U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. PC Iron, Inc. et al

Filing 19

ORDER on 12 Motion to Intervene. Signed by Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo on 8/31/2017. (acc)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,

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ORDER ON MOTION TO
INTERVENE
[Doc. No. 12]

Plaintiff,

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Case No.: #:16-cv-02372-CAB-(WVG)

v.
PC IRON, INC.,
Defendant.

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This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff-Intervenor Elsa Perez’s (“Ms.

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Perez”) motion for leave to intervene. [Doc. No. 12.] The Court finds the matter suitable

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for determination on the papers submitted in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1)

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and therefore denies Defendant’s request for oral argument [Doc. No. 17]. For the reasons

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set forth below, the Court grants the motion.

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I.

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On September 21, 2016, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

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(“EEOC” or the “Commission”), in its capacity as the federal agency charged with the

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interpretation, administration, and enforcement of federal statutes banning employment

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discrimination, filed a complaint alleging Defendant engaged in unlawful employment

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practices in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and § 102 of the Civil

Background

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Rights Act of 1991. [Doc. No. 1.] In the complaint, Ms. Perez is identified as the Charging

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Party whose allegations provide the basis of the EEOC’s action. [Id.]

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On December 15, 2016, the EEOC filed an amended complaint alleging violations

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of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended the Pregnancy Discrimination Act

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of 1978, and Title I of the Civil Rights Act of 1991(“Title VII”) to correct Defendant’s

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alleged unlawful employment practices on the basis of sex and to provide appropriate relief

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to Charging Party Perez. [Doc. No. 5.]

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On August 1, 2017 Ms. Perez filed her motion seeking to intervene in this action as

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of right because she has a significant interest in the underlying action. [Doc. No. 12.] On

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August 3, 2017, the EEOC filed a notice of non-opposition. [Doc. No. 13.] Defendant

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filed its response in opposition [Doc. No. 14] and Ms. Perez filed her reply [Doc. No. 16].

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On August 30, 2017, Defendant filed a request for oral argument on the motion for leave

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to intervene. [Doc. No. 17.] On the same day, Ms. Perez filed a response to the request

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for oral argument. [Doc. No. 18.]

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II.

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Ms. Perez seeks to intervene in this action as of right claiming she has a significant

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interest in the underlying action. [Doc. No. 12.] Further, Ms. Perez asserts that the

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substantial overlap in the evidence needed to prove both the Title VII and her individual

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state law claims provides additional grounds for the Court to invoke its supplemental

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jurisdiction. [Id. at 2.] Ms. Perez wishes to pursue her remedies for compensatory

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damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief under Title VII and the California Fair

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Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) claims. Defendant opposes the intervention on

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the grounds that it is untimely, would cause it substantial prejudice and Ms. Perez’s rights

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are adequately represented by the EEOC. [Doc. No. 14.] Defendant’s response in

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opposition focuses solely on Ms. Perez’s intervention as of right argument and is silent

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regarding her supplemental jurisdiction request.

Discussion

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A. Intervention as of Right

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Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides “(a) Intervention of Right.

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On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who: (1) is given an

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unconditional right to intervene by federal statute. . . .” Title VII, as amended, expressly

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provides that the person aggrieved by a violation of Title VII shall have the right to

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intervene in a civil action brought by the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (“The person

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or persons aggrieved shall have the right to intervene in a civil action brought by the

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Commission or the Attorney General in a case involving a government, governmental

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agency, or political subdivision.”) See also EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 675 F.2d

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164, 165 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. ABM Industries, Inc., 249 FRD 588, 590 (E.D. Cal.

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2008).

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Here, the parties do not dispute that Ms. Perez is an aggrieved person because she

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filed the charge upon which the EEOC’s lawsuit is based. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.,

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534 U.S. 279, 291 (2002) (“If . . . the EEOC files suit on its own, the employee . . . may

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intervene in the EEOC’s suit.”). Thus, Ms. Perez has the right to intervene.

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In determining whether the application to intervene has been timely requested a court

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should broadly construe the requirements of Rule 24 in favor of the moving party. Sw.

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Center for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 2001). Factors to

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consider include: (1) the stage of the proceedings; (2) the reason for any delay in moving

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to intervene; and (3) whether the parties would be prejudiced. Nw. Forest Resource

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Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 836-37 (9th Cir. 1996). “[T]he timeliness requirement

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for intervention as of right should be treated more leniently than for permissive intervention

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because of the likelihood of harm.” U.S. v. State of Or., 745 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1984).

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The procedural posture of this case does not weigh against granting the application

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to intervene. It is two months prior to the close of fact discovery and over ten months to

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the July 20, 2018 trial date. [See Doc. No. 11.]

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As to the second factor, timeliness, the parties dispute whether or not the motion to

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intervene has been brought in a timely manner. Defendant asserts that Ms. Perez has not
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provided adequate justification for her delay, has been aware of this action since she filed

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a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on August 24, 2012, has been actively involved

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in this case and was aware of the deadline to intervene, and the delay in moving to intervene

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was caused by her own lack of diligence. The Court does not agree with Defendant’s

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position. Although a year has elapsed since the filing of this complaint, the Court does not

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find this a dispositive factor in determining the timeliness of the motion. See U.S. v.

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Oregon, 745 F.2d 550, 552 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Mere lapse of time is not determinative”).

