Trujillo et al v. Ametek, Inc. et al

Filing 43

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part 25 Defendant Ametek's Motion to Dismiss and Granting in Part and Denying in Part 24 Defendant Senior Operation's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs' strict liability (ultrahazardous activity) claim is dismissed as to all Defendants. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 11/18/15. (dlg)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DANIELLE TRUJILLO, as Guardian
Ad Litem for KADEN PORTER, a
minor, on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated; LACEY
MORALES, as Guardian Ad Litem for
ISABEL MORALES., a minor, on
behalf of herself and others similarly
situated; BEVERLY HOY, on behalf
of herself and all others similarly
situated,
v.

Plaintiffs,

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ORDER:
GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
AMETEK’S MOTION TO DISMISS
[ECF No. 25]
GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT
SENIOR OPERATION’S MOTION
TO DISMISS
[ECF No. 24]

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CASE NO. 3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

AMETEK, INC., a Delaware
corporation; SENIOR OPERATIONS,
LLC, a limited liability company; and
DOES 1 through 100, inclusive,
Defendants.
Before the Court are Defendant Ametek, Inc. (“Ametek”) and Defendant Senior

24 Operations, LLC’s (“Senior” or “Senior Operations”) separate Motions to Dismiss.
25 Def. Ametek’s Mot. Dismiss (“Am. Mot.”), ECF No. 25; Def. Senior Operations’ Mot.
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1 Dismiss (“Sen. Mot.”), ECF No. 24. The motions have been fully briefed.1 See Pls.’
2 Opp’n Def. Ametek’s Mot. Dismiss (“Am. Opp.”), ECF No. 33; Reply Pls.’ Opp’n Def.
3 Ametek’s Mot. Dismiss (“Am. Reply”), ECF No. 37; Pls.’ Opp’n Def. Senior
4 Operations’ Mot. Dismiss (“Sen. Opp.”), ECF No. 34; Reply Pls.’ Opp’n Def. Senior
5 Operations’ Mot. Dismiss (“Sen. Reply”), ECF No. 38.
6

Upon consideration of the moving papers and the applicable law, and for the

7 foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Ametek’s
8 Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Senior
9 Operation’s Motion to Dismiss.
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FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of the dumping of toxic waste by Defendants and their

12 predecessors into a temporary waste storage tank (or “sump”) on their property on
13 Greenfield Drive in El Cajon, California (“Ametek property”). Am. Compl. (“Compl.”)
14 4, ECF No. 21. Aircraft engine parts were manufactured in the Greenfield facility from
15 1953 or 1954, when the facility was founded by California Aircraft Products (“CAP”),
16 until 1988. Id. at 4–5. In 1964, CAP changed its name to Straza Industries. Id. at 4.
17 Defendant Ametek purchased Straza Industries in 1968. Id. Defendant Senior
18 Operations subsequently purchased the Ametek property in or around 1998. Am. Mot.
19 Exs. 2–3.
20

Plaintiffs allege that from 1963 to 1985, owners of the Ametek property used a

21 sump to temporarily store toxic waste which consisted of a 12 feet in diameter and 10
22 feet deep hole in the ground. Compl. 5. The hole was lined with redwood planks on the
23 sides and had a poured concrete base. Id. Plaintiffs allege that between 1963 and 1985,
24 Defendants or their predecessors dumped up to 7,000 gallons of waste per month into
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1

The Court notes that it does not dismiss the case despite the fact that Plaintiffs’
briefing consisted largely of recitations of the Complaint and the California Civil Jury
27 Instructions without reference to the applicable law. See, e.g., Sen. Opp. 12–23.
Plaintiffs are cautioned that bare recitations of the required elements of each cause of
28 action do not suffice as briefing at the motion to dismiss stage, and that counsel are
expected to support their positions with relevant legal precedent.
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1 the sump, including (a) spent acid and alkaline solutions; (b) industrial chlorinated
2 solvents; (c) 1, 1, 1,- tricholorethane (“TCA”); (d) trichloroethylene (“TCE”); (e)
3 tetrachloroethylene (“PCE”); (f) oils; (g) paint thinner; and (h) process sludge. Id. at
4 5–6. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the nature of the sump, Plaintiffs allege that the
5 waste stored therein deteriorated and breached the sump, resulting in toxic waste
6 seeping and percolating into the surrounding soil, fractures in the granite rock, and into
7 the groundwater over the subsequent years. Id. at 6.
8

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ waste discharge caused a massive waste plume,

9 including the largest TCE plume in the State of California. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs allege that
10 the plume “extend[s] 1.3 miles westward and down-gradient” and includes large
11 amounts of TCE, 1,1-dichloroetyhlene (“DCE”), dioxane, and TCA, as well as smaller
12 amounts of PCE, 1, 1-dichloroethane (“DCA”), benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and
13 xylene. Id.
14

State authorities have been aware of the waste discharge from the Ametek

15 property since at least the 1980’s. Id. at 9. In 2008, the California Regional Water
16 Quality Control Board for San Diego County (“Water Board”), which oversees the
17 identification and monitoring of groundwater contamination, remediation, and ensuring
18 compliance with California Water Code, see, e.g., 23 C.C.R. § 640; 23 C.C.R. § 2907;
19 Cal. Water C. § 13300, et seq, filed an Administrative Liability Complaint which
20 charged Defendants with failure to install a sufficient monitoring well network to
21 delineate the extent of the waste plume and failure to take “any efforts to cleanup and
22 abate the effects of their discharge” despite “20 years of investigation efforts” and
23 Defendants being “repeatedly advised” that their monitoring and remediation efforts
24 were deficient. Id. at 9. The Complaint stated that Defendants “fail[ure] to act
25 appropriately” had resulted in “a condition of pollution and contamination in the
26 ground water beneath the El Cajon Valley with continuing impacts to the existing
27 beneficial uses of the Santee/El Monte Basin.” Id. The California Department of Toxic
28 Substances Control (“DTSC”), which has oversight of remediation of toxic
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1 contamination, has also been monitoring the waste plume. Id. at 10.
2

