James v. United States Marshals Service Agents et al
Filing
18
ORDER (1) Dismissing Civil Action For Failing To State A Claim And (2) Denying Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt # 9 ): The Court grants forty-five (45) days leave in which to file an Amended Complaint. If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint, the Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 8/8/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service.) (mdc)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11
12
KYLE JAMES,
CDCR #AL-1830,
Case No.: 17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
13
v.
14
15
1) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1)
Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES MARSHALS
SERVICE AGENTS, et al.
16
AND
Defendants.
17
2) DENYING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
AS MOOT [ECF Doc. No. 9]
18
19
20
Kyle James (“Plaintiff”), currently housed at the California Men’s Colony located
21
in San Luis Obispo, California, and proceeding pro se, filed this action pursuant to 42
22
U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff did not
23
prepay the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead he
24
has filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
25
(ECF No. 9).
26
I.
Sua Sponte Screening Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)
27
The Court may conduct a sua sponte review of Plaintiff’s pleading because he was
28
“incarcerated or detained in any facility [and] is accused of, sentenced for, or adjudicated
1
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation,
2
pretrial release, or diversionary program” at the time he filed this action. See 28 U.S.C.
3
§ 1915A(a), (c).
4
Section 1915A, also enacted as part of PLRA, requires sua sponte dismissal of
5
prisoner complaints, or any portions thereof, which are frivolous, malicious, or fail to state
6
a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); Coleman v. Tollefson,
7
135 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (2015); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 446-47 (9th Cir. 2000).
8
“The purpose of § 1915A is to ‘ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need
9
not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir.
10
2014) (quoting Wheeler v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 689 F.3d 680, 681 (7th Cir.
11
2012)).
12
A.
13
As an initial matter, the Court takes judicial notice that Plaintiff filed similar claims
14
in an action filed in 2014. A court “‘may take notice of proceedings in other courts, both
15
within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation
16
to matters at issue.’” Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
17
Bennett v. Medtronic, Inc., 285 F.3d 801, 803 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002)).
Previous action
18
Here, Plaintiff filed nearly identical claims against the same Defendants in James v.
19
Unnamed Defendants, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:14-cv-02936-WQH-JMA (“James
20
I”). In the First Amended Complaint filed in James I, Plaintiff claimed that United States
21
Deputy Marshals “maliciously” slandered him “by lying to everyone I’ve ever known and
22
associated with that I am a violent child rapist capable of murder.” (James I, ECF No. 3,
23
at 3.) Plaintiff also alleged that a prosecutor with the United States Attorney’s Office
24
“maliciously turned over jurisdiction” of his criminal matter involving a robbery to the San
25
Diego County District Attorney’s Office in order to give Plaintiff a “life sentence” instead
26
of the ten to fifteen years he would have faced under federal criminal sentencing. (Id. at
27
4.)
28
In James I, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP but simultaneously
2
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
dismissed his amended complaint on the grounds that he had failed to state a claim upon
2
which relief could be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1).
3
(James I, ECF No. 4 at 7-8.) Specifically, to the extent that Plaintiff alleged actions on the
4
part of the defendants that influenced his ongoing criminal proceedings, the Court found
5
that his claims amounted to “an attack on the validity of his underlying criminal
6
proceeding, and as such, are not addressable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, unless he alleges and
7
can ultimately show that conviction has already been invalidated.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff’s
8
claims were dismissed for failing to state a claim “without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to
9
file a new action if he succeeds in invalidating his conviction.” Id. at 5 (citing Edwards v.
10
Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 649 (1997)).
11
In addition, the Court found that Plaintiff’s claims, while brought pursuant to 42
12
U.S.C. § 1983, in fact arose under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal
13
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). (James I, ECF No. 4 at 5-6). The Court
14
dismissed some of the named defendants because they were federal agencies and Bivens
15
does not authorize a suit against the government or its agencies for monetary relief. Id. at
16
6 (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 486 (1994)).
17
Plaintiff was granted forty five (45) days to file an amended pleading in order to
18
correct the deficiencies identified in the Court’s Order. Id. at 8. However, Plaintiff failed
19
to do so and therefore, on April 22, 2015 the Court dismissed the entire action without
20
prejudice for failing to comply with a Court Order and for the reasons set forth in the
21
Court’s January 15, 2015 Order. (James I, ECF No. 8.) Judgment was entered the
22
following day on April 23, 2015. (James I, ECF No. 9.)
23
B.
24
Plaintiff filed this current action on February 24, 2017 (“James II”). (ECF No. 1.)
