Hoffman v. Colvin
Filing
25
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION on 12 and 15 summary judgment motions. Objections to R&R due by 9/7/2017. A party may respond to any objection within 14 days of receiving it. Signed by Magistrate Judge Andrew G. Schopler on 8/24/2017.(jpp)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
Case No.: 16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
Mary M. HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff,
12
13
14
15
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MOTIONS (ECF Nos. 12 & 15)
v.
Nancy A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
16
17
In this Social Security appeal, plaintiff alleges that the Administrative Law Judge
18
erroneously found her mental impairments to be non-severe and improperly disregarded
19
her surgeon’s opinion about her physical ailments. Although the ALJ made some errors,
20
they were harmless. The decision to deny plaintiff’s disability-benefits application should,
21
therefore, be affirmed.
22
BACKGROUND
23
At Step Two of the five-step disability evaluation process, the ALJ ruled that
24
plaintiff Mary Hoffman had various severe physical impairments—joint disease, a spine
25
disorder, reconstructive joint surgery, and obesity—but that her depression and anxiety
26
were not severe. (AR 20.) At Step Four, the ALJ evaluated Hoffman’s residual functional
27
capacity—that is, “the most [work she] can still do despite [her] limitations.” 20 C.F.R.
28
§ 416.945(a)(1). In this analysis, the ALJ gave “little weight” to the opinion of treating
1
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
orthopedic surgeon Dr. Norman Kane, who felt Hoffman was physically disabled. The
2
judge instead found that she could still “perform the full range of sedentary work,” thereby
3
dooming her disability application. (See AR 23, 29.)
4
DISCUSSION
5
A.
Mental Impairments
6
(1) Step Two: Severity
7
Hoffman first faults the ALJ for concluding that her depression and anxiety were not
8
sufficiently severe to pass Step Two of the five-step evaluation process. This objection is
9
inconsequential for a couple reasons. First, because the ALJ went on to “extensively
10
discuss[]” Hoffman’s mental impairments “at Step 4 of the analysis,” any error in
11
“neglecting to list [those impairments as severe] at Step 2 . . . was harmless.” Lewis v.
12
Astrue, 498 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); (see AR 25-28). Second, even
13
at Step Two, Hoffman doesn’t challenge the ALJ’s “Paragraph B” conclusion that she had
14
at most “mild” mental-health limitations and no episodes of decompensation (AR 21),
15
which the regulations warn will “generally” lead to a finding that an “impairment[] is not
16
severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1); see Zueger v. Colvin, No. C14-180-MJP-BAT, 2014
17
WL 3752124, at *7 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2014) (holding that failing to contest an adverse
18
Paragraph B decision renders other Step Two errors harmless); Adams v. Astrue,
19
No. 11-cv-00477-MO, 2012 WL 1664815, at *3 (D. Or. May 10, 2012) (holding that
20
Step Two error “was harmless” because the claimant’s “mental impairments would still
21
fail to satisfy the ‘paragraph B’ criteria”).
22
(2) Step Four: Residual Functional Capacity
23
Perhaps because of these Step-Two harmless-error obstacles, Hoffman re-formulates
24
her argument in her reply brief as a critique of the ALJ’s Step-Four residual-function
25
analysis, during which he allegedly “minimize[ed] Ms. Hoffman’s mental impairments
26
without adequate justification.” (ECF No. 17, at 2.) Although this issue is arguably waived,
27
the Court will address it. See Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
28
that courts may not consider “an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief”).
2
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
ALJs need only support their residual-function determination with “substantial
2
evidence.” Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
3
“Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance; it is
4
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
5
conclusion.” Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2008)
6
(citation omitted).
7
Even accepting Hoffman’s entire critique of the ALJ’s reasoning, there was still
8
“substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s decision” based on “all the other reasons given
9
by the ALJ” for his “residual functional capacity,” so any error is “harmless.” See Batson
10
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2004). In fact, the ALJ gave
11
several compelling reasons that Hoffman barely challenges: (1) Hoffman “did not receive
12
specialized mental health treatment for over a year”; (2) “the State Agency program
13
psychologists” both found her mental impairments were “nonsevere”; and (3) after “a
14
comprehensive psychiatric evaluation,” the examining psychiatrist found she was at most
15
“mildly limited” and could “perform work activities on a consistent basis.” (AR 21, 26.)
