Williams et al v. San Diego, County of et al

Filing 79

ORDER Overruling 58 Plaintiff Katy Williams' Objections to Magistrate Judge's October 15, 2018 Order. The Court finds Judge Burkhardt's 10/15/2018 order was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court overrules Williams' objections. Signed by Judge Michael M. Anello on 12/21/2018.(rmc)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
KATY WILLIAMS; GARY EVANS; and
Minor Plaintiffs A.C., Am.E. and Aa.E.,
by and through their Guardian Ad Litem,
JOHN GARTER,

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Case No.: 17cv815-MMA (JLB)
ORDER OVERRULING PLAINTIFF
KATY WILLIAMS’ OBJECTIONS
TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S
OCTOBER 15, 2018 ORDER

Plaintiffs,

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v.

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COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO; and
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

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[Doc. No. 58]

Defendants.

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Plaintiffs Katy Williams, Gary Evans, and minor plaintiffs A.C., Am.E., and Aa.E.,

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by and through their Guardian ad Litem, John Garter (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed this

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action against Defendant County of San Diego1 (“Defendant” or “County”) alleging

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claims for: (1) Monell liability based upon violations of Plaintiffs’ Fourth and Fourteenth

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Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (2) injunctive relief. See FAC. On

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October 15, 2018, Magistrate Judge Jill L. Burkhardt issued an order denying Plaintiff

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Katy Williams’ (“Williams”) motion to compel further response from Defendant to

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The County was also erroneously sued as “San Diego Health and Human Services Agency.”
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Interrogatories, Set One, and Request for Production of Documents, Set One. See Doc.

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No. 49.

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On October 29, 2018, Williams filed objections to the magistrate judge’s order

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a). See Doc. No. 58. Defendant filed an

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opposition to Williams’ objections, to which Williams replied. See Doc. Nos. 65, 69.

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The Court found the matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral

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argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. See Doc. No. 70. For the reasons set

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forth below, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ objections to the magistrate judge’s

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October 15, 2018 order.

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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

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Williams is the natural mother of A.C., Am.E., and Aa.E (“Minor Plaintiffs”).

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FAC ¶ 8. Williams has another minor child, D.C., who is not a plaintiff in this action.

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Id. Plaintiff Gary Evans (“Evans”) is the natural father of Am.E. and Aa.E. Id. ¶ 9.

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Williams and Evans share custody of Am.E. and Aa.E, and Williams has sole custody of

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A.C. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. On April 24, 2017, the Court appointed Mr. John Garter as Guardian

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ad Litem for Minor Plaintiffs. See Doc. No. 4.

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In 2013, Defendant first became acquainted with Williams and her children after

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an incident involving D.C.’s father, Jason Clark (“Clark”). Id. ¶ 12. Clark became

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violent with Williams and threatened to kill her. Id. As a result, Williams obtained a

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restraining order against Clark. Id.

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In June 2014, County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency

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(“HHSA”) filed a petition on D.C.’s behalf alleging D.C. sustained bruises to his head,

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“which would not ordinarily be sustained except as a result of the unreasonable acts of

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D.C.’s father[.]” Id. ¶ 13. Juvenile dependency proceedings commenced shortly

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thereafter. See id. D.C. lived with Williams during this time, and Clark was no longer

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able to have unsupervised visits with his son. See id. Clark, angry about the supervised

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visits with D.C., began making “false allegations against Williams and [Evans.]” Id. ¶¶

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In January 2016, Clark reported a bruise near D.C.’s eye to HHSA. See id. ¶ 18.

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D.C. “hit his left eye on a corner of a kitchen island while playing with Minor Plaintiff

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Aa.E.” Id. ¶ 18. Social worker Daniel Bernal (“Bernal”) inspected the bruise on January

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8, 2016. See id. ¶ 18. During Bernal’s investigation, Bernal informed Williams that he

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wished to interview minor plaintiff Aa.E. alone, but Williams did not consent to such an

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interview. See id. ¶ 19. On January 11, 2016, Evans and Williams’ attorney sent a letter

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to the County, HHSA, and Bernal, indicating that “Minor Plaintiffs were represented by

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counsel and that no interviews of Minor Plaintiffs A.C., Am.E. or Aa.E. should take place

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without counsel present.” Id. ¶ 20.