Magnolia Elementary School (“Magnolia”) is immediately adjacent to and shares

3 a property line with the Ametek property. Id. at 8. Plaintiffs allege that the waste
4 plumes are directly beneath Magnolia. Id. On May 7, 2015, DTSC held a Community
5 Update Meeting at Magnolia where the agency presented results from ongoing
6 monitoring of toxic vapor intrusion into the school. Id. at 13. The presentation included
7 information as to how vapors from toxic plumes can enter cracks in the ground of a
8 building and affect the indoor air quality. Id. The presentation explained that PCE is
9 a carcinogen and TCE is a “carcinogen, reproductive and developmental toxin.” Id. at
10 14. The presentation also showed that the cancer risk from toxic vapor intrusion inside
11 Magnolia was increasing, from 4.5 parts per million in August 2014 to 5.6 parts per
12 million in March 2015, with a temporary spike in December 2014 to 42 parts per
13 million. Id. Finally, the DTSC presentation included a slide showing that the cancer
14 risk level was veering from the “Acceptable” (no further action required) to
15 “Unacceptable” (further action required) range during this time, although the cancer
16 risk level had not yet crossed the threshold into the “Unacceptable” zone. Id. at 15. In
17 the intermediate zone where the cancer risk levels measured from August 2014 to
18 March 2015 were located, the slide described the situation as one where “the site
19 specific conditions drive the decision.” Id.
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Plaintiffs allege that the various chemicals found in the waste plume and by

21 vapor monitoring have been found by federal agencies, including the Agency for Toxic
22 Substances and Disease Registry (“ATSDR”) and the Environmental Protection
23 Agency (“EPA”), to have toxic health effects. Id. at 20. In particular, Plaintiffs allege
24 that TCE and PCE are listed as having developmental, neurological, and carcinogenic
25 effects on humans; vinyl chloride, which can be formed when other substances such
26 as TCA, TCE, and PCE break down, has cardiovascular, developmental, hepatic,
27 immunological, and carcinogenic effects; TCA has cardiovascular and neurological
28 effects; DCE can cause liver, kidney, and developmental effects; and dioxane can have
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1 hepatic, ocular, renal, and carcinogenic effects. Id. at 20–22. Moreover, Plaintiffs
2 allege that children 10 years and younger as well as pregnant women and their unborn
3 children are especially vulnerable to toxic exposure. Id. at 22.
4

On June 1, 2015, the Board of Governors of the Cajon Valley Union School

5 District voted unanimously to close Magnolia for the 2015-2016 school year because
6 of the risk of toxic vapor intrusion. Id. at 1.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are students and teachers at Magnolia. Id. at 3. On May 29, 2015,

9 Plaintiffs filed a class action complaint on behalf of themselves and all others similarly
10 situated against Defendants in the Superior Court of the State of California in the
11 County of San Diego. Def. Notice Removal 1, ECF No. 1. On June 25, 2015,
12 Defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id.
13 at 3. On August 7, 2015, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 21.
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Plaintiffs bring four causes of action for (1) negligence; (2) gross negligence; (3)

15 public nuisance; and (4) strict liability (ultrahazardous activity). Compl. 25–28.
16 Plaintiffs seek punitive as well as compensatory damages as to each cause of action,
17 as well as medical monitoring costs. Id. at 32; see also id. at 24–28. Defendants filed
18 separate motions to dismiss on August 24, 2015. ECF Nos. 24, 25. Plaintiffs responded
19 on October 2, 2015. ECF Nos. 33, 34. Defendants replied on October 16, 2015. ECF
20 Nos. 37, 38.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal may be based on either a “‘lack of a cognizable

23 legal theory’ or ‘the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal
24 theory.’” Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121–22 (9th
25 Cir. 2008) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.
26 1990)).
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual

28 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
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1 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
2 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
3 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
4 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
5 at 556). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
6 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at
7 555 (noting that on a motion to dismiss the court is“not bound to accept as true a
8 legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”). “The pleading standard . . . does
9 not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than an unadorned,
10 the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations
11 omitted). “Review is limited to the complaint, materials incorporated into the
12 complaint by reference, and matters of which the court may take judicial notice.”
13 See Metlzer Inv. GMBH v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 540 F.3d 1049, 1061 (9th Cir.
14 2008).
15

In analyzing a pleading, the Court sets conclusory factual allegations aside,

16 accepts all non-conclusory factual allegations as true, and determines whether those
17 nonconclusory factual allegations accepted as true state a claim for relief that is
18 plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–84; Turner v. City & Cty. of San
19 Francisco, 788 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that “conclusory allegations
20 of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6)
21 dismissal.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). And while “[t]he
22 plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,” it does “ask[] for
23 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
24 at 678 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In determining plausibility,
25 the Court is permitted “to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at
26 679.
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1

DISCUSSION

2 I.

Judicial Notice

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“Although generally the scope of review on a motion to dismiss for failure to

4 state a claim is limited to the Complaint, a court may consider evidence on which
5 the complaint necessarily relies if: (1) the complaint refers to the document; (2) the
6 document is central to the plaintiff[’s] claim; and (3) no party questions the
7 authenticity of the copy attached to the 12(b)(6) motion.” Daniels–Hall v. Nat'l
8 Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and
9 citations omitted). In addition, Fed. R. Evid. 201(b) permits judicial notice of a fact
10 when it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is generally known
11 within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily
12 determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” The
13 court may take notice of such facts on its own, and “must take judicial notice if a
14 party requests it and the court is supplied with the necessary information.” Fed. R.
15 Evid. 201(c).
16

Under Rule 201, the court can take judicial notice of “[o]fficial acts of the

17 legislative, executive, and judicial departments of the United States,” as well as the
18 “records and ‘reports of administrative bodies.’” Jackson v. Specialized Loan
19 Servicing, LLC, 2014 WL 5514142, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2014) (citing
20 United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno County, 547 F.3d 943,
21 955 (9th Cir. 2008)). This includes documents in the public files of the Water Board
22 and DTSC. See, e.g., Tyco Thermal Controls LLC v. Rowe Indus., Inc., 2010 WL
23 4056007, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15, 2010); SPPI-Somersville, Inc. v. TRC
24 Companies, Inc., 2006 WL 1627010, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2006). Press
25 coverage and news articles are also judicially noticeable under Rule 201. See
26 Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 976 (9th Cir. 1999)
27

