Oceanside Organics et al v. San Diego, County of et al

Filing 31

ORDER granting 25 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. The Court (1) grants the County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) and dismisses without prejudice Plaintiffs' causes of action. Plaintiffs shall file an amended complaint, if any, on or before November 4, 2016. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 10/20/2016. (kcm)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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OCEANSIDE ORGANICS;
OCEANSIDE FARM TO TABLE, INC.;
ALAN SHELTON; JUSTINE SHELTON;
RON MIROLLA; LISA RIGG;
MICHAEL WINKLEMAN; SARAH
DYAL; ANTHONY CARBONNE;
RICHARD DAVIS; DAVID SNYDER;
DUANE LEWIS; SANDRA LEWIS;
WAYNE LARSON; SHAWN SMITH;
KYLE SNELLER; BUCK
HUTCHERSON; LOGAN PIERCE;
BROOK BISHOP; RON BOCIAN,

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Case No.: 15-CV-854 JLS (MDD)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS PLAINTIFFS’ FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT, FILED
ON BEHALF OF DEFENDANTS
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO,
WILLIAM GORE, TIM CLARK AND
MATT STEVENS
(ECF No. 25)

Plaintiffs,
v.

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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, SAN
DIEGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S
DEPARTMENT; WILLIAM GORE; TIM
CLARK; MATT STEVENS; and DOES
1-10 inclusive,

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Defendants.

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Presently before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended

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Complaint, Filed on Behalf of Defendants County of San Diego, William Gore, Tim Clark
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and Matt Stevens (the “County Defendants”). (MTD, ECF No. 25.) Also before the Court

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is Plaintiffs’ Response in Opposition to (Opp’n, ECF No. 27) and the County Defendants’

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Reply in Support of (Reply, ECF No. 29) the County Defendants’ MTD.

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considered the parties’ arguments and the law, the Court GRANTS the County

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Defendants’ MTD.

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Having

BACKGROUND

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Plaintiff Oceanside Organics is a “closed loop marijuana collective” operating in

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San Diego County, California. (FAC ¶19, ECF No. 23.) The other plaintiffs are Oceanside

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Organics’ eighteen individual members and a corporation formed to purchase the property

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upon which Oceanside Organics grows its medical marijuana. (Id. at ¶¶ 3–18, 20.)

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Plaintiffs agreed to contact local law enforcement to ensure the legality and

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compliance of their collective. (Id. at ¶ 28.) In mid-July 2014, Plaintiffs’ counsel contacted

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Defendant Tim Clark, a Deputy Sheriff with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department.

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(Id. at ¶¶ 22, 29.) In the course of their correspondence, Plaintiffs’ counsel provided to

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Defendant Clark “copies of all valid recommendations” for medical marijuana. (Id. at

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¶ 30.) Plaintiffs also “acquired state medical marijuana cards as requested by [D]eputy

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Clark.” (Id.) According to Plaintiffs’ counsel, “Deputy Clark repeatedly indicated to

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[Plaintiffs’ counsel] that no legal action would be taken against the collective operation

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and that nobody at the cultivation site would be subject to arrest.” (Id.)

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Nevertheless, “Deputy Clark conspired with [D]eputy Stevens[, another Deputy

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Sheriff with the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department,] to have an illegal search warrant

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issued which was based on a knowingly false affidavit.” (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 31.) On September

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12, 2014, Plaintiffs’ property was raided (id. at ¶¶ 29, 32), and Plaintiffs Shawn Smith and

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Kyle Sneller were arrested by Defendants Clark and Stevens “without probable cause” (id.

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at ¶¶ 14, 15, 29, 32, 50, 55). “At the time of the raid . . . , there were over 20 valid members

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of the collective and 31 medical marijuana plants on site.” (Id. at ¶ 32.)

