Diaz v. Montgomery

Filing 13

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION for Order denying 1 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed by Steven Michael Diaz. Objections to R&R due by 7/17/2017. Replies due by 7/27/2017. Signed by Magistrate Judge Nita L. Stormes on 6/22/2017.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(acc)

Download PDF
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 Case No.: 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) Steven Michael Diaz, Petitioner, 12 13 v. 14 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION FOR ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS [Dkt. No. 1] W.L. Montgomery, 15 Respondent. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 Petitioner Steven Michael Diaz, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 2 petition for writ of habeas corpus (Petition) alleging that his right to effective assistance 3 of counsel was violated when (1) appellate counsel failed to brief three issues on appeal 4 regarding the trial court’s admission of certain evidence; and (2) trial counsel failed to 5 object to admission of that same evidence. Petition, pp. 6a, 6f. 6 Respondent filed an answer, arguing that the first claim is unexhausted, and that in 7 any event both claims fail on the merits. Diaz filed a traverse. For the following reasons, 8 the court RECOMMENDS that the district judge DENY the habeas petition and dismiss 9 it with prejudice. 10 I. BACKGROUND1 11 A. Relevant Facts. 12 From September 13 to October 7, 2013, there was a series of seven robberies at gas 13 stations throughout San Diego County in which the perpetrator arrived and left the scene 14 in an older model black BMW. He wore a hooded sweater with a bandana over the lower 15 part of his face. On two occasions, he wore a sweatshirt with an emblem on the back. 16 Each time, the perpetrator brandished a gun at the cashier or clerk and demanded all the 17 money from the register. On September 25, the perpetrator was not wearing gloves. A 18 surveillance camera located above the cash register recorded the perpetrator’s tattooed 19 hands as he removed the cash. 20 San Diego Police Department Detective John Smith sent a photo of the 21 perpetrator’s tattoos to law enforcement agencies and received Diaz’s name from his 22                                                 23 24 25 26 27 28 This court quotes verbatim the factual background from the California Court of Appeal’s opinion. Lodgment 8. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (“a determination of a factual issue made by a state court shall be presumed to be correct”); Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 545−47 (1981) (deference is owed to factual findings of state trial and appellate courts); Garvin v. Farmon, 258 F.3d 951, 952 (9th Cir. 2001) (paraphrasing facts from the state court opinion). Petitioner may rebut the presumption of factual correctness only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Slovik v. Yates, 545 F.3d 1181, 1183 n.1 (9th Cir. 2008). 1 2 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 parole officer. Smith obtained a copy of Diaz’s tattoos and determined they were 2 identical to the tattoos recorded on September 25. On October 9, 2013, police officers 3 arrested Diaz outside his mother’s home as he was leaving with his girlfriend in her black 4 2000 BMW 740-IL. Diaz’s girlfriend said she allowed Diaz to use her BMW while she 5 was working. 6 Officers searched Diaz’s mother’s home and found several articles of clothing 7 matching the clothing worn by the perpetrator during the robberies. When detective 8 Smith showed photos of the perpetrator’s tattoos to Diaz’s mother, Maryanne Bennetch, 9 she sighed and said they looked like Diaz’s tattoos. 10 At a pretrial hearing, defense counsel asked the court to limit the detective’s 11 testimony about the parole agent’s identification of Diaz. The prosecutor planned to 12 introduce photos of Diaz’s tattooed hands and the perpetrator’s tattooed hands in 13 evidence but also wanted the officers to testify about their investigations. The trial court 14 said that although the investigation was interesting, it was not part of the People’s case. 15 Nevertheless, the court did not want to invite speculation by the jurors if there was a gap 16 in chronology. The court ruled the detective could not testify that a parole officer 17 identified Diaz. Instead, the detective could say he circulated a photo of the tattoos and 18 another law enforcement officer informed him that Diaz may have similar tattoos. The 19 prosecutor and defense counsel agreed to the proposed limitation of the detective’s 20 testimony. 21 At trial, victims and bystanders from each gas station testified. One witness saw 22 Diaz’s face before Diaz pulled a bandana over his mouth and nose, and identified him in 23 court. Several witnesses noticed the perpetrator’s older model black BMW. One witness 24 identified it as a 740 series BMW. 25 The prosecution introduced surveillance videos from all but one of the gas station 26 robberies. Deputy Sheriff Nikolas Katrantzis testified he secured the surveillance video 27 at an ARCO gas station in Spring Valley but the video had been lost due to human error. 28 The prosecutor asked Katrantzis, “What did you see in the video?” Without objection, 3 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 Katrantzis said the video showed a person exiting a black BMW, entering the store, 2 pointing a gun at the clerk, taking money out of the cash register, and leaving the store. 