Coyle v. Unknown

Filing 40

ORDER DISMISSING CASE. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint and this civil action in its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)( 1), denies leave to further amend as futile, certifies that an IFP appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and directs the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the file. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 3/6/17.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(kas)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10
11
12

JUSTIN COYLE,
Booking No. 16156062,

ORDER DISMISSING CIVIL
ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE
A CLAIM PURSUANT TO
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) AND
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)

Plaintiff,

13
vs.

14
15

Case No.: 3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

UNKNOWN, et al.,
Defendants.

16
17
18

JUSTIN COYLE (“Plaintiff”), who was a pretrial detainee at George Bailey

19

Detention Facility (“GBDF”) at the time he initiated suit, (see ECF No. 1), but whom has

20

since been transferred to the San Diego Central Jail, where the Court presumes he is

21

either still awaiting trial or sentence, (ECF No. 37), is proceeding pro se in this civil

22

rights action filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, but has

23
24

dismissed his original (ECF No. 1), and second amended complaints (ECF No. 4) for

25

failing to state a claim with leave to amend. (ECF Nos. 2, 18.) Plaintiff has since

26

unsuccessfully appealed (ECF Nos. 19, 24, 27), and after being granted an extension of

27

time, has now filed his Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) (ECF No. 34).

28

///
1
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

1

Because Plaintiff’s latest pleading still fails to state a claim, the Court now

2

dismisses the entire action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1)

3

without further leave to amend.

4

Background
Plaintiff’s TAC is sparse and, as was true of his original complaint, he identifies no

5
6

individual defendants and he alleges no violations of any specific constitutional right.

7

For example, in “Count One,” Plaintiff claims 5 bags of Maxwell House coffee, various

8

items from 2 “internet purchase hygiene kits” and other miscellaneous items worth

9

$126.55 were taken from him on October 7, 2015, when he was extracted from his cell.

10

(ECF No. 34 at 1.) In “Count Two,” Plaintiff claims he was “assaulted by two separate

11

SD County Jail staff” while returning from court on January 7, 2016. (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff

12

also claims that afterward, an unidentified nurse “ignored [his] orders … not [to] touch

13

[his] butto[cks],” and “pricked” him with a needle. (Id.) Plaintiff “believe[s] this incident

14

was for humiliation purposes,” and constituted a “sexual attack.” (Id. at 3.) Finally, in

15

“Count Three,” Plaintiff claims he was “falsely imprisoned” for ten days after he was

16

“given an O.R.” on September 29, 2014, by the East County San Diego Superior Court.

17

(Id.)

18
19
20

Discussion
A.

Legal Standards for Screening per 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
Because Plaintiff remains a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his TAC requires a

21

pre-answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). “The purpose

22

of § 1915A is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the

23

expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014)

24

(quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 2012)).

25

“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which

26

relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil

27

Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d

28

1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir.
2
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

1

2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard

2

applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

3

12(b)(6)”).

4

As Plaintiff is now well aware, the Prison Litigation Reform Act requires the Court

5

to review complaints filed by all persons proceeding IFP and by those, like Plaintiff, who

6

are “incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] accused of, sentenced for, or

7

adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole,

8

probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program,” “as soon as practicable after

9

docketing.” See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b). Under these screening statutes,

10

the Court must sua sponte dismiss complaints, or any portions of them, which are

11

frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or which seek damages from defendants who

12

are immune. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d

13

1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v.

14

Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir. 2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)).

15

All complaints must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

16

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are

17

not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by

18

mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)

19

(citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). “Determining whether

20

a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires

21

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere

22

possibility of misconduct” falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also

23

Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

24

“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their

25

veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

26

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The court “ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se,

27

particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the

28

petitioner the benefit of any doubt,” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir.
3
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

1

2010), but it “may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.”

2

Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011) (citations

3

omitted).

4

B.

