Linlor v. JPMorgan Chase & Co. et al

Filing 28

ORDER Granting in Part and Denying in Part 23 Motion to Dismiss. JPMC is dismissed from this case. In all other respects, the Court denies Defendants' motion. Signed by Judge Roger T. Benitez on 8/9/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(knb)

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l,, ' F\LE.D 1 2 i\\IJ "ut -9 PM 2: e·i 3 Cl[~<" , -; "''· TRICT CQURT ,J. ....,··.•. "f cAWDR~ll• 4 ·;aU1filfiHU-',':'Jil\·l"' v --:::nn-· 5 OEPUT V 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMES LINLOR, Case No.: l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC Plaintiff, 12 13 v. 14 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO.; CHASE BANKCARD SERVICES, INC.; and CHASE BANK USA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, 15 16 ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF No. 23] Defendants. 17 18 19 Plaintiff James Linlor, proceeding prose, has filed an Amended Complaint ("AC") 20 alleging a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"). (ECF No. 22). Presently 21 before the Court is the motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Amended Complaint filed by 22 Defendant Chase Bank USA, N.A. ("Chase"), specially appearing Defendant Chase 23 Bank.Card Services, Inc. ("CBSI"), and specially appearing Defendant JPMorgan Chase 24 & Co. ("JPMC"). (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff has opposed the motion (ECF No. 25), and 25 Defendants replied (ECF No. 26). 26 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss for 27 lack of personal jurisdiction as to Defendant JPMC, but in all other respects, DENIES the 28 motion. l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC BACKGROUND 1 1 2 Plaintiff had a credit card issued by Defendants that was co-branded with a major if 2, Background if 1). In February 2016, Defendants notified Plaintiff 3 airline. (AC Intro. 4 by phone of likely fraud on his card, and Plaintiff confirmed notice of the potential fraud 5 in writing to Defendants within 10 days of Defendants' first call. (Id.) Plaintiff asked 6 Defendants to investigate the fraud. (AC Memo. if 3 & Ex. A). Defendants agreed to 7 remove the charges and issue Plaintiff a new card. (AC Background if 2 & Ex. D). 8 Accordingly, Defendants cancelled Plaintiffs credit card and issued him a new card, but 9 they also transferred the fraudulent charges to the new card. (AC Background if 2, 10 Memo. if 5). Plaintiff never received nor accepted the new card. (AC Memo. if 5 & Ex. 11 D). Upon becoming aware that Plaintiff had not received or accepted the new card, 12 Defendants "attempted to intimidate" Plaintiff into accepting the fraudulent charges, but 13 he refused. (AC Claims if 3a). Subsequently, Defendants reported an unpaid debt of 14 $2,223 to consumer reporting agencies ("CRAs"). (AC Memo. 15 Claims if 3a, Ex. D). 16 if 3, Background if 2, In August 2016, Plaintiff contacted three CRAs to inform them about Defendants' 17 misreporting and request that they investigate and work with Defendants to correct and 18 remove the false reporting. (AC Memo. if 7 & Ex. D). Nevertheless, Defendants 19 continued to report erroneous information to CRAs, leading Plaintiff to file tlte instant 20 lawsuit. (AC Intro. if 4, Memo. if 8). Defendants' actions have damaged Plaintiffs credit 21 score, increased his interest rates, threatened his employment, and prevented him from 22 using his airlines rewards points for flights. (AC Intro. 23 III 24 Ill if 4, Background if 2). 25 26 27 28 1 The Court is not making any findings of fact, but ratlter, summarizing the relevant allegations of the Amended Complaint for purposes of evaluating Defendants' motion to dismiss. 2 17-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 2 3 DISCUSSION I. Motion to Dismiss CBSI and JPMC for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Specially appearing Defendants CBSI and JPMC move to dismiss the complaint 4 for lack of personal jurisdiction. Such a motion is properly taken as a Rule 12(b)(2) 5 motion under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the 6 plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z 7 Sporting Goods, Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 671-72 (9th Cir. 2012). Where, as here, the motion 8 is based on written materials and affidavits rather than an evidentiary hearing, a plaintiff 9 is only required to make a "prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the 10 motion to dismiss." Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) 11 (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir. 2004)). 12 A "prima facie" showing means that the plaintiff need only demonstrate facts that, if true, 13 would support jurisdiction over the defendant. Lindora, LLC v. Isagenix Int'!, LLC, 198 14 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1135 (S.D. Cal. 2016). In determining whether a plaintiff has met his 15 burden, "uncontroverted allegations in [the] complaint must be taken as true, and 16 'conflicts between the facts contained in the parties' affidavits must be resolved in [the 17 plaintiffs] favor for purposes of deciding whether a prima facie case for personal 18 jurisdiction exists."' Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 19 588-89 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting WNS, Inc. v. Farrow, 884 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1989) 20 (internal citations omitted)). 21 "Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal jurisdiction, the district 22 court applies the law of the state in which the court sits." Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand 23 Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations omitted). 