3 Detective Smith testified about his investigation into the gas station robberies, his 4 identification and arrest of Diaz, and Bennetch’s identification of Diaz’s tattoos and 5 clothing. Bennetch denied making those statements to Smith. 6 Detectives Smith and Stan Schwarz testified it was unusual to have a BMW 7 involved in a robbery. Over objection, Detective Smith said to his knowledge, there had 8 not been any other robberies in San Diego County involving a 7 series BMW in the year 9 following Diaz’s arrest. 10 After the close of evidence, the trial court said several of the officers had testified 11 about robbery patterns and asked whether the defense wanted an expert opinion 12 instruction. Defense counsel said the police did not testify as experts. She did not want 13 too much weight given to their testimony. The trial court said the expert witness 14 instruction was a defense-friendly instruction required by statute to address that issue. (§ 15 1127, sub. (b).) Counsel withdrew her objection to the instruction. 16 After the verdict, in a bifurcated proceeding, Diaz admitted he was convicted for 17 robbery in 2008. This count was alleged both as a strike and a prison prior. The 18 information also alleged a second prison prior for aggravated assault with a deadly 19 weapon on an inmate. Diaz was convicted and sentenced to a consecutive second term. 20 Diaz admitted the prison assault. 21 At sentencing, Diaz filed a motion to dismiss the strike under section 1385 and 22 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 530 (Romero). The court 23 denied the motion, stating that although the previous robbery was relatively minor, the 24 nature and circumstances of the current offenses were extreme. In addition, Diaz 25 committed the current offenses while he was on parole. The trial court also determined 26 the consecutive sentence for the prison assault was a second prison prior under People v. 27 Walkkein (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409-1411. 28 /// 4 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 The trial court sentenced Diaz to 29 years in prison, imposing the upper term of 2 five years on count 1, doubled to 10 years for the prior strike; the midterm of one year on 3 counts 2 through 7, each doubled for the strike, for a total of 12 years; five years on the 4 2008 robbery; and one year for each prison prior, for a total of two years. The trial court 5 imposed fines, fees and restitution, and credited Diaz with custody credits. 6 B. Procedural History. 7 After the conviction Diaz’s appellate counsel found no arguable appellate issues. 8 She filed a Wende2 brief and identified 10 potential issues. Lodgment 5. Diaz then filed 9 a supplemental brief with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) based on 10 counsel’s failure to (1) object to “profile evidence” regarding the use of BMWs in 11 robberies; (2) object to testimony about the investigation that led to Diaz being identified 12 as a suspect; and (3) request a limiting instruction about law enforcement’s investigatory 13 steps, profile evidence and opinions. Lodgment 7. Diaz also asked that eight of the 10 14 issues appellate counsel identified receive further briefing or consideration. Lodgment 7, 15 p.26. 16 The court of appeal found that the eight identified issues and the ineffective 17 assistance of counsel claim all lacked merit. Lodgment 8. Diaz then filed a petition for 18 review with the California Supreme Court that alleged UAC on these bases: (1) appellate 19 counsel was ineffective by failing to brief the trial counsel’s deficient performance on the 20 three evidentiary issues Diaz identified in his IAC claim to the appellate court; and (2) 21 trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the identified evidence at trial. 22 Lodgment 9, pp.13, 17. The California Supreme Court summarily denied review. 23 Lodgment 10. 24 25 Diaz filed this Petition alleging IAC based on the same two claims he raised in the petition for review with the California Supreme Court. Dkt. No. 1. 26 27                                                 28 2 People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436, 441-442 (1979). 5 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 A. Exhaustion of Claim 1. 3 Habeas petitioners who wish to challenge either their state court conviction or the 4 length of their confinement in state prison must first exhaust their state judicial remedies. 5 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 134 (1987). To exhaust a 6 claim, a petitioner must “fairly present[] his federal claim to the highest state court with 7 jurisdiction to consider it . . . or . . . demonstrate[] that no state remedy remains 8 available.” Johnson v. Zenon, 88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). The 9 petitioner must raise the very same federal claims brought in the federal petition before 10 the state supreme court. See Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66 (1995). For 11 example, “[i]f a habeas petitioner wishes to claim that an evidentiary ruling at a state 12 court trial denied him the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 he must say so, not only in federal court, but in state court.” Id. at 366. 14 Diaz raised both claims alleged in the Petition to the California Supreme Court. 15 But Respondent points out that the first claim for appellate IAC may not be properly 16 exhausted because Diaz did not present the IAC claim regarding appellate counsel to the 17 court of appeal in his supplemental brief filed with that court. