Franks v. Franks et al
Filing
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Sua Sponte Order of Remand to State Court. Signed by Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo on 5/4/2017. (Certified copy mailed to San Diego County Superior Court) (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(jjg)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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DANIEL FRANKS,
Case No.: 3:17-CV-893-CAB-AGS
Plaintiff,
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v.
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SUA SPONTE ORDER OF REMAND
TO STATE COURT
JEFFREY FRANKS et al.,
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Defendants.
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On December 8, 2016, Plaintiff Daniel Franks filed a complaint for unlawful
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detainer against Defendants Jeffrey Franks, Guardian Angel Productions, Inc., and Kellie
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McKenzie in San Diego County Superior Court. [Doc. No. 1 at 12.] On May 3, 2017,
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Defendant Jeffrey Franks, proceeding pro se, removed the action to this court. [Doc. No.
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1.] After reviewing the notice of removal and the underlying complaint, the Court finds
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that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case. Accordingly, the Court
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REMANDS this action to state court.
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A suit filed in state court may be removed to federal court by the defendant or
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defendants if the federal court would have had original subject matter jurisdiction over that
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suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1243
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(9th Cir. 2009). On the other hand, “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that
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the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C.
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3:17-CV-893-CAB-AGS
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§ 1447(c); see also Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead Ins. Co., 346
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F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and,
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indeed, we have held that the district court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.”). The
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Court may remand sua sponte or on motion of a party. Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d
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822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3) provides that a court
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may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the
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pendency of the action . . . .”). “The defendant bears the burden of establishing that removal
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was proper.” Provincial Gov’t of Marinduque v. Placer Dome, Inc., 582 F.3d 1083, 1087
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(9th Cir. 2009). “The removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the right
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of removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244.
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Generally, subject matter jurisdiction is based on the presence of a federal question,
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see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, or on complete diversity between the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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In the notice of removal, Jeffrey Franks argues only that this Court has federal-question
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jurisdiction. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the
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‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a
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federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”
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Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). The complaint must establish
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“either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
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necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax
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Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1983).
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Here, federal question jurisdiction is absent because no “federal question is
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presented on the face of plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at
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392. Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a single claim for unlawful detainer, a cause of action
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that is purely a matter of state law. See Muhammad v. N. Richmond Senior Hous., Inc.,
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No. 15-CV-00629-WHO, 2015 WL 1154209, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2015) (“California
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federal courts have repeatedly held that unlawful detainer cases brought under California’s
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unlawful detainer statute do not raise federal questions.”); Fed. Nat’l. Mortg. Ass’n v.
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Enshiwat, No. 12-631 CAS (CWx), 2012 WL 683106, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012)
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3:17-CV-893-CAB-AGS
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(“Unlawful detainer actions are strictly within the province of state court.”) (quotations
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omitted). Accordingly, the face of the complaint does not present a federal question
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justifying removal.
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Jeffrey Franks argues that federal question exists because Plaintiff allegedly violated
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the notice provisions of the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (“PTFA”), and that the
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PTFA preempts Plaintiff’s unlawful detainer action. He is incorrect. “First, the PTFA
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expired on December 31, 2014.” Fairview Tasman LLC v. Young, No. 15-CV-05493-
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LHK, 2016 WL 199060, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2016) (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street
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Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 2204 (2010)
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(setting date of expiration)).
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Second, even if it had not expired, “[t]he PTFA creates no cause of action allowing
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for evictions, either explicitly or implicitly.” Wescom Credit Union v. Dudley, No. CV 10-
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8203 GAF SSX, 2010 WL 4916578, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2010). While Jeffrey Franks
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may be able to assert a violation of the PTFA as a defense to the unlawful detainer claim,
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“a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense . . . even if
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the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that
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the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
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“Indeed, federal courts have consistently rejected attempts to premise federal subject
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matter jurisdiction on the 90–day notice provision of the PTFA.” U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v.
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Bracken, No. 2:14-CV-1738-TLN-KJN, 2014 WL 3729563, at *3 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2014)
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report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-CV-1738-TLN-KJN, 2014 WL 4197566
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(E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2014). “Put simply, the existence of federal jurisdiction depends solely
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on the plaintiff’s claims for relief and not on anticipated defenses to those claims.” ARCO
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Envtl. Remediation, L.L.C. v. Dep’t of Health & Envtl. Quality of Montana, 213 F.3d 1108,
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1113 (9th Cir. 2000). Accordingly, the possible existence of issues under the PTFA does
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not establish federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
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Jeffrey Franks does not argue that removal is proper on the basis of diversity
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jurisdiction, and the complaint makes clear that no such jurisdiction exists. For a federal
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3:17-CV-893-CAB-AGS
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court to exercise diversity jurisdiction, the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000.
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See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff’s complaint explicitly states that he seeks limited civil
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damages totaling less than $10,000. Thus, diversity jurisdiction is lacking as well.
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Based on the foregoing, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this matter
and therefore REMANDS the case to San Diego County Superior Court.
It is SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 4, 2017
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