Schutza v. Cuddeback et al

Filing 7

ORDER granting Defendants' 5 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's state law claim under 28 USC 1367(c). Court retains jurisdiction over the ADA claim. Defendants shall file an answer to the ADA claim by 4/24/2017. Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 4/10/2017. (jah)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

10

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

11
12

SCOTT SCHUTZA,

13

Case No. 16-cv-02746-BAS-KSC
Plaintiff,

14

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS’
MOTION TO DISMISS STATE LAW
CLAIM [ECF No. 5]

v.

15
16
17

WILLIAM B. CUDDEBACK; LOU G.
CUDDEBACK; INTERSTATE GROUP
LLC,

18
Defendants.

19
20
21

On November 07, 2016, Plaintiff Scott Schutza commenced this civil action against

22

Defendants William Cuddeback, Lou Cuddeback, and Interstate Group, LLC

23

(“Defendants”) alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §

24

12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act §§ 51–53 (“Unruh Act”).

25

Defendants now move to dismiss the state law claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction

26

under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Plaintiff has not opposed.1

27
28

The Court would be within its discretion to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on Plaintiff’s
failure to file an opposition. See CivLR 7.1(f)(3)(c) (“If an opposing party fails to file the papers in the
1

1
16cv2746

1

The Court finds this motion suitable for determination on the papers submitted and

2

without oral argument. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b); CivLR 7.1(d)(1). For the following

3

reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim.2

4

(ECF No. 5.)

5

I.

BACKGROUND

6

Plaintiff Scott Schutza is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for mobility. (Compl.

7

¶ 1.) Defendants own the real property known as “TrailersPlus” located at or about 12024

8

Woodside Avenue, Lakeside, California. (Id. ¶¶ 2–5.)

9

In February 2016, Plaintiff went to TrailersPlus in search of a trailer. (Id. ¶ 10.)

10

However, as a result of his physical disabilities, Plaintiff alleges he was unable to access

11

or use the property because of various access barriers, including barriers in the parking lot,

12

at the entrance door, in the establishment itself, and in the restroom area. (Id. ¶¶ 22–27.)

13

Plaintiff contends that he personally encountered said problems, and consequently, was

14

denied full and equal access of the property. (Id. ¶ 28.)

15

On November 7, 2016, Plaintiff sued Defendants for violations of the ADA and the

16

Unruh Act. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages under the Unruh Act and injunctive relief

17

under the ADA. (Compl. 9:18–25.)

18

On December 1, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law

19

claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Defendants primarily contend that: (1) Plaintiff’s

20

state law claim raises novel and complex issues of state law due to California’s recent

21

adoption of pleading requirements for disability discrimination lawsuits; (2) the state law

22

claim substantially predominates over the federal law claim because Plaintiff is seeking

23

statutory damages only available under California law; and (3) Plaintiff is engaging in

24
25
26
27
28

manner required by [the Local Rules], that failure may constitute a consent to the granting of a motion or
other request for ruling by the court.”); see also Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Failure
to follow a district court’s local rules is a proper ground for dismissal.”). However, in this case, the Court
will proceed to the merits.
2

The Court retains jurisdiction over the ADA claim.
2
16cv2746

1

forum shopping. (EFC No. 5.)

2

II.

LEGAL STANDARD

3

The federal supplemental jurisdiction statute provides:

4

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they
form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.

5
6
7
8

28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental jurisdiction is mandatory unless prohibited by §

9

1367(b), or unless one of the exceptions in § 1367(c) applies. Under § 1367(c), a district

10
11
12
13
14
15

court may decline supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which
the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.

16
17

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Underlying the § 1367(c) inquiry are considerations of judicial

18

economy, convenience and fairness to litigants, and comity. “[I]f these are not present a

19

federal court should hesitate to exercise jurisdiction over state law claims[.]” United Mine

20

Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).

21

Under § 1367(c), “a district court can decline jurisdiction under any one of [the

22

statute’s] four provisions.” San Pedro Hotel Co. v. City of L.A., 159 F.3d 470, 478 (9th Cir.

23

1998). When a district court declines supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim

24

pursuant to one of the first three provisions of the statute—that is, §§ 1367(c)(1)–(3)—the

25

court need not state its reasons for dismissal. Id. However, when the court declines

26

supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to the statute’s “exceptional circumstances”

27

provision—that is, § 1367(c)(4)—the court must “articulate why the circumstances of the

28

case are exceptional,” and consider whether values of judicial economy, convenience,
3
16cv2746

1

fairness, and comity provide compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. Exec. Software

2

N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1552 (9th Cir. 1994).

3

III.

DISCUSSION

4

A. The ADA

5

The ADA prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability in the full and equal

6

enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of

7

any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or

8

operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). A sales or rental

9

establishment is a “public accommodation” for purposes of the ADA. 42 U.S.C. §

10

12181(7)(E).