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(c)(1) 18 (“As a policy matter, on petition for review the Supreme Court normally will not consider 19 an issue that the petitioner failed to timely raise in the Court of Appeal.”). Further, 20 Respondent argues that California courts encourage prisoners to raise IAC claims on 21 habeas review. Despite this possibility of unexhaustion, Respondent argues that the 22 claim is without merit and should be denied. 23 If the court assumes for the purpose of this analysis that Claim 1 is unexhausted, 24 the court could review the claim on the merits notwithstanding the failure to exhaust. See 25 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the 26 merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in 27 the courts of the State.”). Specifically, a “federal court may deny an unexhausted petition 28 on the merits only when it is perfectly clear that the applicant does not raise even a 6 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 colorable federal claim.” Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 623-624 (9th Cir. 2005). If 2 the court proceeds with reviewing an unexhausted claim, it must review it de novo. 3 Bovarie v. Giurbino, 558 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1037 (C.D. Cal. 2008); see Lucas v. Davis, 4 2017 WL 1807907, at *9 (S.D. Cal. May 5, 2017) (noting “the ‘plainly meritless’ 5 standard is akin to that of a ‘colorable’ claim). A claim is “plainly meritless” or “not 6 colorable” if “‘it is perfectly clear that the petitioner has no hope of prevailing.’” Lucas, 7 2017 WL 1807907 (citing Cassett, 406 F.3d at 624). 8 But Claim 1 appears to be either actually or technically exhausted. Here, the 9 California Supreme Court denied the petition for review that contained the appellate IAC 10 claim in question. Because this claim was presented to the highest state court, and the 11 language of Rule 8.500(c)(1) leaves room for a possible exception to the rule that 12 requires a claim to first be presented to the court of appeal, the claim may in fact be 13 actually exhausted. See Cal. R. Ct. 8.500(c)(1) (stating “the Supreme Court normally will 14 not consider an issue…” (emphasis added)). Given that the California Supreme Court 15 ruled on Claim 1 without mention of the impropriety of the claim being before it, it is 16 likely that Claim 1 is actually exhausted. 17 Alternatively, Claim 1 may be technically exhausted if a return to state court would 18 be futile. If Diaz were to return to state court, he already exhausted his direct appeal, so 19 the only option left for him would be to file a habeas petition. But his time for filing a 20 habeas petition in the California courts expired because he would have had, at most, 60 21 days to file his habeas petition from the time the California Supreme Court denied his 22 petition for review on November 10, 2015. Thus, Diaz would have had to file a habeas 23 petition no later than early January 2016. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 199-201 24 (2006) (holding that federal courts should assume that California courts consider petitions 25 filed after unexplained delays of 30 to 60 days to be untimely); Walker v. Martin, 562 26 U.S. 307, 312 (2011) (holding that California’s timeliness requirement providing that a 27 prisoner must seek habeas relief without “substantial delay” as “measured from the time 28 the petitioner or counsel knew, or should reasonably have known, of the information 7 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 offered in support of the claim and the legal basis for the claim,” is clearly established 2 and consistently applied). 3 Because Diaz would no longer be able to pursue Claim 1 in state court, the claim is 4 technically exhausted. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732 (1991) (AA habeas 5 petitioner who has defaulted his federal claims in state court meets the technical 6 requirements for exhaustion; there are no state remedies any longer >available= to him@); 7 Phillips v. Woodford, 267 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2001) (Athe district court correctly 8 concluded that Phillip=s claims were nonetheless exhausted because a return to state court 9 would be futile@). To the extent Claim 1 meets the actual or technical requirements of 10 exhaustion, the court recommends the claim be denied on the merits for the reasons set 11 forth below. 12 B. Legal Standard Under AEDPA. 13 The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) of 1996 governs 14 this Petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997). Under AEDPA, a federal court 15 will not grant a habeas petition with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in 16 state court, unless that adjudication was (1) contrary to or involved an unreasonable 17 application of clearly established federal law; or (2) based on an unreasonable 18 determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); 19 Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003). 20 To determine whether a state court “unreasonably applied” Supreme Court law or 21 “unreasonably determined” the facts, this court reviews the last reasoned state court 22 decision on the merits. Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir. 2004). When 23 no state court provides a reasoned decision on the merits, this court must independently 24 review the record. Stanley v. Cullen, 633 F.3d 852, 860 (9th Cir. 2003); Himes v. 25 Thomspon, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that an independent review of 26 the record is the only basis to see whether a silent state court decision is objectively 27 reasonable). 