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On January 12, 2016, D.C. sustained additional injuries to his head when “he ran

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into a doorknob at his home[.]” Id. ¶ 21. Williams took D.C. to the hospital, and the

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doctor discharged D.C. indicating that D.C. “sustained a ‘normal childhood injury.’” Id.

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Clark, once again, reported the incident to the HHSA hotline. See id.

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On January 19, 2016, Bernal went to A.C.’s middle school, instructed staff to

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remove her from her classroom, and “detained her against her will” without court order,

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parental consent, knowledge, or presence. Id. ¶ 22. That same day, Bernal also visited

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Am.E. and Aa.E.’s elementary school, instructed staff to remove them from their

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classrooms, and “detained them against their will” without court order, parental consent,

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knowledge, or presence. Id. ¶ 23. Once the children were removed from their

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classrooms, Bernal, social worker Janet Barragan (“Barragan”), and social worker

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Miriam Partida (“Partida”) “interrogated” the children, despite the fact that Bernal, the

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County, and HHSA “were informed in writing” that Evans and Williams “did not want

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their minor children to be interviewed by social workers with the County and HHSA

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without a parent and/or attorney being present at that interview.” Id. ¶ 24. Notably, there

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were not, nor have there ever been, any allegations that Minor Plaintiffs were abused or

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neglected by their parents, or any other individuals. See id.

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During the interviews, the social workers inquired about Minor Plaintiffs’ safety at

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home, how their parents disciplined them, and whether D.C. “was an active child.” Id. ¶
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25. The social workers did not inform the Minor Plaintiffs that they could decline to be

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interviewed, nor were they given a choice about being interviewed “once they were

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detained and confronted by the County workers.” Id. ¶ 26. Further, the Minor Plaintiffs

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“were not informed that they could have a parent and/or an attorney present for the

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interviews.” Id. At the time of the interviews, the social workers “did not have exigency,

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Court Order, parental consent, knowledge or presence, or even reasonable suspicion that

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the Minor Plaintiffs were the subject of abuse or neglect.” Id. ¶ 27.

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Clark “continues to make false allegations” and on December 29, 2017, social
worker Lisette Alvarez (“Alvarez”) contacted Williams to inquire about conducting an

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in-person interview regarding disciplinary issues involving Williams’ children. See id. ¶

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28. On January 11, 2018, Alvarez “reiterated her intent” to interview Williams and her

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children. See id. ¶ 29. Williams indicated that she agreed for a meeting with herself,

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D.C., and her counsel, but that she would not agree to interviews of her other children.

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See id. Alvarez, however, “refused to agree not to go to the schools” of the Minor

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Plaintiffs pursuant to Defendant’s “policies that allowed her to conduct such

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interviews[.]” Id. (emphasis in original). Based on these allegations, Plaintiffs

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commenced the instant action.

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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

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On July 16, 2018, the parties requested the magistrate judge’s assistance with a

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discovery dispute. See Doc. No. 42. Judge Burkhardt held a telephonic Discovery

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Conference the following day, but the parties were unable to resolve their dispute. See

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Doc. No. 43. Judge Burkhardt ordered briefing on the issue and set a briefing schedule.

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See Doc. No. 44. Williams filed a motion to compel on September 25, 2018. See Doc.

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No. 45. Defendant filed an opposition on September 28, 2018, to which Williams

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replied. See Doc. Nos. 46, 47. On October 15, 2018, Judge Burkhardt issued an order

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denying Williams’ motion. See Doc. No. 49. Williams filed the instant objections to

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Judge Burkhardt’s order on October 29, 2018. See Doc. No. 58.