11

To prevail on a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must prove that (1) he or she has a

12

disability; (2) the defendant operates, leases, or owns a place of public accommodation;

13

and (3) the plaintiff was denied appropriate accommodations by the defendant because of

14

his or her disability. Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 2007). “[A]

15

plaintiff need not show intentional discrimination in order to make out a violation of the

16

ADA.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 846 (9th Cir. 2004).

17

Under the ADA, “damages are not recoverable . . . only injunctive relief is available.”

18

Wander v. Kaus, 304 F.3d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1)).

19

B. The Unruh Act

20

The Unruh Act provides in part that “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of

21

[California] are free and equal, and no matter what their . . . disability . . . are entitled to

22

the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all

23

business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act

24

also provides that a violation of the federal ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of the

25

Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f).

26

As a general matter, a claim under the Unruh Act requires a plaintiff to allege an

27

intentional act or omission on behalf of defendant. See Org. for the Advancement of

28

Minorities v. Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1129 (S.D. Cal. 2005). Thus, “[a]
4
16cv2746

1

violation of the Unruh Act may be maintained independent of an ADA claim where a

2

plaintiff pleads ‘intentional discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the

3

terms of the [Unruh] Act.’” Schutza v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1241, 1247

4

(S.D. Cal. 2015) (citations omitted). However, a showing of intentional discrimination is

5

not required where a plaintiff brings an Unruh Act claim on the grounds that a defendant

6

has violated the ADA. See Munson v. Del Taco, Inc., 208 P.3d 623, 628–29 (Cal. 2009);

7

see also Lentini, 370 F.3d at 847 (“[N]o showing of intentional discrimination is required

8

where the Unruh Act violation is premised on an ADA violation.”).

9

Unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows for recovery of monetary damages. A

10

plaintiff may recover actual damages for each and every offense “up to a maximum of three

11

times the amount of actual damage but in no case less than four thousand dollars

12

($4,000)[.]” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). “The litigant need not prove she suffered actual

13

damages to recover the independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski, 481 F.3d at 731

14

(citing Botosan v. Paul McNally Realty, 216 F.3d 827, 836 (9th Cir. 2000)).

15

IV.

ANALYSIS

16

A. Plaintiff’s State Law Claim Substantially Predominates

17

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s state law claim substantially predominates over his

18

ADA claim under § 1367(c)(2). The Court agrees for two main reasons.

19

First, when considering the number of violations alleged by Plaintiff, the total

20

amount of damages available to him under the Unruh Act—a minimum of $4,000 for each

21

offense—indicates that Plaintiff’s predominant focus is recovering monetary damages

22

under state law. At a minimum, Plaintiff alleges the following nine individual violations:

23

(1) the raised threshold at the entrance door is greater than the permitted threshold for the

24

type of door; (2) the entrance is inaccessible to Plaintiff; (3) parking is inaccessible to

25

Plaintiff; (4) there are no parking spaces designed and reserved for persons with

26

disabilities; (5) there is no lowered portion of transaction counters for persons in

27

wheelchairs; (6) the restroom doorway clear passage is inaccessible to Plaintiff; (7) the

28

restroom does not have grab bars for use by persons with disabilities; (8) the sink lacks
5
16cv2746

1

knee clearance for wheelchair use; and (9) the restroom mirror is mounted higher than the

2

maximum permitted. (Compl. ¶¶ 13–27.) These nine allegations, if proven, would entitle

3

Plaintiff to a minimum monetary award of $36,000. In contrast, under the ADA, Plaintiff

4

would only be entitled to injunctive relief. Thus, under the circumstances presented, the

5

Court finds that the monetary damages sought by Plaintiff under the Unruh Act

6

substantially predominate over federal injunctive relief. See Brick Oven Rest., 406 F. Supp.

7

2d at 1131 (finding that statutory damages available under the Unruh Act substantially

8

predominated over injunctive relief available under the ADA where the plaintiff alleged

9

distinct violations that, if proven, would entitle him to an award of $56,000); see also

10

Molski v. Hitching Post I Rest., Inc., No. CV 04-1077SVWRNBX, 2005 WL 3952248, at

11

*7 (C.D. Cal. May 25, 2005) (finding that statutory damages available under the Unruh

12

Act substantially predominated over injunctive relief available under the ADA where the

13

plaintiff alleged 13 allegations that, if proven, would entitle plaintiff to an award of

14

$52,000).

15

Second, Plaintiff places intentionality at the heart of his claims for relief (see Compl.

16

¶ 35), which when combined with the amount of monetary relief sought, strongly suggests

17

the Unruh Act claim substantially predominates. As the Court noted earlier, intentional

18

discrimination is unnecessary to establish a violation under the ADA. However,

19

intentionality is relevant to Plaintiff’s state law claim because it allows Plaintiff to maintain

20

an independent action under the Unruh Act. See Earll v. eBay, Inc., No. 5:11-CV-00262-

21

JF HRL, 2011 WL 3955485, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2011) (“A violation of the Unruh

22

Act may be maintained independent of an ADA claim where a plaintiff pleads intentional

23

discrimination in public accommodations in violation of the terms of the Act.”).

