Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Global Financial Support, Inc. et al
Filing
21
ORDER Granting 11 Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Affirmative Defenses. The Court grants Defendants' leave to file an amended answer in order to revise any affirmative defenses so they are consistent with this order on or by March 18, 2016. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 2/24/16. (dlg)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10
11
CONSUMER FINANCIAL
PROTECTION BUREAU,
14
15
16
17
18
19
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO STRIKE
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
Plaintiff,
12
13
Case No.: 15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
v.
[ECF No. 11]
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SUPPORT, INC.,
d/b/a Student Financial Resource Center,
d/b/a College Financial Advisory; and
ARMOND ARIA a/k/a ARMOND AMIR
ARIA, individually and as owner and
CEO of GLOBAL FINANCIAL
SUPPORT, INC.,
Defendants.
20
21
Before the Court is Plaintiff Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“Plaintiff’s”)
22
Motion to Strike Defendants Global Financial Support, Inc. d/b/a Student Financial
23
Resource Center d/b/a College Financial Advisory and Armond Aria’s (collectively
24
“Defendants’”) Affirmative Defenses. (Mot. Strike, ECF No. 11.) The motion has been
25
fully briefed. (See Opp’n, ECF No. 18; Reply, ECF No. 19.) The Court finds the motion
26
suitable for disposition without oral argument. Civ. L. R. 7.1(d)(1). Upon consideration
27
of the moving papers and the applicable law, and for the following reasons, the Court
28
GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike.
1
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
BACKGROUND
2
On October 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Complaint against Defendants for alleged
3
violations of Sections 1031(a), 1036(a)(1)(B), 1053 and 1055 of the Consumer Financial
4
Protection Act (“CFPA”), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536(a)(1)(B), 5564(a) and 5565 in
5
connection with the offering, marketing, sale and provision of student financial aid
6
advisory services, and under Section 1016 of Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. § 1016.4(a), based
7
on Defendants’ failure to provide a required notice. (Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) Defendant
8
Aria is the owner and registered agent of Global Financial Support, Inc., the President of
9
College Financial Advisory, and the CEO of Student Financial Resource Center. (Id. ¶ 10.)
10
Plaintiff alleges that from at least January 2011 until the present (the “Relevant
11
Period”), Defendants have run a deceptive scheme to persuade high school seniors,
12
enrolled college students and their families to participate in a student financial aid
13
“program.” (Id. ¶ 22.) As part of the program Defendants promise to match students with
14
targeted financial aid opportunities.
15
purchasing lists of student information from online vendors. (Id. ¶ 28.) Plaintiff alleges
16
that Defendants have sent millions of letters to consumers nationwide that employ seals
17
and watermarks of iconic images found predominantly on seals and watermarks used by
18
government agencies. (Id. ¶ 30.) At the top of each letter is a bold print box that includes
19
a “filing deadline” and a “filing status,” which always reads “pending.” (Id. ¶ 31.) Each
20
letter also includes in large bold print in a box at the center of the page a nine-digit “student
21
profile number” and the name of the student’s academic institution. (Id. ¶ 32.)
(Id.)
Defendants identify these consumers by
22
The letters instruct students or their families to fill out and return an application
23
called a “Student Aid Profile Form” along with a “refundable processing fee”—which has
24
varied from $59 to $78 depending on the year—to proceed with the student aid “program”
25
and “apply for the maximum merit and need–based financial aid programs.” (Id. ¶¶ 33–
26
34.) Plaintiff alleges that the “Student Aid Profile Form” looks visually similar to the Free
27
Application for Federal Student Aid (“FAFSA”) and uses similar terms. (Id. ¶ 33.) On the
28
Student Aid Profile Form, Defendants promise to “review” and “assess” borrowers’
2
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
applications and “strive to provide as many targeted financial aid opportunities as possible
2
to each and every student, regardless of his/her financial status or academic performance.”
3
(Id. ¶ 35.) Defendants’ letters warn that completed forms must be received by the filing
4
deadline and that “the entire processing fee will be returned within ten (10) business days
5
to all students who do not qualify or do not receive financial aid funding.” (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.)
6
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ letters represent that consumers will lose their
7
opportunity to obtain student financial aid unless they submit the Student Aid Profile Form
8
and pay the fee to Defendants by a specified date. (Id. ¶ 40.) Plaintiff alleges that
9
Defendants’ “program” deadline does not correspond to any real deadline associated with
10
any particular financial aid opportunity and is an arbitrary date that serves only to give the
11
letters an artificial sense of urgency. (Id. ¶ 60.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Global
12
Financial Support, Inc. claims its physical address is 3268 Governor Drive, Suite F, PMB
13
144, San Diego, CA 92122 but the address is merely a PostalAnnex+ store near Defendant
14
Aria’s home and not a business address. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 49.)