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As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs “suffered loss of illegally confiscated

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medical marijuana, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of
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emotional distress, false arrest, [and] violation of civil rights under the Constitution of the

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United . . . States and the State of California.” (Id. at ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs further allege that

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[t]he County of San Diego, through the actions of the Board of
Supervisors, the District Attorney’s Office and the Sheriff’s
Department[,] maintain a custom, policy and practice of violating
the legal rights of valid medical marijuana patients in San Diego
County by failing to properly train and supervise deputies regard
the obligation of the deputies to follow the statutory scheme
created by the citizens of the State of California to allow
cultivation of marijuana in California for medical use, by
creating and allowing an environment in which deputies are
encouraged and allowed to violate[] their oath to uphold the laws
of the State of California, by creating and allowing an
environment in which deputies are encouraged and allowed to
violate the laws of the State of California, by creating and
allowing an environment for illegal searches, false search
warrant affidavits, false arrests and false criminal prosecutions
are encouraged and allowed, by ratifying this illegal conduct of
their deputies and by creating and allowing an environment in
which deputies are encouraged and allowed to violate the
guidelines of the Attorney General for the State of California
regarding the security and non-diversion of marijuana grown for
medical use in the State of California.

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(Id. at ¶ 25.) “As a proximate result of the custom, policy and practice of the County of

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San Diego an illegal warrant was issued, [and the] illegal raid . . . t[ook] place . . . .” (Id.

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at ¶ 39.)

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On April 17, 2015, Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint, setting forth six causes

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of action against Defendants Stevens and Clark or “all Individual Defendants” under both

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42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and California law. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 40–64.) Plaintiffs

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also alleged a separate cause of action under Section 1983 against Defendants County of

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San Diego and the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department. (Id. at ¶¶ 35–39.) The

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Complaint also named Sheriff William Gore as a defendant, alleging only that he “is the

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chief policymaker and decision maker for the San Diego County Sheriff’s Department on

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all issues regarding proper police training.” (Id. at ¶ 21.)
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The County Defendants filed their MTD on June 22, 2015 (ECF No. 5), and

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Plaintiffs filed their Request for Preliminary Injunction on June 25, 2015. (ECF No. 7.)

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On November 30, 2015, the Court granted the County Defendants’ MTD and denied

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Plaintiffs’ Request for Preliminary Injunction. (ECF No. 22.)

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Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) on February 17, 2016 (ECF No.
23), and Defendants filed the instant MTD on March 2, 2016. (ECF No. 25.)

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MOTION TO DISMISS
I.

Legal Standard

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a party to raise by motion the

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defense that the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,”

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generally referred to as a motion to dismiss. The Court evaluates whether a complaint

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states a cognizable legal theory and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil

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Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

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pleader is entitled to relief.”

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allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-

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me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

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Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In other words, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide

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the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and

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a formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at

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555 (alteration in original). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’

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devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original)

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(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Although Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual

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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting

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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A claim is facially plausible

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when the facts pled “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant

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is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). That is not to

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say that the claim must be probable, but there must be “more than a sheer possibility that a
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defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[F]acts that are

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‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” fall short of a plausible entitlement to

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relief. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Further, the Court need not accept as true

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“legal conclusions” contained in the complaint. Id. at 678–79 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.

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at 555). This review requires “context-specific” analysis involving the Court’s “judicial

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experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit

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the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—

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but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ.

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P. 8(a)(2)). The Court will grant leave to amend unless it determines that no modified

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contention “consistent with the challenged pleading . . . [will] cure the deficiency.” DeSoto

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v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 957 F.2d 655, 658 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Schriber Distrib.

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Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986)).

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II.

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Analysis
A. First Cause of Action: Violation of Civil Rights (Section 1983) Against County
Defendants (Monell Theory of Liability)

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Plaintiffs’ first cause of action claims violation of civil rights under Section 1983

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against the County Defendants. A government entity may not be held liable under Section

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1983 unless a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving force

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behind a violation of constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New

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York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

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under Monell, a “plaintiff must show: (1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional

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right of which [s]he was deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that

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this policy amounts to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and, (4)

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that the policy is the moving force behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch.