24 California's long-arm statute permits its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction "on any 25 basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." Daimler 26 AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code§ 410.10). 27 Thus, "California's long-arm statute allows the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the 28 full extent permissible under the U.S. Constitution," and the Court must ensure that its 3 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 assertion of personal jurisdiction over a party comports with the limits imposed by 2 federal due process. Id. (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 464 3 (1985)). The traditional bases of personal jurisdiction that comport with due process are 4 service while physically present in the forum, domicile, or consent. None of the 5 traditional bases of jurisdiction are at issue here. Absent the traditional bases, a 6 defendant must have such "minimum contacts" with the forum state that "maintenance of 7 the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int 'l Shoe 8 Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Personal jurisdiction can be either "general" or "specific." See Helicopteros 9 10 Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984). Defendants argue 11 that Plaintiff has not met his burden to show that this Court has either general or specific 12 jurisdiction over Defendants JPMC and CBSI. The Court agrees as to JPMC but 13 disagrees as to CBSI. 14 A. General Jurisdiction 15 General jurisdiction allows a defendant to be brought into court for its activities 16 anywhere in the world, untethered from its specific contacts with the forum. Martinez, 17 764 F .3d at 1066. "General jurisdiction over a corporation is appropriate only when the 18 corporation's contacts with the forum state 'are so constant and pervasive as to render it 19 essentially at home' in the state." Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 ). The 20 paradigmatic locations where general jurisdiction is appropriate over a corporation are its 21 place of incorporation and its principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. 22 "Only in an 'exceptional case' will general jurisdiction be available anywhere else." 23 Martinez, 764 F.3d at 2070 (quoting Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19). 24 In this case, JPMC and CBSI are neither incorporated in California, nor is their 25 principal place of business in California. Furthermore, there are no allegations about 26 Defendants' contacts with the State to justify treating this as an "exceptional case." 27 Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishing general jurisdiction. 28 /// 4 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 B. Specific Jurisdiction 2 Specific jurisdiction exists "when a case 'aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the 3 defendant's contacts with the forum.'" Martinez, 764 F.3d at 1066 (quoting 4 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct. a/Cal., San 5 Francisco Cnty., 13 7 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) ("In order for a state court to exercise 6 specific jurisdiction, 'the suit' must 'aris[e] out of or relat[e] to the defendant's contacts 7 with the forum."' (emphasis in original)); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 (2014) 8 ("For a State to exercise jurisdiction consistent with due process, the defendant's suit- 9 related conduct must create a substantial connection with the forum State."). 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 The Ninth Circuit uses a three-part test to determine whether a defendant's contacts with the forum state are sufficient to subject it to specific jurisdiction: (l)The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof, or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws; (2)The claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant's forum-related activities; and (3)The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable. 18 19 Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). The Supreme Court has 20 emphasized that "it is the defendant, not the plaintiff or third parties, who must 21 create contacts with the forum State" itself, not with persons who reside there. 22 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123-26. The plaintiff has the burden of proving the first 23 two prongs and, if met, the burden shifts to the defendant to "set forth a compelling 24 case" as to the third. Picot, 780 F.3d at 1212. 25 Here, Plaintiff argues that this Court has jurisdiction over JPMC because it is 26 "the umbrella managing company" that provides IT services to the co-Defendants. 27 Specifically, JPMC allegedly owns and manages the website and the 28 email address, which its co-Defendants use. Plaintiff emailed with a 5 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 CBSI representative to dispute the allegedly erroneous reporting. In response, 2 Defendant JPMC argues that it is merely a holding company and that Plaintiff has 3 failed to allege any specific conduct by it. 4 "The existence of a relationship between a parent company and its 5 subsidiaries is not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over the parent on the 6 basis of the subsidiaries' minimum contacts with the forum." Doe v. Unocal 7 Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 925 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiff has only alleged that JPMC 8 provided technology services that its subsidiaries used. He has not stated how 9 JPMC itself created contacts with California. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to 10 establish a prima facie case for specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant 11 JPMC. See Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 144, 419 (9th Cir. 1997) 12 (hosting a passive website is insufficient to establish purposeful availment or 13 purposeful direction towards forum state). 