Golden v. BofI Holding, Inc. et al

Filing 80

ORDER 52 Reversing in Part the Magistrate Judge's Order 49 Granting Motion for Determination of Discovery Dispute. The Court further denies as moot Plaintiff's ex parte motion for leave to file a sur-reply 75 . Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 11/30/16. (dlg)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 IN RE: BofI HOLDING, INC. SECURITIES LITIGATION., Case No.: 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 13 ORDER: 14 REVERSING IN PART THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DETERMINATION OF DISCOVERY DISPUTE 15 16 17 18 [Dkt. No. 49] 19 20 21 Before the Court are Defendants’ Objections, Dkt. No. 52, to Magistrate Judge 22 Karen Crawford’s August 26, 2016 order (the “August 26 Order” or “the Order”), Dkt. 23 No. 49, granting the parties’ joint motion for determination of discovery dispute (“the 24 Joint Motion”), Dkt. No. 39. In the August 26 Order, the magistrate judge granted Lead 25 Plaintiff’s request to issue a protective order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (“Rule”) 26(c). Defendants timely objected to the Order on September 9, 2016. Dkt. 27 No. 52. Defendants’ objections have been fully briefed. Lead Plaintiff Houston 28 1 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 Municipal Employees Pension System filed an opposition to Defendants’ objections on 2 October 7, 2016, Dkt. No. 68, and Defendants filed a tardy reply1 on October 28, 2016. 3 Dkt. No. 74. On September 28, 2016, the Court denied Defendants’ ex parte motion to 4 shorten time for hearing its objections to the magistrate’s Order. Dkt. No. 67. On 5 November 1, 2016, Lead Plaintiff filed an ex parte motion for leave to file a sur-reply to 6 respond to new argument in Defendants’ reply. Dkt. No. 75-1. 7 Upon consideration of the moving papers and the applicable law, and for the 8 reasons set forth below, the Court REVERSES in part the magistrate judge’s August 26 9 Order and DENIES Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to file a sur-reply as moot. 10 BACKGROUND The current dispute arises from Lead Plaintiff’s reliance on confidential witness 11 12 allegations in its Consolidated Amended Class Action Complaint (“CAC”).2 Dkt. No. 26. 13 The CAC incorporated the allegations of eleven confidential witnesses, all of whom were 14 former BofI employees. Dkt. 68 at 5.3 Although the CAC did not identify the 15 confidential witnesses by name, the CAC provided details about the confidential 16 witnesses’ job titles and responsibilities in order to comply with the PSLRA and Zucco 17 Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp., 552 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2009). See generally CAC. 18 Soon after filing the CAC, Lead Plaintiff alleges that it began to receive reports 19 that Defendants’ counsel had made contact with, and left messages for, some of the 20 confidential witnesses. Dkt. No. 68 at 5. One of the voicemails, Lead Plaintiff avers, 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 The Court’s briefing schedule specified that Defendant was to file a reply “on or before October 21, 2016.” Dkt. No. 54. 2 Ever since Congress passed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), the use of confidential witnesses in class action securities litigation has become ubiquitous. See, e.g., Gideon Mark, Confidential Witnesses in Securities Litigation, 36 J. Corp. L. 551, 552-54 (2011) (noting that the PSLRA’s strict pleading requirements and mandatory stay of discovery during the pendency of a motion to dismiss have propelled dependence on confidential witnesses). Confidential witnesses are typically current or former employees of the securities defendant who, out of fear of retaliation, lend support to plaintiff’s pleadings on the condition that their identities remain anonymous. Id. at 554-55. 3 Page numbers refer to the internal pagination provided by CM/ECF. 1 2 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 stated that the recipient had been “named as a witness” in the CAC and that Defendants’ 2 counsel wished to speak with them “informally” in order to “investigate” the claims 3 made. Id. at 5-6. Another began by saying that “as you know, your name’s come up 4 because of the complaint,” and went on to say that Defendants’ counsel “now need[s] to 5 do an investigation based upon your allegations.” Id. at 6. Thereafter, Plaintiff’s counsel 6 contacted Defendants’ counsel to express their concern that Defendants were “seeking to 7 intimidate or coerce former employees into speaking with Defendants’ counsel by 8 suggesting their identities had already been disclosed,” and to communicate their position 9 that the identities of the confidential witnesses “constitute[d] attorney work product, and 10 that Defendants’ attempt to contact the former BofI employees was an improper attempt 11 to obtain Plaintiff’s work product.” Id. at 6. Because the parties