Jackson v. Colvin

Filing 26

ORDER Granting 24 Motion for Attorney Fees. Counsel is awarded $24,700.00 in attorney's fees. Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff Alex L. Jackson $4,200 for the EAJA fees previously paid. Signed by Judge Thomas J. Whelan on 4/3/2019. (jao)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ALEX L. JACKSON,

Case No.: 15-CV-2227 W (RBB)
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER 42
U.S.C. § 406(b) [DOC. 24]

NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,

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Defendant.

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Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s counsel Young Cho’s (“Counsel”) motion

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for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. §406(b). Counsel requests an order granting him

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$24,700.00 in fees, with a credit to Plaintiff for the EAJA fees previously paid in the

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amount of $4,200.00. On March 8, 2019, Defendant filed a response taking no position

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on the request, but providing an analysis of the fee requested. (See Def’s Response [Doc.

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25].) Plaintiff was served with the motion and notified that any response had to be filed

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within 14 days. (Notice of Mot. [Doc. 24] 2:3–10.) To date, Plaintiff has not filed a

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response to Counsel’s attorney’s fee request.

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15-CV-2227 W (RBB)

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The Court decides the matter on the papers submitted, and without oral argument.
See Civ.L.R. 7.1.d. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion [Doc. 24].

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I.

DISCUSSION

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Section 406(b) provides, in relevant part:

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Whenever a court renders a judgment favorable to a claimant under this
subchapter who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court may
determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such
representation, not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits
to which the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment . . . .

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Id. “In contrast to fees awarded under fee-shifting provisions such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988,

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the fee is paid by the claimant out of the past-due benefits awarded; the losing party is not

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responsible for payment.” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir.2009) (en

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banc) (citing Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 802, (2002)). “The goal of fee awards

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under section 460(b) is to provide adequate incentive to represent claimants while

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ensuring that the usually meager disability benefits received are not greatly depleted.”

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Thomas v. Colvin, 2015 WL 1529331, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Cotter v. Bowen, 879

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F.2d 359, 365 (8th Cir.1989), abrogated on other grounds in Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807).

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In evaluating an attorney’s fee request, courts “must respect ‘the primacy of lawful

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attorney-client fee arrangements,’ … ‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then

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testing for reasonableness.’” Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148 (quoting Gilbrecht, 535 U.S. at

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793, 808). Factors courts may consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the attorney

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fee award are: (1) the character of the representation; (2) the results achieved; (3) whether

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the attorney engaged in dilatory conduct; (4) whether the benefits are large in comparison

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to the amount of time counsel spent on the case; and (5) the attorney’s record of hours

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worked and counsel's regular hourly billing charge for non-contingent cases. Thomas,

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2015 WL 1529331, *2 (citing Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1148).

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15-CV-2227 W (RBB)

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Here, Counsel was successful in obtaining a favorable decision for Plaintiff in this

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Court, which granted Plaintiff’s summary-judgment motion, denied Defendant’s

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summary-judgment motion and remanded the case to the Social Security Administration

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for further proceedings. (Order [Doc. 20] 3:1–5.) On remand, the Commissioner granted

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Plaintiff’s application for benefits, entitling him to receive $98,802.52 in retroactive

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benefits. (Cho Decl. [Doc. 24-1] ¶¶ 3, 4, citing Ex. 2 [Doc. 24-3] and Ex. 3 [Doc. 24-4].)

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Thus, no reduction is warranted due to a substandard performance, nor is there any basis

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to reduce fees based on dilatory conduct as there is no indication Counsel caused any

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excessive delay. Additionally, the Court has reviewed the amount of time spent on this

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matter, Counsel’s experience, and the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey

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Report 2015–2016. (See Cho Decl., ¶¶ 5, 6, Ex. 4 [Doc. 24-5] and Ex. 5 [Doc. 24-6].)

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Considering all these factors, the Court finds the effective hourly rate is consistent with

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the market and the work on this matter reasonable.

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II.

CONCLUSION & ORDER
For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Counsel’s motion for attorney’s

fees [Doc. 24] and ORDERS as follows:

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1.

Counsel is AWARDED $24,700.00 in attorney’s fees.

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2.

Counsel shall reimburse Plaintiff Alex L. Jackson $4,200 for the EAJA fees
previously paid.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 3, 2019

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15-CV-2227 W (RBB)