Farrar v. Catalina Restaurant Group, Inc. et al

Filing 14

ORDER denying 8 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or Stay All Proceedings. Signed by Judge M. James Lorenz on 5/2/2016. (sjt)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JERI FARRAR, Case No.: 15cv2407-L(RBB) Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY OR DISMISS CATALINANRESTAURANT GROUP, INC. et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 18 Pending in this putative labor class action is Defendants' motion to dismiss or stay 19 proceedings. Plaintiff filed an opposition and Defendants replied. For the reasons which 20 follow, the motion is denied. 21 Plaintiff Jeri Farrar contends Defendants Catalina Restaurant Group, Inc. and Food 22 Management Partners, Inc. ("Defendants") violated the federal and California Worker 23 Adjustment Retraining Notification Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq. & Cal. Labor Code 24 §§1400 et seq. (“WARN”), and the California Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. 25 Code §§17200 ("UCL"), by failing to provide proper notice and severance pay before a 26 mass layoff. She seeks declaratory and monetary relief on her own behalf and on behalf 27 of a putative class. 28 1 15cv2407-L(RBB) 1 Defendants move to dismiss or stay this action until the resolution of Fast v. Food 2 Management Partners, Inc. et. al, case no. 15cv2626, pending in the United States 3 District Court for the Central District of California (“Fast”). Fast was filed before the 4 instant action by a different plaintiff on behalf of essentially the same putative class 5 alleging essentially the same claims against the same Defendants. Defendants argue this 6 action should be dismissed or stayed as duplicative of Fast based either on the first-to-file 7 rule of comity, see, e.g., Barapind v. Reno, 225 F.3d 1100, 1109 (9th Cir.2000), or the 8 Court's inherent authority to manage its docket in the interests of efficiency and judicial 9 economy, see e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936). 10 Under the first to file rule, "when cases involving the same parties and issues have 11 been filed in two different districts, the second district court has discretion to transfer, 12 stay, or dismiss the second case in the interest of efficiency and judicial economy." 13 Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 125 F.3d 765, 769 (9th Cir. 1997). "While no precise 14 rule has evolved, the general principle is to avoid duplicative litigation, and to promote 15 judicial efficiency." Barapind, 225 F.3d at 1109 (internal quotation marks, brackets and 16 citations omitted). 17 Defendants argue this action should be dismissed or stayed because it is 18 duplicative of Fast. While it is beyond dispute that this action was filed second against 19 the same defendants based on essentially the same claims, the plaintiffs are not the same. 20 Defendants point to the definitions of the putative plaintiff classes alleged in the 21 operative complaint in each action.1 However, as no class action has been certified in 22 either of the cases, reliance on the scope of the plaintiff class is premature. It is 23 undisputed that the named plaintiffs in each action are not the same. 24 25 1 26 27 28 Plaintiff disputes that the classes are the same, and argues that this action is brought on behalf of a smaller set of putative class members who were employed at Defendants' headquarters in Carlsbad, California, and are not subject to arbitration agreements. Plaintiff's assertion, however, is unsupported by the allegations, including the putative class definition, in the complaint. 2 15cv2407-L(RBB) 1 Defendants next argue that identity of the parties is not required, and that 2 substantial similarity suffices. In the absence of any indication that the Fast plaintiffs 3 and Plaintiff herein are in any way related, acting in concert, representing each other's 4 interests, or even represented by the same counsel, the Court has no basis to conclude that 5 the parties are substantially similar. Accordingly, the Court declines to stay or dismiss 6 this action under the first to file rule. 7 Alternatively, Defendants request a stay under the Court's inherent power to 8 "control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for 9 itself, for counsel, and for litigants." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254. Defendants maintain they 10 will "suffer prejudice if forced to simultaneously litigate cases with identical 11 claims/classes before separate courts with the possibility of inconsistent judgments." 12 (Mot. at 5.) Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends she will be prejudiced because the 13 resolution of Fast could take a long time, given that at least some of the lead plaintiffs 14 therein had apparently signed arbitration agreements which not only preclude litigation of 15 the asserted claims in court, but also preclude class actions, whether in court or by 16 arbitration. (See Opp'n Ex. 1.) 17 In considering Defendants' motion, the Court "must weigh competing interests and 18 maintain an even balance." Landis, 299 U.S. at 254-55. The movant "must make out a 19 clear case of hardship or inequity in being required to go forward, if there is even a fair 20 possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to someone else. Only in 21 rare circumstances will a litigant in one cause be compelled to stand aside while a litigant 22 in another settles the rule of law that will define the rights of both." Id. at 255. Even 23 where the other action in all likelihood will settle many issues of law or fact and simplify 24 the action sought to be stayed, the "burden of making out the justice and wisdom of a 25 departure from the beaten track lay[s] heavily on the ... suppliants for relief, and 26 discretion [is] abused if the stay [is] not kept within the bounds of moderation." Id. at 27 256. Accordingly, to warrant a stay of even modest duration, the moving party must 28 show a "pressing need." See id. at 255. 3 15cv2407-L(RBB) 1 The Court is not persuaded by Defendants' claimed need. Defendants contend the 2 actions are almost the same. Although this could potentially present duplication of effort, 3 such as discovery requests and responses, it also suggests that Defendants could re- 4 purpose their work in the Fast case for purposes of this pending action.2 Moreover, Fast 5 is a putative class action. Even if the Court were to grant Defendants' motion and dismiss 6 this action or stay it for the duration of Fast, Defendants would not necessarily avoid the 7 duplication of effort. If class certification is ultimately granted in Fast, Plaintiff herein 8 would presumably be included in the scope of the class. However, she has a right to 9 exclude herself, avoid the effect of the judgment which binds the class members, and 10 bring an action of her own. See Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 23(c)(2)(v) (class members' right to 11 exclude themselves from the class) & (3)(B) (judgment not binding on the members who 12 exclude themselves). By filing her own action, Plaintiff has in effect already excluded 13 herself from the Fast class. Staying or dismissing this action would not preclude Plaintiff 14 from formally excluding herself from the Fast class upon receiving notice of class 15 certification. She would then be free to re-file her action or return to this Court. 16 Granting Defendants' motion would therefore require a futile act. Accordingly, the 17 motion is denied 18 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to stay or dismiss this action is 19 DENIED. 20 Dated: May 2, 2016 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendants' concern about inefficiencies and duplication can be mitigated short of the drastic remedies of stay or dismissal if they request coordination of discovery between the two proceedings. 4 15cv2407-L(RBB)

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