Alexander v. Madden et al
Filing
30
ORDER Denying Petitioner's 27 Motion for Reconsideration. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 6/26/18. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(dlg)
1
2
3
4
5
6
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8
9
10
JAMES DANIEL ALEXANDER,
Case No.: 3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
Petitioner,
11
12
13
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S
MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
v.
RAYMOND MADDEN,
Respondent.
14
[ECF No. 27.]
15
Pending before the Court is Petitioner James Daniel Alexander’s (“Petitioner”)
16
17
Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b) and Civil
18
Local Rule 7.1. (ECF No. 27.) Petitioner seeks reconsideration of the Court’s August
19
16, 2017 order denying his motion for a preliminary injunction. (See ECF No. 24.)
20
Having reviewed Petitioner’s motion and the applicable law, for the reasons set forth
21
below, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
22
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 7, 1995, Petitioner was found guilty of first degree burglary in
23
24
violation of California Penal Code § 459 and § 460. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.1) Having
25
sustained a prior felony conviction pursuant to Penal Code § 667(d)(1) and two prior
26
1
27
28
Pagination cited in this ruling references the pagination provided by the CM/ECF system.
1
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
strikes under Penal Code § 667(e)(2), Petitioner was sentenced to an indeterminate term
2
of thirty years to life with the possibility of parole. (Id.)
3
Pursuant to an order by a panel of three federal judges entered on February 10,
4
2014, California adult correctional institutions were required to implement policies to
5
reduce prison populations. (See ECF No. 1-1 at 44-45.) Specifically, the Order required
6
institutions to increase good time credits for non-violent second strike offenders. (Id. at
7
45.) In response to the Order, the California Department of Corrections and
8
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) amended the Good Conduct Credit provisions of the California
9
Code of Regulations (“CCR”) to permit a higher percentage of Good Conduct Credit to
10
qualifying inmates. 15 C.C.R. § 3043.2. The changes relevant to Petitioner’s motion fall
11
under § 3043.2(b)(1)-(3), specifically the provisions allowing non-violent second and
12
third strike offenders to earn between 33.3 to 50 percent of credit.2 The changes to
13
§ 3043.2 became effective May 1, 2017, and are not retroactive. (ECF No. 24 at 2.)
14
On May 30, 2014, the CDCR issued a memorandum to all CDCR inmates
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
2
Section 3043.2(b)(1)-(3) provides:
(b) Notwithstanding any other authority to award or limit credit, effective May 1, 2017, the award of
Good Conduct Credit shall advance an inmate's release date if sentenced to a determinate term or
advance an inmate's initial parole hearing date pursuant to subdivision (a)(2) of section 3041 of the
Penal Code if sentenced to an indeterminate term with the possibility of parole pursuant to the following
schedule:
(1) No credit shall be awarded to an inmate sentenced to death or a term of life without the
possibility of parole;
(2) One day of credit for every four days of incarceration (20%) shall be awarded to an inmate
serving a determinate or indeterminate term for a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of
section 667.5 of the Penal Code, unless the inmate qualifies under paragraph (4)(B) of this
section or is statutorily eligible for greater credit pursuant to the provisions of Article 2.5
(commencing with section 2930) of Chapter 7 of Title I of Part 3 of the Penal Code;
(3) One day of credit for every two days of incarceration (33.3%) shall be awarded to an inmate
sentenced under the Three Strikes Law, under subdivision(c) of section 1170.12 of the Penal
Code, or under subdivision (c) or (e) of section 667 of the Penal Code, who is not serving a term
for a violent felony as defined in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 of the Penal Code, unless the
inmate is serving a determinate sentence and qualifies under paragraph (5)(B) of this section.
2
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
notifying them of the changes to the Good Conduct Credit provisions. (ECF No. 1-1 at
2
40.) In response to the memorandum issued by CDCR, Petitioner filed an administrative
3
appeal with CDCR complaining about his ineligibility to receive the 33.3 percent conduct
4
credits awarded to qualifying second strike inmates. (See ECF No. 1-2 at 1.) Petitioner
5
argued such decision was a violation of his equal protection rights. (Id.) Petitioner’s
6
administrative appeal was denied at the third and final level of review on January 9,
7
2014. (Id. at 2.)
Following Petitioner’s administrative denial, Petitioner filed a petition of writ of
8
9
habeas corpus with the Orange County Superior Court. (ECF No. 1-1 at 11–14.)
10
Petitioner’s habeas petition was denied on August 18, 2015. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner
11
appealed to the California Supreme Court, which denied the petition on October 14,
12
2015. (Id. at 3.)