28 /// 8 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 A summary denial of petitioner’s claim is presumed to be a denial on the merits. 2 See Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120, 1126 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a petition for 3 failure to state a prima facie case constitutes a denial on the merits). While conducting an 4 independent review of the record, the federal court cannot analyze just what the state 5 court did when it issued a summary denial; it must review the state court record to 6 determine whether there was any “reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” 7 Harrington v. Ritcher, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). 8 9 Here, the California Supreme Court issued a summary denial of both of Diaz’s claims, which constitutes a denial on the merits. See Lodgment 10. The state court gave 10 a reasoned opinion as to Claim 2. Lodgment 8. And while the IAC issue of appellate 11 counsel was not expressly before it, the appellate court made a finding as to appellate 12 counsel’s performance. Lodgment 8, p.9. 13 14 15 C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 1. Legal Standard. A defendant is denied his constitutional right to counsel when a defense attorney’s 16 performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and consequently 17 prejudices the defense. Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003); Strickland v. 18 Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Counsel’s errors must be so serious that the 19 result of the proceeding was fundamentally unfair or unreliable. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 20 506 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1993). In assessing counsel’s performance, the court employs a 21 strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and exercised reasonable 22 professional judgment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 23 The Strickland standard is “clearly established law” for AEDPA purposes. 24 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000). Petitioner carries the burden to show the 25 state court applied Strickland to the facts here in an objectively unreasonable manner. 26 Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24-25 (2002). “An unreasonable application of 27 federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.” Id. (quotations 28 omitted). The court’s review of counsel’s performance is “doubly deferential when it is 9 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 conducted through the lens of federal habeas.” Yarborough, 540 U.S. at 6. The “doubly 2 deferential” standard “gives both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of 3 the doubt.” Burt v. Titlow, __ U.S. __, 134 S.Ct. 10, 13 (2013) (citation omitted). 4 5 2. Claim 1: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel. Diaz filed an IAC claim based on appellate counsel’s failure to brief an IAC claim 6 based on trial counsel’s failure to: (1) object to “profile evidence” regarding the use of 7 BMWs in robberies; (2) object to testimony about the investigation that led to Diaz being 8 identified as a suspect; and (3) request a limiting instruction about law enforcement’s 9 investigatory steps, profile evidence and opinions. The court of appeal made an express 10 finding that appellate counsel was competent on Diaz’s appeal: “A review of the record 11 pursuant to Wende and Anders, including the issues suggested by counsel and appellant, 12 has disclosed no reasonably arguable appellate issues. Diaz has been represented by 13 competent counsel on this appeal.” Lodgment 8, p.9. Further, the appellate court went 14 through each of the identified types of evidence and jury instruction and determined that 15 trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to them, as addressed below. 16 “The proper standard for evaluating [a] claim that appellate counsel was ineffective 17 . . . is that enunciated in Strickland.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) 18 (citation omitted); Morrison v. Estelle, 981 F.2d 425, 427 (9th Cir. 1992). To establish 19 prejudice in the context of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must 20 show a reasonable probability that he would have prevailed on appeal absent counsel’s 21 errors. Smith, 528 U.S. at 285 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). As with ineffective 22 assistance of trial counsel claims: “The performance component need not be addressed 23 first. ‘If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of 24 sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.’” 25 Id., n. 14 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697). 26 In its order addressing Petitioner’s direct appeal, the court of appeal—after 27 reviewing the record pursuant to People v. Wende, 25 Cal.3d 436 (1979) and Anders v. 28 California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)—found no reasonably arguable appellate issues, and that 10 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 appellate counsel competently represented Diaz on the appeal. Lodgment 8, p.9. Further, 2 the appellate court gave a reasoned decision as to why Diaz suffered no prejudice from 3 the allowed evidence and jury instruction that he complains appellate counsel failed to 4 brief. 5 Diaz complains in the traverse that because he raised reasonable arguments in his 6 supplemental brief, he was entitled to counsel that argued those issues on appeal. 