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Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (alterations in original)

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(quoting Oviatt ex rel. Waugh v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1992)) (internal

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quotation marks omitted).

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To establish liability for governmental entities

[T]here are three ways to show a policy or custom of a
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municipality: (1) by showing “a longstanding practice or custom
which constitutes the standard operating procedure of the local
government entity”; (2) “by showing that the decision-making
official was, as a matter of state law, a final policymaking
authority whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy in the area of decision”; or (3) “by showing that
an official with final policymaking authority either delegated that
authority to, or ratified the decision of, a subordinate.”

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Villegas v. Gilroy Garlic Festival Ass’n, 541 F.3d 950, 964 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ulrich

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v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 984–85 (9th Cir. 2002)). “A plaintiff

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cannot prove the existence of a municipal policy or custom based solely on the occurrence

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of a single incident of unconstitutional action by a non-policymaking employee.” Davis v.

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City of Ellensburg, 869 F.2d 1230, 1233 (9th Cir. 1989) (emphasis removed) (citing City

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of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality opinion)). Although

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“[p]reviously, the Ninth Circuit held that a Monell claim was sufficient to withstand a

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motion to dismiss even if the claim was based on ‘nothing more than a bare allegation that

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the individual officers’ conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice,’ Warner

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v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 10CV1057 BTM BLM, 2011 WL 662993, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Feb.

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14, 2011) (quoting Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir.

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1988)), “since then, Twombly and Iqbal have made it clear that conclusory allegations that

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merely recite the elements of a claim are insufficient for 12(b)(6) purposes,” id.

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The County Defendants move to dismiss the FAC because Plaintiffs fail to show an

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underlying constitutional deprivation and to state any plausible Monell claim under any of

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the three mandatory elements to establish liability. (MTD 17–23, ECF No. 25.)1 Plaintiffs

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counter that they are “constitutionally protected from illegal police behavior.” (Opp’n 4,

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ECF No. 27.) Plaintiffs again allege that Monell liability may be imposed for a failure to

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properly train and supervise deputies, (FAC ¶ 37, ECF No. 23) however the County

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Defendants contend that Plaintiffs have failed to “allege any manifestations of inadequate

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For ease of reference, page citations to docketed materials refer to the CM/ECF page number.
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training or supervision of Sheriff’s deputies, outside of their own experience; nor do they

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allege a County policymaker had prior notice of any such inadequacy.” (Reply 7, ECF No.

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29.)

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In particular, Plaintiffs allege that

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the County of San Diego . . . maintain a custom, policy and
practice of violating the legal rights of valid medical marijuana
patients in San Diego County by failing to properly train and
supervise deputies regarding the obligation of the deputies to
follow the statutory scheme created by the citizens of the State
of California to allow cultivation of marijuana in California for
medical use, by creating and allowing an environment in which
deputies are encouraged and allowed to violate[] their oath to
uphold the laws of the State of California, by creating and
allowing an environment in which deputies are encouraged and
allowed to violate the laws of the State of California, by creating
and allowing an environment in which illegal searches, false
search warrant affidavits, false arrests and false criminal
prosecutions are encouraged and allowed and by creating and
allowing an environment in which deputies are encouraged and
allowed to violate the guidelines of the Attorney General for the
State of California regarding the security and non-diversion of
marijuana grown for medical use in the State of California.

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(FAC ¶ 37, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiffs additionally re-allege that, “[a]s a proximate result of

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the custom, policy and practice of the County of San Diego an illegal warrant was issued,

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an illegal raid did take place on September 12, 2014 and plaintiffs suffered mentally and

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emotionally and suffered economic loss

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“GORE is the chief policymaker and decision maker for the San Diego County Sheriff’s

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Department on all issues regarding proper police training for the San Diego County

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Sheriff’s Department.” (Id. at ¶ 21 (emphasis in original).)

