Ahtazaban-el-ben v. Hicks et al

Filing 13

ORDER Denying Plaintiff's #12 Motion for Recusal. Signed by Judge Marilyn L. Huff on 3/28/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(ag)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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AHTAZABAN-EL-BEN YAHAWADA,
dba Robert P. Crowe,

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Case No.: 17-cv-00007-H (JLB)
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR RECUSAL

Plaintiff,

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v.

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HAUHNA A. HICKS; et al.,

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[Doc. Nos. 10, 12.]
Defendants.

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On January 6, 2017, Plaintiff Ahtazaban-El-Ben Yahawada dba Robert P. Crowe,

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proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against several defendants, alleging state law causes

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of action for fraud, forgery, trespass, and conspiracy. (Doc. No. 1.) Along with the

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complaint, Plaintiff paid the $400.00 filing fee.1 (Id.)

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The entirety of the allegations set forth in the complaint were as follows:

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[I], ahtazaban-el-ben yahawada, require: a ‘court of record’ and trial by
jury[.]

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Claim: Fraud, Forgery, Trespass and Conspiracy

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In addition to the $350 statutory fee required under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), civil litigants must pay
an additional administrative fee of $50. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914 Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees,
District Court Misc. Fee Schedule, § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2014).
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17-cv-00007-H (JLB)

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[I], ahtazaban-el-ben yahawada; autochthon; a man: all said wrongdoer(s)
continue and conspire to trespass upon my property with the use of forged
document(s) on/near 2/25/2015 by force and intimidation along with the
aiding of said ex officio employee(s) Black’s Law 9th pg. 657.
[I] require compensation for the continual trespass upon my property;
compensation due: All property retuned to i and one-million dollars for
damages and wrongs done to i.

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[I]; ahtazaban-el-ben yahawada; a man; verify/certify said claims to be true
under penalty and perjury.

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(Id.) On January 23, 2017, the Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint without prejudice
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (Doc. No. 3.) In the order, the Court explained that
it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action because the allegations in the complaint
were obviously frivolous, and the complaint failed to sufficiently allege facts showing that
the Court possessed diversity jurisdiction. (Id. at 2-3.) See Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d
1221, 1226 n.6 (9th Cir. 1984); NewGen, LLC v. Safe Cig, LLC, 840 F.3d 606, 612 (9th
Cir. 2016). In the order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to file a first amended complaint
by February 24, 2017. (Doc. No. 3 at 4.)
To date, Plaintiff has not filed a first amended complaint. On March 20, 2017,
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth Circuit as to the Court’s January 23, 2017
order dismissing his complaint without prejudice. (Doc. No. 6.)
On March 20 and 21, 2017, Plaintiff filed two documents requesting an order from
the undersigned judge recusing herself from the case. (Doc. Nos. 10, 12.) The Court denies
Plaintiff’s request for recusal. The only basis for recusal given in Plaintiff’s filings is the
Court’s January 23, 2017 order dismissing his complaint without prejudice. This is
insufficient to justify a recusal from the case. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540,
555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or
partiality motion.

In and of themselves (i.e., apart from surrounding comments or

accompanying opinion), they cannot possibly show reliance upon an extrajudicial source;

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and can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism

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required (as discussed below) when no extrajudicial source is involved. Almost invariably,

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they are proper grounds for appeal, not for recusal.” (citation omitted)); United States v.

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Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138, 1148 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that dismissal of a civil case will

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not “will not serve as [a] bas[is] for recusal absent unusual circumstances” and that

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“[a]dverse findings do not equate to bias”); United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914

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(9th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “‘prior rulings in the proceeding’” will not ordinarily serve

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as a basis for recusal). Further, Plaintiff’s assertion that the Court’s dismissal order was

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malicious is without merit given that the dismissal order contained a thorough and reasoned

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analysis of the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint and the order granted Plaintiff leave to

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file a first amended complaint. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion for

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recusal.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: March 28, 2017
MARILYN L. HUFF, District Judge
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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