Application to Third Amended Complaint
Plaintiff’s TAC suffers from the same critical deficiencies of pleading as his prior

5
6

pleadings and therefore, it must be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

7

and § 1915A(b)(1).

8
9

As an initial and overall matter, both the Rules of Federal Procedure and the Civil
Rights Act require Plaintiff to, at minimum, identify the persons he seeks to sue, and

10

allege at least some non-conclusory facts from which the Court might “draw the

11

reasonable inference” that each defendant has violated the Constitution. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

12

at 676-78. While Rule 8 does not impose a “hyper[-]technical, code-pleading regime,” it

13

“demands more than [the] unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

14

accusation[s,]” id. at 678, Plaintiff continues to make in this case, despite having the

15

benefit of two prior Orders explaining the deficiencies of his approach. See ECF Nos. 2,

16

18.

17

Specifically, as to any allegedly unauthorized, negligent, or even intentional

18

deprivation of his personal property, Plaintiff was advised such claims could not proceed

19

under § 1983 because the State provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy through the

20

California Tort Claims Act. See ECF No. 18 at 8 (citing Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S.

21

113, 129-32 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984); Barnett v. Centoni, 31

22

F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994)). Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff continues to contend

23

his coffee, hygiene kits, and other canteen purchases were “taken from [him] and never

24

returned,” (ECF No. 34 at 1), he still fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

25

granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii); 1915A(b)(1).

26

Plaintiff’s January 7, 2016 “assault” claims fare no better. See ECF No. 34 at 2.

27

Again, Plaintiff was previously apprised that his failure to offer any “explanation

28

whatsoever” as to the circumstances giving rise to this incident, identify the defendants
4
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

1

involved, describe the necessity for, type or severity of the force used, or to explain

2

whether he was injured or resisting, was insufficient to support a plausible excessive

3

force claim. (ECF No. 18 at 7-8, citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct.

4

2466, 2473 (2015) (noting that excessive force claims alleged by pretrial detainees

5

require allegations that defendants’ application of force was objectively unreasonable).)

6

Plaintiff’s TAC still fails to identify any person who is alleged to have “assaulted” him,

7

and still fails to contain any “factual content that allow the court to draw the reasonable

8

inference that [any] defendant is liable.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“‘[N]aked assertion[s]’

9

devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” are insufficient to “‘state a claim for relief that

10
11

is plausible on its face.’”) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 570).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff also claims to have been “falsely imprisoned” for ten

12

days, (ECF No. 34 at 3), he again fails to identify any person who may be held liable for

13

“illegally ke[eping] him” after he alleges to have been ordered released. See Taylor v.

14

List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Liability under [§] 1983 arises only upon a

15

showing of personal participation by the defendant.”). Even more critically, however, the

16

Court finds this type of claim may not even be brought in a § 1983 action–for it amounts

17

to a challenge against both the length and the validity of his incarceration. A petition for

18

habeas corpus is Plaintiff’s sole judicial remedy when attacking “the validity of the fact

19

or length of ... confinement.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90 (1973); Young

20

v. Kenny, 907 F.2d 874, 875 (9th Cir. 1990).

21

Based on this authority, and in light of Plaintiff’s multiple opportunities to fix his

22

pleadings, the Court finds his TAC must now be dismissed without further leave to

23

amend, because he has continually failed to state any plausible claim upon which § 1983

24

relief may be granted. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Rhodes, 621 F.3d at 1004.

25
26

Conclusion and Order
The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint and this civil action in

27

its entirety for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28

28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1), denies leave to further amend as futile, see
5
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS

1

Hartmann v. CDCR, 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny

2

leave to amend when amendment would be futile.”), certifies that an IFP appeal of this

3

Order would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and directs

4

the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the file.

5

IT IS SO ORDERED.

6
7
8
9

Dated: March 6, 2017
HON. LARRY ALAN BURNS
United States District Judge

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
6
3:15-cv-02867-LAB-AGS