. . . .”

(Id. at ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs add that Defendant

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The Court finds again that these allegations are indistinguishable from those rejected

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as insufficient by the Ninth Circuit in Dougherty v. City of Covina, 654 F.3d 892 (9th Cir.

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2011):

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Here, [plaintiff]’s Monell and supervisory liability claims lack
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any factual allegations that would separate them from the
“formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements” deemed
insufficient by Twombly. . . . [Plaintiff] alleged only that (1)
“Defendant CITY’s policies and/or customs caused the specific
violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights at issue in this
case[ ]” and (2) “Defendant CITY’s polices and/or customs were
the moving force and/or affirmative link behind the violation of
the Plaintiff’s constitutional rights and injury, damage and/or
harm caused thereby.” The Complaint lacked any factual
allegations regarding key elements of the Monell claims, or,
more specifically, any facts demonstrating that his constitutional
deprivation was the result of a custom or practice of the
[Defendant] City . . . or that the custom or practice was the
“moving force” behind his constitutional deprivation. . . .
[Plaintiff] failed to plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” . . . Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s dismissal of these claims.

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Dougherty, 654 F.3d at 900–01 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570); see also Lopez

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v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, No. CV 15-01745 MMM MANX, 2015 WL 3913263, at *8 (C.D.

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Cal. June 25, 2015) (“[P]laintiffs do little more than recite the elements of a municipal

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liability claim. This is not sufficient under Twombly and Iqbal.”); Warner, 2011 WL

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662993, at *4 (“Here, Plaintiffs’ Monell claim consists of formulaic recitations of the

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existence of unlawful policies, customs, or habits. Plaintiffs do not allege any specific facts

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giving rise to a plausible Monell claim.”). Consequently, the Court GRANTS the County

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Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ first cause of

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action.

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B. Second Cause of Action: Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights (Section 1983)
Against All Individual Defendants

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With respect to their second cause of action for conspiracy to violate civil rights,

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Plaintiffs similarly allege that “all individual named defendants herein acted in concert and

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conspired to intentionally have plaintiffs subjected to false arrest and illegal and false

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confiscation of legally grown medical marijuana.” (FAC ¶ 41, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiffs

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further allege that “the conduct of all individual defendants herein was motivated by evil
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motive and intent” (id. at ¶ 43), and that “all individual defendants named herein exhibit

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reckless and callous indifference to the plaintiffs[’] rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth

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Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and the Constitution of the State of California” (id.

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at ¶ 44).

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The Ninth Circuit has explained that “[c]onspiracy is not itself a constitutional tort

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under § 1983. . . . It does not enlarge the nature of the claims asserted by the plaintiff, as

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there must always be an underlying constitutional violation.” Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty.,

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693 F.3d 896, 935 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Cassettari v. Nev. Cnty., 824 F.2d 735, 739 (9th

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Cir. 1987) (“The insufficiency of these allegations to support a section 1983 violation

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precludes a conspiracy claim predicated upon the same allegations.”)).

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concludes that Plaintiffs have failed to state a constitutional violation due to insufficient

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allegations. Using the word “conspiracy” and stating “it is exactly what happened” does

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not in fact create a conspiracy. (Opp’n 4, ECF. No. 27.) Additionally, Plaintiffs fail to

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provide any proof that deputies Clark and Stevens “conspired to swear a false affidavit”

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and “conspired at the scene to illegally arrest plaintiffs Sneller and Smith.”

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Consequently, the Court GRANTS the County Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ second cause of action.

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The Court

(Id.)

C. Third Cause of Action: Violation of Civil Rights (Section 1983) Against
Defendants Clark and Stevens
With respect to their third cause of action, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants maliciously and without probable cause caused an
illegal search warrant affidavit to be sworn against plaintiffs,
executed the illegal warrant issued upon said false affidavit and
illegally confiscated and converted plaintiffs’ legally grown
medical marijuana upon false evidence to be issued for plaintiffs
in violation of plaintiffs’ rights to due process under the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of the State of California.