Defendants seek judicial notice of a variety of items, which primarily consist

28 of memorandums, correspondence, orders, and records of proceedings issued by the
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1 Water Board, DTSC, and other state agencies; authenticated correspondence
2 between Defendants and said agencies; court documents; newspaper articles; and
3 real property transaction records. See generally Am. Mot. Exs.; Sen. Mot. Exs.
4 Plaintiffs argue that these items should not be considered because they constitute
5 “extrinsic information or documents.” Am. Opp. 2; Sen. Opp. 3. However, plaintiffs
6 do not dispute the authenticity of these documents. The Court finds that these items
7 are appropriate for judicial notice because they are matters of public record, the
8 parties do not dispute their authenticity, and they are central to Plaintiff’s claims.
9 Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ requests for judicial notice, with the
10 exception of Sen. Mot. Exs. K and M, which appear to be unauthenticated
11 correspondence between a private consultant, Robert Morrison, and an official of
12 the Cajon Valley Union School District that does not fall into any provision of Rule
13 201.
14 II.

Ametek’s Motion to Dismiss

15

Ametek argues that the case should be dismissed because: (1) Plaintiffs have

16 failed to adequately plead facts supporting each of their causes of action; (2)
17 Plaintiffs fail to plead facts entitling them to medical monitoring; (3) Plaintiffs lack
18 standing; and (4) the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs’ claims. Ametek also
19 argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages. Since some of Ametek’s
20 arguments overlap with each other, the Court will address Ametek’s arguments
21 grouped as appropriate.
22

A.

23

Ametek makes a number of arguments that essentially boil down to the

Speculative harm (negligence/medical monitoring/standing)

24 proposition that the case must be dismissed because Plaintiffs advance only a
25 speculative claim of harm. In particular, Ametek argues that an allegation of actual,
26 present physical injury is necessary to: (1) a negligence claim; (2) damages for
27 medical monitoring; and (3) standing. See Am. Mot. 10–11; 14–15; 17–18.
28

To resolve these arguments, it is necessary to turn to California’s precedents
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1 in toxic tort cases. Toxic tort cases present difficult problems of scale, causation,
2 and latency as compared to traditional tort cases that have prompted courts to take a
3 distinctive approach to such cases. See 1 Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 1:4. In
4 particular, California permits a claim for damages for medical monitoring costs in
5 toxic torts cases even where there is no present physical injury. See Miranda v. Shell
6 Oil Co., 17 Cal. App. 4th 1651, 1656 (1993); see also Potter v. Firestone Tire &
7 Rubber Co. 6 Cal. 4th 965, 1007 (1993) (adopting Miranda’s approach). As the
8 Court of Appeal put it in Miranda,
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A plaintiff who is involved in an automobile accident and suffers no
observable physical injury but nevertheless undergoes medically
necessary diagnostic tests to determine whether internal injuries exist is
no doubt entitled to recover the costs of the examination. If accepted
medical practice also deemed it necessary to perform such tests in the
future, in order to detect the onset of any subsequently developing
injury caused by the accident, the costs of the continued testing would
be recoverable under Civil Code section 3333. The outcome should be
the same when the operative incident is toxic exposure rather than
collision and the potential future harm is disease rather than physical
impairment.

15 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1657 (citing Friends For All Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Co.,
16 746 F.2d 816, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Such a right to medical monitoring is not
17 absolute: “the toxic-tort plaintiff who seeks money damages for future medical
18 surveillance is required to establish that the need for monitoring is a reasonably
19 certain consequence of the exposure.” Id. Miranda sets forth a five-factor test for
20 when this standard is met, which considers:
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(1) the significance and extent of the plaintiff’s exposure to the
chemicals;
(2) the relative toxicity of the chemicals;
(3) the seriousness of the diseases for which plaintiff is at an increased
risk;
(4) the relative increase in the plaintiff’s chances of developing a
disease as a result of the exposure, when compared to (a) plaintiff's
chances of developing the disease had he or she not been exposed, and
(b) the chances of members of the public at large developing the
disease; and
(5) the clinical value of early detection and diagnosis.

27 Id. at 1657–58.
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The Court of Appeal noted that this does not mean that the plaintiff must
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1 show that “it is reasonably certain he or she will actually contract a particular
2 disease or suffer some definite future affliction.” Miranda, 17 Cal. App. 4th at 1658.
3 Instead, “medical monitoring damages reimburse the specific cost of periodic
4 medical testing which is proved by a reasonable medical certainty to be necessary.”
5 Id. The Court of Appeal reasoned that a number of “sound policy concerns”
6 supported this balanced approach, including “(1) public health interest in
7 encouraging and fostering access to early medical testing for those exposed to
8 hazardous substances; (2) possible economic savings realized by the early detection
9 and treatment of disease; (3) deterrence of polluters; and (4) elemental justice.” Id.
10 at 1660 (citations omitted).
11

In so holding, the Miranda court emphasized that they were not creating a

12 “new cause of action.” Id. at 1658 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the
13 court conceived of recovery of medical monitoring costs as a component of the
14 consequential damages which flow from established torts. As the Potter court put it,
15 “[r]ecognition that a defendant’s conduct has created the need for future medical
16 monitoring does not create a new tort. It is simply a compensable item of damage
17 when liability is established under traditional tort theories of recovery.” 6 Cal. 4th at
18 1007. Indeed, Potter itself dealt with medical monitoring costs in the context of a
19 negligence action. Id. at 974. Thus, the fact that Plaintiffs have not alleged a present
20 physical injury is not a basis to dismiss their negligence cause of action or their
21 damages claim for medical monitoring.
22

Ametek alsos argue that Plaintiffs should not be entitled to pursue a damages

23 claim for medical monitoring because they have not pled facts that would satisfy
24 Miranda’s five-factor test. Am. Mot. 15. In particular, Ametek argues that in
25 December 2014, DTSC mailed a Community Update expressly stating that “[t]hese
26 levels [of toxic vapors] do not pose a significant risk to human health,” and that the
27 Water Board and DTSC “have repeatedly . . . emphazis[ed] that there is no health
28 risk associated with vapor levels at Magnolia.” Id. Ametek relies on Riva v.
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1 Pepsico, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1045 (N.D. Cal. 2015) to support the proposition that
2 Plaintiffs’ damages claims should be dismissed for failure to plead factual content
3 showing that there was a “significant” increase in their risk of developing cancer.
4 Am. Mot. 15.
5

