Southland Home Mortgage II LLC v. Zavala et al

Filing 4

ORDER Sua Sponte Remanding Action to the Superior Court of the State of California for San Diego County. Signed by Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel on 7/26/16.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(Certified copy sent to Superior Ct.) (dlg)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SOUTHLAND HOME MORTGAGE,
LLC AND/OR ITS SUCCESSORS
AND/OR ASSIGNEES IN
INTEREST,
vs.

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 16cv1815-GPC(RBB)
ORDER SUA SPONTE
REMANDING ACTION TO STATE
COURT

VIDAL ZAVALA, an individual,
DOES 1 to 10, inclusive,
Defendant.
On July 14, 2016, Defendant Vidal Zavala filed a notice of removal of this
unlawful detainer action from the Superior Court of the State of California for San
Diego County. Having reviewed Defendant’s notice of removal, the Court finds it does
not have subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, the Court sua sponte
REMANDS the action to state court.
Discussion
The federal court is one of limited jurisdiction. Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat'l
Ass'n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007). It possesses only that power authorized by
the Constitution or a statute. See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S.
534, 541 (1986). It is constitutionally required to raise issues related to federal subject
matter jurisdiction, and may do so sua sponte. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't,

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[16cv1815-GPC(MDD)]

1 523 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1998); see Indus. Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090,
2 1092 (9th Cir.1990). Removal jurisdiction is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441 et seq. A
3 state court action can only be removed if it could have originally been brought in
4 federal court. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 (1987); Duncan v.
5 Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996). Thus, for an action to be removed on the
6 basis of federal question jurisdiction, the complaint must establish either that federal
7 law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends
8 on the resolution of substantial questions of federal law. Franchise Tax Board of Cal.
9 v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1983).
10 Alternatively, a federal court may have diversity jurisdiction over an action involving
11 citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28
12 U.S.C. § 1332.
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The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction “is governed by the

14 ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when
15 a federal question is presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”
16 Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). A review of the state court
17 summons and complaint in this case shows that Plaintiff alleges a unlawful detainer
18 claim under California state law. (Dkt. No. 1-2.)
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“The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is on the party seeking removal,

20 and the removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction.” Emrich v.
21 Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). “Federal jurisdiction must
22 be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus
23 v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992).
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In the notice of removal, Defendant alleges that the Court has jurisdiction

25 pursuant to a federal question. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-3.) Defendant contends that there is
26 a federal question based on a notice which expressly references and incorporates the
27 “Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of 2009,” 12 U.S.C. § 5201. (Id. at 2-3.) She
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[16cv1815-GPC(MDD)]

1 alleges that this statute will be drawn into the issues in this case because Plaintiff failed
2 to comply with the alleged 90 day notice period prior to filing any state eviction
3 proceeding. (Id.)
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Defendant’s alleged federal “claim” is actually a defense or counterclaim against

5 Plaintiff. However, defenses and counterclaims are not considered in evaluating
6 whether a federal question appears on the face of a Plaintiff's complaint. Vaden v.
7 Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009) (federal question jurisdiction cannot “rest upon
8 an actual or anticipated counterclaim”); Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1075
9 (9th Cir. 2005) (“A federal law defense to a state-law claim does not confer jurisdiction
10 on a federal court, even if the defense is that of federal preemption and is anticipated
11 in the plaintiff's complaint.”). As such, Defendant’s allegation does not establish
12 federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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Defendant has not adequately established a basis for this Court’s subject matter

14 jurisdiction and the Court must remand the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
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Conclusion
Based on the above, the Court sua sponte REMANDS the action to the Superior

17 Court of the State of California for San Diego County.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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HON. GONZALO P. CURIEL
United States District Judge

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[16cv1815-GPC(MDD)]