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(FAC ¶ 46, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiffs further allege that “the conduct of all individual

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defendants herein was motivated by evil motive and intent.” (Id. at ¶ 47.)
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To establish liability under Section 1983, Plaintiffs must show (1) that they were

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deprived of a right secured by the United States Constitution or a federal law and (2) that

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the deprivation was effected “under color of state law.” Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023,

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1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978))

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(internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiffs nowhere plead that the alleged

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deprivations were effected under color of state law, they have failed to state this legal

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theory along with sufficient facts to support this claim. See Garcia v. City of Merced, 637

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F. Supp. 2d 731, 763 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (“Plaintiff[,] however, does not plead . . . that

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Defendants

effected

the

deprivation

of

his

right

to

be

free

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from unreasonable search and seizure ‘under color of law.’”) (citing Broam, 320 F.3d

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1028).

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Even assuming the officers in question were acting under color of state law,

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however, Plaintiffs still fail to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” no matter

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how their claim is construed. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557. In particular, Plaintiffs failed to

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revise any part of their argument from their original Complaint, despite the Court’s

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previous admonition that Plaintiffs’ theory of liability lacked clarity. (See Order Granting

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MTD 13, ECF No. 22.) Therefore, a similar analysis will be presented, although the Court

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will not address Plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim because “Plaintiffs submit on the

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analysis on the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Opp’n 4, ECF No. 27.)

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Plaintiffs still “contend that liability for the illegal search warrant still attaches

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pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.” (Id.) Although Plaintiffs again do not explicitly

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allege that Defendants violated their right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure

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(see FAC at ¶ 46, ECF No. 23), Plaintiffs do allege the procurement and execution of an

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“illegal warrant” and the “illegal[] confiscat[ion]” of their medical marijuana plants (see

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id.). It is therefore possible that Plaintiffs are attempting to state a claim under the Fourth

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Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to invoke judicial

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deception under the Fourth Amendment:

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A person who knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth
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includes material false statements or omits material facts in an
affidavit submitted in support of a warrant application may be
liable under § 1983 for a Fourth Amendment violation. . . . To
state a claim for judicial deception . . . , “a § 1983 plaintiff must
show that the investigator ‘made deliberately false statements or
recklessly disregarded the truth in the affidavit’ and that the
falsifications were ‘material’ to the finding of probable
cause.” . . . Facts pled on “information and belief” are sufficient
as long as the other Iqbal-Twombly requirements are satisfied.

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Johnson v. Shasta Cnty., 83 F. Supp. 3d 918, 925–26 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted);

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see also KRL v. Moore, 384 F.3d 1105, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Although Plaintiffs allege

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generally that “Deputy Clark conspired with deputy Stevens to have an illegal search

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warrant issued which was based upon a knowingly false affidavit in support of the warrant”

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(FAC ¶ 31, ECF No. 23), Plaintiffs fail to allege what false statements were made or that

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those statements were material to the finding of probable cause. Additionally, Plaintiffs

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argue that the search warrant would not have issued “had the deputies not lied in the search

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warrant affidavit, had they included the information that the collective members had

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contacted them and had provided copies of all documentation, and [had] they included the

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truthful information that they themselves believed the operation to be compliant.” (Opp’n

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4–5, ECF No. 27.) However, these hypotheticals do not expand upon the lack of factual

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allegations in the FAC that purportedly support a theory of judicial deception.2 Plaintiffs

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therefore fail to plead a Fourth Amendment cause of action arising under a theory of

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judicial deception. See Johnson, 83 F. Supp. 3d at 926 (“[Plaintiffs] have not sufficiently

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alleged the falsifications were ‘material’ to the finding of probable cause. . . . Accordingly,

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. . . defendants’ motion to dismiss . . . is GRANTED . . . .”) (emphasis in original) (citing

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Galbraith v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002)).

