Gonzalez Kreutzkamp v. Vega et al

Filing 6

ORDER Remanding Case. Court remands this action to San Diego Superior Court. Because Court lacks jurisdiction over this case, Court terminates Defendant's 5 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, 4 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis, 2 MOTION for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Cynthia Bashant on 6/22/2017. (cc: San Diego Superior Court) (All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service) (jah)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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ERNESTINA GONZALEZ
KREUTZKAMP,

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ORDER:

Plaintiff,

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Case No. 17-cv-01265-BAS-KSC

(1) REMANDING ACTION FOR
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION; AND

v.
LETICIA VEGA, et al.,

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(2) TERMINATING MOTIONS
TO PROCEED IN FORMA
PAUPERIS (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5)

Defendants.

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On June 21, 2017, Defendants Lila Galindo, Damariez Vega, and Leticia Vega

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removed this matter to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446 based

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on federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) On the same

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day, Defendants filed motions seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos.

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2, 4, 5.)

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A court addresses the issue of subject matter jurisdiction first, as “[t]he

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requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the

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nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States and is ‘inflexible and

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without exception.’ ” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95
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(1998) (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)).

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“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

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Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “They possess only that power authorized by

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Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.” Id. (internal

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citations omitted). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

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jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting

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jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem.

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Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 2006).

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Consistent with the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the removal statute is

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strictly construed against removal jurisdiction. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566

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(9th Cir. 1992); see also Sygenta Crop Prot. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32

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(2002); O’Halloran v. Univ. of Wash., 856 F.2d 1375, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). “The

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‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction means that the defendant always

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has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566; see

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also Nishimoto v. Federman–Bachrach & Assoc., 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir.

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1990); O’Halloran, 856 F.2d at 1380. “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there

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is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566.

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It is well-established that “a district court’s duty to establish subject matter

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jurisdiction is not contingent upon the parties’ arguments.” See United Inv’rs Life

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Ins. Co. v. Waddell & Reed Inc., 360 F.3d 960, 966 (9th Cir. 2004). Courts may

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consider the issue sua sponte. Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1149 n.8 (9th

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Cir. 1984). Indeed, the Supreme Court has emphasized that “district courts have an

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‘independent obligation to address subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte.’” Grupo

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Dataflux v. Atlas Glob. Grp., L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 593 (2004) (quoting United States

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v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 964, 972 (E.D. Cal. 2004)).

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Here, Defendants seek to remove this action from state court based upon

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federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 provides that

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“district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
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Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[T]he

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presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded

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complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal

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question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet

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v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v.

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Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). A federal “defense is not part of a plaintiff’s

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properly pleaded statement of his or her claim.” Id. (citing Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.

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Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, (1987)). A case, therefore, may not be removed to federal court

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based on a federal defense “even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s

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complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly

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at issue in the case.” Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. for

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S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14 (1983); see also Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475.

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The case removed here is a residential unlawful detainer action. (Compl. –

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Unlawful Detainer, Notice of Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1.) It contains one cause of

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action for unlawful detainer brought pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure

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section 1161(2). (Id.) Therefore, the action arises exclusively under California state

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law. Defendants argue in their Notice of Removal that a federal question exists

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because they filed a responsive pleading in state court that required a determination

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of the parties’ “duties under federal law.” (Id.) The Court is unconvinced. Plaintiff’s

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Complaint does not raise a federal issue. Consequently, even if Defendants have

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implicated the parties’ “duties under federal law” by raising federal defenses in their

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responsive pleading, this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction under the well-

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pleaded complaint rule. See Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475; see also, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank

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NA v. Zimmerman, No. 2:15-cv-08268-CAS-MRWx, 2015 WL 6948576, at *4 (C.D.

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Cal. Nov. 10, 2015) (remanding unlawful detainer action to state court); McGee v.

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Seagraves, No. 06-CV-0495-MCE-GGH-PS, 2006 WL 2014142, at *3 (E.D. Cal.

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July 17, 2006) (same).

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//
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Accordingly, Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing this

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Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Thus, the Court REMANDS this action

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to the San Diego Superior Court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C.

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§ 1447(c) (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks

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subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”). Further, because the Court

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lacks jurisdiction over this case, the Court TERMINATES Defendants’ motions to

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proceed in forma pauperis (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 5).

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In addition, the Court warns Defendants that any further attempt to

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remove this action without an “objectively reasonable basis for removal” may

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result in an award of attorneys’ fees for Plaintiff. See Martin v. Franklin Capital

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Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 136 (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Wells Fargo Bank

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Nat’l Ass’n v. Vann, No. 13–cv–01148–YGR, 2013 WL 1856711, at *2 (N.D. Cal.

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May 2, 2013) (awarding $5,000.00 in attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)

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following defendant’s third attempt to remove unlawful detainer action despite the

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court’s two prior orders remanding the action).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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DATED: June 22, 2017

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