were unable to reach an 12 agreement concerning the proper scope of Defendants’ investigation of the confidential 13 witnesses, the parties submitted the Joint Motion to the magistrate judge in order to 14 resolve their dispute. Id. 15 In the Joint Motion, Lead Plaintiff moved for a protective order pursuant to Rule 16 26(c) for the specific purpose of “curb[ing] Defendants’ pre-discovery efforts to mislead 17 or intimidate former BofI employees into divulging their possible roles as CWs 18 [confidential witnesses] in this case and/or revealing Lead Counsel’s work product before 19 the Court can appropriately consider the arguments . . . against such disclosure.” Dkt. 20 No. 39 at 14 (emphasis removed). Specifically, Lead Plaintiff sought to prohibit 21 Defendants “from contacting or attempting to contact, until further order of the Court, 22 any former BofI employees for the purpose of ascertaining whether they provided 23 information in this action to Lead Plaintiff’s Counsel as confidential witnesses.” Dkt. 24 No. 49 at 1. In support of their request for a protective order, Lead Plaintiff argued: (1) 25 that the allegations attributed to the confidential witnesses were not the proper subject of 26 27 28 3 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 dispute on a motion to dismiss4; (2) that Defendants’ investigation of the confidential 2 witnesses’ claims improperly encroached upon Lead Plaintiff’s attorney work product; 3 and (3) that public policy weighed in favor of keeping the identities of the confidential 4 witnesses private to prevent against harassment. Dkt. No. 39 at 14-20. Lead Plaintiff’s 5 counsel further suggested that issuing a protective order was, moreover, appropriate 6 given that Defendants’ informal investigation of the confidential witnesses was improper 7 in light of the PSLRA’s mandatory stay on discovery.5 Id. at 15. 8 9 Defendants, in turn, offered four main arguments against issuing the protective order: (1) Lead Plaintiff lacked standing to request a protective order under Rule 26(c) 10 because Defendants had not sought discovery and because Lead Plaintiff was not a “party 11 or person from whom discovery [wa]s sought”; (2) Lead Plaintiff had failed to establish 12 “good cause” for the issuance of the order because their argument was based on hearsay 13 and speculation; (3) BofI had not improperly obtained Lead Plaintiff’s work product; and 14 (4) BofI’s informal investigations were proper because they were not seeking any formal 15 discovery. Id. at 21-33. Defendants’ argument also accused Lead Plaintiff’s proposed 16 protective order of being akin to an “injunction” or “gag order.” See id. at 33. 17 On August 26, 2016, Magistrate Judge Crawford issued the requested protective 18 order under the authority of Rule 26(c). Dkt. No. 49. The magistrate judge concluded 19 that (1) Lead Plaintiff had standing to seek a protective order for the benefit of third 20 parties (i.e., the confidential witnesses); (2) that the potential disclosure of attorney work 21 product “provide[d] plaintiff . . . with standing to seek a protective order under Rule 22 26(c)”; and (3) that Lead Plaintiff had established good cause for the issuance of the 23 24 25 This argument is moot as the Court has already ruled on Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 64. The PSLRA provides for a mandatory stay of discovery for the duration of a pending motion to dismiss. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (“In any private action arising under this chapter, all discovery and other proceedings shall be stayed during the pendency of any motion to dismiss, unless the court finds upon the motion of any party that particularized discovery is necessary to preserve evidence or to prevent undue prejudice to that party.”) 4 5 26 27 28 4 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 order. See id. at 3. The August 26 Order made a point to emphasize that it was 2 particularly concerned with the language Defendants had used to contact the confidential 3 witnesses. See id. at 4 (“The limited evidence provided to the Court . . . portrays an effort 4 to mislead witnesses, potentially under false pretenses, into cooperating with the 5 defendants.”). Coupling that concern with the “potential for disclosure of attorney work 6 product,” the magistrate judge concluded that Lead Plaintiff’s showing had “clearly 7 crosse[d] the good cause threshold.” Id. The magistrate judge then engaged in a 8 balancing analysis weighing the risk of “annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or 9 undue burden or expense” to Lead Plaintiff against Defendants’ needs to “conduct an 10 investigation and prepare defenses,” and found that the analysis tipped in favor of Lead 11 Plaintiff because of the current stay on discovery and the fact that a Rule 16(f) Case 12 Management Conference had not yet occurred. Id. at 4-5. Accordingly, the magistrate 13 judge issued the Rule 26(c) protective order and prohibited Defendants from contacting 14 “any former BofI employees for any purpose related to this litigation” until the magistrate 15 judge revisited the issue at the case management conference. Id. at 5. 