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Furthermore, these allegations only appear in Plaintiffs’ opposition brief, and thus the Court cannot
consider them for purposes of the instant motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See Schneider v.
California Dep’t of Corr., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998) (“In determining the propriety of a
Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a court may not look beyond the complaint to a plaintiff’s moving papers, such
as a memorandum in opposition to a defendant’s motion to dismiss.”) (emphasis in original).
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The Court also cannot find that Plaintiffs have pled sufficient factual allegations to

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support any other Fourth Amendment theory, such as the unlawful execution of a search

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warrant or unlawful seizure of their property, given the allegations in Plaintiffs’ FAC. The

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factual allegations here are similar to those rejected in Rocha v. County of Tulare, No. CV

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F 13-0796 LJO GSA, 2013 WL 4046373 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2013), in which the district

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court dismissed plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim:
The gist of the factual allegations are that given [plaintiff]’s
recommendation, Deputy [Defendant] and others illegally
searched [plaintiff]’s residence and seized marijuana . . . . The
[complaint] lacks facts to support that Deputy [Defendant] and
others made false affidavits, forcibly entered [plaintiff]’s
residence, were not entitled to execute the search warrant, and
mistreated [plaintiff] . . . . [Plaintiff]’s reliance on falsity of
statements to support the search warrant are inadequate
conclusions. Neither the [complaint] nor [plaintiff] identify the
false statements nor explain their falsity. Merely alleging the
search warrant is based on unidentified false statements is
insufficient . . . . An explanation as to falsity is necessary.

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Rocha, 2013 WL 4046373, at *7. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed

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to plead sufficient facts that would allow this claim to be plausible on its face, whether

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construed as a claim for violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States

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Constitution or violation of rights under the California Constitution. 3 Consequently, the

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Plaintiffs’ third cause of action also alleges “violation of plaintiffs’ rights to due process under . . . the
Constitution of the State of California.” (FAC ¶ 46, ECF No. 23.) The discussion of Plaintiffs’
federal claims resolves both the federal and state constitutional claims. See Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass’n
v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 705 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) (“California Constitution provides the same ‘basic guarantee’
as the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citing Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 914 n.3 (1976) (en
banc)); Arroyo v. Tilton, No. 1:11-CV-01186 DLB PC, 2012 WL 1551655, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2012)
(“[T]he Article I, Section 1 privacy clause of the California Constitution has not been held to establish a
broader protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”)
(citing Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 903 (9th Cir. 2008); Sanchez v. Cnty. of San
Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 943 (9th Cir. 2006)); Barsamian v. City of Kingsburg, 597 F. Supp. 2d 1054, 1065
(E.D. Cal. 2009) (“California’s constitutional ban on unreasonable searches and seizures is ‘similar’ to the
Fourth Amendment’s . . . . Thus, it is appropriate to consider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in
analyzing a claim that is based on a purported violation of California’s similar constitutional provision.”)
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Court GRANTS the County Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ third cause of action.

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D. Fourth and Fifth Causes of Action: False Arrest/Malicious Prosecution (State
Law and Section 1983) Brought by Plaintiffs Sneller and Smith Against
Defendants Clark and Stevens

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Regarding the state law claim, Plaintiffs Sneller and Smith re-allege that

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“Defendants Clark and Stevens falsely, intentionally and maliciously arrested Plaintiffs

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Smith and Sneller without probable cause and despite the fact that defendants Clark and

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Stevens knew at all times that . . . plaintiffs were engaged in legal conduct under the laws

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of the State of California.” (FAC ¶ 50, ECF No. 23.) Regarding the Section 1983 claim,

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Plaintiffs allege that “Defendants Clark and Stevens Plaintiffs Sneller and Smith

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intentionally and maliciously arrested plaintiffs Smith and Sneller without probable cause

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and recommended that false criminal charges be filed against them, despite the fact that

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defendants Clark and Stevens knew at all times that knew that plaintiffs were engaged in

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legal conduct under the laws of the State of California.” (Id. at ¶ 55.) Plaintiffs further

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allege that these “illegal arrest[s]” “violated plaintiffs’ rights under the laws of the State of

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California” (id. at ¶ 51) and “violat[ed] . . . plaintiffs’ rights to due process under the Fourth

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and Fourteenth Amendments” (id. at ¶ 56).

