Goolsby v. San Diego, County of et al
Filing
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ORDER (1) Granting Motion To Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Dkt # 2 ) And (2) Dismissing Complaint For Failing To State A Claim: The Watch Commander of SDCJ or his designee, is ordered to collect from Plaintiff's trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly payments from his account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 pur suant to 28 USC 1915(b)(2). The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Price and Mesa and Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims. Plaintiff is granted forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in which to either : (1) Notify the Court of the intention to proceed with the Eighth Amendment claims only; or (2) File an Amended Complaint. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 6/26/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service. Copy mailed to Watch Commander of SDCJ. Per Order, a blank civil rights complaint form also was sent to plaintiff.) (mdc)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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THOMAS GOOLSBY,
Booking# 16178866,
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Case No.: 3:17-cv-0564-WQH-NLS
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.
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Defendants.
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ORDER:
1) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS
[Doc. No. 2]
AND
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3) DISMISSING COMPLAINT FOR
FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
AND§ 1915A(b)
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Plaintiff Thomas Goolsby is a state inmate who was temporarily housed in the San
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Diego Central Jail ("SDCJ") at the time he initiated this action. 1 Plaintiff filed a
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Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a request for leave to proceed in forma
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pauperis ("IFP"). (ECF Nos. 1,2). Because Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP complies
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Plaintiff filed a notice of change of address on June 12, 2017. (ECF No. 3).
3:17-cv-0564-WQH-NLS
1 II with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), the Court grants him leave to proceed without full
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prepayment of the civil filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. §1914(a) and dismisses some of
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the claims in his Complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)
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and§ 1915A(b).
Background
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Plaintiff claims that he has been placed in solitary confinement without due
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process in addition to being subjected to constant cell illumination and deprived of
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outdoor exercise in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. (See ECF No. 1 at 16-17.)
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He seeks injunctive relief along with $100,000 in compensatory damages and $250,000
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in punitive damages from each named Defendant. (Id. at 18.)
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Discussion
1211A.
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Plaintiff's IFP Motion
All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the
United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of
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$400. 2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). The action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to
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prepay the entire fee only ifhe is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v.
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Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, a prisoner who is granted leave to
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proceed IFP remains obligated to pay the entire fee in "increments" or "installments,"
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Bruce v. Samuels, 136 S. Ct. 627, 629 (2016); Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185
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(9th Cir. 2015), and regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281F.3d844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002).
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Section 1915(a)(2) requires prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP to submit a
"certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) for ... the
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In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of $50. See
27 II 2g U.S.C. § l 914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule,§ 14 (eff.
28 II Dec. 1, 2014 ). The additional $50 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave to proceed
IFP. Id.
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6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1915(a)(2); Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1119 (9th Cir. 2005). From the certified
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trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average
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monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly
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balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner
6 II has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). The institution having
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custody of the prisoner then collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the
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preceding month's income, in any month in which his account exceeds $10, and forwards
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those payments to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2);
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Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629.
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In support of his IFP motion, Plaintiff has submitted a copy of his San Diego
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Central Jail prison certificate. ECF No. 2 at 5; see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL.
13 II CrvLR 3.2; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1119. This certificate shows that while he has had
14 11 monthly deposits to his account preceding the filing of his Complaint, his current
15 11 available balance is $0.51 (ECF No. 2 at 5), and it appears Plaintiff is unable to pay any
16 II initial fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) (providing that "[i]n no event shall a
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prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil action or criminal
18 11 judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay [a]
19 II initial partial filing fee"); Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 630; Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850 (finding that
20 1128 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) acts as a "safety-valve" preventing dismissal of a prisoner's IFP
21 11 case based solely on a "failure to pay ... due to the lack of funds available to him when
22 11 payment is ordered").
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Therefore, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to proceed IFP, declines to "exact" any
initial filing fee because his trust account statement shows he "has no means to pay it,"
25 II Bruce, 136 S. Ct. at 629, and directs the Watch Commander at the San Diego Central Jail
26 !Ito collect the entire $350 balance of the filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914 and
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forward them to the Clerk of the Court pursuant to the installment payment provisions set
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forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(l).
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3:17-cv-0564-WQH-NLS
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II B.
Legal Standards for Screening Complaint Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his complaint requires a pre-
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answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e )(2) and § l 9 l 5A(b ). Under these
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statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of
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it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants
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who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en bane)
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(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621F.3d1002, 1004 (9th Cir.
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2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). "The purpose of [screening] is 'to ensure that
1o the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.'"
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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.l (9th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
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"The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon
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which relief can be granted under§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of
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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter, 668
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F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th
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Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to§ 1915A "incorporates the familiar standard
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applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
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12(b)(6)"). Rule 12(b )(6) requires a complaint "contain sufficient factual matter, accepted
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as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.
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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the
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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
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relief [is] ... a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
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judicial experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" or
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"unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[ s]" fall short of meeting
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this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969
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(9th Cir. 2009).
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u.s.c. § 1983
1 II C.
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Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a cause of action for the "deprivation of any rights,
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privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States.
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Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992). To state a claim under§ 1983, a plaintiff must
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allege two essential elements: ( 1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the
6 II United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person
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acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Long v. Cty. of
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Los Angeles, 442 F .3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006).
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1.
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"Under Color of State Law"
All the Defendants named in Plaintiffs complaint are alleged to have acted in their
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individual and official capacities as employees of the San Diego County Sheriff's
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Department at the time of his alleged injuries. (ECF No. 1 at 2-3). "[G]enerally, a public
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employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while
14 II exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." West, 487 U.S. at 50. Therefore, the
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need only determine whether Plaintiff has "plead[ ed] factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference" that each defendant he seeks to hold liable,
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"through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." Iqbal, 556
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U.S. at 676, 678.
