Davis v. Fraser

Filing 15

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION. Signed by Judge Cathy Ann Bencivengo on 8/22/2017.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(jjg)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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GAVIN B. DAVIS,

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01164-CAB-NLS
Plaintiff,

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v.

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ORDER DISMISSING PETITION

JEFFREY F. FRASER,

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Defendant.

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On June 8, 2017, Petitioner Gavin B. Davis (“Petitioner”) filed a Petition for Writ

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of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2241. [Doc. No. 1.] On June 18, 2017,

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Plaintiff filed an Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Amended Petition”).

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[Doc. No. 2.] While somewhat unclear, it appears that Petitioner is alleging that he is

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wrongfully incarcerated in federal custody in Vermont, as a result of a bench warrant

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issued by Judge Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, in a state court

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criminal proceeding. [Doc. No. 2 at 6, ¶(A)(1).] In the Amended Petition, Petitioner

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acknowledges that he has posted bond and is now “at liberty,” but complains that the bail

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has been set at an unreasonably high amount. [Doc. No. 2 at 8, ¶7.] On July 12, 2017,

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Petitioner filed a Supplement to Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus [Doc. No. 13]

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wherein he acknowledges that the state court criminal proceeding is ongoing. [Doc. No.

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13 at 4, ¶4.] For the reasons set forth below, the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE.

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DISCUSSION

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Although there is no exhaustion requirement for a petition brought under 28 U.S.C.

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§ 2241(c)(3), principles of federalism and comity require that a district court abstain until

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all state criminal proceedings are completed and the petitioner exhausts available judicial

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state remedies, unless the petitioner can show that special circumstances warrant federal

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intervention prior to the state criminal trial. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of

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Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973); Carden v. Montana,

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626 F.2d 82, 83-84 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1014, 101 S.Ct. 573, 66 L.Ed.2d 473

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(1980); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-46 (1971)(under principles of comity

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and federalism, a federal court should not intervene in a pending state criminal

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prosecution absent extraordinary circumstances where the danger of irreparable harm is

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both great and immediate, and cannot be eliminated by defense against the prosecution).

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“[O]nly in the most unusual circumstances is a defendant entitled to have federal

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interposition by way of injunction or habeas corpus until after the jury comes in,

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judgment has been appealed from and the case concluded in the state courts.” Drury v.

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Cox, 457 F.2d 764, 764-65 (9th Cir.1972).

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Younger abstention is appropriate in favor of a state proceeding if three criteria are

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met: (1) the state proceedings are ongoing; (2) the proceedings implicate important state

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interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise federal

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constitutional challenges. See Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar

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Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982); Kenneally v. Lungren,

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967 F.2d 329, 331-32 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122

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L.Ed.2d 133 (1993). In Carden, the Ninth Circuit held that “[o]nly in cases of proven

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harassment or prosecutions undertaken by state officials in bad faith without hope of

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obtaining a valid conviction and perhaps in other extraordinary circumstances where

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irreparable injury can be shown is federal injunctive relief against pending state
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prosecutions appropriate.” Carden, 626 F.2d at 84 (citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,

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85, 91 S.Ct. 674, 677, 27 L.Ed.2d 701 (1971)).

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Here, all three criteria for Younger abstention are met with respect to the criminal

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proceeding still pending against Petitioner in San Diego Superior Court. Moreover,

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Petitioner has failed to allege the type of special circumstances that warrant federal

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intervention. First, Petitioner acknowledges that he is no longer in custody. Moreover,

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Petitioner's challenge to the allegedly excessive bail is a claim that can and should be

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addressed in the first instance by the trial court, and then by the state appellate courts,

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before Petitioner seeks a federal writ of habeas corpus. See Sojourner v. Reed, 2009 WL

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762517, *1 (N.D.Ga., March 20, 2009) (invoking abstention doctrine where state habeas

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petitioner making inter alia an excessive bail claim); Bembry v. St. Lawrence, 2006 WL

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3085511, * 1-*2 (S.D.Ga., Oct.27, 2006) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition for failure to

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exhaust state remedies where petitioner claiming excessive bail); Merrick v. Ornell, 1997

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WL 12128, * 1(N.D.Cal., Jan.8, 1997) (invoking abstention doctrine where state habeas

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petitioner claiming that he was being held on excessive bail); Woodruff v. Plummer, 1994

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WL 412438, *1 (N.D.Cal., Aug.1, 1994) (dismissing § 2241 habeas petition without

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prejudice to refiling after state remedies exhausted where petitioner claiming excessive

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bail). Therefore, Younger abstention is appropriate.

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CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT

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PREJUDICE. The Clerk of the Court shall CLOSE the case.

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Dated: August 22, 2017

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