24

Furthermore, resolving the issue of intentional discrimination “entails application of state-

25

law standards.” Schutza, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 1247 (finding that plaintiff’s allegations of

26

intentional discrimination was one of the main reasons why plaintiff’s state law claims

27

substantially predominated over his ADA claim). Thus, Plaintiff’s allegation of intentional

28

discrimination bolsters the conclusion that his Unruh Act claim substantially predominates
6
16cv2746

1

over his ADA claim.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s state law claim under the Unruh Act

2
3

substantially predominates over his federal claim under the ADA.

4

B. There Are Exceptional Circumstances Supported by Compelling Reasons

5

for Declining Supplemental Jurisdiction

6

In considering values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the

7

Court finds compelling reasons for declining supplemental jurisdiction in this case. See

8

Exec. Software N. Am., Inc., 24 F.3d at 1557.

9

In 2012, California adopted heightened pleading requirements for disability

10

discrimination lawsuits under the Unruh Act, including provisions requiring high-

11

frequency litigants to verify and specify their allegations. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §

12

425.50.3 The purpose of these heightened pleading requirements is to deter baseless claims

13

and vexatious litigation. See e.g., SB 1186, Chapter 383 § 24 (Ca. 2012).

14

The Court notes that Plaintiff Schutza has filed over one hundred cases in this and

15

other courts alleging disability discrimination.4 As a high-frequency litigant primarily

16

seeking relief under state law, the Court finds it would be improper to allow Plaintiff to use

17

federal court as an end-around to California’s pleading requirements. Therefore, as a matter

18

of comity, and in deference to California’s substantial interest in discouraging unverified

19

disability discrimination claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction over

20

Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. See Cross v. Pac. Coast Plaza Invs., L.P., No. 06 CV 2543 JM

21

RBB, 2007 WL 951772, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2007) (declining to exercise supplemental

22

jurisdiction over plaintiff’s Unruh Act claims in the interest of comity and noting this

23
24
25
26
27
28

3

A plaintiff alleging disability discrimination under the Unruh Act must: (1) explain the specific access
barrier(s) encountered; (2) how the barrier(s) denied full and equal access on each particular occasion; and
(3) the specific date of each particular occasion. Additionally, except for complaints that allege injury or
damage, a complaint filed by or on behalf of a high-frequency litigant must state the number of claims the
plaintiff has filed in the previous 12 months and the reason and purpose for the plaintiff’s desire to access
the defendant’s business. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 425.50.
4

According to PACER, Plaintiff Scott Schutza is a plaintiff in 127 cases as of March 27, 2017.
7
16cv2746

1

interest has become more compelling “as the courts struggle to resolve what is at the

2

moment an irreconcilable tension between the ADA and the Unruh Act”); Hitching Post I

3

Rest., 2005 WL 3952248 at *8–9 (finding comity to be a compelling reason for declining

4

supplemental jurisdiction over state claims on the ground that California courts should have

5

the ability to interpret state disability laws).

6

Finally, and relatedly, the Court agrees with Defendants’ contention that Plaintiff is

7

engaging in forum-shopping by bringing his action in federal court and attempting to avoid

8

California’s heightened pleading requirements for disability discrimination claims. It is

9

unclear what advantage—other than avoiding state-imposed pleading requirements—

10

Plaintiff gains by being in federal court since his sole remedy under the ADA is injunctive

11

relief, which is also available under the Unruh Act. Federal courts may properly take

12

measures to discourage forum-shopping, see, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–

13

68 (1965), and here, where Plaintiff has filed over one hundred disability discrimination

14

cases, and settled more than fifty of them in a two-year period,5 the Court finds this to be

15

a compelling reason to decline supplemental jurisdiction. See, e.g., Brick Oven Rest., 406

16

F. Supp. 2d at 1132 (“Because a legitimate function of the federal courts is to discourage

17

forum shopping and California courts should interpret California law . . . compelling

18

reasons exist to decline supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state law claims.”).

19

V.

CONCLUSION

20

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that (1) Plaintiff’s state law claim under

21

the Unruh Act substantially predominates over his federal claim under the ADA, and (2)

22

there are otherwise exceptional circumstances—including comity and this Court’s interest

23

in discouraging forum-shopping—for declining supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh

24

Act claim. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s

25

state law claim under 28 U.S.C § 1367(c). (ECF No. 5.) The Court retains jurisdiction over

26

the ADA claim. Defendants shall file an answer or otherwise respond to the ADA claim no

27
28

5

According to PACER, Plaintiff has settled 56 disability cases since 2015.
8
16cv2746

1
2

later than April 24, 2017.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

3
4

DATED: April 10, 2017

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
9
16cv2746