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2.
Fourteenth Amendment due process claims
Plaintiff claims that upon his arrival from a California state prison, he was
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immediately placed in solitary confinement. (ECF No. 1 at 10). Plaintiff alleges he
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asked for the basis of this classification because he was previously housed in the "general
23 II population." (Id.) However, Defendants allegedly refused to provide him with the basis
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of this decision or allow him to attend a classification hearing. (Id.)
The Due Process Clause protects prisoners against deprivation or restraint of"a
protected liberty interest" and "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation
27 II to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir.
28 II 2003) (quoting Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995)) (internal quotation marks
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3:17-cv-0564-WQH-NLS
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omitted). Although the level of the hardship must be determined in a case-by-case
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determination, courts look to:
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1) whether the challenged condition "mirrored those conditions imposed upon
inmates in administrative segregation and protective custody," and thus
comported with the prison's discretionary authority; 2) the duration of the
condition, and the degree of restraint imposed; and 3) whether the state's
action will invariably affect the duration of the prisoner's sentence.
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Id. at 861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87). Only ifan inmate has alleged facts
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sufficient to show a protected liberty interest does the court next consider "whether the
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procedures used to deprive that liberty satisfied Due Process." Id. at 860.
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As currently pleaded, Plaintiffs Complaint fails to allege facts which show that the
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placement in solitary confinement subjected him to any "atypical and significant hardship
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in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Id.; Sandin, 515 U.S. at 584. Plaintiff
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does not compare the conditions of his confinement before or after his solitary
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confinement placement. Nor does he allege the degree of restraint it imposed. See id. at
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861 (quoting Sandin, 515 U.S. at 486-87).
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Moreover, Plaintiffs pleading contains no "factual content that allows the court to
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draw the reasonable inference," Igbal, 556 U.S. at 678, that Defendants' actions
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"presented a dramatic departure from the basic conditions of [Plaintiffs] indeterminate
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sentence," or caused him to suffer an "atypical" or "significant hardship." Sandin, 515
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U.S. at 584-85; see also Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1088-89 (9th Cir. 1996), amended
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!2y 135 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process
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claims must be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
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3.
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Individual Causation
The Court also finds that dismissal of Defendants Price and Mesa is warranted at
stage. "The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and
27 II responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have
28 II caused a constitutional deprivation." Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988),
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1 II (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976)); Berg v. Kincheloe, 794 F.2d 457,
2 11460 (9th Cir. 1986); Estate of Brooks v. United States, 197 F.3d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir.
3 111999) ("Causation is, of course, a required element of a § 1983 claim.") A person
4 11 deprives another "of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does
5 II an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act
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which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [the plaintiff
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complains]." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintiff has not
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stated a claim against Defendants Price and Mesa because he has failed to allege facts
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regarding what actions were taken or not taken by these Defendants which caused the
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alleged constitutional violations.
The Court finds that Defendants Price and Mesa must be dismissed from this
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4.
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A pro se litigant must be given leave to amend his or her complaint to state a claim
Leave to Amend
15 11 unless it is absolutely clear the deficiencies of the complaint cannot be cured by
16 II amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130 (noting leave to amend should be granted when
17 11 a complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) "if it appears at all possible that the
18 11 plaintiff can correct the defect"). Therefore, while the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged
19 11 Eighth Amendment claims that survive the sua sponte screening process, Plaintiffs
20 11 Complaint fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim upon which relief can be granted.
21 II
However, the Court will provide Plaintiff the opportunity to notify the Court as to
22 11 whether he intends to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claims only or file an
23 11 amended complaint fixing all the pleading deficiencies discussed in this Order.
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Plaintiff is cautioned, however, that should he choose to file an amended
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complaint, it must be complete by itself and it must comply with Federal Rule of Civil
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Procedure 8(a). Any claim not re-alleged will be considered waived. See S.D. Cal.
27 JI CivLR 15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546
28 II (9th Cir. 1989) ("[A]n amended pleading supersedes the original."); Lacey, 693 F.3d at
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1 11928 (noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an
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amended pleading may be "considered waived if not repled.").
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Conclusion
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For all the reasons explained the Court:
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1.
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GRANTS Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)
(Doc. No. 2).
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DIRECTS the Watch Commander of SDCJ or his designee, to collect from
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Plaintiffs trust account the $350 filing fee owed in this case by garnishing monthly
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payments from his account in an amount equal to twenty percent (20%) of the preceding
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month's income and forwarding those payments to the Clerk of the Court each time the
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amount in the account exceeds $10 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). ALL
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PAYMENTS SHALL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY THE NAME AND NUMBER
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ASSIGNED TO THIS ACTION.
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3.
DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to serve a copy of this Order on the Watch
Commander, San Diego Central Jail, 1173 Front Street, San Diego, California, 92158.
4.
DISMISSES Plaintiffs claims against Defendants Price and Mesa and
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Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment claims for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28
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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and§ 1915A(b).
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5.
GRANTS Plaintiff forty-five (45) days leave from the date of this Order in
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which to either: (1) Notify the Court of the intention to proceed with the Eighth
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Amendment claims only; or (2) File an Amended Complaint which cures all the
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deficiencies of pleading noted. Plaintiffs Amended Complaint must be complete in itself
23 11 without reference to his original pleading. Defendants not named and any claims not re24
alleged in the Amended Complaint will be considered waived. See S.D. CAL. C1vLR
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15.1; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th
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Cir. 1989) ("[A Jn amended pleading supersedes the original."); Lacey, 693 F .3d at 928
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(noting that claims dismissed with leave to amend which are not re-alleged in an
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amended pleading may be "considered waived if not repled.").
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6.
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail Plaintiff a court approved form civil
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
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5 II Dated:
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(/,L~/t1
Hon. William Q.
United States Di
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