The Estate of Ruben Nunez et al v. County of et al

Filing 426

ORDER Denying Motions to File Under Seal [Docs. No. 353 , 356 , 361 , 367 91 397 ]; and Denying Ex Parte Motion to Intervene [Doc. No. 40 . Signed by Judge Roger T. Benitez on 6/24/2019. (anh)

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Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10474 Page 1 of 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 13 THE ESTATE OF RUBEN NUNEZ by and through its successor-in-interest LYDIA NUNEZ, ALBERT NUNEZ, and LYDIA NUNEZ, Case No.: 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD ORDER: DENYING MOTIONS TO FILE UNDER SEAL [Docs. 353, 356, 361, 367, 391, 397]; DENYING EX PARTE MOTION TO INTERVENE [Doc. 403] Plaintiffs, 14 15 v. 16 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al, Defendants. 17 18 19 Pending before the Court are several groups of motions to file documents under seal 20 and the ACLU’s ex parte motion to intervene to oppose several of those motions to seal. 21 [Docs. 353, 356, 361, 367, 391, 397, 403.] For the following reasons, the motions are 22 DENIED. 23 I. BACKGROUND 24 The Court assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural posture of this case. 25 There are two sets of motions to file under seal related to the briefing and exhibits for two 26 substantive motions. CPMG offers the same policy arguments in support of sealing both 27 sets of documents. The first set of documents contains the parties’ briefing on Plaintiffs’ 28 Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and Sanctions against CPMG and associated exhibits. 1 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10475 Page 2 of 7 1 [Docs. 353, 356, 361.] The second set of documents contains the parties’ briefing on 2 Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Summary Judgment Order in Favor of CPMG 3 on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims and prayer for punitive damages. [Docs. 391, 397.] 4 Plaintiffs filed their Motion to Reconsider on April 22, 2019. They supported their 5 motion with substantial newly acquired evidence, including recent deposition testimony of 6 three CPMG employees. Two days letter, CPMG sent a letter to the parties’ court reporting 7 company, stating that it was designating the entire transcript of each of the three witnesses 8 as “confidential.” CPMG then requested that Plaintiffs withdraw numerous exhibits they 9 had filed in support of their motion and re-file them under seal. As a result, Plaintiffs 10 withdrew their April 22, 2019 filings, re-filed with redactions their Motion to Reconsider 11 and their exhibits, and filed an accompanying motion to seal the exhibits and motion, as 12 required by the local rules. In their accompanying motion to seal, however, Plaintiffs re- 13 asserted their position that compelling reasons did not exist for sealing any of the 14 documents. CPMG then filed under seal its opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Reconsider 15 and numerous exhibits, as well as filed its own motion to seal the documents. On May 14, 16 2019, the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed an ex parte Motion to Intervene 17 to oppose CPMG’s motions to seal. For the following reasons, the motions to seal and the 18 ACLU’s motion to intervene are DENIED. 1 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 There is a strong presumption in favor of public access to court records. See Nixon 22 v. Warner Comm’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-99 (1978). Thus, a party seeking to seal a 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 Additionally, CPMG moved to strike pages 41-42 of Exhibit 1 to [Doc. 363], which it filed with its opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing and Sanctions. In support, CPMG contends it inadvertently failed to redact information from the two email pages. CPMG, however, did not offer any specific explanation for why such redactions were required, and the Court has not identified any. Thus, the motion, [Doc. 367], is DENIED. 2 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10476 Page 3 of 7 1 judicial record bears the burden of overcoming this strong presumption by meeting the 2 “compelling reasons” standard. Foltz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 3 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). That is, the party must “articulate[ ] compelling reasons supported 4 by specific factual findings,” id., that outweigh the general history of access and the public 5 policies favoring disclosure, such as the “public interest in understanding the judicial 6 process,” Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). “Simply mentioning 7 a general category of privilege, without further elaboration or any specific linkage with the 8 documents, [also] does not satisfy the burden.” Id. at 1184. A party’s failure to meet the 9 burden of articulating specific facts showing a “compelling reason” means that the “default 10 posture of public access prevails.” Id. at 1182. 11 Where the party states compelling reasons to seal, the court must “conscientiously 12 balance[ ] the competing interests” of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 13 judicial records secret. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. After considering these interests, if the 14 court decides to seal certain judicial records, it must “base its decision on a compelling 15 reason and articulate the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or 16 conjecture.” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434 (citing Valley Broadcasting Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 17 798 F.2d 1289, 1295 (9th Cir. 1986)). 18 B. Motions to Seal 19 The “compelling reasons” standard applies fully to dispositive motions like the ones 20 at issue here. Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 21 2006). As compelling reasons, CPMG contends that (1) the documents are marked 22 “CONFIDENTIAL” under their protective order, and (2) filing the documents publicly 23 would hamper the intent behind California’s peer review privilege. Among the documents 24 CPMG contends should remain under seal are the following: 26 • Plaintiffs’ Points and Authorities in Support of the Motion to Reconsider the Court’s Order Granting Summary Judgment as to CPMG; 27 • CPMG’s Opposition Memorandum; 25 28 3 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10477 Page 4 of 7 1 2 3 4 • Exhibit 4: a binder of email chains and documentation produced from CPMG as a supplemental response to Plaintiffs’ request for production; • Exhibit 5: an email from Alfred Joshua, dated November 10, 2014, with the subject heading “Follow-up from Psych Meeting”; 6 • Exhibits 6, 7, and 9: the deposition transcripts of the three CPMG employees, Steven Mannis, Sanjay Rao, and Nicholas Badre; 7 • Exhibit 12: Psychiatric Peer Review – Intake and Follow-up; 5 8 9 • Exhibit 17: CPMG Journal Club Meeting Minutes, dated January 12, 2016. 