Oliver v. International Association et al.

Filing 4

ORDER: (1) Granting 2 Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis; and (2) Dismissing Complaint. If Oliver believes he can fix the problems the Court has identified by amending his complaint, he may do so by 10/27/2017. If he fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will dismiss this action. Signed by Judge Larry Alan Burns on 9/29/2017. (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(lrf)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SYLVESTER T. OLIVER,
Plaintiff,

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CASE NO. 17-cv-1075

vs.

ORDER: (1) GRANTING MOTION TO
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS; AND
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION et al.,
Defendants.

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Sylvester Oliver filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis to commence an action

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against Iron Workers Local 433 and Granite Construction for retaliation under Title VII and

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42 U.S.C. § 1981. Oliver works construction as a member of Iron Workers Local 229. His

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complaint is hard to follow, but his main argument is that Local 433 and Granite failed to hire

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him for a job in Rosamond, California on February 4, 2016. Oliver alleges he wasn’t hired

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because he previously filed complaints with the EEOC and NLRB.

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Courts may authorize litigants to proceed without paying when they make a showing

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that they can’t afford the filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Oliver satisfied that requirement. But

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the Court “shall dismiss the case at any time if it determines that” the action “fails to state a

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claim on which relief may be granted.” Id. To state a claim for retaliation, Oliver needed to

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offer plausible allegations that defendants took an adverse employment action against him

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because of his engagement in a protected activity. Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prod., 847

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F.3d 678, 693 (9th Cir. 2017). He’s failed to do so.

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“To show the requisite causal link,” Oliver must allege facts that suggest his

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“protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Cohen v. Fred Meyer, 686

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F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). Oliver says he wasn’t hired on February 4, 2016 because he

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previously filed “complaints of unfair labor practices and discrimination to the NLRB and

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EEOC.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 27.] But Oliver filed his EEOC charge in December 2016. [Dkt. 1-2.] This

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complaint couldn’t have caused the adverse action that occurred ten months earlier. Oliver’s

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EEOC charge mentions previous charges, but he doesn’t specify them in his complaint.

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While Oliver filed an NLRB charge in November 2015—three months before the

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Rosamond job—that charge was against his own union, Local 229, for failing to provide him

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minutes from a grievance hearing against Granite. [Dkt. 1-2 at 49.] Oliver suggests that he

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wanted the minutes to show one of the voting members at the hearing was a Local 443

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worker who favored Granite. The gist of his argument is that Local 443 and Granite got wind

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of Oliver’s intentions, and that’s why he wasn’t hired for Rosamond three months later. But

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he hasn’t provided specific, plausible facts to back that up. As it stands, the Court has no

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basis to conclude that an NLRB charge against his own union was the likely reason that

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Local 443 or Granite failed to hire him for the Rosamond job.

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There’s another major problem with Oliver’s complaint. He named two defendants—

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California Field Iron Workers Administrative Trust and District Council of Iron Workers of the

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State of California and Vicinity—but doesn’t offer any factual allegations against them in his

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complaint. The complaint needs to lay out a concise, plain statement of who did what, why

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those actions are illegal, and what laws entitle plaintiff to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. And it’s

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not sufficient to lump all of the defendants together. Oliver needs to explain, specifically,

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what each defendant did that amounts to retaliation.

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In addition, Oliver’s complaint only articulates a cause of action for retaliation under

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Title VII and § 1981. Yet, Oliver says he’s an African American and was “treated differently

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due to his protected status.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 26.] There aren’t any other allegations in the complaint

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that support a discrimination claim on the basis of race. If Oliver has a legitimate claim for

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racial discrimination, he needs to allege a second claim for relief, and lay out the specific

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facts that show his claim is plausible. Oliver also says he wants the Court to “declare null

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and void language in the union CBA.” [Dkt. 1 ¶ 1.] He provides no context for this request,

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nor cites any law that allows him to bring an action for this claim or empowers this Court to

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rule on a collective bargaining agreement. Again, if he has a legitimate cause of action, he

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needs to lay out a separate claim and explain the relevant facts. If not, he should delete

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these allegations from his amended complaint.

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Finally, the complaint should include all of the facts that the Court needs to

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understand the legal claim—but only those. It’s unacceptable to attach 230 pages of exhibits

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and ask the Court to piece together the story. Everything the Court needs to know should

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be concisely, and chronologically, laid out in the complaint. For example, Oliver needs to

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explain how the hiring process worked for the Rosamond job: what role did Local 433 play?

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Local 229? What about Granite? The Court doesn’t have any basis to evaluate who was

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responsible for deciding not to hire Oliver and whether that decision was improper. On the

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other hand, Oliver needs to delete any allegations that don’t relate to the Rosamond job.

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For example, the Court doesn’t understand how Oliver’s efforts to track down documents

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from Michael Silvey relate to defendants’ decision not to hire him for Rosamond.

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While the Court has an obligation to construe pro se complaints liberally, especially

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in civil rights cases, the Court can’t “supply essential elements of claims that were not initially

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pled.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 954 (9th Cir. 2011). If Oliver

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believes he can fix the problems the Court has identified by amending his complaint, he may

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do so by October 27, 2017. If he fails to file an amended complaint, the Court will dismiss

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this action. Oliver’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. Oliver’s complaint is

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DISMISSED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: September 29, 2017

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HONORABLE LARRY ALAN BURNS
United States District Judge

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