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a), aggrieved parties may file objections 18 to the rulings of a magistrate judge in non-dispositive matters within fourteen days. 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). In reviewing a magistrate judge’s order, the district judge “must 20 consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly 21 erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); see 22 also United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673 (1980); Osband v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 23 1036, 1041 (9th Cir. 2002). Under the “clearly erroneous standard,” a court should 24 overturn a magistrate judge’s ruling when it is “left with the definite and firm conviction 25 that a mistake has been committed.” See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constrs. 26 Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993). A magistrate judge’s legal 27 conclusions as to non-dispositive matters are reviewable for clear error. Grimes v. City & 28 5 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 Cnty. of San Francisco, 951 F.2d 236, 240-41 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Maisonville v. F2 2 America, Inc., 902 F.2d 746, 747-48 (9th Cir. 1990)). 3 DISCUSSION 4 Defendants challenge the protective order as: (1) contrary to law because it is not 5 supported by admissible evidence; (2) clearly erroneous because the statements made by 6 defense counsel were not false and misleading; and (3) “prohibitively broad in scope, 7 having the potential to prejudice BofI in this and other litigation.” Dkt. No. 52-1 at 2. 8 Defendants argue that the August 26 Order is prohibitively broad in scope because, 9 among other reasons, it seeks to regulate Defendants’ informal investigations. See id. at 10 10-11. Relying on the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 26(d), Defendants assert that 11 their reliance on informal investigations is distinct from the formal discovery that occurs 12 under Rule 26 and, therefore, proper. See id. at 11 (“in the Note to Rule 26(d), the 13 Committee observed that “[t]his subdivision is revised to provide that formal 14 discovery — as distinguished from interviews of potential witnesses and other informal 15 discovery — not commence until the parties have met and conferred as required by 16 subdivision (f).”) 17 As an initial matter, the Court agrees with Defendants that their informal 18 investigations do not fall within the scope of formal discovery regulated by Rule 26. In 19 the Joint Motion, Lead Plaintiff made clear that it sought “to curb Defendants’ pre- 20 discovery efforts” to mislead confidential witnesses into cooperating with defense 21 counsel and into revealing attorney work product. Dkt. No. 39 at 14. Lead Plaintiff, 22 however, cites to no authority indicating that the Court has the power to issue protective 23 orders prohibiting informal investigations conducted before discovery has commenced. 24 As Lead Plaintiff indicated in its request for a protective order, see Dkt. No. 39 at 3, and 25 as the magistrate judge acknowledged in its August 26 Order, see Dkt. No. 49 at 5, 26 discovery has not yet begun in this case. See generally Fed. R. Civ. P 26(d) (“Timing. A 27 party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as 28 6 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 required by Rule 26(f)”). The Court knows of no authority that would permit it to enter a 2 Rule 26(c) protective order before discovery has begun. Moreover, the magistrate judge 3 cited to no such authority — or alternate authority — in issuing the requested protective 4 order. See generally Dkt. No. 49. 5 Rule 26 is entitled “Duty to Disclose; General Provisions Governing Discovery.” 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 26. Rule 26(c) addresses “Protective Orders” and states that “[a] party or 7 any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective order in the court 8 where the action is pending . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The plain language of Rule 9 26(c) does not provide authority for a protective order over prediscovery, informal 10 investigations. Accordingly, the magistrate judge clearly erred by granting Lead 11 Plaintiff’s request for a protective order under Rule 26(c). 12 Yet even if the magistrate judge had the authority to issue a protective order 13 regulating pre-discovery, informal investigations under Rule 26(c), the Court further 14 concludes that the magistrate judge’s decision was “contrary to law” on the merits. 