15
Along with the letters, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ scheme utilizes two
16
websites—www.collegefinadv.org and www.studentctr.org—with .ORG as its generic
17
top-level domain. (Id. ¶ 40.) The main pages of these two websites prompt consumers to
18
input a “Student Profile Number” in order to enter the site and view content. (Id. ¶ 45.)
19
However, although consumers are instructed that they must input their individual nine–
20
digit number in order to access the content on the website, there is no individualized content
21
on the website. (Id. ¶ 47.) The website provides instructions for downloading and filling
22
out the Student Aid Profile Form. (Id.)
23
Defendants claim consumers can use a toll–free phone number to reach the “College
24
Financial Advisory Student Aid Information Center.” (Id. ¶ 48.) Consumers’ calls to this
25
number and the number provided for the Student Financial Resource Center are directed to
26
a third–party answering service where an unaffiliated person answers the call, disclaims
27
any association with the Defendants, and purportedly forwards any message along to the
28
Defendants. (Id.)
3
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants do not provide the services offered in their letters
2
and on their website and do not fulfill their promise that “the entire processing fee will be
3
returned within ten (10) business days to all students who do not qualify or do not receive
4
financial aid funding.” (Id. ¶¶ 51, 57.) Instead, many consumers receive absolutely nothing
5
or a generic booklet that is not tailored to the consumers’ circumstances in exchange for
6
sending in their Student Aid Profile Form and fee. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59.) Plaintiff alleges that
7
Defendants have obtained at least $4.7 million in fees from at least 76,000 consumers
8
during the Relevant Period. (Id. ¶ 60.)
9
On December 7, 2015, Defendants filed a first amended answer along with twenty–
10
two affirmative defenses, eight of which Plaintiff moves to strike. (Answer, ECF No. 9;
11
Mot. Strike, ECF No. 11.) Defendants filed an opposition on January 22, 2015 (Opp’n,
12
ECF No. 18) and Plaintiff filed a reply on February 5, 2015 (Reply, ECF No. 19).
13
LEGAL STANDARD
14
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(f), the Court may, by motion or
15
on its own initiative, strike “an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial,
16
impertinent or scandalous” matter from the pleadings. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). The purpose
17
of Rule 12(f) is “to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating
18
spurious issues by disposing of those issues prior to trial.” Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi–
19
Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 984 F.2d
20
1524, 1527 (9th Cir. 1993), rev’d on other grounds by Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S.
21
517 (1994)). The Court begins its analysis by determining whether the affirmative defenses
22
are “(1) an insufficient defense; (2) redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5)
23
scandalous.” See id. at 973–74.
24
The Court must view the pleadings in a light most favorable to the pleading party
25
when ruling upon a motion to strike. In re 2TheMart.com, Inc. Sec. Litig., 114 F. Supp. 2d
26
955, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (citing California v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 36, 39 (N.D.
27
Cal. 1981)). Motions to strike are regarded with disfavor because striking is such a drastic
28
remedy. Freeman v. ABC Legal Servs., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 919, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
4
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
If a claim is stricken, leave to amend should be freely given when doing so would not cause
2
prejudice to the opposing party. Vogel v. Huntington Oaks Delaware Partners, LLC, 291
3
F.R.D. 438, 440 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (citing Wyshak v. City Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 826
4
(9th Cir. 1979)). Although generally disfavored, a court’s ruling on a motion to strike will
5
be overturned only for abuse of discretion. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d
6
970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010).
7
In the Ninth Circuit, “[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an
8
affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Simmons v.
9
Navajo County, Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1023 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Wyshak v. City Nat’l
10
Bank, 607 F.2d 824, 827 (9th Cir. 1979)). “Fair notice generally requires that the defendant
11
state the nature and grounds for the affirmative defense.” Roe v. City of San Diego, 289
12
F.R.D. 604, 608 (S.D. Cal. 2013). “It does not, however, require a detailed statement of
13
facts.” Id.
14
DISCUSSION
15
Plaintiff moves to strike eight of Defendants’ affirmative defenses. First, Plaintiff
16
argues that affirmative defenses 15, 16 and 7 are immaterial and/or impertinent because
17
while they are asserted as defenses to Plaintiff’s deception claims they are unnecessary and
18
unrelated because they are actually defenses to an unfairness claim. (Mot. Strike at 5–8,
19
ECF No. 11.) Second, Plaintiff contends that affirmative defenses 2 and 17–20 do not meet
20
the fair notice standard. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint is not clearly limited
21
to claims of deception—and not also claims of unfairness and abuse—under the CFPA,
22
failure to state a claim is a viable defense, and Defendants’ affirmative defenses provide
23
fair notice. (Opp’n, ECF No. 18.)