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False imprisonment “is the unlawful arrest or detention of a person without a

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warrant, or by an illegal warrant, or a warrant illegally executed.” Garcia, 637 F. Supp. 2d

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at 752 (quoting Donati v. Righetti, 9 Cal. App. 45, 48 (1908); Mackie v. Ambassador Hotel

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& Inv. Corp., 123 Cal. App. 215, 220 (1932)); see also Ross v. City of Ontario, 66 F. App’x

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93, 95 (9th Cir. 2003) (“A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a

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violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or

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other justification.”) (quoting Dubner v. City and Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959,

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(citing People v. Celis, 33 Cal. 4th 667, 673 (2004); Wood v. Emmerson, 155 Cal. App. 4th 1506, 1514,
1526 (2007)).
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964 (9th Cir. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Plaintiffs have failed to

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show in their third cause of action that Defendants Clark and Stevens violated Plaintiffs’

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civil rights by illegally obtaining or executing the search warrant, Plaintiffs Sneller and

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Smith have also failed to state specific facts giving rise to plausible Section 1983 and state

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law claims for false arrest.4

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Since Plaintiffs submit on the state law malicious prosecution claim (Opp’n 5, ECF

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No. 27), the Court will not further elaborate on the issue beyond what it explained in its

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order granting dismissal of the original Complaint. (See Order Granting MTD 17–19, ECF

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No. 22.) Accordingly, Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to support a plausible claim

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for relief in their fourth and fifth causes of action under both state law and Section 1983.

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Consequently, the Court GRANTS the County Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ fourth and fifth causes of action.

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E. Sixth Cause of Action: Conversion (State Law Claim) Against Defendants
Clark and Stevens

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In support of their sixth cause of action for conversion, Plaintiffs allege that “[a]ll

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individual defendants at all times alleged herein owed a duty to Plaintiffs to exercise due

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care towards Plaintiffs in the execution of their duties as sworn peace officers and to not

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illegally confiscate plaintiffs’ property” (FAC ¶ 59, ECF No. 23), and that “as a proximate

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The Court further notes that
[t]he showing of probable cause is therefore a defense to [plaintiff]’s false
arrest claim under § 1983, as well as her common law claim for false arrest
and false imprisonment under California law. . . . “Probable cause exists
when, under the totality of the circumstances known to the arresting officers
(or within the knowledge of the other officers at the scene), a prudent person
would believe the suspect had committed a crime.”

Ross, 66 F. App’x at 95 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations do not suffice to demonstrate
that Defendants Smith and Clark lacked probable cause. See Barrios v. Cnty. of Tulare, No. 1:13-CV1665 AWI GSA, 2014 WL 2174746, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 23, 2014) (“With respect to the allegation that
the warrant was issued without probable cause, the Complaint does not explain why probable cause is
absent.”).
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result of defendants[’] intentional and malicious conduct and the consequences

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proximately cause by it, as hereinabove alleged, plaintiffs suffered damages according to

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proof” (id. at ¶ 61).

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“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another.”

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Burlesci v. Petersen, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1062, 1066 (1998); see also Mindys Cosmetics, Inc.

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v. Dakar, 611 F.3d 590, 601 (9th Cir. 2010). “The elements of a conversion claim are: (1)

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the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant's

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conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” Burlesci,

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68 Cal. App. 4th at 1066. “Conversion is a strict liability tort” and thus neither “the

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knowledge nor the intent of the defendant” are generally relevant. Id.