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LEGAL STANDARD

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A party may object to a non-dispositive pretrial order of a magistrate judge within

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fourteen days after service of the order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The magistrate

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judge’s order will be upheld unless “it has been shown that the magistrate [judge]’s order

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is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). “The ‘clearly

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erroneous’ standard applies to factual findings and discretionary decisions made in

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connection with non-dispositive pretrial discovery matters.” Obesity Research Inst., LLC

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v. Fiber Research Int’l, LLC, No. 15-cv-595-BAS (MDD), 2017 WL 3335736, at *1

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(S.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2017) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 196 F.R.D. 375,

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378 (S.D. Cal. 2000)).

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“Under Rule 72(a), [a] finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is

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evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite

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and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Waterfall Homeowners Ass’n v.

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Viega, Inc., 283 F.R.D. 571, 575 (D. Nev. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation

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omitted). “An order is contrary to law when it fails to apply or misapplies relevant

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statutes, case law or rules of procedure.” Id. (citation omitted).

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“When reviewing discovery disputes, however, the Magistrate is afforded broad

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discretion, which will be overruled only if abused.” Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell,

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245 F.R.D. 443, 446 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (internal citations and quotation omitted).

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DISCUSSION

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Williams objects to the magistrate judge’s order on two grounds, “both of which

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are based on the [judge’s] legal conclusions.” Doc. No. 58 at 10. Specifically, Williams

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asserts that Judge Burkhardt erred: (1) in determining that the Interrogatories and Request

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for Production seek information covered by the work product doctrine; and (2) in

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sanctioning Plaintiffs for violating the Civil Local Rules and her order regarding the

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Early Neutral Evaluation Conference. See id. at 10-11, 13. The Court addresses

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Williams’ objections in turn.

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1.

Motion to Compel

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First, Williams objects to the magistrate judge’s order denying her motion to

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compel, including the magistrate judge’s determination that the Interrogatories and

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Request for Production seek information covered by the attorney work product doctrine.

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Doc. No. 58 at 10-11.

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In her Interrogatories, Williams asks the following:

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1.
Have YOU reviewed any documents in conjunction with the
litigation filed in this case, other than those documents produced to YOU by
Plaintiffs on May 18, 2018, since the litigation was filed in this matter on
April 24, 2017?

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2.
If YOUR answer to Interrogatory No. 1. is “yes,” please
identify each and every document that you have reviewed, other than
documents produced to YOU by Plaintiffs on April 24, 2017.

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Doc. No. 50-3 at 3.

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The terms “YOU” and “YOUR” are defined as “Defendant COUNTY OF SAN

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DIEGO, including its Health and Human Services Agency,” and includes “past and

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present attorneys, agents, employees, representatives, agencies, organizations, entities or

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any of them, and any PERSON and ENTITY acting through or on YOUR behalf.” Id. at

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1.

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Williams’ Request for Production similarly provides, “[p]lease produce each and

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every DOCUMENT that YOU have identified in YOUR Responses to Plaintiff Katy

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Williams’ Interrogatories Propounded to Defendant County of San Diego, Set One.”

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Doc. No. 50-4 at 5.

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In her objections, Williams focuses exclusively on the Juvenile Case File

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documents. In describing the information sought in the Interrogatories and Request for

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Production, Williams notes that she “clarified that the requests were seeking only

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information and documents from the Juvenile Case Files.” Doc. No. 58 at 7 n.2

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(emphasis in original). Thus, “contrary to Defendant’s assertions and the Magistrate
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[Judge]’s order, this Interrogatory . . . is asking whether the County received documents

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obtained from the confidential Juvenile Case Files of the Plaintiff minors after the

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litigation was filed.” Doc. No. 69 at 3; see also Doc. No. 58-1 (hereinafter “Nahama

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Decl.”) ¶ 19.

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However, as noted by Judge Burkhardt, Williams “did not request the production

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of Juvenile Case File documents in the possession of Defendant. Rather, she requested

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identification of, and production of, documents reviewed by Defendant and/or counsel

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‘in conjunction with’ this litigation.” Doc. No. 49 at 9 (emphasis in original). Thus, in

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examining the express language of the Interrogatories and Request for Production, it is

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clear that the request encompasses more than just the Juvenile Case File documents.

