Wick v. Colvin

Filing 24

ORDER adopting 23 Report and Recommendation on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denies Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and grants Defendants motion for summary judgment. Signed by Judge Jeffrey T. Miller on 9/22/2017. (jpp) M

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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RYAN DAVID WICK,

Case No.: 16cv1987 JM (AGS)
Plaintiff,

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ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION ON CROSSMOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

v.
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,

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Defendant.

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On August 8, 2016, Plaintiff Ryan David Wick filed a complaint, pursuant to 42

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U.S.C. § 405(g), asking for judicial review of the denial of Social Security disability

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benefits. (Doc. No. 1.) On January 30, 2017, Plaintiff moved for summary judgment.

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(Doc. No. 13.) Shortly thereafter, Defendant Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner of

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Social Security, did the same. (Doc. No. 14.) Magistrate Judge Andrew G. Schopler issued

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a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that this court deny Plaintiff’s

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motion and grant Defendant’s motion. (Doc. No. 23.) Neither party filed objections to the

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R&R by the date required. Now, having carefully considered the thorough and thoughtful

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R&R, the record before the court, the applicable authorities, and the absence of any

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objections to the R&R, the court adopts the R&R in its entirety and grants summary
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judgment in favor of Defendant.

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BACKGROUND
The court hereby incorporates by reference the background presented in the R&R.
(Doc. No. 23 at 2.)

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LEGAL STANDARDS

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A.

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The duties of the district court in connection with a magistrate judge’s R&R are

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governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b). The district court

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“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection

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is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings

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or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also United

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States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–74 (1980); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore

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Bus. Machines, Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). If neither party contests the

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magistrate judge’s proposed findings of fact, “the court may assume their correctness and

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decide the motion on the applicable law.” Orand v. United States, 602 F.2d 207, 208 (9th

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Cir. 1979). The magistrate judge’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, however,

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regardless of whether any party filed objections thereto. See Robbins v. Carey, 481 F.3d

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1143, 1146–47 (9th Cir. 2007).

District Court Review of R&R

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B.

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Under the Social Security Act, an unsuccessful claimant may seek judicial review of

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the Commissioner’s final agency decision. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3). As indicated

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in the R&R, the court “may set aside a denial of benefits only if it is not supported by

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substantial evidence or is based on legal error.” Garcia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F.3d

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925, 929 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1999) (“The

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ALJ’s decision denying the disability insurance benefits will be disturbed only if that

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decision is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error.”).

Judicial Review of the Commissioner’s Decision

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“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla but less than a preponderance.”

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Tidwell, 161 F.3d at 601 (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
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evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Parra v.

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Astrue, 481 F.3d 742, 746 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human

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Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995)). If the evidence “can reasonably support either

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affirming or reversing the decision, [the court] may not substitute [its] judgment for that of

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the Commissioner.” Id.

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C.

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To determine whether a claimant is disabled under Title II of the Social Security

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Act, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) must employ the five-step sequential process laid

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out in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). However, the inquiry does not end there. As indicated

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in the R&R, disability benefits are prohibited if drug addiction is “a contributing factor

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material to the Commissioner’s determination that the individual is disabled.” Parra, 481

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F.3d at 746 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). The court incorporates by reference the

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legal standard presented in the R&R. (Doc. No. 23 at 3, ¶ 2.) Ultimately, the claimant

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“bears the burden of proving that his substance abuse is not a material contributing factor

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to his disability.” Parra, 481 F.3d at 748.

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Drug Abuse as a Material Contributing Factor to Disability

DISCUSSION

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Plaintiff, while not contesting the ALJ’s finding that he abused drugs, argues that

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the ALJ’s finding that such drug abuse was a material contributing factor to his disability

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“lacks the support of substantial evidence.” (See Doc. No. 13-1 at 4–7.) In his R&R,

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Magistrate Judge Schopler rejected Plaintiff’s argument and found that the ALJ’s finding

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is supported by substantial record evidence. This court agrees.

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First, Plaintiff failed to carry his burden to produce evidence that his drug abuse was

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not a material contributing factor to his disability. See Parra, 481 F.3d at 748 (affirming

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denial of benefits because the claimant failed to carry his burden of proving that his

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alcoholism was not a material contributing factor to his disability). Dr. Nathan Strahl

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testified that Plaintiff’s schizophrenia likely resulted from his drug abuse, and it was

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exacerbated by Plaintiff’s voluntary non-compliance with prescribed treatment. (A.R. 19,

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60–62, 67–68.) Dr. Strahl’s testimony provided the ALJ with substantial evidence to
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support his conclusion regarding the effect Plaintiff’s drug abuse had on his schizophrenia.

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Second, the ALJ appropriately gave less weight to the letter from Plaintiff’s mother,

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Suzanne Browne, because it contained inaccurate information about Plaintiff’s drug use.

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See Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005) (“An ALJ need only give

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germane reasons for discrediting the testimony of lay witnesses.” (citing Lewis v. Apfel,

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236 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 2001))). The available medical records and admissions made

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by Plaintiff contradicted Ms. Browne’s statement regarding his drug use. (See A.R. 17–

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18, 262, 272; Doc. No. 13-1 at 8.) The ALJ thus concluded that Ms. Browne “may not be

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as aware of [Plaintiff’s] activities and symptoms as she may believe she is”; accordingly,

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he gave her letter “less weight.” (A.R. 18.)

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In sum, the court finds that the agency’s decision is not based on legal error or

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unsupported by substantial evidence. Therefore, it will not be disturbed. Tidwell, 161 F.3d

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at 601.

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CONCLUSION

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For the reasons stated, the court adopts the R&R in its entirety. Accordingly, the

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court denies Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grants Defendant’s motion for

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summary judgment. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: September 22, 2017
JEFFREY T. MILLER
United States District Judge

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