13
On November 3, 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant
14
28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 1.) In his petition, Petitioner raises the following
15
arguments. First, he argues he is being “denied commensurate good conduct credit
16
benefits that have been afforded to similarly situated prisoners.” (Id. at 6.) Next, he
17
argues California Penal Code § 667(e)(2) “does not prevent CDCR [California
18
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation] from granting [him] prison credit
19
conducts.” (Id.) Petitioner further argues that his “fundamental right of
20
physical/personal liberty” is at issue and that he is a “class of one” for purpose of his
21
equal protection claim. (Id.) Finally, Petitioner argues there is “no legitimate
22
governmental interest in denying [him] prison conduct credits.” (Id.)
23
24
Petitioner filed a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and/or a Temporary
Restraining Order. (ECF No. 24.)3 In his motion, Petitioner alleged equal protection
25
26
27
28
3
The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is that same as that for a preliminary injunction.
See Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 434 U.S. 1345, 1347 n.2 (1977); see also Koller v.
3
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
violations by CDCR. (Id. at 1-2.) Petitioner argued that CDCR is refusing to apply to the
2
new Good Conduct Credit provisions retroactively, which is resulting in a violation of his
3
equal protection rights. (Id. at 2.) In his motion for a preliminary injunction, Petitioner
4
asked the Court to do the following:
5
9
(1) require[] CDCR to retroactively apply the newly implemented good
conduct credit provision of CCR, Title 15, Section, 3043.2(b)(3); and (2) to
require[] CDCR to repeal the language contained within CCR, Title 15,
Sections 2449.1(a)(1) and 3940(a)(1)—that excludes NVTS [Non-Violent
Third Strike] prisoners from early parole considerations, and that are
guaranteed to ‘any person convicted of a non-violent felony offense’ under
California Constitution, Article 1, Section 32(a)(1).
10
(Id. at 4.) After a careful consideration of Petitioner’s motion, the Court denied it. The
11
Court’s basis for denial was based upon Petitioner’s failure to satisfy the four elements
12
that must be demonstrated by a party seeking the issuance of a preliminary injunction:
13
(1) likelihood of success on the merits, (2) likelihood that the movant will suffer
14
irreparable harm absent an injunction, (3) that the balance of equities tips in the movant’s
15
favor, and (4) that an injunction is in the public interest. (See ECF No. 25 at 3 (citing
16
Winter v. Nat. Res. Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)).) The Court stated:
6
7
8
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
Even construing Petitioner’s motion liberally, it does not satisfy the four
elements of this test. Petitioner states that he will suffer irreparable harm in
the form of ‘continued incarceration,’ but irreparable injury is just one of the
four elements that must be satisfied in order to obtain a preliminary
injunction or restraining order. Petitioner makes no argument about why he
is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims, why the balance of equities
tips in his favor, or why the injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly,
Petitioner’s motion must be denied.
(Id. at 3 (citations omitted).) The Court also noted that even if Petitioner would have met
the Winter test, his motion would have still been denied because his requests were not
grounded in claims raised in Petitioner’s original habeas petition. (Id.)
Brown, 224 F. Supp. 3d 871, 875 (N.D. Cal. 2016). Petitioner’s motion is analyzed under the Winter
test. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008).
4
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
Petitioner has now filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying his
2
motion for a preliminary injunction. (ECF No. 27.) Petitioner argues “the Court
3
mistakenly concluded that a request in Petitioner’s motion for a preliminary
4
injunction/temporary restraining order was not raised in the original habeas petition.” (Id.
5
at 1.) Petitioner seeks reconsideration only of the portion of the order denying his request
6
to have CDCR retroactively apply good conduct credits at the rate of 33.3 or 50 percent.
7
(Id. at 2.)4
8
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
9
A motion for reconsideration may be brought under either Federal Rule of Civil
10
Procedure 59(e) or 60(b). In re Arrowhead Estates Dev. Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th
11
Cir. 1994) (citing Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. Acands, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255,
12
1262 (9th Cir. 1993)); see also S.D. Cal. L. Civ. R. 7.1(i). The Court has discretion in
13
granting or denying a motion for reconsideration. Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437,
14
1441 (9th Cir. 1991). A motion for reconsideration should not be granted absent highly
15
unusual circumstances. 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold, 179 F.3d 656, 665 (9th Cir.
16
1999). “Reconsideration is appropriate if the district court (1) is presented with newly
17
discovered evidence; (2) clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if
18
there is an intervening change in controlling law.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., 5
19
F.3d at 1263. “Clear error occurs when ‘the reviewing court on the entire record is left
20
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Smith v.
21
Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013).
22
III.
23
DISCUSSION
Petitioner does not suggest that there is any new evidence or that the order was
24
manifestly unjust; he argues only the Court committed clear error by mistakenly denying
25
the motion for preliminary injunction. (See ECF No. 27 at 1.)
26
4
27
28
Petitioner concedes that other his second request in his motion for a preliminary injunction—seeking a
repeal of regulatory language—was not properly raised. (ECF No. 27 at 2.)