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Moreover, in considering the parties’ arguments, Judge Burkhardt noted that Defendant

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claimed that responding to the Interrogatories and Request for Production “would force

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defense counsel to divulge its strategies, impressions, and theories of the case[.]” Doc.

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No. 49 at 10 (quoting Doc. No. 51 at 6). Judge Burkhardt explained that the court “has

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no reason to question these assertions” and determined that the Interrogatories and

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Request for Production are “shielded from disclosure.” Id. Thus, after citing relevant

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and binding authority, Judge Burkhardt concluded that “the manner in which Williams is

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attempting to obtain the requested documents is improper.” Id. The Court agrees. Upon

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review of the record and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that Williams has not

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demonstrated that the magistrate judge’s determination that the Interrogatories and

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Request for Production seek information covered by the work product doctrine was

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clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

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Additionally, the cases cited by Williams in support of her argument are inapposite

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to the case at bar. Williams primarily relies on OCI Wyoming, L.P. v. Pacificorp, No. 3-

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cv-259-B, 2005 WL 8155452 (D. Wyo. Jan. 21, 2005). In OCI Wyoming, the district

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court held that documents “collected by counsel in the course of preparation for possible

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litigation, but [that] were not created by counsel or at the behest of counsel do not fall

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under the protection of the work product doctrine.” 2005 WL 8155452, at *3 (internal
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quotation marks omitted). However, the plaintiff in OCI Wyoming did not request

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defense counsel to identify and produce documents reviewed in conjunction with the

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litigation. Moreover, Williams continues to focuses exclusively on the Juvenile Case File

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documents, despite the fact that the express language of her requests encompass

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additional documents. See Doc. No. 50-3 at 3. Williams contends that the Juvenile Case

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File documents “were not prepared by or at the behest of Defendant’s counsel.” Doc. No.

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58 at 11. While that may be true, OCI Wyoming does not support Williams’ argument

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because she did not solely request the production of Juvenile Case File documents in

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Defendant’s possession.

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Further, Williams relies on In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litigation, a

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case from the First Circuit, in support of her argument that the Juvenile Case File

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documents are not protected by the attorney work product doctrine. 859 F.2d 1007 (1st

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Cir. 1988). In San Juan, the court explained that “[t]he key factor distinguishing such

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materials from protected opinion work product is that, even absent compelled disclosure,

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the information will probably come to light during the course of trial, if not before.” Id.

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at 1016. However, “[t]he rules do not compel disclosure of matters which would likely

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remain inviolate in the bosom of the lodge; they merely accelerate disclosure of matters

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that would probably be revealed in due course.” Id. Williams claims she “is simply

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attempting to ‘accelerate disclosure of matters’ that will ultimately be revealed in due

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course (albeit very lengthy due course).” Doc. No. 58 at 13 (quoting San Juan, 859 F.2d

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at 1016). However, as noted above, the Interrogatories and Request for Production

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request the County, including its attorneys, to identify and produce every document

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reviewed “in conjunction with the litigation filed in this case[.]” Doc. No. 50-3 at 3.

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Thus, Williams’ request is much broader than she admits. Unlike San Juan, Defendant

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notes that “[b]ecause defense counsel’s mental impressions are not at issue in this case, it

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is unlikely they will ever come to light.” Doc. No. 65 at 8. As such, Williams’ reliance

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on San Juan is misplaced.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Judge Burkhardt did not clearly err or act
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contrary to law in finding that “the Interrogatories and Request for Production seek

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information covered by the work product doctrine.” Doc. No. 49 at 9. Thus, the Court

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OVERRULES Williams’ objection.

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Sanctions

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Williams next “objects to the Magistrate’s finding that Plaintiff’s counsel violated

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both the Local Civil Rules and this Court’s Order regarding the Early Neutral Evaluation

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Conference, and it is therefore appropriate to order Plaintiff to pay Defendant the

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reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees, which it incurred in opposing Williams’

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motion to compel [pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)].” 2 Doc. No. 58

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at 13-14.