24
A.
Immaterial/Impertinent Affirmative Defenses
25
In Counts I–IV of the Complaint Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “used deceptive
26
statements to induce consumers into paying a fee for financial services it did not provide
27
in violation of the Consumer Financial Protection Act.” (Compl. at 11, ECF No. 1.)
28
Plaintiff argues that affirmative defenses 15 and 16 are immaterial and/or impertinent
5
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
because while they are asserted as affirmative defenses to Plaintiff’s deception claims,
2
affirmative defenses 15 and 16 are actually defenses to an unfairness claim (which is not
3
alleged here) and affirmative defense 7 is not relevant because a deception claim does not
4
require a showing of “risk to consumers.” (Mot. Strike at 5–8, ECF No. 11.) Defendants
5
contend that on the face of the Complaint it is not clear whether Plaintiff alleges CFPA
6
violations based on unfairness, deception or abuse against consumers. (Opp’n at 4–5, ECF
7
No. 18.)
8
“‘Immaterial’ matter is that which has no essential or important relationship to the
9
claim for relief or the defenses being pleaded.” Fogerty, 984 F.2d at 1527 (quoting 5C
10
Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1382). “‘[I]mpertinent’ matter consists of statements that do not
11
pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. (quoting 5C Fed. Prac. &
12
Proc. Civ. § 1382). The CFPA prohibits covered persons from engaging in “any unfair,
13
deceptive, or abusive act or practice.” 15 U.S.C. § 5536.1 Courts have determined that the
14
standard for a CFPA deception claim is the same as the standard under section 5(a) of the
15
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”). Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Frederick J.
16
Hanna & Assocs., P.C., 114 F. Supp. 3d. (N.D. Ga. July 4, 2015). See also Consumer Fin.
17
Prot. Bureau v. Siringoringo, No. SACV 14–01155–JVS–AJWx, 2016 WL 102435, at *4
18
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2016); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., –––
19
F.Supp.3d ––––, 14–cv–0292, 2015 WL 1013508, at *17–20 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 6, 2015),
20
appeal docketed, No. 15–1761 (7th Cir. Apr. 8, 2015) (CFPA’s prohibition on “unfair” or
21
“abusive” practices is not unconstitutionally vague because longstanding interpretations of
22
the FTCA should inform interpretation of the CFPA). Under interpretation of section 5(a)
23
of the FTCA, the agency, in order to prove a deceptive act or practice, must show (1) a
24
representation, omission or practice that, (2) was likely to mislead consumers acting
25
26
27
28
1
The CFPA also permits the Bureau to commence a civil action to prevent a covered person from
committing or engaging in an unfair, deceptive, or abusive act or practice under federal law. 12 U.S.C. §§
5531(a); 5564.
6
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the representation, omission, or practice was
2
material. FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting FTC v. Gill, 265
3
F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2000)).
4
Defendants’ affirmative defense 15 alleges Plaintiff fails to state a claim for violation
5
under the CFPA because “Defendants conduct did not cause or is likely to cause substantial
6
injury to consumers.” (Affirmative Defense (“AD”) ¶ 15, ECF No. 9.) Affirmative defense
7
16 provides that Plaintiff’s cause of action under the CFPA is barred “because Plaintiff
8
cannot show Defendants’ act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
9
consumers which is not reasonable avoidable by consumers.” (Id. ¶ 16.) A deception claim
10
under the CFPA does not require a showing of substantial injury to consumers. Instead,
11
these are elements of an unfairness claim.
12
“unfairness” as an “act or practice [that] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to
13
consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers”). Because Plaintiffs do not
14
allege an unfairness claim, affirmative defenses 15 and 16 are immaterial and impertinent.
15
Meanwhile, affirmative defense 7 is likewise irrelevant as it alleges that
16
“Defendants’ acts or practices at issue in the Complaint do not pose ‘risks to consumers’
17
within the meaning of the Consumer Financial Protection Act”—and a deception claim
18
does not require a showing of “risk to consumers.” If Plaintiff amends its Complaint to
19
allege CFPA violations premised on unfairness or abuse, Defendants may seek leave to
20
amend affirmative defenses pursuant to Rule 15.
See 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)(1) (defining
21
The Court finds that affirmative defenses 15, 16 and 7 are immaterial and
22
impertinent to Plaintiff’s deception claim under the CFPA. Accordingly, the Court
23
STRIKES these affirmative defenses.