14 However, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden with respect to specific personal 15 jurisdiction over Defendant CBSI. In his opposition to Defendants' motion, 16 Plaintiff states that the phone number printed on the back of his Chase credit card 17 was for CBSI. When he called that number to dispute the charges, a CBSI 18 representative answered the phone. It is unclear if CBSI ever called Plaintiff 19 directly. However, it is appears that CBSI emailed Plaintiff. Plaintiff provides an 20 email dated March 15, 2016, in which Andre Cook from "Card Services Executive 21 Office" writes to Plaintiff that he has "completed [his] review and would like to 22 discuss [his] findings with" Plaintiff. (Pl.'s Opp'n Ex. A). Mr. Cook further 23 states, "IfI am unable to speak to you within the next 24 hours, I will follow up in 24 a letter. You can reach me at 1-888-622-7547 extension 654-8022." (Id.) 25 Mr. Cook also emailed Plaintiff on April 14, 2016, asking Plaintiff to call 26 him. (Id.) In response, Plaintiff wrote back several times. In the first response on 27 April 14, Plaintiff writes, "I called and provided all the information requested to 28 your colleagues today. I was promised a callback by you-you did not call today .. 6 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 .. Any new card must not be linked to existing fraudulent charges, for which I 2 have been held not liable, and followed California and federal law to maintain as 3 such. I will not pay for charges that Chase itself has identified as fraudulent." (Id.) 4 Plaintiff wrote back two more times, on April 15 and April 20, complaining that he 5 still had not heard from Mr. Cook. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiff contends that the Court has personal jurisdiction over CBSI 6 7 because it handled "the calls for credit card servicing, while sending out emails 8 email address." Defendants do not dispute these 9 communications and fail to address their import in the reply brief. 2 Based on 10 Plaintiffs uncontroverted statements, the Court finds that Plaintiff has established 11 a prima facie case for asserting personal jurisdiction over CBSI. By listing its 12 phone number on Chase credit cards and consequently engaging in 13 communications with Plaintiff, a California resident, about the card dispute, CBSI 14 has purposefully directed its activities to the forum state. CBSI's contact with the 15 forum state was not "random" or "fortuitous." Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475 16 ("Th[e] 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a defendant will not be 17 haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' 18 contacts."). Rather, CBSI has held itself out as the Chase entity that card holders 19 should contact for card servicing inquiries. CBSI voluntarily associated itself with 20 this forum for the purpose of conducting business, availing itself of the benefits 21 and protections of this State's laws. See id. at 476 ("Thus where the defendant 22 'deliberately' has engaged in significant activities within a State, or has created 23 'continuing obligations' between himself and residents of the forum, he manifestly 24 25 26 27 28 2 Defendants contend that CBSI is not a "furnisher of information" under the FCRA and thus is not the proper party to this lawsuit. But such an argument is one for failure to state a claim, not lack of personal jurisdiction. 7 17-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his 2 activities are shielded by 'the benefits and protections' of the forum's laws it is 3 presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of 4 litigation in that forum as well. ... So long as a commercial actor's efforts are 5 'purposefully directed' toward residents of another State, we have consistently 6 rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal 7 jurisdiction there."); Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319 ("[T]o the extent that a 8 corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within a state, it enjoys 9 the benefits and protections of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give 10 rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected 11 with the activities within the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to 12 respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to 13 be undue."). 14 Further, Plaintiffs claim relates to CBSI's forum-related conduct. Plaintiff 15 and CBSI corresponded regarding allegedly fraudulent charges on Plaintiffs card. 16 Plaintiff claims that CBSI did not correct those charges, as the parties agreed, 17 which led to him contacting CRAs. Plaintiffs FCRA claim seeks to hold 18 Defendants liable for failing to re-investigate the disputed information as 19 statutorily required upon notice to the CRAs. Had CBSI resolved Plaintiffs 20 reports of fraudulent charges upon his first contact with its representatives, he 21 would not have contacted the CRAs and the instant lawsuit would not have been 22 filed. 23 Accordingly, Plaintiff has satisfied his burden as to the first two prongs. 24 CBSI has not set forth any arguments why the exercise of personal jurisdiction 25 would not be fair or reasonable. Nevertheless, the Court will consider whether the 26 assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with "fair play and substantial 27 justice." Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 320. Courts evaluate the burden on the 28 defendant, the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiffs 8 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system's 2 interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared 3 interest of the states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Burger 4 King Corp., 471 U.S. at 477. 