16
Critically, nothing in the medical record rebuts the adverse opinions of these two consulting
17
psychologists and the examining psychiatrist. And even on the first point, Hoffman merely
18
notes that she received non-specialized mental health treatment during her year without a
19
specialist visit. (ECF No. 12, at 15-16.) But this rebuttal side-steps the ALJ’s argument:
20
that the lack of specialized psychiatric care “suggests her mental symptoms were not
21
significantly limiting and that treatment with medication prescribed by her primary care
22
physician was sufficient to manage her symptoms.” (AR 21.) So, even in their repackaged
23
form, Hoffman’s criticisms do not warrant reversal.
24
B.
Treating Physician Rule
25
Next, Hoffman complains that the ALJ improperly rejected the uncontradicted
26
opinion of her surgeon Dr. Kane. “If a treating physician’s opinion is ‘well-supported by
27
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent
28
with the other substantial evidence in [the] case record, [it will be given] controlling
3
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
weight.’” Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). When the
2
treating physician’s opinion is uncontradicted by any other doctor,1 an ALJ may only reject
3
it by stating “clear and convincing reasons that are supported by substantial evidence.”
4
Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). If
5
the ALJ chooses not to give that opinion “controlling weight,” the judge must decide what
6
weight to give it after “consider[ing] all of the following factors”:
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination;
nature and extent of the treatment relationship;
supportability (whether the medical opinion includes “supporting
explanations” and “relevant evidence,” particularly “medical signs and
laboratory findings”);
consistency with the record as a whole;
specialization (whether the opinion relates to the doctor’s specialty); and
any “other factors.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
14
(1) Failing to Explicitly Analyze All the Regulatory Factors
15
In explaining his rejection of Dr. Kane’s opinion, the ALJ did not explicitly analyze
16
each of these § 404.1527(c) factors. The Ninth Circuit has never expressly held that an ALJ
17
should. Yet that conclusion might seem implicit in the recent case of Trevizo v. Berryhill,
18
862 F.3d 987 (9th Cir. 2017), pet. for rehrg. filed, No. 15-16277 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2017),
19
when the Court wrote:
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
As the ALJ noted, Dr. Galhorta is Trevizo’s “primary treating
physician,” having treated her at least 22 times between 2008 and 2012. . . .
. . . . [T]he ALJ did not consider [§ 404.1527(c)] factors such as the
length of the treating relationship[ and] the frequency of examination. . . . This
failure alone constitutes reversible legal error.
1
Although the Commissioner argues the opinion “is contradicted” (ECF No. 15-1,
at 19 n.3), the ALJ “did not find that [Dr. Kane’s] opinion was contradicted by any of the
other physicians. We therefore treat [his] opinion as uncontradicted.” See Trevizo v.
Berryhill, 862 F.3d 987, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2017).
4
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
Id. at 997-98 (citation omitted). In other words, although it seems the ALJ “noted” a four-
2
year treating relationship with 22 examinations, the Trevizo Court nonetheless found the
3
ALJ did not “consider” that relationship’s length and frequency. A reasonable reading of
4
this language would be: When considering the regulatory factors, it is not enough to merely
5
mention the relevant facts; ALJs must explicitly set forth their analysis of those facts.
6
Because that holding would be dispositive here, this Court ordered the parties to submit
7
additional briefing on Trevizo.
8
Hoffman endorses this very interpretation. She argues that the Ninth Circuit has long
9
required express consideration of each regulatory factor and that Trevizo only “breaks new
10
ground . . . in prescribing the appropriate remedy where an ALJ breaches that duty.” (ECF
11
No. 24, at 2-3.) But Hoffman cites only three cases in her briefing, and none of them hold
12
that an ALJ must explicitly analyze each factor. See Ghanim v. Colvin, 763 F.3d 1154,
13
1161 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The ALJ is required to consider the factors set out in 20 C.F.R.
14
§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(6). . . .”) (citations omitted and emphasis added); Orn, 495 F.3d at 631
15
(“[T]he Administration considers specified factors. . . .”) (emphasis added); Holohan v.
16
Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1202 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he treating physician’s opinion . . .
17
must be weighted using all the factors provided in 20 [C.F.R.] § 404.1527.”) (alterations
18
and citations omitted; emphasis added).
19
The Commissioner, on the other hand, contends that many Ninth Circuit cases have
20
affirmed treating-physician decisions that lacked such an explicit factor-by-factor analysis,
21
and Trevizo cannot overrule such longstanding precedent. It is true that, absent intervening
22
Supreme Court authority, one three-judge Ninth Circuit panel “cannot reconsider or
23
overrule the decision of a prior panel.” United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 327 (9th Cir.