25
Plaintiff purports to bring this action pursuant to “5 U.S.C. § 702, Federal Question
26
Jurisdiction and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and F.T.C.A and Pendent Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1367.”
27
(Id. at 1.)
28
Current litigation
1.
Factual allegations
3
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
Plaintiff claims that he was on federal probation in 2013 when he “absconded Dec
2
2013 - March 17, 2014 with an active Federal warrant giving the United States Marshals
3
Service (“USMS”) jurisdiction” over him. Id. Plaintiff claims that in March of 2014, the
4
USMS “worked with the San Diego Sheriff’s Dep’t as part of the Regional Fugitive Task
5
Force.” Id. at 2. Plaintiff claims that he was charged with crimes that were “unfounded
6
and unsupported by evidence” and some of these charges were dismissed in September of
7
2016 while Plaintiff was convicted of bank robbery. Id. Plaintiff alleges that five unnamed
8
USMS Deputies, along with USMS Deputy Brown and USMS Deputy Laney “acted
9
maliciously” and “slandered” Plaintiff in March of 2014. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that they
10
lied to his “friends, family, and associates” by claiming that Plaintiff had “raped a little
11
girl.” (Id.) As a result of these actions, Plaintiff alleges he was the “target for serious harm
12
and injury to the point of death.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that “due to the actions and
13
misconduct of the ‘Marshals,’ people to this day think/believe that the lies the Marshals
14
told are true putting the Plaintiff’s life at risk in the future.” (Id. at 7-8.)
15
2.
Bivens and 42 U.S.C. § 1983
16
As the Court informed Plaintiff in the James I matter, because he is naming federal
17
officials as Defendants, his claims of constitutional violations arise under Bivens rather
18
than 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Bivens established that “compensable injury to a constitutionally
19
protected interest [by federal officials alleged to have acted under color of federal law]
20
could be vindicated by a suit for damages invoking the general federal question jurisdiction
21
of the federal courts [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331].” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478,
22
486 (1978); Western Center for Journalism v. Cederquist, 235 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.
23
2000) (under Bivens, “federal courts have the inherent authority to award damages against
24
federal officials to compensate plaintiffs for violations of their constitutional rights.”).
25
To state a claim under Bivens, Plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color
26
of federal law deprived him of his constitutional rights. See Serra v. Lappin, 600 F.3d
27
1191, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010). Thus, the Ninth Circuit considers “[a]ctions under § 1983 and
28
those under Bivens [as] identical save for the replacement of a state actor under § 1983 by
4
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
a federal actor under Bivens.” Van Strum v. Lawn, 940 F.2d 406, 409 (9th Cir. 1991);
2
Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 254, 254 n.2 (2006) (a suit brought pursuant to Bivens is
3
the “federal analogue” to § 1983).
4
3.
Eighth Amendment claims
5
Plaintiff claims that his “life is at risk in the future” due to the fact that the USMS
6
Deputies have labeled him a child molester. (ECF No. 1 at 8). Plaintiff refers to this claim
7
as a “deliberate indifference to safety claim” and thus, the Court will construe this claim as
8
arising under the Eighth Amendment as Plaintiff is currently incarcerated. Plaintiff also
9
purports to bring an Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” claim based on
10
the “malicious and sadistic actions of the U.S. Marshals in 2014 March lying telling my
11
entire community that I was a child rapist.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff alleges that the statements
12
by the Defendants “amounted to cruel and unusual punishment” and were “such a severe
13
threat” that Plaintiff “ended up in prison for 38 years to life for 2 bank Robberies.” Id.
14
Plaintiff contends that the threat created by Defendants’ statements “pushed [him] into
15
robbing a bank because I felt I had no other option and that I had to . . . survive the ‘wildfire’
16
the Marshals spread.” Id.
17
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment of a person
18
convicted of a crime. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing U.S.
19
Const. amend. VIII). “After incarceration, only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of
20
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.”
21
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977) (citations omitted).
22
The Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials take reasonable measures to
23
guarantee the safety and well-being of prisoners. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832–
24
33 (1994); Johnson, 217 F.3d at 731. To state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect
25
claim, Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to plausibly show that (1) he faced conditions
26
posing a “substantial risk of serious harm” to his health or safety, and (2) the individual
27
prison officials he seeks to hold liable were “deliberately indifferent” to those risks.
28
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). To
5
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
demonstrate deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must show that the defendant both knew of
2
and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to his health and safety. Farmer, 511
3
U.S. at 837. Thus, Plaintiff must allege “the official [was] both be aware of facts from
4
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed], and
5
[that] he . . . also dr[e]w that inference.” Id.