7 Traverse, p.19. To be effective under Strickland, “counsel need not appeal every possible 8 question of law.” Turner v. Calderon, 281 F.3d 851, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal 9 quotation omitted). On direct appeal, the appellate court reviewed the record itself for 10 any appealable issues. It did not find any. Lodgment 8. When Diaz raised in his 11 supplemental brief to the appellate court all the claims he presumably asserts that 12 appellate counsel failed to argue in the direct appeal, the state appellate court denied 13 those claims. Appellate counsel’s failure to raise all the claims Diaz wanted raised, along 14 with the state court’s findings that those claims had no merit, show that counsel was not 15 ineffective under Strickland. 16 Based on these findings, this court finds that the state court’s finding that appellate 17 counsel was competent and that Diaz suffered no prejudice from the permitted evidence 18 and jury instruction was neither contrary to, nor involved an unreasonable application of, 19 clearly established federal law, and was not based on an unreasonable determination of 20 the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. 21 22 3. Claim 2: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel. Diaz claims that trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to: (1) object to 23 “profile evidence” regarding the use of BMWs in robberies; (2) object to testimony about 24 the investigation that led to Diaz being identified as a suspect; and (3) request a limiting 25 instruction about law enforcement’s investigatory steps, profile evidence and opinions. 26 The appellate court noted that the appellate record “sheds no light on why trial counsel 27 acted or failed to act in the manner alleged.” Lodgment 8, p.7. But it found that that 28 counsel’s actions did not meet the required showing of prejudice: 11 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Diaz’s claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel centers on counsel’s failure to object to what he terms “profile evidence” concerning the use of BMW’s in robberies and to testimony about the investigation that led to the identification of Diaz as the suspect. Diaz also contends counsel was ineffective by not requesting a limiting instruction about law enforcement’s investigatory steps, profile evidence, and opinions. *** Any claim of ineffective assistance for not objecting to the deputy sheriff’s testimony about the contents of the lost surveillance video at the Spring Valley ARCO gas station would not meet the required showing of prejudice. The victim in that robbery identified Diaz at trial as the man who came into the gas station with a gun and demanded money. With respect to any claim for not objecting to an expert witness instruction, the record shows counsel withdrew her objection as a valid trial tactic. 13 14 15 16 17 18 There is no merit to the claim the trial court erred when it allowed the detective to give opinion evidence concerning the perpetrator’s identity. The jurors were instructed they were not required to accept the opinion of any witness as true or correct. The jury viewed photos of the perpetrator’s hands and Diaz’s hands. Presumably, the jurors followed the court’s instructions and independently decided whether the information on which the witness relied was true and accurate. 19 20 Lodgment 8, pp.7-8. The appellate court found that any testimony about the lost ARCO 21 video, which included a statement about “a person exiting a black BMW,” did not 22 prejudice Diaz because the victim of that crime identified Diaz as the perpetrator. 23 Lodgment 8, pp.3, 7. It also found that there was no prejudice regarding the testimony 24 that led to Diaz’s identification because the jurors were instructed on the issue, and the 25 court noted that victims and bystanders from each gas station testified as to elements of 26 his identity. Lodgment 8, pp.3, 8. Finally, the appellate court found that the record 27 showed that trial counsel’s withdrawal of her objection to the expert witness instruction 28 was a valid trial tactic, as the “trial court said the expert witness instruction was a 12 16cv2475 AJB (NLS) 1 defense-friendly instruction required by statute to address that issue.” Lodgment 8, pp.4, 2 8. 3 4 5 6 In reviewing the appellate court opinion, this court finds that the state court’s finding is not an unreasonable application of Strickland. III. CONCLUSION The court finds that Diaz fails to state a claim cognizable on federal habeas review, 7 and RECOMMENDS that the district judge DENY the Petition and dismiss it with 8 prejudice. 9 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States District Judge 10 assigned to this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). IT IS ORDERED that no later 11 than July 17, 2017, any party to this action may file written objections with the court and 12 serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned “Objections to Report and 13 Recommendation.” 14 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any reply to the objections must be filed with 15 the court and served on all parties no later than July 27, 2017. The parties are advised 16 that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to raise those 17 objections on appeal of the Court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 18 1991). 19 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: June 22, 2017 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13 16cv2475 AJB (NLS)

Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.

Why Is My Information Online?