statutory damages by

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considering only those damages actually recoverable under the facts alleged. See

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Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404-05 (9th Cir. 1996).
Defendants do not state the citizenship of the parties, so it is unclear whether

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the parties are citizens of different states. Regardless, Plaintiff’s complaint states that

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the amount demanded does not exceed $10,000, which is clearly under the $75,000

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amount in controversy requirement. Therefore, as the issue is whether Plaintiff’s

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claim in the operative pleading (i.e., the complaint filed in state court) meets the

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amount in controversy requirement, diversity jurisdiction cannot be established.

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Defendants have not shown that the state court action could have originally been

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brought in federal court; therefore, the Court must remand this action.

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CONCLUSION

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Having carefully reviewed the Notice of Removal and the accompanying

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documents, the Court finds and concludes that it does not have subject matter

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jurisdiction over this action and the removal is procedurally defective. Accordingly,

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the above captioned case is REMANDED to the Superior Court for the County of San

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Diego, case no. 37-2015-00002709-CL-UD-CTL. The Court DENIES AS MOOT

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Defendants’ motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

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The Clerk of Court is instructed to return the case to state court forthwith and
close this action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: April 7, 2015

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Hon. Michael M. Anello
United States District Judge

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