6
There are no facts from which the Court could conclude that Defendants acted with
7
“deliberate indifference” to a serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s allegations are
8
broad, vague, and fail to identify how any inmate he is currently incarcerated with is aware
9
of the comments allegedly made by Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff claims defamation and
10
injuries to his reputation with his friends, family, and community, which is not a federally
11
protected right.
12
publication, however seriously it may have harmed someone’s reputation, did not deprive
13
him of any liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause). Further,
14
Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to establish that the alleged statements by Defendants
15
made prior to Plaintiff’s conviction for robbery and current incarceration constitute cruel
16
and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. For these reasons, the
17
Court finds Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims must be dismissed for failing to state a
18
claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
19
4.
See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 785, 708-712 (1976) (a defamatory
FTCA claims
20
Plaintiff also purports to bring claims under the FTCA alleging defamation, slander,
21
negligence and intentional infliction of mental or emotional distress. (ECF No. 1 at 9-12).
22
The FTCA provides a remedy “for injury or loss of property or personal injury or death
23
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission” of a federal employee. 28 U.S.C. §
24
2672. However, the FTCA provides that the exclusive remedy for torts committed by
25
federal employees is a suit against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(1). While
26
Plaintiff did name the United States as a Defendant, he also named the United States
27
Marshal Service, which is an agency of the federal government. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 4.) The
28
sole permissible Defendant in a claim under the FTCA is the United States and thus, the
6
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
Court DISMISSES any FTCA claims against the United States Marshals Service and
2
individual defendants. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2679(a); Allen v. Veterans Admin., 749
3
F.2d 1386, 1388 (9th Cir. 1984).
4
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to pursue claims of defamation and slander against
5
the United States under the FTCA, these claims must be dismissed. The FTCA does not
6
waive sovereign immunity as to claims arising out of “libel, slander, misrepresentation,
7
deceit and interference with contract rights.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). The Court lacks subject
8
matter jurisdiction to hear these claims and thus, these claims are DISMISSED without
9
leave to amend as amendment would be futile.
10
Plaintiff also brings a negligence and an intentional infliction of emotional distress
11
(“IIED”) claim arising from the same set of facts he attributes to his defamation and slander
12
causes of action. (ECF No. 1 at 9-12). “In determining whether a claim ‘arises out of’ one
13
of the enumerated torts, we look beyond a plaintiff’s classification of the cause of action
14
to examine whether the conduct upon which the claim is based constitutes one of the torts
15
listed in § 2680(h).” Sabow v. U.S., 93 F.3d 1445, 1456 (9th Cir. 1996).
16
As to Plaintiff’s IIED claim, he alleges that Defendants lied “to the entire community
17
convincing people I was a child rapist.” (ECF No. 1 at 9.) As for Plaintiff’s negligence
18
claim, he claims that Defendants told “lies” that he had “allegedly raped a little girl” and
19
they “convince[ed] the public that I was a ‘child rapist.’” Id. at 11. These facts upon which
20
these claims are based arise from the same set of facts that Plaintiff seeks to pursue in his
21
defamation and slander claims which are barred under the FTCA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h).
22
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s negligence and IIED claims arise from the alleged
23
defamation and slander claims, these claims are also barred by § 2680(h). Thomas-Lazear
24
v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 851 F.2d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 1988).
Thus, the Court DISMISSES all of Plaintiff’s claims brought pursuant to the FTCA
25
26
for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
27
III.
28
Conclusion and Order
For the reasons explained, the Court:
7
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
1
(1) DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief
2
may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and GRANTS him forty-five (45) days
3
leave from the date of this Order in which to file an Amended Complaint which cures all
4
the deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be complete by
5
itself without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claim not
6
re-alleged in his Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. CIVLR
7
15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir.
8
1989) (“[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original.”); Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693
9
F.3d 896, 928 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are
10
not re-alleged in an amended pleading may be “considered waived if not repled.”).
11
If Plaintiff fails to file an Amended Complaint within the time provided, the Court
12
will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on Plaintiff’s failure to state
13
a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and
14
1915A(b), and his failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring
15
amendment. See Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does
16
not take advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the
17
dismissal of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”).
18
19
20
(2)
DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP (ECF Doc. No. 9) as moot and
without prejudice to be re-opened if Plaintiff files an amended pleading.
Dated: August 8, 2017
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
8
17-cv-0414-WQH-BLM
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?