John M. Floyd & Associates, Inc. v. First Imperial Credit Union

Filing 20

ORDER denying 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 02/01/2017. (ja1)

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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 JOHN M. FLOYD & ASSOCIATES, INC., a Texas corporation, 15 ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO AMEND SCHEDULING ORDER Plaintiff, 13 14 Case No.: 16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG v. [ECF No. 18] FIRST IMPERIAL CREDIT UNION, a California corporation, 16 Defendant. 17 18 I. BACKGROUND 19 Present before the Court is the parties Joint Motion (“Motion”) to modify the 20 Scheduling Order and extend deadlines for discovery. (ECF No. 18.) On December 20, 21 2016, the Court issued a Scheduling Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 (“FRCP”) 16(b) that set January 31, 2017 as the date by which the parties were to 23 “complete the inspection of Defendant First Imperial Credit Union.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.) In 24 their Motion, the parties state that they have agreed to conduct the inspection of 25 Defendant’s facility on February 14, 2017 and have scheduled the inspection for the same 26 day. (ECF No. 18 at 2.) Given this, the parties request the Court extend the deadline by 27 which this must be completed to February 28, 2017. (Id.) 28 /// 1 16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG 1 2 3 II. RULING The Court does not find good cause to grant this request and hereby DENIES the Joint Motion with prejudice for the reasons set forth below. 4 A. NO GOOD CAUSE SHOWN 5 Pursuant to FRCP 16(b)(3), a district court is required to enter a pretrial scheduling 6 order that “must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete 7 discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). The scheduling order “controls 8 the course of the action unless the court modifies it [ ]” and FRCP “16 is to be taken 9 seriously.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d); Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 10 1994). Indeed, parties must “diligently attempt to adhere to [the Court’s] schedule 11 throughout the subsequent course of the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D. 12 605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). “A scheduling order ‘is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly 13 entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril.’” Johnson v. Mammoth 14 Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gestetner Corp. v. Case 15 Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985)). 16 FRCP 16(b)(4) “provides that a district court’s scheduling order may be modified 17 upon a showing of ‘good cause,’ an inquiry which focuses on the reasonable diligence of 18 the moving party.” Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2007); citing 19 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal explained, 20 …Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily concerns the diligence of 21 the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial 22 schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party 23 seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983 24 amendment)…[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons 25 for seeking modification…If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should 26 end. 27 28 Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In part, the “good cause” standard requires the parties to demonstrate that 2 16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG 1 “noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding [their] 2 diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not have 3 been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 Scheduling 4 conference…” Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608. However, “carelessness is not compatible with 5 a finding of diligence and offers no basis for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. 6 Here, the parties have offered no cause, let alone good cause for amending the 7 Scheduling Order. The parties simply agreeing to a date past the deadline established by 8 the Court does not substitute diligence and establish good cause. Rather, it appears the 9 parties “cavalierly disregarded” the scheduling order, at their own peril, and assumed the 10 Court would simply rubber stamp their request. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. The parties have 11 utterly failed to show good cause for both failing to schedule the inspection of the premises 12 within the time frame set by the Court and for waiting until the eleventh hour to file a 13 motion to request an extension of time. The Court expected the parties to demonstrate far 14 more enthusiasm in conducting the inspection of Defendant’s credit union. It was certainly 15 in the interest of all the parties to this lawsuit to convene at the credit union, inspect the 16 overdraft protection program, and then swiftly analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and 17 Defendant’s defenses. 18 Given the lackadaisical approach displayed by all parties to perform this simple task, 19 the Court is left with the unmistakable impression that inspecting the credit union was not 20 that important. The Court sincerely hopes this is not the approach that counsel intends to 21 take with their other discovery obligations. 22 III. CONCLUSION 23 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the Joint Motion with prejudice. 24 IT IS SO ORDERED. 25 Dated: February 1, 2017 26 27 28 3 16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG

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