Mendoza v. United States of America et al

Filing 155

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 141 Defendants National City and Benjamin Peck's motion to Amend Scheduling Order. Signed by Judge John A. Houston on 4/19/2018. (jpp)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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Case No.: 15cv1528-JAH (BGS)

ALI ALEJANDRO MENDOZA,
an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
CITY OF NATIONAL CITY; THOMAS
MALANDRIS; BENJAMIN PECK; and
MICHAEL NUTTALL,

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND
DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS
NATIONAL CITY AND BENJAMIN
PECK’S MOTION TO AMEND
SCHEDULING ORDER

Defendants.

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INTRODUCTION

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On March 31, 2017, this Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants City
of National City and Benjamin Peck’s (“Defendants”) Motion for Summary Judgment
and Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff Ali Mendoza’s (“Plaintiff”) Second
Amended Complaint. Doc No. 116. On January 5, 2018, Defendants filed a motion to
amend or correct the scheduling order to allow the filing of a second summary judgment
motion. Doc. No. 141. The motion has been fully briefed. Doc. Nos. 150, 151. After
review of the parties’ submissions, the Court deemed Defendants’ motion to amend the
scheduling order suitable for adjudication without oral argument. See CivLR 7.1 (d.1).
After a careful review of the pleadings and for the reasons set forth below, Defendants’

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motion to amend the scheduling order is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN
PART.
DISCUSSION

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Defendants’ move to amend the scheduling order to file a successive motion for

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summary judgment on three grounds: (1) to reassert a qualified immunity defense as to
Defendant Peck, (2) to challenge the City’s liability under section 1983 in the absence
of a Monell claim in the Third Amended Complaint, and (3) to challenge the viability

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of the Bane Act claims. Defendants’ motion focuses primarily on the issue of qualified

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immunity, highlighting the importance of deciding qualified immunity “at the earliest

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possible stage in litigation” in order to preserve the essence of its purpose as “immunity

11 from suit rather than a mere defense to liability.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
12 231 (2009); Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 822 (9th Cir. 2017).

Plaintiff argues that Defendants have not shown good cause to amend the

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14 scheduling order. He contends not only have Defendants already raised the issue of
15 qualified immunity, but any failure on Defendants’ part to raise it effectively is solely
16 a result of their lack of diligence. Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants’ motion to
17 amend the scheduling order amounts to a belated motion for reconsideration of this
18 Court’s ruling on prior Motion for Summary Judgment and that Plaintiff would suffer
19 prejudice as a result.

In response, Defendants’ maintain that a successive motion would neither be

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21 frivolous nor repetitive. Defendants assert that the issue of whether the alleged conduct
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22 unreasonably violated a “clearly established” legal standard under the Fourth or Fifth

23 Amendment was not addressed or decided by this Court; nor has the Court determined
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The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, whether the
law, at the time, clearly established that it is unreasonable for an officer to rely on the apparent
26 consent of a person under the same or similar circumstances as Plaintiff in the instant case has yet to
be brought before the Court. “Thus, the relevant question is whether a reasonable officer could have
27 believed [Mendoza’s blood draw] to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information
the [investigating] officer possessed. Knox v. Sw. Airlines, 124 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997)
28 (citing Kennedy v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 702, 706 (9th Cir.1989).

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how entitlement to qualified immunity would impact Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims.
Defendant also questions whether Mendoza can even assert a 42 U.S.C. §1983 claim
based on an alleged Fifth Amendment violation because he was never subject to any
criminal proceeding.
1. ANALYSIS
A. Successive Summary Judgment Motion
“[D]istrict courts have discretion to entertain successive motions for summary

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judgment.” Hoffman v. Tonnemacher, 593 F.3d 908, 911 (9th Cir. 2010). Allowing a

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second summary judgment motion is a matter concerning case management, over which

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district court judges have broad discretion. Avila v. Willits Envtl. Remediation Tr., 633

11 F.3d 828, 833 (9th Cir. 2011).
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Defendants’ posture their request in the form of a Rule 16(b) motion to amend

13 the scheduling order to allow for a successive summary judgment motion. However, in
14 many respects, Defendants’ motion is akin in to an untimely motion to alter or amend
15 the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 59(e). While the Court recognizes it may
16 tailor and adjust scheduling orders to the needs of the case as it progresses to permit
17 successive motions for summary judgment it is not appropriate to reexamine issues
18 already addressed or advance arguments that could have been raised prior to entry of
19 the judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 59; J & J Sports Prods., Inc. v. Brummell, No.
20 15CV2601-MMA (MDD), 2016 WL 4595140, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2016) (citing
21 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 544 U.S. 471, 486-87 (2008) (Rule 59 may not be used
22 to relitigate old matters, raise new arguments, or present evidence that could have been
23 raised prior to entry of the judgment.)
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The arguments Defendants wish to assert in a successive summary judgment

25 motion could have previously been raised, as Defendants do not assert a change in law
26 or the discovery of new evidence. Nonetheless, the Court recognizes that the core
27 principles underlying the doctrine would be diluted, depriving a defendant of a speedy
28 and just resolution, if a defendant were forced to trial despite assertion of a viable

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15cv1528

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qualified immunity defense. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985); See also
Gordon v. Veneman, 61 F. App'x 296, 298 (7th Cir. 2003)(acknowledging three grounds
for allowing a renewed or successive summary judgment motion: 1) when the
controlling law has changed; 2) when new evidence has been discovered; and 3) when
allowing such a motion would be necessary to correct a clear error or prevent a manifest
injustice.) (Emphasis added.).
B. Qualified Immunity
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the purpose behind the creation
of doctrine of qualified immunity.
Because qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense
to liability ... it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.
Indeed, we have made clear that the “driving force” behind creation of the
qualified immunity doctrine was a desire to ensure that insubstantial claims
against government officials [will] be resolved prior to discovery. Accordingly,
we repeatedly have stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at
the earliest possible stage in litigation. (Citations and quotations omitted).
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231.
The issue of whether the alleged conduct by Officer Peck, in light of the
undisputed facts, violated a “clearly established” legal standard under the Fourth or
Fifth Amendment was not briefed by the parties nor addressed by this Court. Neither
has the Court determined how entitlement to qualified immunity would impact
Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims. The Supreme Court “clarified that while it ‘do[es] not
require a case directly on point ... existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate,’ such that ‘every’ reasonable official—not just
‘a’ reasonable official—would have understood that he was violating a clearly
established right. Morales v. Fry, 873 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft,
563 U.S. at 741).

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In light of Pearson and Morales, the Court finds it appropriate to permit
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Defendants to file a successive motion for summary judgment on the sole issue of
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qualified immunity.
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Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ motion to amend the Scheduling Order is GRANTED and the
pretrial motion deadline of June 13, 2016 is VACATED only as to the
qualified immunity issue concerning Plaintiff’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment
and Bane Act claims;
2. Defendants’ motion is DENIED in all other respects;
3. Defendants may file a second motion for summary judgment concerning

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Plaintiff’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment and Bane Act claims no later than May

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11, 2018;

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4. Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment shall be
filed no later than May 29, 2018;
5. Defendant’s reply brief, if any, shall be filed and served no later than June 5,
2018;
6. The motion hearing shall be held on July 6, 2018, at 10:30 a.m., unless
otherwise ordered by this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

17 DATED: April 19, 2018
_________________________________

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HON. JOHN A. HOUSTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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