5
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and never awarded as of
2
right.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 24. As discussed above, to obtain a preliminary injunction,
3
the moving party must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a
4
likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary relief;
5
(3) that the balance of equities tips in the moving party's favor; and (4) that an injunction
6
is in the public interest. Id. at 20.
7
Injunctions come in two forms: prohibitory and mandatory. Arizona Dream Act
8
Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1060 (9th Cir.2014). “A mandatory injunction orders a
9
responsible party to take action, while a prohibitory injunction prohibits a party from
10
taking action and preserves the status quo pending a final resolution on the merits.” Id.
11
(internal citations and quotations omitted). A mandatory injunction goes well beyond
12
simply maintaining the status quo and is “particularly” disfavored. Anderson v. United
13
States, 612 F.2d 1112, 1114 (9th Cir. 1979). Mandatory preliminary relief “should not be
14
issued unless the facts and law clearly favor the moving party.” Id. In his motion
15
Petitioner sought an injunction requiring CDCR to retroactively apply Good Conduct
16
Credits, which would alter the status quo. As a result, the requested injunctive is
17
mandatory in nature, and is subject to a heightened burden of proof.
18
In his motion for reconsideration, Petitioner argues “the district court mistakenly
19
concluded that a request in the motion for a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining
20
order was not raised in the original habeas petition.” (ECF No. 27 at 3.) Even assuming
21
Petitioner is correct on this point, he still has not offered any argument suggesting that the
22
Winter elements are satisfied in this case.
23
As indicated above, a party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate
24
they he is likely to succeed on the merits of their challenge to a particular law. See
25
Winter, 555 U.S. at 7, 20. Petitioner argues that CDCR’s failure to apply good conduct
26
credits retroactively is a violation of his equal protection rights. (ECF No. 24 at 1.)
27
Since Petitioner formulates his claim as a “class of one” claim (see ECF No. 1-1 at 6), to
28
6
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
prevail he must show that (i) he has been intentionally treated differently from others
2
similarly situated and (ii) that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.
3
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). “A similarly situated offender
4
is one outside the protected class who has committed roughly the same crime under
5
roughly the same circumstances but against whom the law has [or has] not been
6
enforced.” United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 27 (1st Cir.2008) (citing United States v.
7
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996)).
8
First, Petitioner argues that “similarly situated ‘Non-Violent Second Strike’
9
(NVSS) prisoners . . . have been afforded a retroactive application of their good conduct
10
credits.” (ECF No. 24 at 2.) However, Petitioner is a non-violent third strike offender.
11
(Id. at 6.) Rather than showing how he is similarly situated to such second strike
12
offenders, Petitioner offers only conclusory assertions that some inmates that have been
13
convicted of the same crime—or even of worse crimes—are being afforded the benefit of
14
the new good conduct credit provision. (See ECF No. 24 at 6.) But it is clear that
15
Petitioner is differently situated from NVSS prisoners because he has been convicted of
16
more qualifying offenses than NVSS prisoners.
17
Next, because the CCR regulations are not retroactive, Petitioner argues “any and
18
all identically situated ‘Non-Violent Third Strike’ (NVTS) prisoners—who have been
19
received into CDCR after May 1, 2017—will serve only 20 years before they become
20
eligible for a parole suitability hearing” as opposed to Petitioner, who will have to wait
21
28. (Id. at 2.) Even assuming Petitioner is similarly situated to NVTS prisoners
22
“received into CDCR” after May 1, 2017, it was likely not irrational for CDCR to choose
23
against applying its new policy retroactively. Retroactivity would have caused every
24
third-strike prisoner in the California system to apply for a sentence reduction, which
25
would have drained considerable resources and created significant administrative delays.
26
As the CDCR explained:
27
28
A number of reasons support the department’s determination that new and
7
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
revised credit earning programs should be implemented prospectively. First,
implementation of all the new and revised credit earning programs will
likely affect the credit calculations of more than 80,000 inmates. To do so
prospectively represents a major task for almost all of the divisions and
branches of the department, but especially for the staff responsible for
updating information technology systems, auditing release date calculations,
and developing credit earning programs. To apply the credits retroactively
would require significantly more time, staff, and resources.
Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., Notice of Change to Regulations, 2017 CA REG TEXT
462644 (NS), available at
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Regulations/Adult_Operations/docs/NCDR/2017NCR/1705/17-05.pdf, at 10. This was a rational choice.
Even if there was a reason to believe Petitioner is likely to succeed on the merits of
his claims, he offers no argument in his original memorandum or motion for
reconsideration showing why the balances of equities tip in his favor or that an injunction
is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20 (explaining that both must be shown for a
preliminary injunction to be proper).
In sum, the Court correctly denied the motion for preliminary injunction because
Petitioner has failed to satisfy the Winter factors.
CONCLUSION
18
19
20
21
22
23
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner failed to demonstrate the
Court committed clear error in denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 26, 2018
24
25
26
27
28
8
3:15-cv-002498-GPC-AGS
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?