Ametek’s reliance on Riva is misplaced. In Riva, the district court granted a

6 motion to dismiss where plaintiffs alleged that the presence of 4-methylimidazole
7 (“4-mel”) in defendant’s products entitled them to medical monitoring costs. The
8 district court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead factual content showing that
9 there was a “significant” increase of developing lung cancer where studies had
10 found clear evidence of the carcinogenic effects of 4-mel on mice, but not humans,
11 id. at 1059 (“[T]he Riva Plaintiffs are not mice, and there is nothing in the
12 [Complaint], or the studies incorporated by reference, to suggest that 4-Mel causes
13 this specific form of lung cancer in humans.”), contrasting the facts of the case with
14 those in a number of other cases where courts upheld medical monitoring claims
15 where the toxic exposures had a demonstrable risk to health, see id. at 1060 (citing
16 cases). The district court also noted as an additional deficiency that the plaintiffs
17 had not presented “the quantitative (or even qualitative) increased risk to
18 individuals.” Id. at 1062 (citing Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir.
19 1993)).
20

By contrast, here, Plaintiffs allege that the ATSDR and the EPA have

21 established the health risks that TCE, PCE, and other present chemicals have upon
22 humans, including developmental, neurological, and carcinogenic effects. See
23 Compl. 20–22. Moreover, they allege that the named chemicals have been found by
24 the ATSDR to be particularly harmful for young children and pregnant women. Id.
25 at 22–24. In addition, in contrast to the Riva plaintiffs, Plaintiffs here have
26 quantified the increased cancer risk they allege was presented to them by the DTSC:
27 an increase in cancer risk of a range of 5.6 to 42 chances in a million. Id. at 15.
28

What is more, even if it is true that the Water Board and DTSC have in the
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1 past not found that the toxic vapor levels in the school posed a significant risk to
2 human health, that previous determination by state administrative agencies would
3 not be binding upon this Court. The California Supreme Court contemplated that
4 establishing whether the Miranda standard is met is usually a question for the trier
5 of fact, since “competent medical testimony” will usually be required to determine
6 “whether and to what extent the particular plaintiff’s exposure to toxic chemicals in
7 a given situation justifies future periodic medical monitoring.” Potter, 6 Cal. 4th at
8 1009; see also Riva, 82 F. Supp. at 1055. Thus, it is inappropriate to decide whether
9 Plaintiffs have satisfied the Miranda factors at the motion to dismiss stage.
10

Finally, Ametek also argues that Plaintiffs’ failure to establish actual injury

11 defeats Article III’s standing requirement. Am. Mot. 17–18. It is well-established
12 that Article III standing requires (1) injury in fact; (2) causality; and (3)
13 redressability. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Ametek
14 again relies on Riva to argue that Plaintiffs cannot show injury in fact. But as Riva
15 itself discussed, the Ninth Circuit has previous found that “[i]ncreased risk of injury
16 can suffice to establish an Article III injury-in-fact where the increased risk of injury
17 is credible and not conjectural.” 82 F. Supp. 3d at 1052 (citing Cent. Delta Water
18 Agency v. United States, 306 F.3d 938, 950 (9th Cir. 2002)). In Central Delta, the
19 Ninth Circuit found standing where plaintiffs challenged a plan to release reservoir
20 waters where the plan was projected to violate the state salinity standards for a
21 neighboring river, ultimately threatening to jeopardize plaintiffs’ crops, finding that
22 the “threat of injury resulting from [Defendants] employing an operational plan that
23 will likely lead to violations of the [state salinity] standard is sufficient to confer
24 standing on plaintiffs.” Id. at 948.
25

Thus, the standing problem in Riva was not that plaintiffs’ harm was

26 speculative, but that it was not “credible” for the reasons identified above. 82 F.
27 Supp. 3d at 1053. By contrast, here, as discussed above, Ametek has failed to show
28 that, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs cannot
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1 demonstrate a “credible” increased risk of cancer.
2
3
4

B.

Other causes of action
i.

Gross Negligence

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead facts supporting

5 gross negligence. Am. Mot. 11. Gross negligence has long been defined as a either a
6 “want of even scant care” or “an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
7 conduct.” City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. 4th 747, 754 (2007).
8

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs cannot show that Ametek failed to exercise

9 even scant care, since the Water Board’s Executive Officer’s Reports “routinely
10 note” that “Ametek continues to conduct on-site and off-site soil vapor monitoring
11 and groundwater monitoring in accordance with its cleanup and abatement order.”
12 Am. Mot. 12 (citing Ex. 39). Even assuming that is correct, however, as Plaintiffs
13 point out, Am. Resp. 6, the Water Board also filed an Administrative Liability
14 Complaint in 2008 criticizing Defendants for “hav[ing] not installed a sufficient
15 monitoring well network to delineate the vertical and horizontal extent of the waste
16 plume and hav[ing] not taken any efforts to cleanup and abate the effects of their
17 discharge” despite “20 years of investigation efforts,” and stating that Defendants
18 “were repeatedly advised that their submittals regarding plume delineation were
19 incomplete or deficient, yet they failed to conduct additional work to address the
20 deficiencies,” Compl. 9. Plaintiffs allege that over the course of over two decades,
21 Ametek “dump[ed] 1.848 million gallons of toxic waste next to an elementary
22 school,” and then “fail[ed] to clean up or abate the toxic plume it created, knowing
23 it flowed beneath an elementary school.” Am. Resp. 6. Viewing these allegations in
24 the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have plausibly stated a claim for
25 gross negligence.
26
27

ii.

