Johnson v. Doe et al

Filing 19

ORDER Dismissing First Amended Complaint for Failing to State a Claim and for Seeking Monetary Damages Against Immune Defendants. The Court: 1) Dismisses this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1); 2) Certifies that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and 3) Directs the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close the file. Signed by Judge William Q. Hayes on 02/12/2018.(All non-registered users served via U.S. Mail Service)(ajs)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SEDRIC EUGENE JOHNSON,
CDCR #AZ-2648,

Case No.: 3:17-cv-01309-WQH-WVG
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR
FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM AND
FOR SEEKING MONETARY
DAMAGES AGAINST IMMUNE
DEFENDANTS

Plaintiff,

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vs.

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JOHN DOE, et al.,
Defendants.

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HAYES, Judge:

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I.

Procedural History

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On June 26, 2017, Sedric Eugene Johnson (“Plaintiff”), incarcerated at Kern

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Valley State Prison located in Delano, California, filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant

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to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (ECF No. 1). In addition, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Proceed In

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Forma Pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (ECF No. 4), as well as a

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Motion to Appoint Counsel (ECF No. 9).

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The Court GRANTED Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed IFP, DENIED his Motion for

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Appointment of Counsel, and sua sponte DISMISSED his Complaint pursuant to 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) & § 1915A for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be

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granted. (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff was provided leave to file an amended pleading in order

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to correct the deficiencies of pleading noted in the Court’s Order. Id. On December 18,

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2017, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 18).

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II.

Sua Sponte Screening per 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A

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A.

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Because Plaintiff is a prisoner and is proceeding IFP, his FAC requires a pre-

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answer screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). Under these

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statutes, the Court must sua sponte dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of

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it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks damages from defendants

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who are immune. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)

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(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002, 1004 (9th Cir.

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2010) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)). “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that

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the targets of frivolous or malicious suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”

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Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 920 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).

Standard of Review

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“The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon

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which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of

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Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison v. Carter, 668

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F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th

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Cir. 2012) (noting that screening pursuant to § 1915A “incorporates the familiar standard

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applied in the context of failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

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12(b)(6)”). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain sufficient factual matter,

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accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

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556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); Wilhelm, 680 F.3d at 1121.

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Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the

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elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”

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Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for

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relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its

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judicial experience and common sense.” Id. The “mere possibility of misconduct” or

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“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation[s]” fall short of meeting

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this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969

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(9th Cir. 2009).

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B.

Eighth Amendment Excessive Force Claims

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On August 3, 2016, Plaintiff was housed at Centinela State Prison. See ECF No.

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18 at 3. Plaintiff exited his cell and was “enroute” to the “chow hall” for breakfast. Id.

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Plaintiff claims it is “typical that we remove all head gear” but Plaintiff “decided to

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wear” his head gear because he “felt obligated to hide wounds” from an incident that had

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occurred the day before.1 Id. Plaintiff claims he was “mentally and emotionally, as well

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as physically distraught” from the “amount of damage” he sustained the day prior as a

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result of “multiple blows” to his face. Id. Plaintiff further claims he did not know

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“whom to trust” as a result of the previous incident. Id.

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As Plaintiff entered the “chow hall,” he was “flashed (with his flashlight)” by

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Defendant John Doe “Correctional Officer B #2 Floor Officer.” Id. Plaintiff took this as

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a warning to remove his head gear but he acknowledges he “simply ignored” the

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warning. Id. Plaintiff was, “once again,” told verbally to remove his head gear which he

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again “disregarded.” Id. After Plaintiff received his tray and walked towards the seating

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area, he was “again warned by the same Officer” but Plaintiff “shook [his] head and

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The claims regarding the incident Plaintiff alleges occurred on August 2, 2016 at Centinela State
Prison are the subject of a separate lawsuit Plaintiff has filed and are not part of this action. See Johnson
v. Doe, et al., S.D. Cal. Civil Case No. 3:17-cv-00889-LAB-JLB.
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proceeded to mind [his] own business.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff “guess[es]” that Defendant

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Doe “took offense” and “approached Plaintiff” in what Plaintiff felt was an “aggressive

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manner.” Id.

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Plaintiff claims Defendant Doe “grabbed” his elbow and “directed “Plaintiff that if

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he chose “not to remove [his] head gear,” the officer would “deny [Plaintiff] service.” Id.

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Plaintiff alleges he “threw [his] hands up” and “point blank” told Defendant Doe “not to

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touch [him].” Id. Plaintiff and Defendant Doe “had a discussion” after which Plaintiff

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“agreed to leave” and Defendant Doe “tried to grab” Plaintiff but Plaintiff “withdrew” his

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hand and proceeded to leave the dining area. Id.

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Plaintiff alleges that he was walking away from the discussion but Defendant Doe

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followed “behind” him. Id. Plaintiff claims that he was “compliant” at all times and

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“never directed any signs of aggression” towards Defendant Doe. Id. Plaintiff then

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claims he was “grabbed (from behind), tripped, and forcefully placed into restraints.” Id.

