Hill v. Phieffer

Filing 16

ORDER: (1) Overruling Petitioner's Objection; (2) Adopting 14 Report and Recommendation; (3) Granting Defendant's 8 Motion to Dismiss; and (4) Dismissing With Prejudice Petitioner's Petition. Accordingly, the Court Denies a certificate of appealability. Signed by Judge Janis L. Sammartino on 9/12/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(mpl)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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DIRIKI A. HILL,

Case No.: 16cv2843 JLS (KSC)
Petitioner,

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v.

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ORDER: (1) OVERRULING
PETITIONER’S OBJECTION; (2)
ADOPTING REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION; (3)
GRANTING DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS; AND (4)
DISMISSING WITH PREJUDICE
PETITIONER’S PETITION

CHRISTIAN PHIEFFER, Warden, et al.,

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Respondents.

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(ECF Nos. 8, 14.)

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Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus

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(“Petition,” ECF No. 1), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Petition as Untimely Filed

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(“MTD,” ECF No. 8), and Petitioner’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to

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Dismiss (“Opp’n,” ECF No. 13). Magistrate Judge Karen S. Crawford issued a Report and

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Recommendation (“R&R,” ECF No. 14), recommending that the Court grant Defendant’s

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Motion to Dismiss, and to which Petitioner filed an Objection, (“Obj.,” ECF No. 15).

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Defendant did not file a reply to Petitioner’s Objection.
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Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the law, as well as the underlying state

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court record, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection, ADOPTS Judge

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Crawford’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, and

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DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition.

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BACKGROUND

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Judge Crawford’s Report and Recommendation contains a complete and accurate

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recitation of the relevant portions of the factual and procedural histories underlying

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Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss. (See R&R. 1–2.) This Order incorporates by

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reference the background as set forth therein.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) set forth a district

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court’s duties regarding a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation. The district court

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“shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection

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is made,” and “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

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recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c); see also United

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States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673–76 (1980). In the absence of a timely objection,

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however, “the Court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the

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record in order to accept the recommendation.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s

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note (citing Campbell v. U.S. Dist. Court, 510 F.2d 196, 206 (9th Cir. 1974)).

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ANALYSIS

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In his Opposition, Petitioner’s sole argument in support of tolling the Antiterrorism

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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) statute of limitations (see 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2244(d)) is that there were “lockdowns in prison preventing him access to the law

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library.” (Opp’n 3.) Petitioner further argues that his Motion for a Continuance—filed in

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his prior federal habeas case—“shed a light” on why tolling is appropriate. (Id.)

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The document Petitioner references was a “Motion for a 30 Day Continuance” that

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Petitioner filed 959 days after his first federal petition was dismissed, or 757 days after

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formal judgment was entered in favor of Respondent. In the document, Petitioner requested
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a 30 day continuance, noted that his state petition was denied by the California Supreme

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Court, and explained only that Petitioner had “been having problems obtaining documents

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that he need[s] to argue his case.”1

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In his Objection to Judge Crawford’s R&R, Petitioner argues he “did the best he

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could in exhausting his federal claims . . . [and] [i]t has nothing to do with [sic] law library

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and its [sic] access to, but everything to do with his [sic] how much he knows about the

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legal process.” (Obj. 3.)

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Petitioner has said nothing about the year-long stint between the denial of his final

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state petition and filing of his request for a thirty-day continuance. (See Opp’n 2; Obj. 2.)

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And even if Petitioner’s mere assertions that (1) he had “been having problems obtaining

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documents that he need[s] to argue his case[,]”2—which Petitioner subsequently explained

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was a reference to “prison lockdowns[,]” (see Opp’n 2–3)— and; (2) he does not

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understand “the legal process[,]” were sufficient to toll the AEDPA statute of limitations

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during this entire year,3 the instant Petition would still be untimely.

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Specifically, Petitioner’s first state petition was denied on March 3, 2013, and

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Petitioner took no further action until September 25, 2013, when he filed his first petition

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in federal court. This period comprises 204 days during which the AEDPA statute of

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limitations was running. Next, even assuming that Petitioner’s first federal petition tolled

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AEDPA’s statute of limitations from September 25, 2013 until the final judgment in favor

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of Respondents (rather than the petition’s initial dismissal)—issued on September 18,

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2014—then the statute continued to run from that point forward until Petitioner filed his

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See Hill v. Beard, 13cv2333-CAB (JMA), ECF No. 7. Because the Court rejected this document due to
the case having already been dismissed, the document is not a part of the formal record for the case.
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See Hill v. Beard, 13cv2333-CAB (JMA), ECF No. 7-1, at 1.
They are not. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We have little difficulty
determining that [the petitioner] is not entitled to equitable tolling . . . simply because he remained in
administrative segregation and had limited access to ‘the law library [and] copy machine.’ ” (third
alteration in original)); Clark v. McEwen, No. 10-cv-2149, 2012 WL 1205509, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2012) (holding “a lack of understanding of the law does not constitute the extraordinary circumstances
required for equitable tolling.”)
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next state-court petition4 on July 15, 2015, in the California Supreme Court. The period

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comprises 300 days during which the AEDPA statute of limitations was running. This

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totals 504 days—well beyond AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. Thus, even if the

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Court granted Petitioner a year’s worth of equitable tolling from the denial of his final state

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petition to the date of his request for a thirty-day continuance, the instant Petition would

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still be untimely.

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CONCLUSION

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Given the foregoing, the Court OVERRULES Petitioner’s Objection, ADOPTS

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Judge Crawford’s Report and Recommendation, GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to

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Dismiss, and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition. Furthermore,

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because Petitioner’s Petition would be untimely even if the Court granted Petitioner the

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most generous amount of tolling possible under Petitioner’s allegations, Petitioner has

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failed to show “that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s resolution of

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his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to

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deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327

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(2003); see also Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, the Court

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DENIES a certificate of appealability.

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Because this concludes the litigation in this matter, the Clerk SHALL close the file.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 12, 2017

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Petitioner filed another state-court petition during the pendency of his first federal petition. Specifically,
he filed his second state-court petition on June 18, 2014 in California Superior Court, which the Superior
Court denied on August 18, 2014.
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