Public Nuisance

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead facts supporting

28 a private claim for public nuisance because they have not demonstrated that they
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1 suffer a harm that is unique to them as opposed to the general public. Am. Mot. 12.
2 The general rule is that public nuisance actions must be brought by government
3 officials. Cty. of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 4th 35, 55 (2010) (citing
4 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3493–3494). However, a private party may bring a public
5 nuisance action where the nuisance is “specially injurious” to the private party,
6 beyond the harm caused by the nuisance to the general public. Birke v. Oakwood
7 Worldwide, 169 Cal. App. 4th 1540, 1548 (2009) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 3493).
8 This exception has its origins in the common law, which recognized that “‘the
9 action would lie if the plaintiff could show that he had suffered special damage over
10 and above the ordinary damage caused to the public at large by the nuisance.”
11 Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 22 Cal. App. 3d 116, 123–24 (1971)
12 (quoting Prosser on Torts 608 (3d ed.)).
13

Plaintiffs argue that they have been specially injured because they have been

14 “expos[ed] to toxic vapors in excess of the general public” and “have been exposed
15 to the highest concentrations in the worst conditions for the longest periods of
16 time.” Am. Resp. 8–9. Ametek relies on Venuto to argue that in order to show
17 special injury, Plaintiffs must allege facts showing injury to themselves “different in
18 kind from that suffered by the general public,” rather than just in degree. Venuto, 22
19 Cal. App. 3d at 124 (citing cases); see also Am. Mot. 13. In Venuto, the Court of
20 Appeal rejected a public nuisance claim where plaintiffs alleged that air pollution
21 from a fiberglass manufacturing plant aggravated their allergies and respiratory
22 disorders where “such allegations merely indicate[d] that plaintiffs and the members
23 of the public are suffering from the same kind of ailments but that plaintiffs are
24 suffering from them to a greater degree.” 22 Cal. App. 3d. at 125.
25

Other courts have disagreed about the viability of Venuto’s approach. In Birke

26 v. Oakwood Worldwide, the Court of Appeal suggested that Venuto might be an
27 “incorrect statement of the law” while reversing the trial court’s dismissal of a
28 public nuisance claim where the plaintiff alleged that a residential apartment
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 complex owner’s failure to limit secondhand smoke in outdoor common areas
2 aggravated her allergies and asthmatic symptoms. 169 Cal. App. 4th at 1550
3 (quoting Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 109 Cal. 340, 344 (1895) (“[A]n injury to
4 private property, or to the health and comfort of an individual, is in its nature special
5 and peculiar and does not cause a damage which can properly be said to be common
6 or public, however numerous may be the cases of similar damage arising from the
7 same cause.” (alteration in original)); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821C com. d.
8 (1979) (“When the public nuisance causes personal injury to the plaintiff or physical
9 harm to his land or chattels, the harm is normally different in kind from that suffered
10 by other members of the public and the tort action may be maintained.”)). But see
11 Guttman v. Nissin Foods (U.S.A.) Company, Inc., No. C 15-00567 WHA, 2015 WL
12 4309427, at *5 (N.D. Cal. July 15, 2015) (suggesting that Birke should be limited to
13 its facts, since “the injury contemplated in that decision was the aggravation of the
14 plaintiff’s asthma due to the alleged nuisance of second-hand smoke, which was a
15 special injury as compared to the general public’s increased risk of lung cancer”).
16 And in Lind, the California Supreme Court permitted a private suit for public
17 nuisance to go forward where a defendant sewage company had built a storage vault
18 300 feet from plaintiff’s house. 109 Cal. 340 at 342. While the stench was
19 noticeable to those living further away, it was particularly “intolerable” for plaintiff
20 and one or two of his neighbors that lived closest to the sewage vault. Id. The Court
21 found that the stench constituted a “special injury” to the rights of the plaintiff
22 which was “not common to the public generally.” Id. at 438.
23

After consideration of the applicable law, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have

24 alleged a plausible case for public nuisance. Plaintiffs’ claim that they have been
25 specially injured by the contamination since they are directly adjacent to the Ametek
26 facility is similar to the claim in Lind that the plaintiff in that case was specially
27 injured by the close proximity of the sewage vault to their home. It is possible that
28 further factual development could reveal that the harm suffered by Plaintiffs is too
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 similar to that suffered by the general public, since the 1.3 mile waste plume
2 Plaintiffs are alleging could be emitting the same types of toxic vapors throughout a
3 wide area affecting the general community. However, given the dispute as to the
4 applicable law and the extent of the plume, the Court is not prepared to dismiss
5 Plaintiffs’ public nuisance claim at this stage of the litigation.
6
7

iii.

Strict Liability

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead facts supporting

8 a claim for strict liability based on ultrahazardous activity. A six-part test is used to
9 determine whether a particular activity is ultrahazardous and thus subject to strict
10 liability:
11
12
13
14

(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it
will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of
reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of
common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where
it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is
outweighed by its dangerous attributes.

15 In re Burbank Envtl. Litig., 42 F. Supp. 2d 976, 983 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing
16 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 and cases). A number of courts have
17 determined that under this test, the act of using solvents such as TCE and PCE to
18 clean metal parts in an industrial site is not an ultrahazardous activity, because the
19 risks associated with the use, storage, and/or disposal of such industrial solvents can
20 be avoided through the exercise of reasonable car. Id. (citing Schwartzman, Inc. v.
21 General Elec. Co., 848 F. Supp. 942, 945 (D.N.M. 1993); Greene v. Product Mfg.
22 Corp., 842 F. Supp. 1321, 1326–27 (D. Kan. 1993); see also Palmisano v. Olin
23 Corp., No. C-03-01607 RMW, 2005 WL 6777560, at *17 (N.D. Cal. June 24,
24 2005). Plaintiffs cite no cases supporting the proposition that the use, storage and/or
25 disposal of such solvents is considered an ultrahazardous activity. Accordingly,
26 Plaintiffs’ strict liability (ultrahazardous activity) claim is DISMISSED.
27

C.

