John M. Floyd & Associates, Inc. v. First Imperial Credit Union

Filing 20

ORDER denying 18 Motion for Extension of Time to Complete Discovery. Signed by Magistrate Judge William V. Gallo on 02/01/2017. (ja1)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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JOHN M. FLOYD & ASSOCIATES,
INC., a Texas corporation,

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ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION
TO AMEND SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff,

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Case No.: 16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG

v.
[ECF No. 18]

FIRST IMPERIAL CREDIT UNION, a
California corporation,

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Defendant.

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I. BACKGROUND

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Present before the Court is the parties Joint Motion (“Motion”) to modify the

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Scheduling Order and extend deadlines for discovery. (ECF No. 18.) On December 20,

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2016, the Court issued a Scheduling Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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(“FRCP”) 16(b) that set January 31, 2017 as the date by which the parties were to

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“complete the inspection of Defendant First Imperial Credit Union.” (ECF No. 13 at 2.) In

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their Motion, the parties state that they have agreed to conduct the inspection of

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Defendant’s facility on February 14, 2017 and have scheduled the inspection for the same

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day. (ECF No. 18 at 2.) Given this, the parties request the Court extend the deadline by

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which this must be completed to February 28, 2017. (Id.)

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16-CV-1851-DMS-WVG

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II. RULING
The Court does not find good cause to grant this request and hereby DENIES the
Joint Motion with prejudice for the reasons set forth below.

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A. NO GOOD CAUSE SHOWN

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Pursuant to FRCP 16(b)(3), a district court is required to enter a pretrial scheduling

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order that “must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete

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discovery, and file motions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3)(A). The scheduling order “controls

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the course of the action unless the court modifies it [ ]” and FRCP “16 is to be taken

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seriously.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(d); Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir.

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1994). Indeed, parties must “diligently attempt to adhere to [the Court’s] schedule

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throughout the subsequent course of the litigation.” Jackson v. Laureate, Inc., 186 F.R.D.

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605, 607 (E.D. Cal. 1999). “A scheduling order ‘is not a frivolous piece of paper, idly

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entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded without peril.’” Johnson v. Mammoth

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Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Gestetner Corp. v. Case

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Equip. Co., 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985)).

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FRCP 16(b)(4) “provides that a district court’s scheduling order may be modified

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upon a showing of ‘good cause,’ an inquiry which focuses on the reasonable diligence of

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the moving party.” Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488 F.3d 1163, 1174 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2007); citing

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal explained,

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…Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” standard primarily concerns the diligence of

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the party seeking the amendment. The district court may modify the pretrial

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schedule “if it cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party

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seeking the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee’s notes (1983

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amendment)…[T]he focus of the inquiry is upon the moving party’s reasons

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for seeking modification…If that party was not diligent, the inquiry should

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end.

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Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.
In part, the “good cause” standard requires the parties to demonstrate that
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“noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding [their]

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diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not have

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been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 Scheduling

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conference…” Jackson, 186 F.R.D. at 608. However, “carelessness is not compatible with

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a finding of diligence and offers no basis for a grant of relief.” Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609.

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Here, the parties have offered no cause, let alone good cause for amending the

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Scheduling Order. The parties simply agreeing to a date past the deadline established by

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the Court does not substitute diligence and establish good cause. Rather, it appears the

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parties “cavalierly disregarded” the scheduling order, at their own peril, and assumed the

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Court would simply rubber stamp their request. Johnson, 975 F.2d at 610. The parties have

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utterly failed to show good cause for both failing to schedule the inspection of the premises

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within the time frame set by the Court and for waiting until the eleventh hour to file a

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motion to request an extension of time. The Court expected the parties to demonstrate far

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more enthusiasm in conducting the inspection of Defendant’s credit union. It was certainly

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in the interest of all the parties to this lawsuit to convene at the credit union, inspect the

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overdraft protection program, and then swiftly analyze the merits of Plaintiff’s claims and

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Defendant’s defenses.

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Given the lackadaisical approach displayed by all parties to perform this simple task,

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the Court is left with the unmistakable impression that inspecting the credit union was not

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that important. The Court sincerely hopes this is not the approach that counsel intends to

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take with their other discovery obligations.

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III. CONCLUSION

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For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES the Joint Motion with prejudice.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: February 1, 2017

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