5 California has a strong interest in ensuring that its residents' credit disputes 6 are serviced properly. Erroneous credit information reported to CRAs may affect 7 the card holder's ability to qualify for loans and employment status, among other 8 things. Plaintiff has a strong interest in obtaining relief in this forum, where he 9 resides and where the effects of Defendants' alleged misconduct are most likely to 10 be felt. In contrast, CBSI has not made any case that litigating in this forum would 11 be inconvenient and burdensome. And, finally, the judicial system's interest in 12 efficient resolutions of controversies, and the states' shared interest in fundamental 13 social policies, neither support nor undercut the exercise of jurisdiction here. The 14 Court therefore concludes that exercising personal jurisdiction over CBSI would be 15 reasonable. 16 As explained above, the Court denies Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack 17 of personal jurisdiction as to Defendant CBSI, but grants it as to Defendant JPMC. 18 II. Motion to Dismiss for Violation of Rule 8 19 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs amended complaint for being "vague and 20 conclusory as to be unintelligible." (Mot. at 6). Specifically, Defendants argue that the 21 amended complaint fails to meaningfully distinguish among Defendants Chase, CBSI, 22 and JPMC. Plaintiffs complaint generally refers to "Defendants" collectively. 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 provides that a "pleading that states a claim for 24 relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 25 entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). "Each allegation must be simple, concise, and 26 direct." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d). However, a "prose complaint, 'however inartfully 27 pleaded,' must be held to 'less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 28 lawyers' and can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim ifit appears 'beyond doubt 9 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 2 to relief."' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal citations omitted). While Plaintiffs amended complaint is not of the sort that a lawyer would 3 4 typically compose, it sets forth a basic statement of his claim: He has a Chase credit 5 card. He was the victim of fraudulent charges on his credit card in February 2016. He 6 spoke to Defendants about the alleged fraud but they did not take corrective action. 7 Defendants reported the fraudulent charges as unpaid debts to CRAs. Plaintiff contacted 8 the CRAs to investigate the false report. The CRAs contacted Defendants. Defendants 9 continued to report the allegedly false information. 10 Furthermore, the Court is not persuaded that it should dismiss the amended 11 complaint for not distinguishing among the acts of each individual Defendant. Plaintiff 12 seeks to hold the "furnisher of information" liable for failure to reinvestigate information 13 that it reported to CRAs which Plaintiff disputes. His complaint alleges that Defendants 14 are "furnishers" under the FCRA. (AC Standing 12). The FCRA does not define 15 "furnishers," but a plain reading of the statute indicates that the term "furnisher" refers to 16 a person who provides information about a consumer to a CRA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 s- 17 2. 18 In Plaintiffs opposition, he explains that he does not know yet which Chase entity 19 acted as the furnisher. His credit report only lists "Chase," and the CRAs will not 20 identify which Chase entity reported information to them. Defendants argue that Chase 21 Bank, N.A. is the furnisher, but provide no evidentiary foundation for the Court to 22 conclude that CBSI-the other remaining Defendant and the one that communicated with 23 Plaintiff about his dispute-did not act as a furnisher. Plaintiff contends that Defendants 24 "should remain as being held to account, until or unless such time as they will provide 25 proof beyond their unsupported assertions as to which Chase entity ... reported false 26 Ill 27 III 28 III 10 17-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 information to the CRAs." (Opp'n at 6). This Court agrees as to Chase and CBSI, the 2 Defendants over which this Court has personal jurisdiction. 3 3 The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied his obligations under Rule 8 and thus 4 denies Defendants' motion to dismiss on this ground. 5 III. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim 6 A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) must be 7 granted where the pleadings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When 8 considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must "accept as true facts alleged and draw 9 inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Stacy v. Rederite Otto 10 Danielsen, 609 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2010). A plaintiff must not merely allege 11 conceivably unlawful conduct but must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that 12 is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim 13 is facially plausible 'when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 14 draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'" 15 Zixiang Liv. Kerry, 710 F.3d 995, 999 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 16 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "Threadbare recitals of the elements ofa cause of action, 17 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 18 The FCRA subjects furnishers to two distinct duties. First, under 15 U.S.C. § 19 1681s-2(a), furnishers have a duty to provide accurate information to a CRA. Gorman v. 20 Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2009). It is well-settled 21 however, that there is no private right of action for violations of section 1681s-2(a). See 22 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(c) (stating that section 16810, which confers a private right of action 23 for the willful or negligent noncompliance with the FCRA, does "not apply to any 24 violation of ... subsection (a) of ... section [1681s-2]"); see also Gorman, 584 F.3d at 25 1154 ("Duties imposed on furnishers under [15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)] are enforceable only 26 27 3 28 The Court notes that Chase has not challenged this Court's personal jurisdiction; therefore, the Court assumes that it has personal jurisdiction over Chase. 