28

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the two-year statute of limitations

Statute of Limitations

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1 for toxic tort actions in California. Am. Mot. 18. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 340.8(a)
2 states:
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

In any civil action for injury or illness based upon exposure to a
hazardous material or toxic substance, the time for commencement of
the action shall be no later than either two years from the date of injury,
or two years after the plaintiff becomes aware of, or reasonably should
have become aware of, (1) an injury, (2) the physical cause of the
injury, and (3) sufficient facts to put a reasonable person on inquiry
notice that the injury was caused or contributed to by the wrongful act
of another, whichever occurs later.
Ametek argues that the cause of action accrued more than two years ago since by
2004 at the latest, DTSC had advised of the risks revealed by the 2004 round of
vapor monitoring at Magnolia. Am. Mot. 19. Plaintiffs respond that even if this is
so, they satisfy the requirements for the “delayed discovery” rule specified in the
latter part of § 340.8(a). Am. Resp. 19. Plaintiffs argue that they did not have notice
of the waste plume until May 7, 2015, when DTSC held the community meeting
where the recent air quality test results were disclosed. Id. at 20.
Ametek argues that even if Plaintiffs did not have actual notice until May 7,
2015, Plaintiffs are charged with inquiry notice of the waste plume under the
delayed discovery rule. See Am. Mot. 20–21. Ametek relies on Jolly v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 44 Cal. 3d 1103, 1114 (1988), Camsi IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal. App.
3d 1525, 1530 (1991), and Aguirre v. Larkin, No. B253575, 2015 WL 1577323, at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 8, 2015) (unpublished) to support the proposition that the
limitations period begins when a plaintiff is put on inquiry notice of wrongdoing.
Under this line of reasoning, Plaintiffs should have been aware of the health risk
posed by the waste plume by 2012 at the latest, since by that time DTSC had
recommended quarterly monitoring of indoor air quality in classrooms and soil and
gas at the school, the Ametek facility and the cleanup and abatement operations
were open and notorious operations which have been subject to “countless public
meetings, hearings, and notices,” including notices to Magnolia students, parents,
and staff, and many news articles have been written about the ongoing controversy.
Am. Mot. 23.
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1

However, Ametek’s reliance on these cases to support their argument that

2 Plaintiffs should have been on inquiry notice is misplaced. In Eli Lilly, the Supreme
3 Court of California extensively discussed the standard of notice applicable under
4 the delayed discovery rule. The Court found that under the delayed discovery rule,
5 the statute of limitations only begins to run once the plaintiff has a “suspicion of
6 wrongdoing,” that is, “that someone has done something wrong to her.” 44 Cal. 3d
7 at 1110. The Court then found that the one-year statute of limitations barred
8 plaintiff’s claim, since plaintiff testified that well over a year before she filed suit,
9 she had wanted to “‘make a claim’ [because] she felt that someone had done
10 something wrong to her concerning [the drug at issue], that it was a defective drug
11 and that she should be compensated.” Id. at 1112.
12

In other words, as the Court of Appeal later put it in Alexander v. Exxon

13 Mobil, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1236, 1251 (2013):
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

[A] two-part analysis is used to assess when a claim has accrued under
the discovery rule. The initial step focuses on whether the plaintiff
possessed information that would cause a reasonable person to inquire
into the cause of his injuries. Under California law, this inquiry duty
arises when the plaintiff becomes aware of facts that would cause a
reasonably prudent person to suspect his injuries were the result of
wrongdoing. If the plaintiff was in possession of such facts, thereby
triggering his duty to investigate, it must next be determined whether
“such an investigation would have disclosed a factual basis for a cause
of action[.] [T]he statute of limitations begins to run on that cause of
action when the investigation would have brought such information to
light.”
Id. (second and third alterations in original) (citations omitted).
The cases the Court discussed in Eli Lilly bear out this point. First, in Miller
v. Bechtel Corp., 33 Cal. 3d 868 (1983), the Court held that a plaintiff was barred by
the statute of limitations from pursuing her suit for fraud when plaintiff had longheld suspicions that her former husband had concealed the true worth of his assets
during dissolution negotiations, but where “neither she nor her attorney took
adequate steps then to investigate the matter.” 44 Cal. 3d at 1111. The Court held
that “her early suspicion put her on inquiry notice of the potential wrongdoing.” Id.
Second, in Gray v. Reeves, 76 Cal. App. 3d 567 (1978), the Court of Appeal held
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1 that a plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations where the plaintiff had
2 suffered an allergic reaction to a drug in 1971, but delayed filing suit against the
3 prescribing doctor and manufacturer until 1973. 44 Cal. 3d at 1111 “The Court of
4 Appeal noted plaintiff’s admission that in 1971 he knew defendants ‘did something
5 wrong’” in finding that “[e]ven without specific facts as to why the drug was
6 defective, plaintiff was on notice at that time that he had a potential cause of
7 action.” Id. (citations omitted).
8

The other cases Ametek cites are similarly unavailing. In Camsi IV, the Court

9 of Appeal found that a company that purchased a parcel of land from defendants
10 could not meet the three-year statute of limitations for their toxic tort suit where
11 their actions in only selling “uncontaminated” portions of their property more than
12 three years before filing suit demonstrated their awareness that some of the land was
13 contaminated. Camsi IV v. Hunter Tech. Corp., 230 Cal. App. 3d 1525, 1537
14 (1991), reh'g denied and opinion modified (July 2, 1991). In Aguirre, the Court of
15 Appeal found that the statute of limitations barred plaintiffs’ attempt to add the Fred
16 R. Rippy Trust as a defendant in their Third Amended Complaint where the Trust
17 was a record owner of the two parcels of land contaminated by the other named
18 defendants and where the plaintiffs failed to describe any previous efforts to
19 determine if the trust was responsible for the contamination. 2015 WL 1577323, at
20 *9. The Court reasoned that “[o]nce plaintiffs were on notice of their potential
21 injuries, they were required to ‘conduct a reasonable investigation of all potential
22 causes of that injury.’” Id. at *8 (citing Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 35 Cal.
23 4th 797, 808 (2005)).
24

Thus, under California’s approach to the delayed discovery rule, it is only

25 once a plaintiff possesses information that would cause a reasonable person to
26 inquire into the cause of their injuries that they are under an obligation to
27 investigate the pertinent facts and the statute of limitations begins to run. Here,
28 Plaintiffs allege that they had no awareness of the risk posed by the toxic vapor
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 intrusion until May 7, 2015, and they filed suit less than a month later on May 29,
2 2015. Plaintiffs are entitled to avail themselves of the delayed discovery rule.2
3

D.

4

Ametek argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages. Am. Mot.