24
B.
Insufficiently Pled Affirmative Defenses
25
Plaintiff asserts that five of Defendants’ affirmative defenses are insufficient because
26
they fail to provide adequate notice to Plaintiff. (Mot. Strike at 9–11, ECF No. 11.)
27
Defendants argue that failure to state a claim is a viable affirmative defense and the
28
remaining affirmative defenses provide fair notice. (Opp’n at 5–10, ECF No. 18.)
7
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
Rule 8 governs pleading whether by complaint or answer. Rule 8(c) specifically
2
addresses affirmative defenses and requires that a party “affirmatively state any avoidance
3
or affirmative defense” in the responsive pleading. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1). In pleading an
4
affirmative defense, a defendant must comply with Rule 8’s requirement of a “short and
5
plain” statement to give the opposing party fair notice of the defense and the grounds upon
6
which it rests. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827 (“The key to determining the sufficiency of
7
pleading an affirmative defense is whether it gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.”).
8
Under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 (2007), a plaintiff must
9
allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. While a
10
plaintiff need not provide detailed factual allegations, he does need to allege the grounds
11
for entitlement to relief beyond mere labels and conclusions. Id. at 555. In 2009, the
12
Supreme Court, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), clarified that Twombly was based
13
on its interpretation and application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, thereby extending
14
Twombly’s pleading standard to all civil cases.
15
The Ninth Circuit has not yet decided whether the pleading standard in Twombly,
16
and Iqbal applies to affirmative defenses. District courts within the Ninth Circuit are split
17
on the issue. See J & J Sports Productions, Inc. v. Scace, No. 10–cv–2496–WQH–CAB,
18
2011 WL 2132723, at *1 (S.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (discussing cases). This Court agrees
19
with the reasoning of those courts which have held that district courts in this circuit remain
20
bound by the holding of Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827. See Trustmark Ins. Co. v. C & K Mkt.,
21
Inc., No. CV 10–0465–MO, 2011 WL 587574, at *1 (D. Or. Feb. 10, 2011). Accordingly,
22
“[t]he key to determining the sufficiency of pleading an affirmative defense is whether it
23
gives plaintiff fair notice of the defense.” Wyshak, 607 F.2d at 827.
24
(1)
25
As their affirmative defense 20, Defendants “reserve Defendants’ right to assert
26
additional affirmative defenses in the event discovery or further analysis indicates that
27
additional, unknown or unstated affirmative defenses would be applicable.” (AD ¶ 20,
28
ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff argues that this is not an affirmative defense and the Court agrees.
Affirmative Defense 20
8
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
The mere “‘reservation of affirmative defenses’ is not an affirmative defense.”
2
E.E.O.C. v. Timeless Investments, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1055 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
3
Defendants may assert additional affirmative defenses later by amending their pleadings in
4
compliance with Rule 15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15; Polk v. Legal Recovery Law Offices, 291
5
F.R.D. 485, 493 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (citing U.S. v. Global Mortg. Funding, Inc., 2008 WL
6
5264986 at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (“[I]f a Defendant seeks to add affirmative defenses, it
7
must comply with the procedure set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.”); Timeless
8
Investments, Inc., 734 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (“Rule 15 does not require a defendant to
9
“expressly reserve” unnamed affirmative defenses in its answer.”)). In short, Defendants
10
“[are] either entitled to raise additional defenses at a later time or [ ] [are] not; [their] right
11
to reserve [their] rights to do so is a legal nullity.” U.S. v. Glob. Mortgage Funding, Inc.,
12
No. SACV 07–1275–DOC–PJWx, 2008 WL 5264986 at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2008).
13
Therefore, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ affirmative defense 20.
14
(2)
15
Defendants’ affirmative defense 2 alleges that the Complaint fails to state a claim
16
upon which relief can be granted. (AD ¶ 2, ECF No. 9.) Plaintiff asserts that failure to
17
state a claim is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and not an affirmative defense and fails to provide
18
sufficient notice. (Mot. Strike at 10–11, ECF No. 18.) The Court agrees. Failure to state
19
a claim is not a proper affirmative defense but, rather, asserts a defect in Plaintiff’s prima
20
facie case. Barnes v. AT&T Pension Ben. Plan–Nonbargained Program, 718 F. Supp. 2d
21
1167, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (internal citations omitted). See also Baker v. Ensign, No.
22
11-CV-2060-BAS WVG, 2014 WL 4161994, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014) (“Rule
23
12(b)(6) motion is the proper means of asserting that particular claims are insufficient.”)