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The unavoidable circumstances faced by Ms. Perez including her own hospitalization,

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son’s health issues and her full-time work schedule caused the delay in filing [Doc. No.

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12-3 at ¶¶ 2-4] are sufficient reasons to warrant the delay.

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Related to the third factor, Defendant argues that it will suffer considerable prejudice

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if forced to litigate Ms. Perez’s claims because the addition six causes of action will

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inevitably prolong the litigation and increase its costs. But, the fact that discovery remains

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open in this case and key depositions are yet to be taken are factors that weigh in favor of

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finding that the parties are unlikely to prejudiced at this stage of the proceedings. See

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EEOC v. Univ. of Phoenix, Inc., 2008 WL 1971396 at *1 (D. Ariz. May 2, 2008) (holding

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that motion to intervene was timely and unlikely to prejudice the parties when discovery

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remained open and would not have to be extended, and the intervenor’s claims gave rise to

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the EEOC suit). Ms. Perez has shown that her claims share common questions of fact and

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are, without a doubt, part of the same case and controversy – but for Ms. Perez’s reporting

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of the alleged discriminatory acts the EEOC would not have filed suit. The only real

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material difference between the claims the EEOC is pursuing and Ms. Perez’s is that she

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is seeking damages in excess of the damages that the EEOC can obtain pursuant to Title

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VII. As succinctly stated in the motion, all “claims share a common nucleus of operative

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fact” and “the evidence needed to resolve Ms. Perez’s state law claims substantially

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overlaps with the evidence relevant to the federal claims.” [Doc. No. 12-1 at 4:12-14.]

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Additionally, the EECO has filed a non-opposition to the present motion which illustrates

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that it does not believe it will be prejudiced by the addition of Ms. Perez. [Doc. No. 13.]
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Further, Ms. Perez asserts that she “intends to abide by other upcoming deadlines set in

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this Court’s Scheduling Order,” [Doc. No. 12-1 at 5:25-26], and that she “intends to

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coordinate her discovery efforts with the EEOC to avoid delay and duplication [Doc. No.

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Finally, Defendant claims that in order to sufficiently demonstrate her intervention

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as a matter of right, Ms. Perez must demonstrate that the applicant’s interest must be

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inadequately represented by the parties before the court. [Doc. No. 14 at 7.] Defendant

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posits that Ms. Perez has neither argued that her interest has not been adequately presented

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nor provided any evidence that it has not been adequately represented, has therefore failed

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to meet the standard for intervention and, as a consequence, her motion must be denied.

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Ms. Perez disputes the applicability of the standard relied on by Defendant and counters

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that the very nature of the EEOC, as a federal agency, prevents it from adequately

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representing her claim.

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) requires a court to permit anyone to

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intervene as a matter of right who, absent a federal statute providing an unconditional right,

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on timely motion:

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claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the subject of
the action, and is so situated that disposing of the action may as a practical
matter impair or impede the movant’s ability to protect its interest, unless
existing parties adequately represent that interest.

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Ms. Perez’s intervention as a matter of right has been authorized by a federal statute, Title

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VII, therefore she is not required to prove this adequacy requirement. Regardless, the Court

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agrees with Ms. Perez that “[w]hen the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit

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of specific individuals, it acts also to vindicate the public interest in preventing employment

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discrimination.” See General Tel. of the Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980). Plaintiff’s

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assertion that the EEOC’s interests in preventing employment discrimination under Title

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VII will diverge from her interest in pursuing her state law claims and pursuing damages

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under FEHA satisfies her burden of showing adequacy. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological

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Diversity v. Berg, 268 F.3d 810, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Trbovich v. United Mine

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Workers, 404 U.S. 528 (1972)) (“[T]he burden of showing inadequacy is ‘minimal,’ and

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the applicant need only show that representation of its interests by existing parties ‘may

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be’ inadequate.”) Therefore, the Court finds Ms. Perez has established that the EEOC will

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not adequately represent her interests.

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After weighing the three factors, the Court exercises its discretion and finds that the

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request to intervene was timely and concludes that Ms. Perez has established that she is

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entitled to intervene as of right.

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B. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State Law Claims

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Ms. Perez requests the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over her state law

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claims for pregnancy discrimination, harassment and other claims because they share

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common questions of law and fact with the Title VII claims and the evidence necessary to

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prove all claims substantially overlaps. [Doc. 12-1 at 2.]

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28 U.S.C. § 1367 provides in pertinent part that: “district courts shall have

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supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action

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within such original jurisdiction that the form part of the same case or controversy under

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Article III of the United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Further, the statute

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provides express circumstances where district courts are not always required to entertain

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state law claims, even when they form part of the same case or controversy. 1

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“While discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law

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claims is triggered by the presence of one of the conditions in § 1367(c), it is informed by

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the Gibbs values ‘of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.

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The Court chooses to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Perez’s state law

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claims in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367. The state law claims involve the same

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District courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction when: (1) the claim raises a novel or
complex issue of state law; (2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the court has original jurisdiction; (3) the court has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction; or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c).
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operative facts as the EEOC’s and her individual Title VII claims, and trying both cases in

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the same action will save the parties’ time and money and will not prejudice the parties.

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III.

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For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Perez’s motion to intervene is GRANTED. The

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Court gives Ms. Perez permission to file the Complaint in Intervention attached as Exhibit

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“A” to her motion. Defendant shall respond to the Complaint in Intervention within the

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limits established by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

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Conclusion

It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 31, 2017

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