24
1992) (citations omitted). And “[i]n determining whether it is bound by an earlier
25
decision,” courts must consider not merely “the letter of particular precedents,” but also
26
the “reason and spirit of cases,” including “the facts giving rise to the dispute.” Hart v.
27
Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1170 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). With these guiding
28
principles in mind, it seems the Ninth Circuit has often considered similar “facts giving
5
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
rise to the dispute” and affirmed ALJs who did not reduce their evaluation of each
2
regulatory factor to writing. See, e.g., Bray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 554 F.3d 1219,
3
1221, 1227-28 (9th Cir. 2009) (affirming ALJ’s decision to give treating physician’s
4
opinion “little weight” based on four reasons that did not address certain regulatory
5
factors); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751-54 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming ALJ’s
6
rejection of treating physician’s opinion “based on the claimant’s own testimony, and the
7
opinions and evidence from” four other doctors, even though the ALJ’s discussion did not
8
cover all the regulatory factors). Yet it is not clear that this precise “dispute” has ever been
9
squarely presented to the Ninth Circuit, and this Court is reluctant to infer holdings about
10
issues that were not raised on appeal.
11
The Commissioner also argues that reading Trevizo to require “explicitly
12
articulat[ed] findings” about each factor would conflict with Social Security regulations
13
and rulings, as well as common practice. (ECF No. 23, at 2.) The regulations and rulings,
14
in fact, contain no express-analysis-of-each-and-every-factor requirement. See 20 C.F.R.
15
§ 404.1527(c) (“[W]e consider all of the following factors. . . .”) (emphasis added); id. at
16
§ 404.1527(c)(2) (“[W]e apply the factors” and “will always give good reasons . . . for the
17
weight we give your treating source’s medical opinion.”) (emphasis added); S.S.R. 96-2p,
18
available at 61 Fed. Reg. 34,490, 34,492 (July 2, 1996) (explaining that the ALJ’s decision
19
“must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the
20
adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight”).
21
And the Commissioner points out that if the mandate to “consider” each factor really meant
22
“expressly articulate the reasoning for,” then the regulations would not need to also insist
23
that ALJs set forth specific “reasons.” See Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 607-08 (2010)
24
(holding that courts should avoid “interpreting any statutory provision in a manner that
25
would render another provision superfluous”) (citation omitted).
26
If the Ninth Circuit intended to effect such a sea change in treating-physician practice
27
and procedure—requiring express factor-by-factor reasoning—one would expect the Court
28
to expressly say so. While there is no law against appellate irony, it is hard to fathom that
6
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
the Trevizo Court chose an implicit holding to announce a new rule of explicit findings.
2
This is especially true here since such a rule would contradict a straightforward reading of
3
the relevant regulations. Cf. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380-81 (2005) (“[W]hen
4
deciding which of two plausible statutory constructions to adopt, a court must consider the
5
necessary consequences of its choice. If one of them would raise a multitude of
6
constitutional problems, the other should prevail. . . .”).
7
Happily, Trevizo can be harmonized with the regulations, prior case law, and
8
established practice. We must simply adopt a more restrictive—and less intuitive—reading
9
of this sentence: “As the ALJ noted, Dr. Galhorta is Trevizo’s ‘primary treating physician,’
10
having treated her at least 22 times between 2008 and 2012.” 862 F.3d at 997 (emphasis
11
added). This Court concludes that the phrase “As the ALJ noted” applies only to the main
12
clause (italicized) and not to the remainder of the sentence. In other words, in Trevizo the
13
ALJ failed to note the treating relationship’s length or frequency, and also failed to
14
demonstrate that those factors were otherwise considered, which was error. Interpreted
15
thus, Trevizo does not demand a full-blown written analysis of all the regulatory factors; it
16
merely requires some indication that the ALJ considered them.
17
Thus, the ALJ’s failure to spell out his regulatory-factor rationale was not fatal here,
18
as the record sufficiently shows he considered the necessary elements. (See, e.g., AR 23-
19
24 (setting forth facts relevant to regulatory factors, such as Dr. Kane’s “orthopedist”
20
specialty and years-long treatment relationship with Hoffman).)
21
(2) Reasons for Rejecting Dr. Kane’s Opinion
22
Turning to the merits, Hoffman argues the ALJ rejected Dr. Kane’s opinion without
23
clear and convincing reasons. The ALJ’s four reasons are examined below.