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The Court finds that Judge Burkhardt correctly concluded that Williams’ counsel

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violated both the Civil Local Rules and the court’s order regarding the Early Neutral

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Evaluation Conference. In her order, Judge Burkhardt explained that Defendant is the

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prevailing party on the discovery motion. See Doc. No. 49 at 11. However, Judge

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Burkhardt indicated that she is “deeply concerned with Williams’ violation of her

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obligation to respect the confidentiality of statements made at the Early Neutral

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Evaluation Conference,” as Williams cited numerous representations allegedly made by

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defense counsel at the conference in her motion to compel. Id.; see also Doc. Nos. 50-1

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at 4, 50-2 at 1, 52 at 2-3. The magistrate judge explained that “any unauthorized

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disclosure has served as a basis for sanctions against the violating attorney.” Doc. No. 49

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at 12.

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Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 16.1(c)(1)(b), cited by Judge Burkhardt, “[t]he ENE
conference will be informal, off the record, privileged, and confidential.” CivLR

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Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5), the Court “must, after giving an
opportunity to be heard, require the movant, the attorney filing the motion, or both to pay the party or
deponent who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including
attorney’s fees,” unless the court finds that the “motion was substantially justified or other
circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B).
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16.1(c)(1)(b). Moreover, Judge Burkhardt’s order setting the Early Neutral Evaluation

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states, “[a]ll ENE Conference discussions will be informal, off the record, privileged and

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confidential.” Doc. No. 31 at 1. Additionally, Local Rule 83.1 provides that “[f]ailure of

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counsel or of any party to comply with these rules, with the Federal Rules of Civil or

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Criminal Procedure, or with any order of the court may be grounds for imposition by the

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court of any and all sanctions” including “imposition of monetary sanctions or attorneys’

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fees and costs.” CivLR 83.1(a).

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Williams argues that “[t]he disclosure of these statements . . . in these proceedings

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was made to prevent ‘manifest injustice’ to Plaintiff, and certainly not intended to violate

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the confidentiality of the ENE Conference proceedings.” Doc. No. 58 at 16. Williams

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relies on Jones v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a case from the Northern District of

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California, wherein the magistrate judge explained that ADR Local Rule 6-12 outlines

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limited circumstances in which the need for disclosure outweighs the importance of

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protecting the confidentiality of mediation, including “the need to prevent manifest

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injustice.” No. C-8-03971-JW (DMR), 2010 WL 4055928, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 15,

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2010). The Jones court, however, did not analyze Civil Local Rule 16.1, and ADR Local

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Rule 6-12 does not apply to the Southern District of California. Moreover, unlike ADR

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6-12, neither the Civil Local Rules nor Judge Burkhardt’s order setting the Early Neutral

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Evaluation Conference contain an exception to the privileged and confidential nature of

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discussions at the Early Neutral Evaluation Conference. As such, Williams has not

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shown that Judge Burkhardt’s conclusion was clearly erroneous or contrary to law.

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Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Williams’ objection.

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Finally, Williams appears to object to the imposition of sanctions, claiming her

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motion to compel was substantially justified. See Doc. No. 58 at 14. However, the

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October 15, 2018 order states that “the Court tentatively finds, subject to an opportunity

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to be heard, that it is appropriate to order Plaintiff to pay Defendant the reasonable

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expenses, including attorney’s fees, which it incurred in opposing Williams’ motion to

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compel.” Doc. No. 49 at 12 (emphasis added). On October 30, 2018, Defense counsel
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submitted a declaration in support of the expenses, including attorney’s fees, incurred in

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opposing the motion to compel. See Doc. No. 60. On November 30, 2018, Williams

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filed a response in opposition to defense counsel’s declaration. See Doc. No. 68. Judge

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Burkhardt has not yet issued an order making a final determination on the issue. As such,

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the Court OVERRULES AS PREMATURE Williams’ objection to the tentative finding

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that she be required to pay Defendant the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing her

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motion to compel. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (noting a party may object to a magistrate

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judge’s “written order stating the decision.”).

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CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Burkhardt’s October 15, 2018 order

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was neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law. Accordingly, the Court

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OVERRULES Williams’ objections.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: December 21, 2018
_____________________________
HON. MICHAEL M. ANELLO
United States District Judge

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