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Plaintiff was “escorted” to the “facilities program office” and placed in a “stand up cage.”

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Id. at 5. An interview was conducted and Plaintiff’s injuries from the incident that

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occurred the day before were noted. See id. Plaintiff claims to have “suffered more so

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mentally and emotionally from that altercation.” Id.

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The “core judicial inquiry,” when a prisoner alleges the excessive use of force

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under the Eighth Amendment, is “not whether a certain quantum of injury was sustained,

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but rather “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore

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discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503

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U.S. at 1, 7 (1992); see also Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319-321, (1986). “When

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prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm,” the Supreme Court

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has recognized, “contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . whether or

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not significant injury is evident. Otherwise, the Eighth Amendment would permit any

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physical punishment, no matter how diabolic or inhuman, inflicting less than some

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arbitrary quantity of injury.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9. Thus, “[i]n determining whether the

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use of force was wanton and unnecessary,” the court must “evaluate the need for

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application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the

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threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper

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the severity of a forceful response.” Id. at 7 (internal quotation marks and citations

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omitted).

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In Hudson, the Supreme Court set forth five factors to be considered in

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determining whether the use of force was in good faith or with malicious and sadistic

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intent: (1) the threat the officials reasonably perceived; (2) the need for the use of force;

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(3) the efforts made to minimize the force used; (4) the relationship between the need for

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using force and the amount of force used; and (5) the degree of injury inflicted. Id.

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Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was “grabbed, tripped, and forcefully placed into

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restraints.” (ECF No. 18 at 4). Any physical application of force against a person in

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custody, whether it be through brute strength, chemical or other weaponry, or mechanical

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restraint, may not be excessive. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 325. “That is not to say that

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every malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action.”

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Hudson, 503 U.S. at 10 (citing Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)

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(“Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a

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judge’s chambers, violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”)).

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Plaintiff acknowledges that he repeatedly refused to comply with the multiple

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orders issued by Defendant Doe. Plaintiff acknowledges that he was not physically

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injured in this alleged altercation, but “suffered more so mentally and emotionally.”

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(ECF No. 18 at 5). Based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s FAC, the Court finds that there

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are insufficient factual allegations to find that Defendant “B-Yard #2 Floor Officer John

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Doe” acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Therefore,

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the claims against Defendant “B-Yard #2 Floor Officer John Doe” are dismissed for

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failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

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Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an Eighth Amendment

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against any of the named Defendants, and that these claims must be dismissed pursuant to

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28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b). See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1126-27; Resnick, 213

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F.3d at 446.

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C.

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Finally, the Court finds that to the extent Plaintiff names the Centinela State Prison

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as a Defendant in this action, his claims must be dismissed sua sponte pursuant to both 28

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U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and § 1915A(b) for failing to state a claim and for seeking damages

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against a defendant that is immune. The State of California’s Department of Corrections

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and Rehabilitation and any state prison, correctional agency, sub-division, or department

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under its jurisdiction, are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. Groten v.

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California, 251 F.3d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Hale v. State of Arizona, 993 F.2d

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1387, 1398-99 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a state department of corrections is an arm of

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the state, and thus, not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983)). In addition, to the

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extent that plaintiff seeks to sue the State of California itself for monetary damages, his

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claims are clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment. See Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S.

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781, 782 (1978) (per curiam) (“There can be no doubt . . . that [a] suit against the State

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and its Board of Corrections is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, unless [the State] has

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consented to the filing of such a suit.”).

Eleventh Amendment

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Therefore, the claims against Defendant Centinela State Prison are dismissed from

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this action for failing to state a claim and for seeking monetary damages against immune

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defendants.

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D.

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Because Plaintiff has already been provided a short and plain statement of his

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Eighth Amendment pleading deficiencies, as well as an opportunity to amend those

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Leave to Amend

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claims to no avail, the Court finds granting further leave to amend would be futile. See

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Gonzalez v. Planned Parenthood, 759, F.3d 1112, 1116 (9th Cir. 2014) (“‘Futility of

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amendment can, by itself, justify the denial of . . . leave to amend.’”) (quoting Bonin v.

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Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995)); Zucco Partners, LLC v. Digimarc Corp.,

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552 F.3d 981, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the plaintiff has previously been granted

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leave to amend and has subsequently failed to add the requisite particularity to its claims,

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[t]he district court’s discretion to deny leave to amend is particularly broad.” (internal

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quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original)).

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III.

Conclusion and Order

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For the reasons discussed, the Court:

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1)

DISMISSES this civil action without further leave to amend for failure to

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state a claim upon which § 1983 relief can be granted and for seeking monetary damages

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against immune defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1);

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2)

CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); and
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DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a final judgment of dismissal and close

the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 12, 2018

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