Punitive Damages

5 24. Under Cal. Civ. Code. § 3294(a)), punitive damages require proof by clear and
6 convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or
7 malice. § 3294(c) in turn provides:
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on
by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or
safety of others.
(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to
cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person's rights.
(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or
concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the
intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of
property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.
Conclusory assertions that a defendant has so acted are not enough: sufficient facts
must be alleged to support a request for punitive damages. Smith v. Superior Court,
10 Cal. App. 4th 1033, 1042 (1992). Ametek asserts that “[t]here is not a single
allegation in the FAC capable of supporting punitive damages.” Am. Mot. 25. But
as Plaintiffs point out, the Complaint alleges that “Ametek intentionally dumped
1.848 million gallons of toxic waste into a hole in the ground immediately adjacent
to an elementary school and residential area” and then “consciously and willfully
ignored the state’s Cleanup and Abatement Order by not collecting samples to
delineate the nature and extent of the toxic plume.” Am. Resp. 24–25. In Smith, the
Court of Appeal ordered plaintiff’s prayer for punitive damages struck where the
plaintiff’s amended complaint alleging defendants failed to represent her property
interests in a dissolution proceeding contained no factual assertions supporting a
conclusion petitioners acted with oppression, fraud or malice. By contrast, here,

27
2

Since the Court so rules, the Court need not address Plaintiffs’ additional
28 argument that the statute of limitations does not apply because the waste plume
constitutes a continuing nuisance. See Am. Resp. 18.
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 Plaintiffs have pled facts that plausibly support their argument that Defendants
2 acted with “willful and conscious disregard of the rights and safety of others.”
3 Accordingly, the Court declines to bar Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages at
4 this stage of the litigation.
5 III.

Senior Operations’ Motion to Dismiss

6

Senior Operations argues that the case should be dismissed because: (1)

7 the statute of limitation bars Plaintiff Hoy’s claims; and (2) Plaintiffs fail to state
8 any claim against Senior. The Court will address each argument in turn.
9
10

A.

Statute of Limitations

First, Senior argues that the statute of limitation bars Plaintiff Hoy’s claims

11 because as a teacher at the school, she had reason to suspect the presence of the
12 toxic waste plume due to the “hundreds of publicly available regulatory notices and
13 reports, open meetings of the [Water Board], newspaper articles, television station
14 reports, litigation filings, and continuous air vapor, soil and water testing openly
15 and notoriously conducted in the vicinity of the [Ametek facility], including right
16 inside Magnolia Elementary School classrooms.” Sen. Mot. 7.
17

However, as discussed above in Part II.C, under California’s approach to the

18 delayed discovery rule, it is only once a plaintiff possesses information that would
19 cause a reasonable person to inquire into the cause of their injuries that they are
20 under an obligation to investigate the pertinent facts and the statute of limitations
21 begins to run. Here, Plaintiffs allege that they had no awareness of the risk posed by
22 the toxic vapor intrusion until May 7, 2015, and they filed suit less than a month
23 later on May 29, 2015. Even if the Court considers the voluminous filings provided
24 by Defendants, they do not support the proposition that a “reasonable teacher”
25 would have been aware of the risk posed by the waste plume. As Plaintiffs point
26 out, Defendants’ filings include numerous previous representations by DTSC and
27 the Cajon Valley School District that the toxic vapor levels in the school “d[id] not
28 pose a significant risk” to human health. Sen. Resp. 8 (citing Am. Mot., Ex. 40; Sen.
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 Mot., Ex. NN). Thus, even if Plaintiff Hoy had been aware of the testing conducted
2 around the school and these communications, she reasonably could have believed
3 until the May 7, 2015 meeting that the vapor intrusion levels did not yet pose a risk
4 to human health. Accordingly, under the facts alleged, Plaintiff Hoy is entitled to
5 avail herself of the delayed discovery rule.3
6

B.

7

Senior argues that the case should be dismissed as to Senior because

Claims against Senior

8 Plaintiffs fail to state any claim against Senior. Sen. Mot. 12. Specifically, they
9 argue that: (1) Plaintiffs do not ascribe any wrongful conduct to Senior; (2)
10 Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims are precluded by Cal. Civ. Code § 3482; (3) Plaintiffs
11 fail to plead the essential elements for the negligence and gross negligence claims;
12 and (4) Plaintiffs fail to allege facts supporting an award of punitive damages
13 against Senior.4 The Court will address each argument in turn.
14
15

i.

Wrongful conduct on the part of Senior

First, Senior argues that Plaintiffs have not specified Senior’s wrongful

16 conduct as distinct from Ametek’s. Sen. Mot. 13. However, Plaintiffs respond that
17 they specifically alleged that “Senior Operations knows or has known . . . since
18 purchasing the property and aerospace business almost 20 years ago, that DNAPL
19 TCE and other chemicals are continuously contaminating the groundwater and
20 subsurface soil, thereby continuously trespassing and causing a known nuisance to
21 children and teachers at Magnolia,” and that “[d]espite such knowledge . . . [Senior]
22 has consciously ignored the danger to the children and teachers.” Sen. Resp. 9–10
23
24
25
26

3

Since the Court did not address Plaintiffs’ additional argument that the statute of limitations
does not apply because the waste plume constitutes a continuing nuisance, see Part II.C fn. 1, the Court
also need not address Senior’s countering argument that the waste plume should be understood as a
permanent nuisance. See Sen. Mot. 11–12.
4

Senior’s other arguments have already been addressed in this Order. Senior’s argument that

27 Plaintiffs fail to plead compensable injury or loss, Sen. Mot. 16–18, is addressed by Part II.A of this
Order rejecting Ametek’s argument that Plaintiffs only allege speculative harm. Senior’s arguments
28 that Plaintiffs fail to plead the essential elements for public nuisance and strict liability claims, Sen.
Mot. 19–22, are addressed by Part II.B.ii–iii of this Order.
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 (citing Compl. 18–19). These allegations are enough to put Senior on “sufficient
2 notice of the allegations against them.” See Arikat v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., 430
3 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1020 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Gauvin v. Trombatore, 682 F.
4 Supp. 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 1988)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
5