24
(a) Subjective Symptom Reporting
25
First, the ALJ gave Dr. Kane’s opinion “little weight” because he “relied quite
26
heavily on [Hoffman’s] subjective report of symptoms and limitations,” and “seemed
27
uncritically to accept as true most, if not all,” of what Hoffman said, despite the fact that
28
“there are good reasons for questioning the reliability of the claimant’s subjective
7
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
complaints.” (AR 26.) “If a treating provider’s opinions are based to a large extent on an
2
applicant’s self-reports and not on clinical evidence, and the ALJ finds the applicant not
3
credible, the ALJ may discount the treating provider’s opinion.” Ghanim, 763 F.3d at 1162
4
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
5
Hoffman does not challenge the ALJ’s finding that she was not credible; instead she
6
focuses on whether Dr. Kane’s opinion was based primarily on her self-reports or on
7
clinical evidence. She points out that Dr. Kane “personally performed the most recent two
8
surgeries on her right knee,” which were prompted by the identification of “significant
9
abnormalities on imaging studies, which were themselves corroborated by clinical
10
findings.” (ECF No. 12, at 15.) It is undeniable that Dr. Kane had access to many objective
11
tests from which to draw conclusions, especially about Hoffman’s knees and hips. (See,
12
e.g., AR 396-98 (noting various clinical dysfunctions); AR 400-01, 403 (gait observed);
13
AR 406-07 (X-ray review); AR 409 (MRI review); AR 410 (physical exam and X-rays).)
14
The problem is that while Dr. Kane may have had access to such evidence, he does not
15
refer to any of it in his three written opinions. (See AR 374-75, 413-14, 695-702.) And
16
some of the limitations Dr. Kane identified do not obviously correspond to any objective
17
testing. (See AR 414 (noting restrictions on reaching, handling, fingering, and feeling); AR
18
700-01 (concluding that Hoffman was likely to miss work “[m]ore than three times a
19
month” and could tolerate only “low stress” work).)
20
Even if another judge might reach a different outcome on this same record, it was
21
rational for the ALJ to find that Dr. Kane relied too heavily on subjective complaints. See
22
Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Where the evidence is susceptible
23
to more than one rational interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the
24
ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.” (citation omitted)). This reason was clear and
25
convincing, and supported by substantial evidence.
26
(b) Unexplained Opinion Change—Cane Use
27
The ALJ also discredited Dr. Kane because his “opinion regarding claimant’s ability
28
to ambulate changed significantly within two weeks.” (AR 26.) On the April 18, 2013
8
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
medical source statement, Dr. Kane answered the question, “Does the patient use an
2
assistive device?”, by checking “No.” (AR 374-75.) But twelve days later—on the April 30,
3
2013 statement—he marked “Yes” to the same question, writing that it was “medically
4
necessary” for Hoffman to use a “Cane, when ambulating.” (AR 413-14.) The ALJ pointed
5
out that Dr. Kane “fail[ed] to provide an explanation of the evidence relied on in forming
6
his [new] opinion,” and that opinions lacking sufficient explanation or supporting evidence
7
are entitled to less weight. (AR 26); see Bayliss, 427 F.3d at 1216 (holding that an
8
unexplained “discrepancy” in a treating physician’s “recorded observations and opinions
9
regarding [a claimant’s] capabilities” is a “clear and convincing reason for not relying on
10
the doctor’s opinion”); Thomas, 278 F.3d at 957 (holding that when “[t]he record
11
contain[ed] no information to support” the treating doctor’s change of opinion, the ALJ
12
had a specific and legitimate reason for rejecting it).
13
Hoffman argues that “Dr. Kane did explain Ms. Hoffman’s temporary use of a cane:
14
She obtained it, without Dr. Kane having prescribed it, because she found it helpful for her
15
pain and stiffness, symptoms that flowed from her objectively corroborated right knee
16
osteoarthritis.” (ECF No. 12, at 19.) But the ALJ found that this conclusion was “based
17
almost entirely on claimant’s subjective claim[s],” not objective medical evidence.
18
(AR 26.) Of course, an alternative explanation for the change of opinion between April 18
19
and 30 is that Dr. Kane learned new information at an intervening appointment. (AR 414
20
(“Date last seen: 4/29/13”).) At that appointment, in fact, Dr. Kane recorded a “10º of
21
valgus to her right knee,” which was an uptick from the “7º valgus deformity” last
22
observed. (AR 396, 398.) Similarly, he noted that her knee’s “range of motion is about 3
23
to 5º to 115º,” a slight drop from her prior range of “0 to about 120º.” (AR 396, 398.) But
24
those same records also reflect increasing subjective complaints. (Compare AR 398 (On
25
April 8, 2013: “Hoffman’s right knee is not better. . . . She wants some pain pills. . . .”)