15 A party may demonstrate the “good cause” required for issuance of a protective 16 order by demonstrating that harm or prejudice will result from discovery. See Rivera v. 17 NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2004). “If a court finds particularized harm 18 will result from disclosure of information to the public, then it balances the public and 19 private interests to decide whether a protective order is necessary.” See Phillips ex rel. 20 Estates of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210-11 (9th Cir. 2002). Any 21 protective order that is issued must be narrowly tailored and cannot be overbroad. 22 Ramirez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 231 F.R.D. 407, 412 (C.D. Cal. 2005). 23 The magistrate judge found good cause to issue the Rule 26(c) protective order 24 based upon (1) Defendants’ attempts to mislead confidential witnesses into cooperating 25 with the Defendants and (2) the potential for disclosure of attorney work product. Dkt. 26 No. 49 at 4. The magistrate judge was particularly concerned by the language that 27 defense counsel used to communicate with the confidential witnesses via voicemail. Id. 28 7 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 (“Gleaning the identities of the CWs from the complaint is not the issue. Rather, it is the 2 language defense counsel chose in communicating with potential witnesses that is 3 questionable.”). In fact, the magistrate judge indicated that the content of the voicemails 4 alone was enough to justify issuance of the protective order. Id. Then, “[w]hen 5 combined with the potential for disclosure of attorney work product,” the magistrate 6 added, Defendant’s communications with confidential witnesses “clearly crosse[d] the 7 good cause threshold.” Id. 8 The Court concludes that the order was contrary to law because it was overbroad 9 and not narrowly tailored. The concerns articulated by the magistrate judge combined 10 with Lead Plaintiff’s showing of prejudice and harm did not warrant the breadth of the 11 protective order sought and granted. 12 In the Joint Motion, Lead Plaintiff expressed a number of legitimate concerns 13 about Defendants’ attempts to contact confidential witnesses. At the center of those 14 concerns was the fact that Defendants had left certain individuals voicemails indicating 15 that their “name[s] had come up” as a result of the CAC and that defense counsel wished 16 to discuss the allegations attributed to them. Dkt. No. 39 at 14. As Lead Plaintiff rightly 17 points out, such statements were misleading because the CAC had not referred to any 18 former BofI employees by name. Lead Plaintiff also expressed concern that Defendants’ 19 attempts to interview confidential witnesses might lead to the invasion of Lead Plaintiff’s 20 attorney work product. Id. at 18. (“CWs who have been misled by Defendants into 21 believing that their identities already have been disclosed may believe they have no 22 choice but to answer Defendants’ “informal” requests to discuss what they may have 23 discussed with Lead Counsel, or share their written communications with Lead 24 Counsel.”) Buttressing this unease was the fact that defense counsel had allegedly 25 refused to say, in a conference held on May 12, 2016 “whether they [defense counsel] 26 had requested written communications with Lead Counsel . . . from such former BofI 27 employees, and refused to refrain from asking former BofI employees to voluntarily 28 8 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 provide such written communications in the future.” Id. In fact, defense counsel all but 2 confirmed Lead Plaintiff’s suspicion when it argued in the Joint Motion that: “ex- 3 employees of BofI were under no legal or contractual obligation to hold Lead Plaintiff’s 4 work product confidential . . . [because w]hether or not communications between Lead 5 Plaintiff’s counsel and a CW or other materials provided by Lead Plaintiff’s counsel to a 6 CW are work product is simply not the issue here.” Id. at 24. Finally, the last prejudice 7 or harm that Lead Plaintiff identified was the confidential witnesses’ “legitimate fear of 8 retaliation” that may result if his or her identity were not protected. Dkt. No. 39 at 19. 9 Militating against these three legitimate concerns, however, were a number of 10 other factors that should have been given more weight in crafting a final protective order. 11 For one, at the May 12 conference, identified above, Defendants agreed to stop 12 telling “former BofI employees that their names have been disclosed in the Amended 13 Complaint.” Id. at 18. That Defendants had assured the magistrate judge and Lead 14 Plaintiff that it would refrain from using the language that precipitated the instant 15 discovery dispute, minimized the need for a protective order. 