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The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have failed to show they were in

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“lawful possession of the ‘confiscated’ marijuana.” (MTD 24–25, ECF No. 25.) For one,

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Plaintiffs’ statement that it is “a legally established medical marijuana collective” is

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conclusory. (FAC ¶ 27, ECF No. 23.) Additionally, neither Plaintiffs’ “willingness . . . to

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ensure legal compliance” (id. at ¶ 28) nor Plaintiffs’ communications with Defendant Clark

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“to ensure that the collective cultivation operation was in full compliance with all

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applicable state laws” (id. ¶ 29, 30) demonstrate that Plaintiffs were, in fact, compliant with

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applicable state laws and thus in lawful possession of the marijuana. And even assuming

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Plaintiffs were in lawful possession of the marijuana, as discussed above Plaintiffs fail to

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plead that Defendants’ seizure of the marijuana was pursuant to a “wrongful act,” such as

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executing an illegally obtained warrant. Consequently, the Court GRANTS the County

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Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ sixth cause of

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action.

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F.

Seventh Cause of Action: Violation of Rights Under California Civil Code
Section 52.1 Against Defendants Clark and Stevens (State Law Claim)

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Plaintiffs allege that “[D]efendant Ritter owed a duty to plaintiffs to not violate their

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rights under California Civil Code Section 52.1. Defendants breached their duty owed to

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plaintiffs by, inter alia, illegally destroying plaintiffs' property, illegally arresting plaintiffs
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Sneller and Smith and illegally recommending that false felony charges be brought against

2

plaintiffs Sneller and Smith.” (FAC ¶ 63, ECF No. 23.) Plaintiffs additionally allege “[a]s

3

a proximate result of defendants’ conduct plaintiffs’ rights under the laws and Constitution

4

of the State of California were violated and plaintiffs damaged thereby.” (Id. at ¶ 64.)

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California Civil Code Section 52.1 “authorizes an action at law, a suit in equity, or

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both, against anyone who interferes, or tries to do so, by threats, intimidation, or coercion,

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with an individual's exercise or enjoyment of rights secured by federal or state law.” Jones

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v. Kmart Corp., 17 Cal. 4th 329 (1998). “The word ‘interferes’ as used in [Section 52.1]

9

means ‘violates.’” Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 883,

10

(2007). “The essence” of a Section 52.1 claim is that the defendant, “by the specified

11

improper means (i.e., ‘threats, intimidation or coercion’), tried to or did prevent the plaintiff

12

from doing something he or she had the right to do under the law or to force the plaintiff

13

to do something that he or she was not required to do under the law.” Id. (emphasis added).

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The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plead sufficient facts to support a

15

plausible claim for relief under their seventh cause of action. In particular, and as discussed

16

above, Plaintiffs fail to allege that they were in lawful possession of the marijuana such

17

that their possession might qualify as a right secured by state law for purposes of Section

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52.1. And even if Plaintiffs had lawful possession of the marijuana, Plaintiffs also fail to

19

plead sufficient facts to support a plausible claim that Defendants illegally procured or

20

executed a search warrant, which might otherwise support a claim that Defendants

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“interfered” with Plaintiffs’ possession through “coercion.” Nor do Plaintiffs provide any

22

other facts to support their claim that Defendants interfered with their rights—if any—

23

through “threats, intimidation or coercion.”

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Consequently, the Court GRANTS the County Defendants’ MTD and DISMISSES

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WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ seventh cause of action.

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///

27

///

28

///

Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 883.

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CONCLUSION

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In light of the foregoing, the Court (1) GRANTS the County Defendants’ Motion to

3

Dismiss (ECF No. 25) and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs’ causes of

4

action. Plaintiffs SHALL FILE an amended complaint, if any, on or before November 4,

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2016.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: October 20, 2016

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