11 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 by federal or state agencies."). Second, under 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), furnishers have a 2 duty to undertake an investigation upon receipt of a notice of dispute from a CRA. 3 Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154. However, the duty to investigate is triggered "only after the 4 furnisher receives notice of dispute from a CRA." Id. 5 6 Defendants argue that Plaintiffs section 1681s-2(b) claim should be dismissed for three reasons. Each argument fails. First, they argue that Plaintiff does not allege that a CRA transmitted notice of a 7 8 dispute to Defendants, the furnishers. However, Plaintiff does include such an allegation. 9 He pleads that "Defendants (after by standard processes receiving notice and requests 10 from CRAs), still did not correct reporting to CRAs." (AC Background, 3). 11 Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not alleged that Chase failed to 12 reasonably reinvestigate a dispute provided by the CRAs. Section 1681s-2(b) provides 13 that, after receiving a notice of dispute, the furnisher shall: 14 (A) Conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information; (B) Review all relevant information provided by the [CRA] ... ; (C) Report the result of the investigation to the [CRA]; (D) If the investigation finds that the information is incomplete or inaccurate, report those results to all other [CRAs] to which the person furnished the information ... ; and (E) If an item of information disputed by a consumer is found to be inaccurate or incomplete or cannot be verified after any reinvestigation under paragraph (1 ), for purposes of reporting to a [CRA] only, ... (i) modify that item of information; (ii) delete that item of information; or (iii) permanently block the reporting of that information. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(l). The Court again disagrees with Defendants Although many of Plaintiffs 23 24 allegations are phrased in terms of Defendants failing to correct the alleged 25 misreporting, 4 he also alleges that the reports required by section 1681s-2(b) contained 26 27 4 28 In Baldin v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:12-CV-00648-AC, 2013 WL 6388499, at *7-8 (D. Or. Dec. 6, 2013), the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon 12 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 false, misleading, and defamatory information. (AC Memo. if 2a). A reasonable 2 inference from Plaintiffs allegations is that Defendants did not reasonably investigate the 3 dispute. Grismore v. Capital One F.S.B., No. CV 05-2460 PHXSMM, 2007 WL 841513, 4 at *4 (D. Ariz. Mar. 16, 2007) ("Plaintiff alleges that COS has reported and verified 5 inaccurate information to the credit reporting agencies, from which it can ... be inferred 6 that COS did not follow proper investigatory procedures after it received notice from a 7 credit reporting agency."). 8 9 Third, and finally, Defendants argue that the amended complaint fails to adequately plead the inaccuracy at the heart of the dispute. "To state a claim under the 10 FCRA, [a plaintiff is] required, at a minimum, to allege factual content showing an 11 inaccuracy in his credit report." Bankes v. ACS Educ., 638 F. App'x 587, 590 (9th Cir. 12 2016) (citing Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1154, 1162). While Plaintiffs amended complaint is 13 not a model of clarity, he alleges that "Defendants eventually calculated and reported 14 against Plaintiffs credit a value of $2,223 as a charge-off (bad credit debt against 15 Plaintiff) on Plaintiffs credit card ... despite the amount being in dispute with Plaintiff." 16 (AC Memo. if 3). This is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. 17 III 18 III 19 III 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 distinguished between allegations of failure to correct misinformation and allegations of failure to conduct the investigation in accordance with the duties prescribed by section 1681s-2(b)(l). There, the court found that the plaintiffs allegations demonstrated that the furnisher had addressed the dispute and that plaintiffs challenge was to the manner in which the furnisher processed and applied her loan payments. The court held that the "provisions of [the] FCRA do not require [the furnisher] to ignore its policies and procedures related to the processing and application of loan payments by modifying or deleting information provided to the CRAs simply because the consumer disagrees." Id. at *8. "Nothing in§ 1681s-2(b) ... requires [the furnisher] to correct information simply because the consumer believes it is erroneous." Id. 13 17-cv-00005-BEN-KSC 1 2 CONCLUSION The Court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss specially appearing Defendant 3 JPMC for lack of personal jurisdiction. JPMC is dismissed from this case. In all other 4 respects, the Court DENIES Defendants' motion. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 6 7 8 Dated: August ~' 2017 n(J~~f:-. enitez United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14 l 7-cv-00005-BEN-KSC

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