16 Second, Defendants are not seeking to compel Lead Plaintiff to disclose the 17 identities of the confidential witnesses, as was the case in all of the cases that Lead 18 Plaintiff has cited. See, e.g., In re Ashworth, Inc. Sec. Litig., 213 F.R.D. 385, 386-87 19 (defendants moved to compel further responses by plaintiff as to special interrogatories 20 that inquired about confidential witnesses, and plaintiffs objected based on the attorney 21 work product doctrine); In re MTI Tech. Corp. Sec. Litig. II, 2002 WL 32344347, at *1 22 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2002) (defendants brought motion to compel identification of 23 confidential witnesses, plaintiffs claimed work product rule in defense); Tierno v. Rite 24 Aid Corp., 2008 WL 2705089, *3 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (denying defendants’ objection that 25 magistrate erred in denying request for production of names of confidential witnesses 26 who provided evidence to support complaint); cf. Hernandez v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 2014 27 WL 5454505, *4 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (denying plaintiff’s request for an order compelling 28 9 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 defendant to provide a further response to an interrogatory because defendant claimed 2 that identity of individual was protected by work product doctrine); Gen-Probe Inc. v. 3 Becton, Dickinson & Co., 2011 WL 997189, *1-3 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (denying, in patent 4 dispute, plaintiff’s request that defendant supplement its response to an interrogatory to 5 include contact information for witnesses identified in preliminary invalidity contentions 6 on grounds that identities were protected by work-product doctrine). 7 Here, Defendants have not asked Plaintiff to reveal the identities of its confidential 8 witnesses. Rather, Defendants figured out the identities of the confidential witnesses for 9 themselves. This fact is salient because “as a general proposition . . . no party has 10 anything resembling a proprietary right to any witnesses’ evidence . . . [a]bsent a 11 privilege.” Doe v. Eli Lilly & Co., Inc., 99 F.R.D. 126, 128 (D.D.C. 1983); cf. Gen-Probe 12 Inc., 2011 WL 997189 at *3 (denying defendant’s request to compel identities of 13 witnesses because they had not established “undue hardship in discovering the 14 information for itself”); In re MTI, 2002 WL 32344347 at *5 (citing Hodgson v. Charles 15 Martin Inspectors of Petroleum, Inc., 459 F.2d 303, 306 (5th Cir. 1972) for proposition 16 that “although defendant’s counsel may ultimately obtain the same information from the 17 former employees without disclosure, including whether they have spoken to plaintiff’s 18 counsel, whether the witness is . . . . ”). Further, Lead Plaintiff has not presented the 19 Court with any case that supports their contention that the work product doctrine shields 20 witnesses from being contacted by a party after that party discovers the identity of the 21 witnesses by their own efforts. Accordingly, Lead Plaintiff’s argument in support of the 22 protective order does not stand on the firm ground that it asserts. 23 Third, Lead Plaintiff’s argument that the confidential witnesses harbor a 24 “legitimate fear of retaliation” is not supported by specific “reliable, non-conclusory” 25 evidence. See Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union No. 630 Pension-Annuity Trust Fund 26 v. Arbiton, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 335, 344 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). In the Joint Motion, Lead 27 Plaintiff argues that public policy concerns weigh in favor of protecting the identities of 28 10 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 confidential witnesses from disclosure and, therefore, further justify a protective order. 2 Dkt. No. 39 at 18. Such concerns, Lead Plaintiff contends, apply with great force in this 3 case because “the CWs repeatedly and uniformly reported that a fear-based culture 4 pervaded BofI,” because “CWs reported that such threats follow employees even after 5 they have left the Company,” and because “one CW was just recently accused and 6 brought up on criminal charges for conduct that allegedly took place while employed at 7 BofI, even though the CW left BofI’s employment nearly three years ago.” Id. at 19. 8 While these general concerns of retaliation are entitled to some weight, Lead Plaintiff has 9 not produced any particularized facts demonstrating that any confidential witness faces a 10 credible risk of retaliation so as to justify the total prohibition on contacting former BofI 11 employees. Cf. Plumbers & Pipefitters, 278 F.R.D. at 344 (denying plaintiff’s request to 12 maintain confidentiality of witnesses based on risk of retaliation, but allowing plaintiff’s 13 counsel to produce evidence, via an ex parte affidavit, to “substantiate the concern that 14 disclosure of a particular CI’s [confidential informant] name would result in 15 retribution.”). 