Linlor v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al
Filing
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ORDER: Defendants' Motion for Attorneys' Fees (ECF No. 93 ) is Denied. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 01/17/2019. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(ajs)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JAMES LINLOR,
Case No.: 17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC
Plaintiff,
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v.
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ORDER
CHASE BANKCARD
SERVICES, INC. and CHASE
BANK USA, NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION,
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Defendants.
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HAYES, Judge:
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The matter before the Court is the Motion for Attorneys’ Fees filed by Defendants
Chase Bank USA, N.A. and Chase Bankcard Services, Inc. (ECF No. 93).
I.
Background
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On April 19, 2017, Plaintiff James Linlor filed the First Amended Complaint (ECF
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No. 22) (the “FAC”). The FAC brings a claim against Defendants Chase Bankcard
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Services, Inc. and Chase Bank USA, N.A. for violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act
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(FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). (ECF No. 22 at 9).
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On May 15, 2018, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No.
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70). On August 7, 2018, the Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
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(ECF No. 90). On August 21, 2018 Defendants filed a Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (ECF
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17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC
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No. 93). Plaintiff did not file opposition. On September 17, 2018, Defendants filed a
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Notice of Non-receipt of Opposition to Motion for Attorneys’ Fees. (ECF No. 103).
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II.
Contentions
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Defendants contend that Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, “asserted a frivolous claim that
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defendants . . . violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (“FCRA”)
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by furnishing inaccurate information regarding his credit card account. The only allegedly
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inaccurate information were supposed fraudulent charges.” (ECF No. 93 at 3). Defendants
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assert that “there never were any fraudulent charges and Plaintiff knew this when he filed
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his Complaint.” Id. Defendants contend that they are entitled to $101,650.90 in attorneys’
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fees. Id. Defendants separately contend that the Court should grant the motion because
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Plaintiff’s failure to file opposition constitutes consent to the granting of Defendants’
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motion under Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c). (ECF No. 103 at 2).
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III.
Legal Standard
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The FCRA permits the prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees if an action was
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“filed in bad faith or for purposes of harassment.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681n(c); 1681o(b); Rouse
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v. Law Offices of Rory Clark, 603 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 2010) rev’d on other grounds by
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Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371 (2013); River Oaks Homeowners Prot. Comm.,
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Inc. v. Edington & Assocs., 32 F. App'x 929, 931 (9th Cir. 2002). The term “bad faith” is
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not defined in the statute. In general, bad faith “is not simply bad judgment or negligence,
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but rather it implies the conscious doing of a wrong because of dishonest purpose or moral
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obliquity; . . . it contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
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ill will.” Black's Law Dictionary 139 (6th ed. 1990); accord United States v. Manchester
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Farming P'ship, 315 F.3d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying Black's definition of bad
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faith); Shipley v. Trans Union Corp., 2006 WL 1515594, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 25, 2006)
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(same).
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IV.
Ruling of the Court
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The Ninth Circuit has held a district court may properly grant an unopposed motion
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pursuant to a local rule where the local rule permits, but does not require, the granting of a
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17-cv-0005-WQH-KSC
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motion for failure to respond. See Ghazali v. Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995). Civil
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Local Rule 7.1(f)(3)(c) provides that “[i]f an opposing party fails to file the papers in the
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manner required by Civil Local Rule 7.1.e.2, that failure may constitute a consent to the
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granting of a motion or other request for ruling by the court.” Generally, public policy
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favors disposition of motions on their merits. See, e.g., Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138
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F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998). The Court declines to grant Defendants’ Motion on the basis
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of Plaintiff’s failure to file opposition.
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In this case, Plaintiff alleged that Defendants violated the FCRA when they failed to
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report to the credit rating agencies that Plaintiff disputed the charges at issue. (ECF No.
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22 at 6; 83 at 4–5). Defendants prevailed on summary judgment because the relevant case
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law required Plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting to state a claim
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under the FCRA, and Plaintiff ultimately failed to do so. (ECF No. 90 at 4). Although
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Plaintiff failed to provide the requisite facts to maintain a FCRA claim, Defendants have
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failed to establish that Plaintiff’s actions in initiating this matter constituted more than bad
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judgment or negligence. Defendants have not established that Plaintiff brought this action
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in subjective bad faith or for purposes of harassment, and the Court declines to award
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attorneys’ fees in this matter.
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V.
Conclusion
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees (ECF No.
93) is DENIED.
Dated: January 17, 2019
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