24
(citing See Zivkovic v. S. Cal. Edison Co, 108., 302 F.3d 10808 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A defense
25
which demonstrates that plaintiff has not met its burden of proof is not an affirmative
26
defense.”)). Accordingly, despite its inclusion in Civil Form 30, failure to state a claim
27
under Rule 12(b)(6) is properly brought on a motion to dismiss and not as an affirmative
28
defense. Barnes, 718 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. Defendants’ reliance on district courts outside
Affirmative Defense 2
9
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
of the Ninth Circuit that have held otherwise is unavailing. The Court therefore STRIKES
2
Defendants’ affirmative defense 2.
3
(3)
4
Plaintiff argues that affirmative defenses 17–19 constitute “mere reference[s] to a
5
legal doctrine [and provide] insufficient notice. (Mot. Strike at 10–11, ECF No. 11
6
(internal citations omitted).) Defendants respond that these affirmative defenses are well–
7
pled. (Opp’n at 6–10, ECF No. 18.)
Affirmative Defenses 17–19
8
In affirmative defense 17, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims are “barred by
9
the Statutes of Limitation, in that the actions alleged in the complaint date back to 2011.”
10
(AD ¶ 17, ECF No. 9.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff that this sentence alone is
11
insufficient to provide fair notice. Kohler v. Staples the Office Superstore, LLC, 291 F.R.D.
12
464, 470 (S.D. Cal. 2013) (striking defendant’s affirmative defense that plaintiff’s claims
13
were “barred by the applicable statute of limitations”). Although Defendants argue in their
14
opposition that the CFPA provides a three–year statute of limitations after discovery of the
15
violation to which an action relates, Defendants’ answer makes no mention of the
16
applicable statute or how it applies. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Defendants’
17
affirmative defense 17.
18
Defendants’ affirmative defense 18 is legally plausible but fails to provide fair notice
19
of the nature and grounds of the defense. Defendants’ affirmative defense 18 states:
20
“Plaintiffs actions in this matter have been arbitrary and capricious.” (AD ¶ 18, ECF No.
21
9.) This affirmative defense merely states legal doctrine without any attempt, however
22
cursory, to explain how liability is precluded, even if Plaintiff’s allegations were true. See
23
Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., No. 14–cv–1158–BAS–JLB, 2015 WL 7272222, at *4 (S.D.
24
Cal. Nov. 17, 2015); Qarbon.com Inc. v. eHelp Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (N.D.
25
Cal. 2004) (“A reference to a doctrine, like a reference to statutory provisions, is
26
insufficient notice.”). Though a detailed recitation of facts is unnecessary, some fact or
27
argument must be presented in order for the Court to conclude that the defense asserted is
28
indeed an affirmative defense.” Baker, 2014 WL 4161994, at *4. “Neither mere reference
10
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
to a legal doctrine, nor a bare recitation of statutory provisions, provides fair notice of an
2
affirmative defense absent some fact or argument explaining the defense.” Stevens, 2015
3
WL 7272222, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2015). As such, the Court STRIKES Defendants’
4
affirmative defense 18.
5
Defendants’ affirmative defense 19 alleges:
6
Plaintiff’s Complaint must be dismissed because Plaintiff has exceeded the
authority granted to it under the Consumer Financial Protection Act. For
example, without limitation and according to the public policy, intent of the
statute delegating power to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau,
Plaintiff is first required to investigate, involving Defendants in the process,
and take administrative action, to mitigate any perceived damages to the
consumer. Instead, Plaintiff prevents Defendants from knowing the areas of
Plaintiff’s concern and sued without notice.
7
8
9
10
11
12
(Id.) Defendants specify that Plaintiff has exceeded authority granted to it by the CFPA
13
by, at least, suing without notice and suggest that Plaintiff was required to take
14
administrative action and mitigate damages. However, Defendants fail to point to any
15
applicable law that gives rise to the defense other than vaguely referencing the CFPA.
16
Defendants suggest that Plaintiff had a duty to take administrative action, mitigate
17
damages, and provide notice but do not adequately identify the legal authority giving rise
18
to the duty. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES Defendants’ affirmative defense 19.
19
CONCLUSION
20
In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion to strike affirmative
21
defenses 15, 16, 7, 20, 2, and 17–19. Furthermore, unless it would prejudice the opposing
22
party, courts should freely grant leave to amend stricken pleadings. Wyshak, 607 F.2d at
23
826; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2). Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ leave
24
to file an amended answer in order to revise any affirmative defenses so they are consistent
25
with this order on or by March 18, 2016.
26
IT IS SO ORDERED.
27
28
11
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
1
Dated: February 24, 2016
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
12
15-cv-02440-GPC-WVG
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?