26
with AR 396 (On April 29, 2013: “She is very unhappy with the current state of her right
27
knee.”).) At any rate, in his medical source statements, Dr. Kane did not mention any of
28
this evidence, let alone explain whether such slight variations were medically significant.
9
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
Without such clarification, the ALJ rationally interpreted Dr. Kane’s change of opinion as
2
unexplained or based primarily on subjective complaints, and properly discounted it.
3
(c) Poorly Supported Opinion / Checkbox Forms
4
Another reason the ALJ disregarded Dr. Kane’s opinions was because of their very
5
format: “[c]heck box forms that do not set forth explanations.” (AR 26.) The Ninth Circuit
6
has not spoken with complete clarity on the subject of checkbox or fill-in-the-blank forms.
7
Compare Trevizo, 862 F.3d at 999 n.4 (“[T]he ALJ was not entitled to reject the responses
8
of a treating physician” simply because “those responses were provided on a ‘check-the-
9
box’ form, were not accompanied by comments, and did not indicate to the ALJ the basis
10
for the physician’s answers.” (citation omitted)); with Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104,
11
1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We have held that the ALJ may ‘permissibly reject check-off reports
12
that do not contain any explanation of the bases of their conclusions.’” (alterations and
13
citations omitted)).
14
The one thing that can safely be gleaned from this case law is that when a doctor
15
provides little explanation for an opinion, ALJs may afford it less weight, even if they can’t
16
reject it altogether. On these forms, Dr. Kane provided no explanation for the limitations
17
he checked off, other than conclusory diagnoses—no laboratory findings, no imaging
18
studies, no objective medical evidence. (See AR 374-75, 413-14, 695-702.) Thus, the ALJ
19
properly discounted his unexplained checkbox forms.
20
(d) Opinion Contradicted by Hoffman’s Own Statements
21
Finally, the ALJ found that “Dr. Kane’s opinions are inconsistent with [Hoffman’s]
22
own allegations that she was able to sit in a car for two hours and walk on uneven ground
23
without any increase in pain.” (AR 26; see AR 501.) Hoffman protests that the ALJ simply
24
“cherry-pick[ed]” a single “treatment note indicative of some temporary improvement,”
25
which was not “reflective of the entire trajectory of her treatment course.” (ECF No. 12,
26
at 21; see AR 501.) The Commissioner does not address this argument, and the Court
27
agrees with Hoffman. See, e.g., Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001)
28
(cautioning against “selective” reading of “treatment notes” and noting that medical
10
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
1
improvements “must be read in context of the overall diagnostic picture”). For instance,
2
the ALJ never mentions that days after that fateful car trip Hoffman was “not feeling well,”
3
and within a week of it her knee was already “achy.” (AR 26, 499-500.) Ten months later,
4
her condition deteriorated to the point that she was reportedly taking “1-2 oxycodone per
5
day for the pain,” without complete relief. (AR 543.) In light of her full treatment course,
6
the ALJ erred in finding that Dr. Kane’s opinions clashed with Hoffman’s self-reported
7
capabilities.
8
C.
Harmless Error Analysis
9
Because the ALJ relied on one invalid reason—and three valid ones—for doubting
10
Dr. Kane’s opinion, this Court must review for harmless error. See Marsh v. Colvin, 792
11
F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that “harmless error analysis applies in the social
12
security context,” including in the area of a “treating source’s medical opinion”); see also
13
Baily v. Colvin, 659 F. App’x 413, 415 (9th Cir. 2016) (“Any error in the ALJ’s additional
14
reasons for rejecting [the treating physician’s] opinions was harmless.”). The three
15
remaining reasons here were clear and convincing, and supported by substantial evidence
16
in the record. Thus, any error was harmless. Cf. Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1162-63 (holding
17
two invalid reasons for an adverse credibility finding were harmless error in light of the
18
remaining reasoning).
19
CONCLUSION
20
The Court recommends that plaintiff’s summary judgment motion (ECF No. 12) be
21
DENIED and defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 15) be
22
GRANTED. The parties must file any objections to this report by September 7, 2017. See
23
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party may respond to any objection within 14 days of receiving
24
it. Id.
25
Dated: August 24, 2017
26
27
28
11
16-cv-1976-JM-AGS
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?