Second, Senior argues that Plaintiffs have not alleged that Senior in any way

6 “create[d] or exacerbate[d]” the contamination. Sen. Mot. 13. Senior relies on
7 Resolution Trust Corp. V. Rossmoore Corp., 34 Cal. App. 4th 93, 99–100 (1995) for
8 the proposition that an “owner of contaminated land is liable for trespass only if it
9 was an active, intentional participant in causing the contamination.” Sen. Mot. 13.
10 However, Senior’s reliance on Rossmoore is misplaced. Rossmore found that a
11 defendant lessor was not liable for nuisance or continuing trespass where there was
12 a fuel leak and resulting contamination on a property where the lessor did not have
13 control over the occupation or operation of the premises, but did have a right to
14 reentry, the lessor was not initially aware of the dangerous condition, the lessor
15 acted with ordinary care once they learned of the leaks since they promptly
16 remedied the leaks, and there was no evidence that any failure to act on the part of
17 the lessor caused plaintiff’s injury following the occurrence of the leaks. Rossmore
18 is inapplicable since here, Plaintiffs have not alleged that Senior is a lessor, but that
19 Senior owned the Ametek facility and had control over it from 1998 onwards.
20 Moreover, unlike in Rossmore, here, Plaintiffs allege that Senior was aware of the
21 dangerous condition, and that they did not act with ordinary care once they were
22 aware of the dangerous condition, but instead did nothing to remedy it.
23

Finally, Senior argues that regulatory documents impose a duty on “Ametek

24 alone” to redress contamination issues, not Senior. Sen. Mot. 13. But Senior cites no
25 authority for the proposition that a regulatory imposition of a duty to remediate on
26 one defendant mitigates another defendant’s duties under common law.
27
28

ii.

Cal. Civ. Code § 3482

Senior argues that Plaintiffs’ nuisance claims are precluded by Cal. Civ. Code
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 § 3482, which provides that “[n]othing which is done or maintained under the
2 express authority of a statute can be deemed a nuisance.” Sen. Mot. 15. Senior
3 argues that under the Prospective Purchaser Agreement (“PPA”) Senior secured
4 from the Water Board, the Water Board “affirm[ed] that this mutual release and
5 covenant not to sue resolves Senior’s liability to the Regional Board with regard to
6 any claims related to the matters include in the Prospective Purchaser Agreement
7 and the Resolution” pursuant to § 113(f)(2) of the Comprehensive Environmental
8 Response Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), which provides that “[a]
9 person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
10 administrative or judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for
11 contribution regarding matters addressed to the settlement.” Sen. Mot. 15, Ex. H.
12

As Plaintiffs correctly point out, the PPA by its own terms only released

13 Senior’s liability with respect to the Water Board. But even if it did not, the PPA is
14 not a “statute” under the terms of § 3482. As the California Supreme Court observed
15 in Greater Westchester Homeowners Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, 26 Cal. 3d 86,
16 100–01 (1979),
17
18
19
20
21

We have consistently applied a narrow construction to section 3482
and to the principle therein embodied. Thus, a number of years ago we
observed, “'A statutory sanction cannot be pleaded in justification of
acts which by the general rules of law constitute a nuisance, unless the
acts complained of are authorized by the express terms of the statute
under which the justification is made, or by the plainest and most
necessary implication from the powers expressly conferred, so that it
can be fairly stated that the legislature contemplated the doing of the
very act which occasions the injury.”

22 The PPA, a settlement agreement promulgated by a state agency, cannot be
23 understood as a “statute” under this stringent standard.
24

Senior also argues that “[f]ederal and state law also provide limited immunity

25 from liability for bona fide purchasers like Senior that did not directly cause or
26 contribute to the release of hazardous substances.” Sen. Mot. 16 (citing CERCLA,
27 42 U.S.C. § 9607(r) and the California Land Reuse and Revitalization Act
28 (CLRRA) of 2004, Cal. Health & Safety Code § 25395.81). However, neither
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 statute is applicable. Even assuming that Senior is a bona fide purchaser, 42 U.S.C.
2 § 9607 provides immunity only from CERCLA liability for bona fide purchasers.
3 And § 25395.81 provides immunity for bona fide purchasers only where a release of
4 hazardous materials was characterized, or a response plan was approved pursuant
5 to, Article 6 of the same statute. § 25395.81(1). Senior does not, and could not
6 allege that the PPA was approved pursuant to Article 6 of the same statute, since the
7 CLRRA was only passed in 2004 and the PPA was promulgated in 1998.
8
9

iii.

Negligence and gross negligence

Senior argues that Plaintiffs have not pled the requisite elements for a claim

10 of negligence or gross negligence because they have not alleged facts demonstrating
11 “a duty, breach of that duty, causation, and damages.” Sen. Mot. 18. In a toxic tort
12 case, a duty to exercise reasonable care may exist where a defendant has subjected a
13 plaintiff to harm by exposing them to toxic chemicals. See Miranda, 17 Cal. App.
14 4th at 1659; see also 1 Toxic Torts Litigation Guide § 2:2.10. Senior cites no cases
15 supporting the proposition that, as a matter of law, they had no duty as the owner of
16 the Ametek Facility from 1998 onwards to exercise reasonable care towards
17 Plaintiffs. The Court finds that, viewing the Complaint in the light most favorable to
18 Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible claim that
19 Senior Operations had a duty to exercise reasonable care, that Senior breached that
20 duty by “consciously ignor[ing]” the potential danger the toxic waste plume posed
21 to Plaintiffs, and that such a breach caused the increased risk of cancer. Moreover,
22 as discussed above in Part II.A, Plaintiffs adequately plead a damages claim for
23 medical monitoring.
24
25

iv.

Punitive damages

Senior argues that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts supporting an award of

26 punitive damages against Senior. Sen. Mot. 23. Senior argues that their actions in
27 “defer[ring] to Ametek’s cleanup effort” cannot meet the oppression, fraud, or
28 malice standard for punitive damages. Id. However, as discussed above in Parts II.D
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS

1 and III.B.i, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Senior acted with a “willful and
2 conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others” in “consciously ignor[ing]” the
3 danger posed by the toxic waste plume to Plaintiffs. Accordingly, the Court declines
4 to bar Plaintiffs’ request for punitive damages at this stage of the litigation.
5

CONCLUSION

6

For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

7

1.

8
9

and DENIED IN PART.
2.

10
11
12

Ametek’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 25) is GRANTED IN PART
Senior Operations’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.

3.

Plaintiffs’ strict liability (ultrahazardous activity) claim is
DISMISSED as to all Defendants.

13
14 DATED: November 18, 2015
15
16

HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL
United States District Judge

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
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3:15-cv-1394-GPC-BGS