16 Given the factual and legal deficits in Lead Plaintiff’s various arguments, the 17 protective order that prevented Defendants from contacting any former employee for any 18 purpose related to this litigation was overbroad. The Court recognizes the legitimate 19 needs of defendants to conduct investigations in order to prepare their defense. See, e.g., 20 Wharton v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir. 1997) (observing that a party’s right 21 to interview witnesses is a “valuable right” as it is a primary investigative technique). 22 Here, Defendants’ right to conduct investigations has been all but suspended until 23 discovery formally beings. See Dkt. 39 at 5 (“The Court [i.e., the magistrate judge] 24 intends to revisit this issue [the protective order] at the Case Management Conference.”). 25 Such a drastic prohibition was not appropriate in light of the relative strength of Lead 26 Plaintiff’s arguments. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the protective order was 27 contrary to law because it was overbroad and not narrowly tailored. 28 11 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 That the Court has found that the magistrate judge’s protective order was 2 overbroad does not, however, diminish, in the eyes of the Court, the valid concerns 3 presented by Lead Plaintiff. Defendants’ language in communicating with the 4 confidential witnesses, suggesting that they had been “named” in the complaint, had and 5 has the potential to mar the credibility of Lead Plaintiff’s counsel in the eyes of the 6 witnesses, to influence them so as to not cooperate with Lead Plaintiff moving forward, 7 or even to pressure confidential witnesses to give untruthful statements. Further, if 8 Defendants were to interview confidential witnesses relied upon by Lead Plaintiff in the 9 complaint, and to ask questions regarding the witnesses’ interactions or communications 10 with Lead Plaintiff, that conduct would raise serious concerns about the exposure of Lead 11 Plaintiff’s attorney work product. 12 Accordingly, although the Court finds that the protective order issued by the 13 magistrate judge was contrary to law as overbroad, the Court nonetheless finds that 14 Defendants’ conduct warrants a more narrowly tailored protective order issued pursuant 15 to the Court’s inherent authority to regulate the conduct of attorneys appearing before it. 16 See Wharton, 127 F.3d at 1205-06 (reviewing district court’s issuance of a protective 17 order pursuant to the trial court’s inherent authority and reviewing for abuse of 18 discretion); see also Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1188, 1134 (9th Cir. 2001) (addressing 19 the court’s inherent authority to issue sanctions). 20 As such, given the ongoing discovery dispute concerning Defendants’ informal 21 investigations of confidential witnesses, and taking into account Defendant’s interest in 22 conducting investigations before the initiation of discovery, Lead Plaintiff’s interest in 23 protecting its attorney work product, and the public’s interest in preventing retaliation 24 against confidential witnesses, the Court issues the following protective order. 25 26 27 28 Defendants, their attorneys, agents or representatives may contact and interview former BofI employees for purposes of the informal investigation of the litigation pending before this Court. In the event that the former employees are willing to speak with the defense, Defendants are prohibited, during such interviews, from: (1) telling such former BofI employees that they have been “named in the 12 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC 1 2 3 complaint” or otherwise identified by the Plaintiffs in any pleading; (2) seeking to obtain Lead Plaintiff’s attorney work product from such former employees; and/or (3) publicly disclosing the identities of such former employees as confidential witnesses. 4 In the event that Defendants intentionally violate any of these prohibitions and upon 5 evidence of such violations being filed under seal with the Court, the Court will consider 6 further orders and sanctions including contempt of court proceedings. 7 8 9 10 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Court REVERSES in part the magistrate judge’s August 26 Order granting Lead Plaintiff’s request for a Rule 26(c) protective order. The Court further ORDERS that Defendants abide by the amended protective 11 order, issued pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority, as stated above. The Court 12 further DENIES as moot Plaintiff’s ex parte motion for leave to file a sur-reply. Because 13 the Court did not rely on the purportedly new argument presented in Defendants’ reply 14 brief, see Dkt. No. 75-1 at 2 (identifying Defendants’ references to “documents 15 voluntarily provided by a former BofI employee to Lead Plaintiff” as new argument), a 16 17 sur-reply was not warranted. IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 Dated: November 30, 2016 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 3:15-CV-02324-GPC-KSC

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