10 In support, CPMG argues that these documents pertain to meetings held by CPMG and the 11 County of San Diego for Quality Assurance/Quality Improvement purposes, peer review 12 forms completed following Mr. Nunez’s death, and e-mails between County of San Diego 13 employees and CPMG directors about the peer review investigation findings. As to the 14 depositions, CPMG argues only that the transcripts were marked “CONFIDENTIAL” 15 under the parties’ protective order and concern discussion about the confidential peer 16 review documents. 17 The Court does not find those reasons sufficient to justify sealing. First, the 18 “compelling reasons” standard is invoked, even if the dispositive motion, or its 19 attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective order. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 20 (“[T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where . . . documents subject to a protective 21 order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive motion.”). In other words, a party 22 does not satisfy the compelling reasons standard to justify sealing documents merely by 23 labeling them as “CONFIDENTIAL.” Second, a California state law privilege like the one 24 asserted for various peer review-related documents does not automatically justify sealing. 25 See, e.g., Doe v. City of San Diego, 2014 WL 1921742, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. May 14, 2014) 26 (rejecting argument that state privileges automatically justify sealing). 27 Of course, the presumption in favor of public access can be overridden, but only for 28 “good cause” where the movant shows a particularized harm will result from disclosure, 4 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10478 Page 5 of 7 1 and where the related private interests outweigh the public’s interests in access. CPMG 2 has not carried its burden here. In essence, CPMG argues that making these documents 3 public would hinder the California legislature’s purpose in enacting the peer review 4 privilege: to encourage the free-flow of ideas and improve the quality of patient care. In 5 the same breath, however, CPMG admits that the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected this 6 rationale by declining to apply a state’s peer review privilege to documents “bearing on the 7 death of a prisoner.” Agster v. Maricopa County, 422 F.3d 836, 839 (9th Cir. 2005). In 8 Agster, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a prison’s medical provider, Correctional 9 Health Services, could withhold from discovery as confidential a mortality review 10 conducted about one of its deceased prisoners. As relevant to the present case, the Agster 11 defendants asserted that the Ninth Circuit should adopt Arizona’s peer review privilege, a 12 privilege recognized in many states, including California. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit 13 declined to recognize the peer review privilege as a matter of federal common law for 14 several reasons. First, the Ninth Circuit noted its “reluctan[ce] to recognize a privilege in 15 an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns [on 16 two occasions] but has not provided the privilege itself.” Id. at 839. Second, the Ninth 17 Circuit explained that, within the prison context, “it is peculiarly important that the public 18 have access to the assessment by peers of the care provided.” Id. 19 Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s contention that the peer review 20 process would suffer if made public, aptly explaining, “Given the demands for public 21 accountability, which seem likely to guarantee that such reviews take place whether they 22 are privileged or not, we are not convinced by the [defendant’s] argument that such reviews 23 will cease unless kept confidential by a federal peer review privilege.” Id. The same 24 rationale applies here. Like in Agster, this Court is not persuaded that peer reviews of 25 medical care in county jails will cease to exist or be significantly less productive unless 26 kept confidential, particularly in light of the public’s demands for and interests in 27 accountability within its county jails and state prisons. Accordingly, having considered the 28 interests in confidentiality asserted by CPMG, the Court cannot find “a compelling reason” 5 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10479 Page 6 of 7 1 with an “articula[ble] factual basis . . . without relying on hypothesis or conjecture” that 2 justifies sealing sufficient to overcome the public’s strong interest in access to judicial 3 records. Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434. The motions to seal are DENIED. The parties are 4 ordered to re-file publicly all such documents within 7 days of this Order. 5 C. Motion for Permissive Intervention 6 The ACLU moves ex parte to intervene under Rule 24(b)(2) for the specific purpose 7 of opposing the motions to seal documents. The ACLU describes itself as a nationwide 8 nonprofit organization dedicated to the defense of the guarantees of individual rights and 9 liberties embodied in the state and federal Constitutions. In support of its motion, the 10 ACLU argues it has a particular interest in the sealed documents because it has long 11 advocated for better treatment of inmates. 12 “Nonparties seeking access to a judicial record in a civil case may do so by seeking 13 permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2).” San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. 14 Court—Northern Dist. (San Jose), 187 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 1999). Generally, 15 permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) requires “(1) an independent ground for 16 jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3) a common question of law and fact between the 17 movant’s claim or defense and the main action.” Beckman Indus. v. Int’l Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 18 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1992). 19 independent jurisdictional grounds, where the intervenor asks “the court only to exercise 20 that power which it already has” to protect the public’s access to judicial records, “no 21 independent jurisdictional basis is needed.” Id. Here, Plaintiffs have adequately opposed 22 the motions to seal, as evidenced by the Court’s denial of the sealing motions. Moreover, 23 the Court is not persuaded that an emergency exists justifying the ACLU’s request for ex 24 parte relief, rather than seeking the same relief with proper notice. 25 discretion, the Court DENIES the ACLU’s motion for permissive intervention. Id. at 472. Although permissive intervention ordinarily requires Exercising its 26 27 28 6 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Case 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD Document 426 Filed 06/24/19 PageID.10480 Page 7 of 7 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 The motions to file under seal and to intervene are DENIED. Within 7 days of the 3 date of this Order, the parties are ordered to re-file publicly all sealed lodged documents at 4 issue in these motions. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 8 DATED: June 24, 2019 _______________________________ HON. ROGER T. BENITEZ United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 7 3:16-cv-01412-BEN-MDD

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